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This thesis problematizes the disciplinary gap between the related fields of 
International Relations (IR) and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). It claims that this gap 
is generated as a consequence of the deeper ontological and epistemological 
assumptions of these disciplines. While IR theories are more concerned with macro-
level phenomena and reduce foreign policies of states to structural imperatives, FPA 
theories are inclined to focus on micro-level determinations and reduce relational 
phenomena to non-relational and singular behaviours of states and policy makers. 
This meta-theoretical gap, the thesis argues, can be bridged by a dialectical onto-
epistemology that reconstitutes IR and FPA as the aspects of the same disciplinary 
undertaking by offering an inter-subjective and praxis-oriented view of international 
politics. Through this onto-epistemology, the thesis contributes to wider debates in 
social scientific discourse on the so-called agent-structure problem in favour of an 
agent-based approach by conceptualising macro-level social phenomena not as 
structures, but as inter-subjective consequences of diverse and contradictory praxes 
of a multiplicity of diachronically-situated individual and collective agents. The more 
specific contribution of this thesis to the fields of FPA and IR is that it establishes 
international relations as the cumulative and contradictory results of the inter-
subjective praxes of states in making foreign policies and devising foreign policy 
strategies. 
To illustrate these onto-epistemological arguments empirically, the thesis 
demonstrates that the 2003 Iraq War as a major international relations development 
was the long-term result of the dialectical interplay of the reproductive strategies of a 
series of states and other agents. Similarly, how the individual states discussed in 
the empirical chapters contributed to the transformation of the so-called international 
system through their foreign policy strategies also illustrate the practical bridging of 
FPA and IR by individual and collective agents. 
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INTRODUCTION	  
On	   June	   9	   2014,	   reports	   from	   Iraq	   that	  militants	   of	   the	   extremist	   Islamic	   State	   of	   Iraq	   and	  
Sham	   (ISIS)	   had	   taken	   control	   of	  Mosul,	   the	   second	   largest	   city	   in	   Iraq,	   hit	   the	   international	  
desks	  of	  major	  news	  agencies.	  ISIS’	  first	  act	  was	  to	  slaughter	  in	  their	  hundreds	  people	  they	  saw	  
as	  affiliated	  with	   the	  Maliki	   government	  or	   the	  Kurdistan	  Regional	  Government	   (KRG)	   in	   the	  
North.	   In	   two	  days,	   ISIS	  captured	   the	  nearby	  city	  of	  Tikrit,	   Saddam	  Hussein’s	  hometown	  and	  
capital	   of	   Salah	   ad	   Din	   province,	   and	   in	   a	  week,	   Tal	   Afar	   in	   Nineveh	   province.	   Images	  were	  
shared	   via	   social	  media,	   extensively	   featuring	   barbarian	   displays	   of	   ISIS	  members	   terrorising	  
their	   enemies.	   ISIS	   then	   changed	   its	   name	   to	   the	   Islamic	   State	   (IS),	   dropping	   the	   territorial	  
reference	  in	  its	  name,	  presumably	  in	  a	  bid	  to	  symbolically	  register	  that	  they	  were	  ‘erasing’	  the	  
borders	   determined	   by	   the	   Sykes-­‐Picot	   Agreement	   of	   1916	   (Jacobs	   2014).	   Controlling	   large	  
swathes	  of	  territory	  both	   in	   Iraq	  and	  Syria,	  the	   IS	  also	  seized	  control	  of	  part	  of	  the	   Iraq-­‐Syria	  
border,	  establishing	  a	  territorially	  contiguous	  rule	  in	  the	  region.	  Having	  arisen	  out	  of	  a	  complex	  
set	  of	  circumstances,	  including	  the	  war	  in	  Iraq	  in	  2003,	  the	  spread	  of	  Arab	  uprisings	  following	  
self-­‐immolation	  of	  a	  disaffected	  individual	  in	  Tunis,	  and	  the	  grievances	  of	  the	  Sunni	  population	  
in	  Iraq	  among	  other	  things,	  IS	  led	  the	  US	  and	  many	  other	  states	  to	  form	  a	  coalition,	  leaving	  a	  
mark	  on	  the	  international	  politics	  of	  today’s	  world.	  How	  are	  we	  to	  relate	  the	  self-­‐immolation	  
of	  a	  disgruntled	   individual	   in	  Tunis	  to	  these	  tectonic	  changes	   in	   international	  politics?	  At	  any	  
rate,	   are	   states	   not	   the	   exclusive	   agents	   of	   foreign	  policy	   and	   international	   relations?	   Is	   the	  
field	   of	   international	   relations	   not	   autonomous	   from	   domestic	   politics?	   What	   about	   wider	  
social	  relations?	  Are	  they	  related	  to	  international	  politics?	  Are	  Politics,	  Foreign	  Policy	  Analysis	  
(FPA)	  and	  International	  Relations	  (IR)	  not	  three	  freestanding	  disciplines	  with	  exclusive	  fields	  of	  
inquiry?	  Do	  both	  FPA	  and	  IR	  not	  problematize	  international	  politics?	  	  
To	  answer	   these	  questions,	  and	  specifically	   to	  explore	   the	   relation	  between	  FPA	  and	   IR,	   this	  
thesis	  problematizes	  the	  disciplinary	  gap	  between	  FPA	  and	  IR,	  and	  seeks	  to	  bridge	  this	  gap	  by	  
interweaving	   them	   as	   aspects	   of	   a	   single	   disciplinary	   undertaking.	   FPA,	   like	   much	   of	   IR,	   of	  
which	  it	  is	  considered	  a	  subfield,1	  aims	  to	  disentangle	  the	  complex	  issue	  of	  external	  behaviour	  
of	   state-­‐actors	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   very	   composite	   environment.	   From	   the	   beginning,	   IR	  
attempted	  to	  provide	  a	  general	  theory	  of	  international	  relations.	  Traditional	  studies	  on	  foreign	  
policy,	  however,	  have	  limited	  themselves	  for	  a	  long	  time	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  external	  behaviour	  
of	   specific	   states,	  within	   a	  historically-­‐delimited	   timeframe,	   focusing	  on	  a	   limited	  number	  of	  
instances	   of	   foreign	   policy-­‐making.	   Exclusive	   focus	   on	   specificity	   observed	   in	   single-­‐country	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Carlsnaes	  (2002,	  p.332)	  points	  out	  how	  foreign	  policy	  analysis	  was	  traditionally	  assumed	  to	  be	  part	  of	  
‘public	  policy’	  rather	  than	  international	  politics.	  Although	  this	  has	  changed	  today,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  
register	  the	  historical	  distance	  between	  IR	  and	  FPA.	  
	  	  
2	  
case	   studies	   also	   gives	   rise	   to	   another	   problem:	   although	   it	   may	   be	   possible	   to	   inductively	  
generalize	   findings	   of	   research2	  on	   one	   state	   to	   the	   rest,	   this	   requires	   the	   researcher	   to	  
presuppose	   that	   states	   are	   ‘like	   units’	   with	   similar	   functions.	   Thus,	   it	   results	   in	   either	   an	  
unsubstantiated	   generalization,	   or,	   in	   the	   case	   where	   conclusions	   are	   not	   generalized,	  
produces	   a	   one-­‐sided	   account	   of	   the	   explanandum:	   a	   specific	   foreign	   policy	   decision	   of	   a	  
specific	  state	  under	  a	  certain	  set	  of	  circumstances	  within	  a	  given	  historical	  context	  evaluated	  
from	  the	  vantage	  point	  of	  the	  relevant	  state	  or	  its	  officials.	  Any	  change	  in	  circumstances	  bears	  
the	   possibility	   of	   invalidating	   the	   analysis,	  while	   any	   attempt	   to	   apply	   the	   findings	   to	   other,	  
similarly-­‐positioned	   states	   may	   either	   prove	   completely	   useless	   or,	   even	   worse,	   end	   up	  
imposing	  the	  subjective	  conditions	  of	  one	  state	  onto	  another.	  Empirically	  speaking,	  and	  as	  the	  
early	   history	   of	   American	   foreign	   policy	   studies	  made	   abundantly	   clear,	   analyses	   of	   foreign	  
policy	   at	   every	   instance	  were	   impressed	  with	   the	   stamp	   of	   the	   subjectivity	   of	   the	  US	   state,	  
making	  FPA	  more	  American	  than	  IR.3	  In	  short,	  its	  field-­‐definition,	  the	  subjective	  vantage	  point	  
it	  adopts	  by	  necessity4	  and	  its	  exclusive	  focus	  on	  the	  (sub-­‐)unit	  level,	  make	  it	  very	  difficult	  for	  
students	   of	   FPA	   to	   generalize	   their	   conclusions,	   and	   thereby	   establish	   FPA	   as	   a	   standalone	  
social	  science	  discipline	  comparable	  to	  IR.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  international	  system	  orientation	  of	  ‘actor-­‐general’	  (Hudson	  2005,	  p.2)	  
mainstream	   IR	   does	   not	   leave	   much	   space	   for	   internal	   differentiation	   within	   the	   system.	  
Contrary	   to	   FPA’s	   ‘actor-­‐specific’,	   ‘agency-­‐oriented’	   subjectivism,	  mainstream	   IR	   theories	   are	  
content	  to	  provide	  a	  general	  framework	  for	  understanding	  how	  the	  international	  system	  itself	  
works	  in	  shaping	  the	  behaviour	  of	  states.	  Waltz’s	  systemic	  treatment	  of	  international	  relations,	  
for	   instance,	   despite	   allowing	   for	   variation	   within	   the	   international	   system	   among	   states	  
according	   to	   their	   capabilities	   in	   relation	   to	   others,	   refrains	   from	   explaining	   why	   states,	  
similarly	   located	  and	  constituted	  and	  with	  comparable	  capabilities,	  act	  differently	  when	  they	  
are	  under	   similar	   systemic	  pressures	   (cf.	  Hudson	  2005;	   Skidmore	  and	  Hudson	  1993,	  pp.2-­‐4).	  
From	   an	   FPA	   perspective,	   liberalism	   and	   constructivism	   are	   no	   less	   guilty	   than	   neorealism	  
when	  it	  comes	  to	  subordinating	  agency	  to	  structure	  (Hudson	  2007,	  pp.7-­‐13;	  Hill	  2003,	  p.3).	  
To	   sum	  up,	   the	   two	  modes	   of	   theorizing	   can	   be	   differentiated	   along	   four	   interrelated	   axes:	  
specificity	  and	  generality	  of	   their	  view	  of	  actors,	   their	  position	   regarding	   the	  agent-­‐structure	  
problem,	   their	   reliance	   on	   subjective	   or	   objective	   explanations,	   their	   levels	   of	   analysis,	   i.e.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Snyder,	  R.	  C,	  Bruck,	  H.	  W,	  and	  Sapin,	  B.	  M	  (1962)	  is	  a	  case	  in	  point.	  
3	  For	  the	  conceptualization	  of	  IR	  as	  an	  ‘American	  Social	  Science’	  see	  Hoffmann	  (1977).	  See	  also	  Smith	  
(1989)	  and	  Krippendorff	  (1989)	  for	  the	  function	  and	  relevance	  of	  IR,	  and	  particularly	  FPA,	  for	  the	  US.	  
4	  Subjectivity	  imputed	  to	  FPA	  throughout	  this	  chapter	  refers	  loosely	  to	  the	  necessity	  of	  the	  FPA	  student	  




specific	  unit	  level	  vs.	  general	  system	  level.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  here	  that	  these	  are	  all	  related	  to	  
the	   respective	   field-­‐	   and	   explanandum-­‐	   definitions	   of	   FPA	   and	   IR.	   FPA,	   taking	   foreign	   policy	  
decisions	   as	   its	   explananda,	   seems	   actor-­‐specific,	   agency-­‐oriented,	   subjective	   and	   broadly	  
context-­‐specific.	  In	  studying	  why	  and	  how	  a	  specific	  foreign	  policy	  decision	  is	  made,	  the	  most	  
general	  level	  on	  which	  it	  can	  conduct	  its	  analysis	  is	  that	  of	  the	  state,	  since	  in	  a	  world	  organized	  
politically	  along	  territorial	  boundaries,	  a	  foreign	  policy	  decision	  is	  taken	  as	  a	  decision	  made	  by	  
a	  state	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  influence	  what	  is	  external,	  i.e.	  ‘foreign’,	  to	  that	  state	  (Hill	  2003,	  p.3;	  cf.	  
Rosenau	   1968,	   pp.309-­‐10).	   This,	   by	   definition,	   renders	   the	   analysis	   actor-­‐specific.	   It	   also	  
accounts	   for	   the	  emphasis	  on	  agency	   in	  FPA	  studies,	  since	  the	  analysis	  needs	  to	  explain	  why	  
and	  how	  a	  specific	  agent	  made	  a	  specific	  decision	  or	   formulated	  a	  specific	  policy.	  Moreover,	  
because	   such	  an	   analysis	   requires	   an	   account	  of	   the	   circumstances	   as	   the	   agent	   in	  question	  
sees	   them,	   it	   is	  necessarily	   subjective.	  Following	   from	  these	   is	   the	  almost	  exclusive	   focus	  on	  
the	  unit	  or	  sub-­‐unit	  level.	  IR,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  appears	  to	  occupy	  the	  other	  pole	  on	  all	  four	  
counts:	  generality,	  structure-­‐orientation,	  claim	  to	  objectivity,	  and	  actor-­‐generality.	  While	  IR	  is	  
able	  to	  see	  the	  bigger	  picture	  of	  world	  politics	  and	  its	  systemic	  properties	  that	  govern	  relations	  
among	   states,	   this	   prevents	   it	   from	   taking	   into	   account	   agency	   and	   actor-­‐specificity	  
adequately,	   although	   it	   may	   be	   able	   to	   formulate	   broadly	   the	   likely	   range	   of	   expectations	  
concerning	  the	  external	  behaviour	  of	  specific	  states.	  Emanating	  from	  such	  a	  perspective	  is	  also	  
an	   imposition	   of	   likeness	   to	   states	   as	   units	   in	   the	   international	   system,	   as	   exemplified	   in	  
generalised	   propositions	   such	   as	   ‘liberal	   states	   do	   not	   fight	   each	   other’	   and	   ‘bipolar	   system	  
structures	   are	   more	   stable	   than	   multipolar	   system	   structures’,	   or	   ‘states	   are	   constituted	  
through	  the	  collective	  identity	  generated	  by	  international	  political	  culture’.	  
The	  foregoing	  evaluation	  of	  FPA	  and	  IR	  modes	  of	  theorising	  shows	  that	  both	  may	  help	  develop	  
each	   other’s	   understanding	   of	   world	   politics	   and	   external	   behaviour	   of	   states	   if	   the	  
aforementioned	   theoretical	   gap	   can	   be	   bridged.	   FPA	   may	   contribute	   to	   remedying	   IR’s	  
deficiency	  in	  accounting	  for	  variation	  across	  units	  and	  increase	  its	  sensitivity	  to	  agency.	  IR,	  on	  
the	   other	   hand,	  may	   help	   FPA	   acquire	   a	   broader	   perspective,	   with	   its	   potentially	   relational	  
perspective	  regarding	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  agents.	  No	  matter	  how	  different	  their	  explananda	  are,	  
a	  theoretical	  integration	  is	  needed	  because	  of	  the	  extensive	  overlap	  between	  their	  explanantia	  
(cf.	  Rosenau	  1968,	  pp.311-­‐17).	  What	  is	  required	  for	  this	  theoretical	  integration	  is	  not	  a	  limited	  
conversation	   between	   the	   fields	   that	   would	   make	   them	   recognise	   each	   other’s	   potential	  
contribution,	   however.	   A	   catalogue	   of	   independent	   variables	   bringing	   together	   lists	   of	  
correlations	  identified	  in	  each	  field	  will	  not	  do	  the	  work	  either.	  Neither	  of	  these	  will	  bridge	  the	  
seemingly	  unbridgeable	  gap	  between	  FPA	  and	  IR.	  What	  is	  needed	  is	  a	  rethinking	  of	  FPA	  and	  IR	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together,	   starting	   from	  the	  meta-­‐theoretical	   level,	   since	   their	   respective	  epistemological	  and	  
ontological	  assumptions,	  either	  explicit	  or	  implicit,	  are	  irreconcilable.	  
What	  this	  thesis	  offers,	  accordingly,	  is	  this	  meta-­‐theoretical	  rethinking	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  
FPA	  and	   IR.	  The	  central	  claim	  of	  this	   thesis	   is	   that	   it	   is	   through	  the	   inter-­‐subjective	  praxes	  of	  
states,	  including	  making	  foreign	  policies	  and	  devising	  foreign	  policy	  strategies,	  that	  FPA	  and	  IR	  
are	   bridged,	   and	   that	   perceived	   patterns	   in	   international	   relations	   are	   nothing	   but	   the	  
cumulative	  consequences	  of	  the	  foreign	  policies	  of	  temporally	  and	  spatially	  differently	  situated	  
states.	  States,	  I	  argue,	  in	  developing	  strategies	  of	  reproduction	  and	  putting	  these	  into	  practice,	  
abstract	   aspects	   of	   reality,	   generating	  practical	   gaps	   not	   only	   between	   their	   specific	   foreign	  
policies	  and	  the	  ‘international	  system’,	  but	  also	  between	  the	  economic	  and	  the	  political,	  and	  
the	  domestic	  and	  the	  external.	  These	  gaps,	  in	  turn,	  are	  practically	  bridged	  when	  states	  act	  to	  
respond	   to	   the	   cumulative	   unintended	   consequences	   of	   their	   and	   others’	   actions.	   In	   other	  
words,	  when	  states	  act,	  both	  the	  sources	  and	  influences	  of	  their	  actions	  have	  a	  bearing	  on	  all	  
levels	  and	   fields	  of	  analysis.	  Whether	   intentionally	  or	  unintentionally,	   these	  acts	  express	   the	  
domestic	  and	  the	  external,	  the	  political	  and	  the	  economic	  as	  united	  in	  practice.	  The	  multiplicity	  
of	   states	  and	   their	  praxes	   in	   turn	   relationally	   constitute	  what	  we	  call	   international	   relations.	  
The	  disciplinary	  gap,	  in	  turn,	  is	  bridged	  when	  theory	  reflects	  reality,	  i.e.	  when	  IR	  is	  seen	  as	  the	  
cumulative	   consequences	   of	   the	   strategies	   of	   reproduction	   of	   states	   in	   the	   form	   of	   foreign	  
policies,	  and	  FPA	  as	  the	  ‘ground’	  of	  IR.	  
The	   argument	   is	   developed	   in	   six	   steps.	   Chapter	   1	   starts	  with	   a	   review	   of	   two	   attempts	   by	  
James	  N.	  Rosenau	  and	  Valerie	  M.	  Hudson	  in	  the	  FPA	  literature	  to	  theoretically	  bridge	  the	  gap	  
between	   IR	   and	   FPA.	   Seeking	   to	   develop	   a	   universally-­‐applicable	   theory	   of	   foreign	   policy,	  
Rosenau	   instead	   ends	   up	   with	   an	   abstract	   taxonomy	   with	   innumerable	   determinations.	  
Hudson’s	   attempt,	   in	   turn,	   is	   marred	   by	   the	   problems	   surrounding	   any	   version	   of	  
methodological	   individualism.	   The	   first	   chapter	   then	   goes	   on	   to	   review	   general	   IR	   theories,	  
namely	   realism,	   liberalism	  and	  constructivism,	   represented	  by	  Kenneth	  Waltz,	  Michael	  Doyle	  
and	   Alexander	  Wendt	   respectively.	   It	   shows	   that	   while	  Waltz’s	   approach	   presents	   a	   closed	  
generative	   system	   with	   implicit	   and	   unexplained	   assumptions	   about	   the	   foreign	   policies	   of	  
states,	   reducing	  external	  behaviour	  of	  states	  to	   imperatives	  of	   the	  system,	  Doyle’s	   liberalism	  
attributes	   causality	   to	   the	   domestic	   ordering	   of	   states	   in	   determining	   their	   foreign	   policy	  
orientation,	  reducing	   it	   to	  whether	  the	  state	   in	  question	   is	   liberal	  or	  not.	  Finally,	   the	  chapter	  
shows	  that	  notwithstanding	  the	  sophistication	  of	  Wendt’s	  attempt	  to	  provide	  a	  ‘social’	  theory	  
of	  international	  politics,	  deriving	  foreign	  policies	  from	  ideational	  structural	  imperatives,	  Wendt	  
reproduces	   Waltz’s	   large-­‐scale	   reductionism,	   this	   time	   in	   an	   ideational	   way.	   What	   this	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literature	   review	   shows	   is	   that	   pre-­‐conceived	   analytical	   abstractions,	   taken	   as	   ontological	  
structures,	  make	  it	  impossible	  to	  bridge	  FPA	  and	  IR	  once	  they	  are	  conceived	  of	  as	  autonomous	  
scientific	  enterprises.	  The	  chapter	  concludes	  by	  claiming	  that	  a	  dialectical	  onto-­‐epistemology	  
can	   reconstitute	   FPA	   and	   IR	   as	   a	   single	   scientific	   enterprise	   as	   part	   of	   a	   social	   theory	   of	  
international	  politics.	  
Chapter	  2	  constitutes	  the	  main	  (meta-­‐)theoretical	  argument	  of	  this	  thesis.	  Through	  a	  series	  of	  
onto-­‐epistemological	  arguments,	   it	  claims	  that	  the	  gap	  arises	  from	  the	  temporal	  and	  agential	  
decoupling	  (or	  abstraction)	  of	  individual	  states’	  praxes	  and	  their	  inter-­‐subjective	  consequences	  
and	  that	  the	  gap	  is	  bridged	  and	  generated	  practically	  through	  the	  contradictory	  and	  concrete	  
praxes	  of	  states.	  First,	   I	  argue	  that	  real	  abstractions	  are	  made	  practically	  by	  human	  beings	   in	  
reproducing	  their	   life,	  and	  as	  they	  find	  themselves	   in	  the	  presence	  of	  others	  and	  surrounded	  
by	   practical	   abstractions	   transmitted	   by	   older	   generations,	   these	   real	   abstractions	   confront	  
them,	  most	   of	   the	   time,	   as	   ‘concrete	   structures’.	   Building	   on	   this	   notion	   of	   abstraction,	   the	  
chapter	  goes	  on	  to	  discuss	  abstraction	  in	  different	  versions	  of	  the	  dialectical	  method.	  Providing	  
a	   critical	   overview	   of	   extant	   versions	   of	   the	   dialectical	   method,	   the	   chapter	   presents	   a	  
dialectical	   onto-­‐epistemology	  based	   centrally	   on	   a	   notion	  of	   praxis	   understood	   as	   purposive	  
activity.	  Qualifying	  praxis	  as	  inter-­‐subjective,	  contradictory	  and	  active,	  such	  dialectic	  offers	  an	  
agency-­‐based	  perspective	  on	  FPA	  and	  IR.	  Finally,	  conceiving	  states	  and	  their	  foreign	  policies	  as	  
real	   abstractions,	   Chapter	   2	   argues	   that	   finding	   themselves	   facing	   historically-­‐inherited	   and	  
externally-­‐	   and	   internally-­‐generated	   real	   abstractions,	   states	   face	   these	   as	   ‘concrete	  
structures’;	   and	   in	   coping	  with	   these,	   they	   contextually	   generate	   and	  bridge	   foreign	  policies	  
and	  international	  relations.	  The	  disciplinary	  gap	  between	  FPA	  and	  IR,	  then,	  is	  bridged	  when,	  in	  
a	  given	  conjuncture,	  the	  theory	  reflects	  the	  inter-­‐subjective,	  contradictory	  and	  practical	  nature	  
of	  interrelations	  between	  the	  praxes	  of	  states.	  Finally,	  the	  chapter	  makes	  the	  methodological	  
recommendation	   that	   a	   ‘thick	   narrative’	   of	   praxes	   of	   the	   relevant	   agents	   guided	   by	   a	   well-­‐
formulated	  research	  question	  is	  the	  key	  both	  to	  FPA	  and	  IR.	  
In	  a	  bid	  to	  illustrate	  these	  (meta-­‐)theoretical	  arguments,	  the	  next	  three	  chapters	  problematize	  
three	  seemingly	  counter-­‐intuitive	  decisions	  by	  three	  states.	  Chapter	  3	  discusses	  the	  American	  
decision	  to	  invade	  Iraq	  in	  2003.	  The	  argument	  of	  the	  chapter	  is	  that	  the	  American	  state,	  under	  
the	  neoconservative	  Bush	  administration,	  sought	  to	  perpetuate	  and	  expand	  its	  primacy	  in	  the	  
American-­‐led	   capitalist	   order	   that	  was	   in	   the	  making	   throughout	   the	   twentieth	   century	   and	  
consolidated	  after	   the	  Cold	  War,	  by	  actively	  pursuing	   regime	  change	   in	  states	   recalcitrant	   to	  
incorporation	   in	   this	   order.	   This	   argument	   is	   developed	   by	   historically	   reconstructing	   the	  
making	  of	  American	  primacy	  as	  an	   inter-­‐subjective	  consequence	  of	  the	  praxes	  of	  a	  variety	  of	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temporally	  and	  spatially	  differently	  situated	  and	  motivated	  agents,	   including	  America’s	  ruling	  
classes,	  Presidents,	  other	   states,	  working	   classes	  and	  etc.	   throughout	   the	   twentieth	   century.	  
While	  this	  primacy	  was	  inherited	  and	  confronted	  as	  a	  real	  abstraction	  by	  the	  neoconservative	  
Bush	   administration,	   the	   decision	  was	  more	   the	   expression	   of	   a	   subjective	   interpretation	   of	  
and	  active	  intervention	  into	  this	  abstraction	  than	  a	  necessary	  function	  of	  American	  primacy.	  	  
Chapter	   4	   discusses	   Turkey’s	   decision	   to	   deny	   passage	   and	   basing	   rights	   to	   the	   invading	  
American	   forces.	  Unpacking	   the	  Turkish	   state	   complex,	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   the	  decision	  was	  an	  
inadvertent	  outcome	  of	  a	  fragile	  balance	  in	  the	  power	  struggle	  between	  the	  governing	  Justice	  
and	   Development	   Party	   (JDP)	   and	   the	   military-­‐bureaucratic	   establishment	   who	   ruled	   the	  
country	  for	  most	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  The	  military-­‐bureaucratic	  establishment,	  emerging	  
in	  late	  Ottoman	  times	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  interplay	  of	  contradictory	  strategies	  of	  reproduction	  of	  
the	  local	  notables,	  the	  Sultan,	  the	  Great	  Powers	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  agents,	  consolidated	  its	  
rule	   during	   the	   Republican	   period,	   establishing	   itself	   as	   the	   final	   arbiter	   of	   national	   security	  
and	   foreign	   policy	   matters	   by	   the	   end	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century.	   Confronting	   the	   military-­‐
bureaucratic	   establishment	   and	   its	   near-­‐automatic	   pro-­‐US	   foreign	   policy	   as	   an	   inherited	  
‘structural’	   constraint,	   the	   JDP	   sought	   to	  avoid	  alienating	   it	   despite	  public	  pressure	   to	   reject	  
American	  demands.	  The	   reluctance	  with	  which	   the	  government	   took	   the	   relevant	  motion	   to	  
the	  Parliament	  reflected	  the	  fine	  balance	  of	  this	  dialectical	  interplay	  of	  different	  social	  forces.	  
The	  reluctance	  itself,	  therefore,	  was	  an	  active	  practice	  by	  the	  government	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  
either	  strong	  approval	  or	  defiance	  would	  be	  more	  politically	  costly	  positions	  to	  sustain.	  	  
Chapter	  5	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  Saddam	  Hussein’s	  defiance	  in	  cooperating	  with	  the	  UNMOVIC	  
inspectors,	   risking	   invasion	   by	   the	   US.	   The	   answer	   is	   that	   Saddam	   did	   not	   sufficiently	  
appreciate	  the	  threat	  of	  invasion;	  rather	  he	  was	  almost	  certain	  that	  the	  main	  challenge	  to	  his	  
rule	  was	   a	  possible	  US-­‐backed	  military	   coup.	  Conspiratorial	   politics	   and	   its	   corollary	  political	  
autonomy	  in	  Iraq	  were	  faced	  by	  Saddam	  as	  ‘structural’	  aspects	  of	  political	  life	  in	  Iraq.	  Both	  the	  
autonomy	  and	  the	  conspiratorial	  nature	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  state	  were	  in	  the	  making	  throughout	  the	  
twentieth	  century,	  emerging	  as	  the	  unintended	  consequences	  of	  Ottoman	  and	  British	  rules	  in	  
Iraq	  as	  well	  as	  reproductive	  strategies	  of	  the	  King,	  the	  tribal	  shaikhs	  and	  the	  nascent	  military	  
officer-­‐cum-­‐politicians.	   The	   ‘rentierism’	   of	   the	   later	   Iraqi	   Republic	   and	   the	   expansion	   and	  
strengthening	  of	  the	  internal	  security	  network	  only	  consolidated	  the	  relative	  independence	  of	  
political	  life	  from	  wider	  social	  relations.	  This	  autonomy,	  an	  asset	  in	  the	  1990s,	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  
the	  reason	  why	  Saddam	  believed	  that	  the	  only	  serious	  threat	  to	  his	  rule	  would	  come	  from	  the	  
military	  and	  disregarded	  the	  real	  threat.	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Finally,	   this	   thesis	  ends	  with	  an	   interweaving	  of	   these	   foreign	  policy	  acts	   in	   two	  ways	   in	   the	  
Conclusion.	   First,	   I	   show	   that	   the	   real	   abstractions	  of	  American	  primacy	  and	   Iraqi	   autonomy	  
were	  made	  by	  the	  contradictory	  praxes	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  diachronically-­‐situated	  agents	  including	  
the	   Great	   Powers,	   the	   American	   state,	   American	   ruling	   and	   working	   classes,	   the	   Ottoman	  
Empire,	  King	  Faisal,	  and	  the	  British	  colonial	  administration	  as	  well	  as	  many	  others.	  Therefore,	  
their	   praxes	   and	   the	   asynchronous	   relations	   between	   these	   praxes	   constitute	   the	   social	  
historical	  content	  of	  the	  making	  of	  the	  2003	  Iraq	  war.	  Second,	  in	  a	  bid	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  
dialectic	  of	   these	  praxes	  not	  only	   led	   to	  a	  major	   international	  event,	  but	  also	  contributed	   to	  
the	  making	  of	   the	  new	  parameters	  of	   international	  politics,	   I	   claim	   that	   in	   combination	  with	  
the	   inability	  of	   the	  US	   to	   respond	   to	   the	  Arab	  uprisings	   and	   the	  world	   financial	   crisis	  with	  a	  
sound	  strategy,	  the	  Iraq	  war	  led	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  way	  the	  new	  world	  appeared	  to	  other	  major	  
powers.	  While	  American	  primacy,	  as	  a	  real	  abstraction,	  was	  taken	  for	  granted	  before	  the	  Iraq	  
war,	   as	   the	   world	   appears	   differently	   significantly	   to	   China	   and	   Russia	   now,	   a	   unipolar	  
international	  system	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  given.	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1.	  FOREIGN	  POLICY	  ANALYSIS	  AND	  INTERNATIONAL	  RELATIONS:	  
EXPLORING	  THE	  GAP	  
1.1.	  Introduction	  
	  
This	   chapter	   surveys	   the	   literature	   in	  FPA	  and	   IR	  with	  a	  view	   to	   these	  aspects	  of	  FPA	  and	   IR	  
theories	  as	  the	  first	  step	   in	  an	  attempt	  to	  theoretically	  bridge	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  two.	  The	  
main	  claim	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  that	  the	  theoretical	  integration	  desperately	  sought	  for	  by	  students	  
of	  FPA	  cannot	  be	  achieved	  simply	  by	  combining	  aspects	  of	  pre-­‐existing	  IR	  orientation	  towards	  
macro-­‐level	   ‘structures’	   with	   established	   FPA	   sensitivity	   to	   micro-­‐level	   processes.	   Rather,	   a	  
dialectical	   rethinking	   that	   socialises	   the	   reproductive	   strategies	   of	   states	   is	   required	   to	  
consider	   these	   two	   seemingly	   separate	   enterprises	   as	   aspects	   of	   the	   same	   scientific	  
undertaking.	  	  
In	   doing	   this,	   the	   following	   section	   evaluates	   first	   Rosenau’s	   efforts	   to	   initiate	   a	   project	   of	  
developing	  a	  scientific	  approach	  to	  FPA	  by	  reaching	  collectively	  to	  a	  general	  theory	  of	  foreign	  
policy	   with	   cross-­‐nationally	   applicable,	   testable	   generalizations	   (see	   Rosenau	   1966). 1 	  The	  
section	   ends	   with	   an	   assessment	   of	   Hudson’s	   attempts	   to	   ‘ground’	   IR	   theory	   in	   an	   ‘actor-­‐
specific’	  and	  ‘agency-­‐oriented’	  FPA.	  The	  importance	  of	  Hudson’s	  work	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  
explicitly	  aimed	  to	  establish	  FPA	  as	  the	  micro-­‐foundational	  ground	  of	  systemic	  IR	  theories.	  The	  
third	   section	   provides	   an	   outline	   of	   the	   respective	   approaches	   to	   and/or	   implications	   for	  
foreign	   policy	   analysis	   of	   three	   mainstream	   IR	   theories,	   namely	   neorealism,	   liberalism	   and	  
constructivism.	  Kenneth	  Waltz’s	  structural	  realism,	  Doyle’s	   liberal	  peace	  theory,	  and	  Wendt’s	  
ideational	  perspective	  will	  be	  reviewed	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  theory-­‐
integrative	   challenge	   raised	   by	   FPA	   scholars.	   The	   literature	   to	   be	   reviewed	   in	   these	   two	  
sections	  will	  be	  organized	   in	  particular	  according	   to	   their	   take	  on	   the	  aforementioned	  meta-­‐
theoretical	   problems	   of	   levels	   of	   analysis	   and	   agency.	   The	   fourth	   and	   final	   section	   will	  
recapitulate	  the	  problem,	   followed	  by	  a	  conclusion	  that	  the	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  lies	   in	  a	  
dialectical	   rethinking	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   question	   of	   theoretical	   integration	   of	   FPA’s	   ‘agency-­‐
oriented’,	  ‘actor-­‐specific’	  approach	  to	  micro-­‐processes	  with	  IR’s	  structural	  approach	  to	  macro-­‐
level	  generalities.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Rosenau’s	  work	  represents	  the	  first	  and	  most	  comprehensive	  attempt	  to	  develop	  a	  general,	  and	  
comparative	  theory	  of	  foreign	  policy	  and	  international	  relations.	  FPA	  stagnated	  for	  a	  long	  time	  after	  
Rosenau	  and	  his	  colleagues	  stopped	  pursuing	  the	  comparative	  approach.	  Recently,	  however,	  the	  field	  





1.2.1.	  Rosenau	  and	  the	  behaviouralist	  aspiration	  to	  general	  theory	  	  
An	   initial	   attempt	   at	   theoretical	   integration	  was	  undertaken	  by	   James	  N.	  Rosenau,	  who	   saw	  
FPA	   as	   a	   ‘bridging	   discipline’	   by	   definition	   (Rosenau	   1987,	   p.1).	   Discontent	   with	   the	  
unscientific,	   ‘classicist’	   approach	   to	   foreign	  policy,	  Rosenau	   set	  out	   to	  outline	  a	   comparative	  
study	  of	  foreign	  policy	  which	  would	  remedy	  descriptive,	  unscientific,	  noncumulative,	  moralistic	  
deficiencies	  of	  traditional	  single	  country	  case	  studies.	  His	  dissatisfaction	  was	  so	  intense	  that	  he	  
felt	   compelled	   to	   note	   that	   ‘our	   indictment	   of	   the	   state	   of	   research	   in	   the	   field	   may	   be	  
exaggerated,	   but	   the	   foregoing	   evidence	   provides	   no	   basis	   for	   revising	   it’	   (Rosenau	   1980a,	  
p.76);	   his	   indictment	   being	   that	   the	   then	   extant	   case	   studies	   in	   the	   field	   did	   not	   reflect	  
‘scientific	  consciousness’	  at	  all,	  and	  indeed	  were	  responsible	  for	  the	  ‘slow	  progression’	  of	  the	  
field	   ‘toward	   general	   theory’	   (Rosenau	  1980a,	   p.122).	  No	  matter	   how	  detailed	   and	   accurate	  
the	  descriptions	  these	  studies	  generated,	  they	  were	  not	  able	  to	  elevate	  foreign	  policy	  studies	  
to	  the	  status	  of	  science,	  comparable	  to	  other	  fields	  of	  social	  sciences.	  The	  main	  problem	  with	  
these	   studies	   was	   that	   their	   analyses	   were	   over-­‐specified,	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   they	   restricted	  
themselves	  to	  the	  external	  behaviour	  of	  one	  specific	  state	  ‘at	  a	  specific	  moment	  in	  time	  or	  …	  
over	   a	   period	   of	   time’	   (Rosenau	   1980a,	   pp.121-­‐22;	   1968,	   p.298).	   The	   field	   of	   foreign	   policy,	  
‘dominated’	   by	   these	   studies,	   lamented	   Rosenau,	   failed	   to	   generate	   a	   cumulative,	   scientific	  
theory	   of	   foreign	   policy.	  Moreover,	   according	   to	   Rosenau	   (1965;	   1980a,	   p.35,	   43;	   cf.	   Singer	  
1961,	   pp.83-­‐84),	   the	   subjective	   nature	   of	   these	   studies	   gave	   rise	   to	   a	   moralism	   in	   their	  
descriptions	  of	  cases.	  What	  Rosenau	  generically	  calls	  the	  ‘classicist’	  approach	  to	  foreign	  policy,	  
therefore,	   could	   not	   match	   the	   scientific	   stature	   of	   other	   disciplines	   that	   analyse	   human	  
behaviour.2	  
The	   remedy	   Rosenau	   proposed	   was	   to	   develop	   a	   ‘general	   theory’	   of	   foreign	   policy.	   Briefly	  
stated,	  in	  the	  ‘reorientation’	  of	  the	  field	  of	  foreign	  policy	  toward	  generality,	  the	  explanandum	  
was	   to	   be	   ‘undertakings’	   rather	   than	   ‘decisions’	   or	   ‘policies’	   (Rosenau	  1980a,	   pp.60-­‐61),	   the	  
method,	  comparison	  (Rosenau	  1968),3	  and	  the	  explanans,	  any	  variable	  that	   is	  shown	  to	  be	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Even	  attempts	  to	  utilize	  methods	  of	  the	  then-­‐fashionable	  behaviouralism	  in	  the	  field	  that	  Rosenau	  
treasured	  immensely,	  were	  harshly	  criticized	  by	  him	  for	  their	  failure	  to	  deliver	  on	  their	  promise	  of	  
scientificity;	  see	  Rosenau	  (1965).	  His	  former	  teacher	  Snyder’s	  foray	  into	  the	  decision-­‐making	  approach	  
(Snyder,	  Bruck	  and	  Sapin	  1962)	  was	  no	  exception	  in	  Rosenau’s	  dismissal	  of	  existing	  literature	  (Rosenau	  
1967;	  see	  also	  Smith	  1983,	  p.139;	  1986,	  pp.16-­‐17).	  
3	  These	  three	  aspects	  of	  the	  proposed	  ‘reorientation’,	  i.e.	  undertakings,	  comparison,	  and	  the	  scope	  of	  
variables	  are	  clear	  indicators	  of	  Rosenau’s	  theory-­‐integrative	  purposes.	  While	  ‘undertakings,	  unlike	  
policies	  and	  decisions	  …	  fuse	  commitments	  with	  their	  enactment,	  decisions	  with	  their	  outcomes,	  
resources	  with	  their	  utilization’	  relating	  decisions	  and	  policies	  to	  their	  larger	  context	  (Rosenau	  1980a,	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correlation	   with	   ‘undertakings’.	   First	   of	   all,	   however,	   according	   to	   Rosenau,	   a	   scientific	  
consciousness	   was	   necessary,	   requiring	   the	   student	   to	   ask	   the	   question	   ‘Of	   what	   is	   it	   an	  
instance’	  in	  order	  that	  she	  can	  look	  for	  the	  underlying	  pattern	  (Rosenau	  1980a,	  pp.41-­‐42):	  
To	  think	  theoretically	  is	  to	  be	  at	  home	  with	  abstractions,	  to	  generalize,	  to	  discern	  the	  
underlying	  order	  that	   links	  otherwise	  discrete	   incidents,	  and	  such	  a	  mode	  of	  thinking	  
cannot	   be	   achieved	   and	   maintained	   unless	   every	   observed	   phenomenon	   is	  
approached	  as	  merely	  one	  instance	  of	  a	  recurring	  sequence	  (Rosenau	  1980a,	  p.25).	  
Even	  single	  country	  case	  studies	  could	  contribute	  to	   the	  development	  of	  a	  general	   theory	  of	  
foreign	  policy	  if	  they	  were	  taken	  as	  instances	  of	  a	  ‘larger	  pattern’.	  	  
A	  general	  theory	  of	  foreign	  policy,	  however,	  does	  not	  emerge	  by	  itself.	  In	  Rosenau’s	  view,	  ‘pre-­‐
theories’	  are	  needed	  to	  ‘facilitate	  the	  development	  of	  general	  theory’	  (Rosenau	  1980a,	  p.135),	  
since	   they	   render	  empirical	  material	   comparable.	   In	  other	  words,	  pre-­‐theories	  are	  necessary	  
milestones	   on	   the	   path	   leading	   to	   general	   theory,	   with	   cross-­‐nationally	   applicable,	   testable	  
generalizations	   expressed	   in	   ‘if-­‐then’	   hypotheses	   derived	   from	   empirical	   data	   collection	  
processes.	   Pre-­‐theories	   would	   also	   serve	   to	   identify	   the	   ‘relative	   potencies’	   of	   each	   set	   of	  
variables	   (Rosenau	   1980a,	   p.129)	   helping	   develop	   the	   multi-­‐level,	   multi-­‐causal	   theoretical	  
integration	  that	  Rosenau	  desired	  to	  offer	  (Hudson	  and	  Vore	  1995,	  p.213).	  His	  pre-­‐theory	  was	  
based	  on	  a	  taxonomy	  of	  states	  drawing	  on	  the	  biological	  concept	  of	  ‘genotypes’	  along	  axes	  of	  
political	   accountability	   (open	   vs.	   closed),	   size	   (large	   vs.	   small),	   and	   level	   of	   development	  
(developed	   vs.	   underdeveloped).	   He	   then	  went	   on	   to	   add	   two	  more	   variables:	   The	   level	   of	  
penetration	   by	   the	   international	   system	   (penetrated	   vs.	   non-­‐penetrated)	   and	   issue	   areas.	  
Giving	   five	   sets	  of	   sources	  of	   foreign	  policy	  behaviour	   ‘listed	   in	  order	  of	   increasing	   temporal	  
and	  spatial	  distance	  from	  external	  behaviours’,	  i.e.	  individual,	  role,	  governmental,	  societal	  and	  
systemic	  variables,	  he	  proposed	  a	  pre-­‐theory	  of	   foreign	  policy	  where	   the	   relative	  potency	  of	  
these	  sources	  are	  ordered	  according	  to	  the	  type	  of	  the	  state	  in	  question	  (Rosenau	  1980a).	  This	  
way,	   Rosenau	  was	   able	   to	   enumerate	   16	   genotypes	  of	   states	   and	   three	   issue	   areas	   and	   the	  
corresponding	  relative	  potencies	  of	  each	  source	  of	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  case	  of	  each	  issue	  area,	  
culminating	  in	  48	  sets	  of	  weighting	  of	  sources.	  	  
If	   researchers	   in	   the	   field	   subscribed	   to	   this	   project	   of	   theoretical	   integration	  whereby	   they	  
standardised	   their	   empirical	   material	   so	   as	   to	   allow	   comparison,	   and	   thus	   generalization,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
p.61),	  comparison	  serves	  to	  show	  the	  larger	  pattern	  of	  which	  an	  undertaking	  is	  an	  instance;	  for	  his	  
methodological	  guide	  to	  ‘Comparing	  Foreign	  Policies’	  see	  Rosenau	  (1974).	  Finally,	  a	  wider	  scope	  of	  
variables	  in	  the	  comparative	  study	  of	  foreign	  policy	  aims	  to	  link	  the	  international	  to	  the	  domestic,	  the	  
political	  to	  the	  economic,	  and	  the	  individual	  to	  the	  national.	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Rosenau	  did	  not	   see	  why,	   in	   the	  end,	   a	   general	   theory	  of	   foreign	  policy	   should	  not	  emerge.	  
Indeed	   his	   proposal	   gained	   much	   following	   and	   in	   a	   postscript	   to	   his	   article,	   ‘Comparative	  
Foreign	  Policy:	  Fad,	  Fantasy,	  or	  Field’	  (Rosenau	  1968),	  in	  which	  he	  had	  initially	  condemned	  the	  
state	  of	  affairs	  in	  foreign	  policy	  research,	  he	  celebrated	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  comparative	  
study	   of	   foreign	   policy	   as	   a	   scientific	   discipline,	   and	   registered	   his	   hope	   for	   the	   immediate	  
future	  of	  the	  field	  (Rosenau	  1980a,	  pp.104-­‐14).	  Not	  only	  were	  many	  studies	  along	  the	  lines	  he	  
proposed	   published	   through	   ICFP	   (Inter-­‐University	   Comparative	   Foreign	   Policy	   Project)	   (S.	  
Smith	  1985,	  p.597),	  but	  also	  Comparative	  Foreign	  Policy	  (CFP)	  turned	   into	  a	   ‘major	   industry’,	  
supported	   by	   generous	  US	   government	   funding	   (Carlsnaes	   2002;	   Hudson	   2005;	   Hudson	   and	  
Vore	   1995),	   all	   of	   which	   helped	   launch	   an	   effort	   to	   collect	   empirical	   data	   on	   foreign	   policy	  
‘events’	   in	   order	   to	   reach	   ‘scientific’	   generalizations.	   Creation	  of	   events	   data	   sets	   generated	  
118	  propositions	  expressing	  correlations	  between	  variables	  and	  events	  (McGowan	  and	  Shapiro	  
1973).	   In	   this	   period,	   Rosenau	   himself	   published	   extensively	   on	   individual	   variables	   in	   the	  
context	  of	  different	  ‘genotypes’	  of	  states,	  and	  on	  possible	  ways	  of	  linking	  variables.4	  Rosenau’s	  
dream	  did	  not	  come	  true,	  however,	  and	  the	  expectation	  that	  studies	  in	  CFP	  would	  generate	  a	  
general	  theory	  of	  foreign	  policy	  was	  never	  realized.	  What	  this	  enterprise	  produced	  in	  the	  end	  
was	  a	  myriad	  of	  propositions	  and	  matrices	  of	  foreign	  policy	  behaviour,	  not	  a	  theory	  of	  foreign	  
policy.5	  
‘You	  can’t	  have	  your	  parsimony	  and	  eat	  it,	  too…’	  noted	  Valerie	  Hudson	  (2007,	  pp.28-­‐29)	  in	  her	  
evaluation	  of	  the	  CFP	  approach,	   ‘…	  CFP	  methods	  demanded	  parsimony	  in	  theory;	  CFP	  theory	  
demanded	  nuance	  and	  detail	   in	  method.’	  This	   tension	  between	  generality	  and	  specificity,	  no	  
matter	  how	  detailed	  Rosenau’s	  pre-­‐theory	  was,	  could	  not	  be	  resolved,	  since	  no	  attempt	  was	  
made	   to	   resolve	   it.	   The	   positivist	   and	   behaviouralist	   approaches	   Rosenau	   and	   others	   in	   CFP	  
tradition	   adopted	   proved	   unsustainable	   when	   considered	   in	   light	   of	   a	   potentially	   endless	  
proliferation	   of	   source	   variables	   and	   genotypes	   of	   states.6	  In	   other	   words,	   they	   hoped	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  See,	  for	  instance,	  his	  ‘Toward	  the	  Study	  of	  National-­‐International	  Linkages’	  (Rosenau	  1969)	  for	  an	  
attempt	  to	  theoretically	  combine	  the	  domestic	  and	  the	  international	  within	  a	  linkage	  framework;	  for	  an	  
example	  of	  his	  call	  for	  greater	  integration	  of	  the	  economic	  and	  the	  political	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  
international	  politics	  see	  Rosenau	  (1988).	  
5	  Rosenau	  himself	  registered	  his	  disappointment	  about	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  CFP	  project	  to	  generate	  general	  
theory	  (Rosenau	  1980a).	  See	  also	  Carlsnaes	  (2002);	  Smith	  (1983).	  
6	  With	  the	  rise	  of	  post-­‐positivism,	  the	  label	  positivist	  is	  used	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  positions.	  Here	  it	  simply	  
denotes	  the	  belief	  that	  empirical	  generalisations	  about	  observable	  social	  facts	  generate	  causal	  
explanations	  by	  identifying	  a	  constant	  conjunction	  between	  two	  or	  more	  social	  facts.	  Behavioralism	  in	  
political	  science	  emerged	  in	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  1950s,	  modelled	  itself	  after	  behaviorism	  in	  
psychology,	  and	  gained	  an	  immense	  following	  in	  the	  1960s.	  The	  aim	  of	  behavioralism	  in	  political	  science	  
was	  to	  identify	  regularities	  in	  observable	  individual	  political	  behaviour	  in	  aggregate,	  and	  it	  was	  marked	  
by	  a	  strict	  separation	  of	  facts	  from	  values.	  So	  naïve	  was	  the	  positivism	  of	  Roseanu	  that	  he	  admitted	  not	  
having	  heard	  of	  the	  word	  ‘positivist’	  until	  he	  was	  charged	  with	  it	  (Rosenau	  2003,	  p.417).	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establishing	   correlations	   between	   variables	  would	   automatically	   lead	   to	   a	   general	   theory	   of	  
foreign	  policy,	  but	  even	  in	  positivist	  epistemology	  ‘correlation	  is	  not	  [sic]	  causation’	  (S.	  Smith	  
1986,	  p.23),	  and	  a	  catalogue	  of	  sources	  of	  foreign	  policy	  arranged	  according	  to	  their	   ‘relative	  
potencies’	  in	  the	  context	  of	  issue	  areas	  facing	  ‘genotypes	  of’	  states	  is	  not	  theory.	  Writing	  in	  the	  
mid-­‐1960s,	  when	  there	  were	  slightly	  over	  160	  internationally	  recognized	  states,	  Rosenau	  listed	  
16	  types	  of	  states.	  Not	  only	  is	  any	  taxonomy,	  including	  Rosenau’s	  pre-­‐theory	  of	  foreign	  policy,	  
arbitrary,	  but	  also	  even	   in	   the	  case	   that	  Rosenau’s	  genotypes	  corresponded	   to	   the	   reality	  of	  
the	   states,	   there	   is	   no	   guarantee	   that	   any	   set	   of	   propositions	   derived	   from	   constant	  
conjunction	  of	  foreign	  policy	  ‘events’	  with	  sets	  of	  source	  variables	  will	  automatically	  generate	  
a	  general	  theory	  of	  foreign	  policy.7	  To	  be	  fair,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  what	  he	  perceived	  to	  be	  growing	  
interdependence,	   Rosenau	   developed	   his	   own	   theory	   of	   foreign	   policy	   around	   another	  
concept	   from	   biology,	   i.e.	   adaptation,8	  but	   this	   theory,	   despite	   utilising	   Rosenau’s	   earlier	  
genotypes	   and	   sets	   of	   variables	   to	   a	   certain	   extent,	   fell	   short	   of	   delivering	   the	  promise	  of	   a	  
general	   theory	  of	   foreign	  policy	  sensitive	  to	  specificity,	  and	   is	  not	  clearly	   linked	  to	  his	  earlier	  
work	  (S.	  Smith	  1983,	  p.144).	  Put	  another	  way,	  while	  his	  early	  work	  could	  not	  generate	  general	  
theory	  because	  of	  its	  sensitivity	  to	  variations,	  his	  work	  on	  adaptation	  surrendered	  specificity	  in	  
return	   for	   parsimony	   and	   generality:	   every	   actor	   adapts	   to	   its	   environment.	   In	   spite	   of	   his	  
fierce	  criticism	  of	  classical	  realism’s	  assumptions	  about	  the	  international	  system	  (anarchy)	  and	  
the	   external	   behaviour	   of	   states	   as	   unitary	   actors	   (pursuit	   of	   interest	   defined	   in	   terms	   of	  
power)	  (Rosenau	  1980a),	  rather	  than	  challenging	  these	  core	  assumptions	  of	  realism,	  he	  simply	  
changed	  its	  methodology	  (Vasquez	  1999;	  Carlsnaes	  2002;	  S.	  Smith	  1989;	  1986).	  Nevertheless,	  
his	   coming	   to	   terms	   with	   growing	   interdependence,	   or	   what	   he	   called	   ‘fragmegregation’	  
(Rosenau	   1997),	   forced	   him	   to	   distance	   himself	   from	   his	   realist	   assumptions,	   positivist	  
epistemology,	  and	  behaviouralist	  methodology	  towards	   ‘pre-­‐postmodernism’,	  at	  the	  expense	  
of	  his	  aspiration	  to	  unified	  general	  theory.9	  
After	  this	  appraisal	  of	  Rosenau’s	  work	  on	  his	  own	  terms,	  a	  brief	  assessment	  of	  it	  according	  to	  
the	   gap	   problematised	   in	   the	   first	   section	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   in	   order.	   Rosenau’s	   ‘pre-­‐theory’	  
and	   longing	   for	   general	   theory	   represent	   a	   ‘significant	   …	   failure’	   (Carlsnaes	   2002),	   both	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Theory	  building,	  as	  Smith	  (1986,	  p.23)	  notes,	  is	  an	  ‘entirely	  separate	  cognitive	  act’	  from	  data	  collection,	  
and	  therefore	  theory	  does	  not	  emerge	  by	  itself.	  Rousenau,	  in	  fact,	  registered	  this	  point	  elsewhere	  
(Rosenau	  1980b)	  in	  relation	  to	  his	  framework	  of	  ‘linkage	  politics’	  designed	  to	  link	  variables	  between	  
national	  and	  international	  systems	  (Rosenau	  1969).	  He	  recognised	  that	  his	  ‘typology	  that	  yielded	  …	  144	  
linkages	  was	  barren	  of	  theory’	  (Rosenau	  1981,	  pp.26-­‐27).	  For	  a	  critical	  appreciation	  of	  his	  ‘linkage	  
politics’	  see	  Hill	  (2003,	  pp.208-­‐14).	  
8	  A	  collection	  of	  his	  articles	  on	  his	  theory	  of	  ‘political	  adaptation’	  can	  be	  found	  in	  his	  ‘The	  Study	  of	  
Political	  Adaptation’	  (Rosenau	  1981).	  
9	  For	  an	  understanding	  of	  Rosenau’s	  later	  ‘pre-­‐postmodern’	  position	  see	  his	  Distant	  Proximities	  (2003).	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terms	  of	   accounting	   for	   the	   specificity	  of	   actors,	   and	   for	   the	  generality	  of	   theory.	   Increasing	  
the	   number	   of	   ‘genotypes’	   in	   trying	   to	   draw	   out	   more	   specific	   knowledge	   of	   the	   external	  
behaviour	   of	   different	   classes	   of	   states,	   he	   could	   not	   account	   for	   the	   variation	   of	   foreign	  
policies	   within	   the	   same	   genotype,	   or	   the	   overlap	   between	   the	   foreign	   policies	   of	   states	  
located	  in	  different	  genotypes;	  nor	  could	  he	  manage	  to	  develop	  a	  general	  theory.	  His	  theory	  of	  
political	  adaptation,	  in	  contrast,	  focused	  mostly	  on	  the	  adaptation	  of	  states	  qua	  actors	  to	  their	  
external	   environment,	   thereby	   providing	   a	   more	   general	   perspective	   on	   the	   external	  
behaviour	   of	   states.	   Making	   this	   move,	   however,	   Rosenau	   sacrifices	   specificity	   in	   favour	   of	  
generality.	   Relatedly,	   both	   his	   early	   and	   later	   work	   deny	   agency	   to	   states,	   as	   they	   are	  
conceptualised	  as	  fulfilling	  the	  requirements	  of	   imperatives	  emanating	  either	  from	  their	  size,	  
accountability,	  penetratedness,	   level	  of	  development	   in	  given	   issue	  areas,	  or	  from	  four	  types	  
of	  adaptation	  available	  to	  them	  in	  an	  interdependent	  world.	  Furthermore,	  denying	  agency	  to	  
states	   does	   not,	   as	   one	   would	   expect,	   result	   in	   a	   well-­‐developed	   structural-­‐functional	  
theorization.	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  his	  efforts	  toward	  theoretical	  integration	  of	  multiple	  levels	  and	  
fields	   of	   causality	   failed	   primarily	   because	   of	   a	   prior	   acceptance	   of	   their	   separation,	   or	  
confusion	  of	   their	  analytical	   separation	   for	   their	   real	  separation.	  No	  matter	  how	  many	  times	  
he	   tried	   to	  bridge	  domestic-­‐	   and	   international-­‐	   systemic	   ‘factors’	   in	   various	  ways	  –as	   source	  
variables	  in	  his	  pre-­‐theoretical	  ordering	  of	  variables,	  through	  his	  linkage	  politics	  framework	  or	  
political	  adaptation	  framework,	  or	  later	  in	  his	  ‘prepostmodern’	  times	  through	  the	  concepts	  of	  
‘fragmegregation’	   and	   ‘distant	  proximities’–	  both	   the	   international	   and	   the	  domestic	   remain	  
reified,	  notwithstanding	  his	  dismissal	  of	  realist	  assumptions.	  Although,	  in	  short,	  both	  domestic	  
and	   international	   determinations	   are	   present	   in	   his	   framework	   as	   different	   independent	  
variables,	   one	   finds	   it	   very	   difficult	   to	   see	   how	   they	   are	   integrated	   into	   a	   general	   theory	   of	  
foreign	  policy	  so	  as	  to	  drive	  home	  his	   initial	  view	  of	  foreign	  policy	  as	  a	  bridging	  discipline.	  To	  
quote	  Rosenau	  (1980a,	  p.118)	  himself	  ‘to	  recognize	  that	  foreign	  policy	  is	  shaped	  by	  internal	  as	  
well	   as	   external	   factors	   is	   not	   to	   comprehend	   how	   the	   two	   intermix’;	   one	   should	   add:	   to	  
provide	  a	  catalogue	  of	  internal	  and	  external	  factors	  is	  not	  to	  comprehend	  how	  they	  are	  united.	  
The	  same	  holds	  true	  for	  his	  bridging	  of	  the	  economic	  and	  the	  political.	  They	  figure	  only	  as	  sets	  
of	  variables	  among	  others	  without	  any	  theoretical	  integration	  but	  for	  a	  matrix	  of	  their	  relative	  
weights	  in	  different	  states	  within	  the	  context	  of	  different	  issue	  areas.10	  Even	  his	  postpositivism	  
or	  prepostmodernism	  does	  not	  allow	  him	  to	  reconsider	  the	  analytical	  boundaries	  abstracting	  
‘spheres’	  vertically	  (the	  domestic	  and	  the	  international)	  and	  horizontally	  (the	  political	  and	  the	  
economic)	   from	   each	   other	   not	   as	   what	   they	   are,	   i.e.	   abstractions	   made	   for	   analytical	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Rosenau	  later	  acknowledged	  that	  his	  pre-­‐theory	  had	  failed	  to	  account	  for	  international	  political-­‐
economic	  processes	  in	  determining	  foreign	  policies	  of	  states	  (Rosenau	  1988;	  cf.	  Starr	  1988).	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purposes;	   instead	   he	   introduces	   even	  more	   ‘factors’	   without	   theoretically	   integrating	   them.	  
The	  theoretical	  gap	  between	  FPA	  and	  IR	  in	  the	  end	  remains	  as	  wide	  as	  ever.	  
1.2.2.	  Hudson	  and	  FPA	  as	  the	  ground	  of	  IR	  
Valerie	   M.	   Hudson	   is	   no	   less	   enthusiastic	   and	   assertive	   about	   FPA’s	   theory-­‐integrative	   and	  
natural	  ‘bridging’	  role	  than	  Rosenau,	  and	  she	  goes	  so	  far	  as	  to	  claim	  that	  FPA	  has	  the	  potential	  
to	   serve	   as	   the	   ‘ground’	   of	   IR	   theory	   (Hudson	   2005).	   She	   shares	  with	   Rosenau	   not	   only	   the	  
dissatisfaction	   with	   the	   realist	   generic	   view	   of	   state	   behaviour,	   but	   also	   an	   aspiration	   to	   a	  
‘multifactorial’,	   ‘multilevel’,	  multidisciplinary,	   and	   theory-­‐integrative	  orientation,	   all	   of	  which	  
she	  considers	  identifying	  characteristics	  of	  the	  FPA	  tradition.	  The	  other	  two	  ‘hallmarks’	  of	  FPA	  
that	  she	   lists,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  are	  what	  differentiate	  her	  approach	   from	  that	  of	  Rosenau:	  
agency-­‐orientation	  and	  actor-­‐specificity	  (Hudson	  2005,	  pp.2-­‐3).	  It	  is	  these	  latter	  two	  aspects	  of	  
Hudson’s	  approach	  to	  FPA	  as	  the	  ground	  of	  IR	  that	  the	  present	  review	  of	  her	  work	  shall	  bring	  
to	  the	  fore	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  our	  analysis.	  
Hudson	  (1997,	  pp.4-­‐6;	  2005,	  pp.4-­‐5),	  unlike	  Rosenau	  (1980a)	  who	  saw	  climbing	  the	  ‘ladder	  of	  
abstraction’	  as	   the	  way	   forward	   in	  developing	  a	  scientific-­‐theoretical	  consciousness,	  views	   IR	  
as	  marred	  by	  an	  omnipresent	  exaltation	  of	  abstraction.	  The	  problem	  for	  her	  is	  not	  that	  IR	  uses	  
abstractions	  such	  as	  the	  state;	  the	  problem	  is	  rather	  that	  when	  these	  abstractions	  are	  devoid	  
of	  concrete	  content,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  much	  IR	  theory,	  ‘agency	  vanishes’	  (Hudson	  2002,	  p.10).	  
Echoing	  Wight	  (1999),	  Hudson	  (2007,	  pp.9-­‐12)	  argues	  that	  IR	  theories,	  neorealist,	  neoliberal	  or	  
constructivist	  variants	  alike,	  are	  actor-­‐general	  theories	  because	  of	  their	  international-­‐systemic	  
orientation,	   which	   leaves	   no	   space	   for	   a	   theorisation	   of	   human	   agents	   in	   their	   specificity,	  
although	   ‘all	   that	  occurs	  between	  nations	  and	  across	  nations	   is	   grounded	   in	  human	  decision	  
makers	   acting	   singly	   and	   in	   groups’	   (Hudson	   2005,	   p.1,	   italics	   in	   original).	   Individual	   human	  
beings	  is	  the	  locus	  where	  all	  determinants	  of	  foreign	  policy,	  however	  mediated,	  take	  their	  final	  
shape	  as	  foreign	  policy	  decisions,	  and	  they	  are	  both	  the	  ‘source	  of	  change’	  of,	  and	  the	  source	  
of	   internal	   variation	   in,	  an	   international	   system	   (Hudson	  1997,	  p.5).	  According	   to	  Hudson,	   in	  
order	   that	   ‘the	   entire	   enterprise	   of	   IR	   theorizing’	   is	   saved	   from	   ‘irrelevance	   and	   vacuity’	  
(Hudson	   2005,	   p.5),	   its	   empty	   abstractions	   should	   be	   filled	   with	   the	   appropriate	   concrete	  
content,	   i.e.	   the	   actual	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making	   acts	   of	   human	   beings,	   and	   FPA	   is	   the	  
natural	   candidate	   for	   doing	   this	   by	   generating	   the	   ‘concrete	   theory’	   that	   will	   provide	   the	  
‘micro-­‐foundations’	  of	  and	  the	  ‘ground’	  for	  IR	  theory	  (Hudson	  2005,	  p.21).	   ‘Concrete	  theory’,	  
from	   this	   perspective,	   is	   distinguished	   from	   ‘abstract	   theory’	   by	   its	   ‘focus	  on	  actual	   decision	  
makers’	   and	  on	  actual	   actions	  of	  decision-­‐making,	   its	   emphasis	  on	  behaviour-­‐	   and	   situation-­‐	  
specificity,	  and	  its	  freedom	  from	  ‘analytical	  preconceptions’	  (Lane	  1990,	  p.928).	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Building	   on	   Lane’s	   formulation	   of	   ‘concrete	   theory’,	   Hudson	  places	   utmost	   emphasis	   on	   the	  
sub-­‐unit	   level,	  despite	  her	  acknowledgment	  that	  sub-­‐unit	   level,	  unit	   level	  and	  system	  level	  of	  
analysis	  can	  and	  should	  be	  theoretically	  integrated.	  More	  than	  anything	  else,	  her	  work	  focuses	  
on	  the	  perception,	  psychology,	  and	  personality	  of	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making	  elites,	  as	  their	  
decisions	   constitute	   the	   instances	   and	   the	   concrete	   content	   of	   theory.	   As	   a	   result	   of	   her	  
dissatisfaction	  with	  taking	  states	  as	  utility-­‐maximising	  unitary	  actors	  constituting	  homogeneity	  
in	   the	   international	   system	   approaches	   (actor-­‐general	   IR	   theories),	   she	   turns	   to	   human	  
individuals	  who	  make	  foreign	  policy	  decisions.	  Replacing	  the	  abstract	  conception	  of	  states	  with	  
humans,	   however,	   does	   not	   automatically	   resolve	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   assumption	   of	   actor-­‐
generality,	  as	  becomes	  obvious	  in	  her	  attribution	  of	  an	  unchanging	  nature	  to	  all	  human	  beings	  
based	  on	  their	  ‘genetic’	  basic	  needs,	  and	  by	  analogy,	  to	  all	  regimes	  (Hudson,	  Sims	  and	  Thomas	  
1993).	  
This	  problem	  becomes	  more	  visible	  when	  the	  focus	  is	  strictly	  on	  the	  relation	  between	  ‘political	  
psychology’	   and	   foreign	   policy	   making	   processes.	   It	   is	   not	   unusual	   that	   students	   of	   foreign	  
policy	  rely	  on	  explanations	  based	  on	  the	  personality	  and	  perception	  analyses	  of	  foreign	  policy	  
making	   officials.	   As	   individual	   human	   agents	   make	   the	   decisions	   constituting	   the	   concrete	  
content	  of	  state	  behaviour,	  the	  subjectivity	  of	  analysis	  (of	  state	  behaviour)	  in	  FPA	  mentioned	  
in	   the	   first	   section,	   turns	   into	   the	   subjectivities	   of	   individual	   political	   elites	   taking	   part	   in	  
foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  in	  Hudson’s	  view	  (Singer	  and	  Hudson	  1992),	  requiring	  
an	   investigation	   of	   the	   variables	   within	   the	   factor	   areas	   of	   perception	   and	   personality.	  
Underlying	   this	   focus	  on	   the	  psyche	  of	   the	  decision-­‐making	  political	   elites	   is	   the	  assumption	  
that	   causal	   proximity	   is	   the	   best	   criterion	   against	   which	   causal	   weight	   can	   be	   judged.	   Put	  
another	   way,	   although	   Hudson	   seeks	   to	   integrate	   levels	   of	   analysis	   and	   factors,	   she	   almost	  
exclusively	   focuses	  on	  one	   level,	   i.e.	   the	   individual,	   and	  on	  one	   factor,	   i.e.	   psychology.11	  Her	  
attempt	  to	  identify	  a	  meaningful	  correlation,	  for	  instance,	  between	  the	  birth	  order	  of	  leaders	  
and	   their	   personal	   characteristics,	   and	   between	   these	   characteristics	   and	   foreign	   policy	  
behaviour	   of	   leaders	   (Hudson	   1990;	   1992)	   unsurprisingly	   does	   not	   yield	   any	   significant	  
correlation	   between	   a	   typology	   of	   birth	   order,	   personal	   characteristics	   and	   foreign	   policy	  
behaviour.	  Even	   in	  the	  case	  that	  she	  was	  able	  to	   identify	  a	  correlation,	  Carlsnaes’	  critique	  of	  
Rosenau’s	  method	   evoking	   the	   positivist	   dictum	   that	   ‘correlation	   does	   not	   imply	   causation’	  
equally	  holds	  for	  this	  analysis.	  What	  Rosenau	  did	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  unit	  level,	  Hudson	  does	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  To	  be	  fair	  she	  also	  wrote	  on	  cultural	  (Hudson	  1997)	  and	  societal	  (Hudson,	  Sims	  and	  Thomas	  1993)	  
‘factors’	  in	  foreign	  policy	  making,	  yet	  all	  these,	  from	  her	  perspective,	  crystallise	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  
act	  of	  the	  policy-­‐	  making	  individuals	  and	  her	  oeuvre	  lacks	  any	  theoretical	  integration	  of	  these	  diverse	  
‘factors’	  going	  beyond	  research	  agendas.	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by	   moving	   the	   focus	   to	   the	   sub-­‐unit	   level:	   sets	   of	   variables,	   typologies	   of	   personal	  
characteristics	   and	   national	   attributes	   do	   not	   yield	   by	   themselves	   a	   theoretically-­‐integrated	  
approach	  to	   foreign	  policy.	  What	  they	  yield	   is	  an	  unlimited	  number	  of	   isolated	  variables	  and	  
types	   of	   cultures	   and	   personalities	   from	   different	   levels	   of	   analysis	   and	   factor	   areas,	   the	  
theoretical	  integration	  of	  which	  was	  aptly	  designated	  a	  ‘hopeless	  task’	  (Macridis	  1976).	  It	  is	  no	  
surprise,	  then,	  that	  Hudson	  (2007,	  p.188-­‐189)	  left	  the	  task	  of	  theoretical	  integration	  not	  to	  the	  
‘upcoming	  generation’	  but	   to	   the	   ‘subsequent	  generation’	  of	   students	  of	   foreign	  policy	  who,	  
she	   hopes,	   using	   recently	   developing	  methods	   of	   neuroscience	   can	   enter	   into	   the	  minds	   of	  
human	  beings.	  
Hudson’s	   failure	   in	   theoretical	   integration	   because	   of	   her	   almost	   exclusive	   focus	   on	   the	  
specificity	  of	  decision-­‐making	   individuals,	  one	  may	  hope,	  would	  at	   least	  bring	   forth	  a	   robust	  
conception	   of	   agency.	   She	   focuses	   on	   the	   actual	   decision	  makers	   as	   the	   concrete	   actors	   of	  
foreign	   policy	   who,	   she	   believes,	   not	   only	   form	   the	   micro-­‐foundations	   of	   all	   forms	   of	  
interaction	   in	   world	   politics	   with	   their	   acts	   of	   decision	   making	   in	   line	   with	   Weberian	  
methodological	   individualism,	   but	   also	   the	   central	   locus	   of	   scientific	   explanation.	   Therefore,	  
unlike	  Weber,	  who	  accepts	   that	   there	  are	  different	   levels	  of	  explanation	   (Wight	  2006,	  p.64),	  
Hudson	   leans	  toward	  psychologism.12	  Denying	  the	  state	  any	  agency,	  because	  she	  sees	   it	  as	  a	  
‘metaphysical	  abstraction’,13	  Hudson	  does	  not	   realise	   that	  her	  pre-­‐social	  decision-­‐makers	  are	  
not	  any	  less	  abstracted	  than	  states,	  in	  that	  human	  decision	  makers,	  ‘singly	  and	  in	  groups’,	  are	  
abstracted	  from	  social	  relations	  that	  are	  in	  fact	  constitutive	  not	  only	  of	  their	  decision-­‐making	  
roles	  as	  political	  elites,	  but	  also	  of	  their	  perception	  and	  personality	  (Hollis	  and	  Smith	  1990;	  Hill	  
2003,	  pp.29-­‐30).	  Although	  Hudson	  acknowledges	  the	  challenge	  that	  this	  problem	  poses	  for	  her	  
FPA	  approach	  and	  appreciates	  the	  need	  to	  account	  for	  the	  social	  sources	  of	  decision-­‐makers’	  
psyche	   and	   mind	   (Singer	   and	   Hudson	   1992,	   pp.258-­‐60),	   one	   wonders	   how	   it	   is	   possible	   to	  
reconcile	   this	   with	   inductive	   empirical	   generalisations	   regarding	   leader	   personalities.	  
Furthermore,	   because	   of	   both	   methodological	   individualism	   and	   psychologism,	   and	   ‘neuro-­‐
scientism’	  for	  that	  matter,	  she	  reduces	  a	  central	  and	  irreducible	  aspect	  of	  sociality	  that	  arises	  
from	  relations	  to	  individual	  determinations.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Traceable	  to	  Weber’s	  (1978)	  theory	  of	  action,	  methodological	  individualism	  in	  social	  studies	  refers	  to	  
a	  methodological	  orientation	  to	  interpret	  rather	  than	  explain	  social	  phenomena	  in	  terms	  of	  individuals’	  
subjective	  social	  setting.	  Whatever	  the	  problem	  in	  question	  is,	  methodological	  individualism	  takes	  
individuals	  as	  its	  unit	  of	  analysis.	  Gellner	  (1956,	  p.176)	  captures	  the	  main	  problem	  with	  methodological	  
individualism	  as	  follows:	  ‘History	  is	  about	  chaps.	  It	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  its	  explanations	  are	  always	  in	  
terms	  of	  chaps.	  Societies	  are	  what	  people	  do,	  but	  social	  scientists	  are	  not	  biographers	  en	  grande	  série.’	  
Psychologism	  denotes	  the	  tendency	  in	  social	  sciences	  to	  explain	  social	  phenomena	  and	  social	  action	  in	  
terms	  of	  psychological	  factors.	  
13	  The	  case	  for	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  state	  as	  an	  ‘actor-­‐like’	  entity	  in	  FPA	  is	  made	  by	  Hill	  (2003,	  pp.30-­‐37)	  and	  
will	  be	  touched	  upon	  in	  the	  last	  section	  of	  this	  chapter	  and	  further	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	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Theoretical	   integration,	   in	   short,	   proves	   impossible	   in	   Hudson’s	   case	   primarily	   due	   to	   her	  
individualist	  methodology	  and	  assumptions.	  What	  Rosenau	  does	  at	  the	  unit	  level,	  Hudson	  does	  
at	   the	   sub-­‐unit	   level,	   substituting	   his	   actor-­‐general	   theory	   of	   states	   with	   an	   actor-­‐general	  
theory	   of	   human	   decision-­‐makers.	   Although	   she	   recommends	   developing	   ‘interlockable	  
propositions,’	   it	   is	  quite	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  this	  interlocking	  may	  occur	  when	  one	  starts	  with	  
hypotheses	   regarding	   isolated	   observable	   empirical	   regularities	   that	   claim	   to	   reflect	  
correlations	  between	  independent	  variables	  and	  foreign	  policy	  decisions.	  Her	  strong	  focus	  on	  
agency	  fails	   too	  to	  deliver	  on	   its	  promise,	  as	  the	  human	  decision-­‐makers	  she	  takes	  to	  be	  the	  
agents	  of	  all	  that	  is	  social,	  and	  by	  extension	  international,	  are	  abstracted	  from	  social	  relations	  
that	   constitute	   their	   subjectivity	   as	   individuals	   in	   relation	   to	  other	   individuals.	   The	  matter	   is	  
not	  that	  she	  abstracts;	   it	   is	  rather	  that	  she	  ontologically	  and	  methodologically	  prioritises	  one	  
abstraction	  over	  others,	  mistaking	  it	  for	  the	  concrete.	  	  
The	   failure	   on	   the	   part	   of	   FPA	   scholars	   who	   strived	   to	   propose	   general	   theories	   of	   foreign	  
policy	  by	  combining	  the	  virtues	  of	  both	  systemic	  and	  unit-­‐level	  analyses	   led	  to	  a	  tendency	  to	  
abandon	  this	  aspiration.	  As	  S.	  Smith	  (1986,	  p.21)	  notes,	  general	  theory-­‐oriented	  FPA	  tradition	  
gave	  way	  to	  more	  systemic	  theories	  of	   international	  relations,	  such	  as	  structural	   realism	  and	  
world	  systems	  theory,	  and	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  ‘residual	  FPA	  approach’	  came	  to	  be	  represented	  
by	   ‘middle	   range	   theories’	   that	   concern	   themselves	  with	  a	   smaller	  universe	  of	  determinants	  
and	   abstracted	   sets	   of	   correlations	   between	   foreign	   policy	   decisions	   and	   a	   set	   of	  
predetermined	  areas	  of	  independent	  variables.	  
1.3.	  IR	  
1.3.1.	  Kenneth	  Waltz	  and	  the	  Systemic	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics	  
Systemic	   approaches	   to	   international	   relations	   find	   their	   purest	   expression	   in	   the	   work	   of	  
Kenneth	   Waltz.	   His	   theory	   operates	   at	   the	   most	   general	   level,	   with	   no	   explanatory	   role	  
assigned	  to	  specific	  agents	  or	  their	  actions,	  individually	  or	  collectively.	  Waltz	  himself	  is	  keen	  to	  
distinguish	   the	   theory	  of	   international	  politics	   from	  the	   theory	  of	   foreign	  policy	  according	   to	  
the	   level	   of	   generality	   the	   theory	   requires	   (Waltz	   1979,	   pp.71-­‐73,	   121-­‐23),	   not	   because	   in	  
reality	  foreign	  policy	  and	  international	  politics	  are	  not	  intertwined,	  but	  because	  so	  far	  no	  one	  
has	   come	   up	   with	   a	   satisfactory	   theory	   that	   can	   show	   interrelations	   between	   a	   theory	   of	  
foreign	   policy	   and	   a	   theory	   of	   international	   politics	   (see	   Halliday	   &	   Rosenberg	   1998).	  
Nevertheless,	   like	   all	   other	   structuralist	   theories,	  Waltz’s	   systemic	   approach	   to	   international	  
politics	  has	  some	  very	  crucial	  implications	  for	  foreign	  policy	  analysis	  and	  agency,	  and	  therefore	  
it	  finds	  itself	  a	  place	  in	  textbooks	  on	  foreign	  policy	  (e.g.	  Smith,	  Hadfield	  &	  Dunne	  2008).	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Waltz,	   like	   Rosenau,	   starts	   developing	   his	   systemic	   theory	   partly	   as	   a	   result	   of	   his	  
dissatisfaction	   with	   classical	   realism,	   albeit	   from	   a	   very	   different	   point	   of	   view.	   For	   Waltz,	  
classical	   realism,	   or	   traditionalism,	   for	   all	   its	   contributions	   to	   our	   understanding	   of	  
international	   relations	   by	   virtue	   of	   its	   micro-­‐theories	   of	   anarchy,	   balance	   of	   power,	   etc.,	  
remains	  a	   reductionistic	  approach	  since	   it	  derives	   these	  qualities	  of	   the	   international	   system	  
from	  the	  behaviour	  of	  units,	   thus	   revealing	   its	  underlying	  behaviouralist	  nature	   (Waltz	  1979,	  
pp.62-­‐64).	   Waltz,	   in	   contrast,	   believes	   that	   a	   non-­‐reductionist	   approach	   to	   international	  
politics	   should	   limit	   itself	   to	   the	  properties	  of	   the	   system	  which	   cannot	  be	  derived	   from	   the	  
behaviour	   of	   units,	   ‘nor	   can	   one	   arrive	   at	   an	   understanding	   of	   international	   politics	   by	  
summing	  the	  foreign	  policies	  and	  the	  external	  behaviors	  of	  states’	  (Waltz,	  1979,	  p.64).	  This	  is	  
why,	   argues	   Waltz,	   ‘low-­‐level	   explanations’	   keep	   failing	   to	   account	   for	   the	   ‘sameness’	   of	  
international	   political	   life	   and	   constant	   repetitions	   in	   international	   history	   of	   certain	  
phenomena	  such	  as	  war	  despite	  the	  changing	  qualities	  of	  units	   interacting	  within	  the	  system	  
(Waltz	   1979,	   p.67-­‐68).	   It	   is	   in	   this	   sense	   that,	   for	  Waltz,	   a	   systemic	   theory	   of	   international	  
politics	   can	   and	   should	   be	   developed	   in	   isolation	   from	   a	   theory	   of	   foreign	   policy	   which	  
operates	  at	   the	  unit	   level.	  This	   isolation	   is	  a	  precondition	  of	   theory-­‐building	  although	   it	  does	  
not	   represent	  an	  ontological	   separation	  between	   international	  politics	  and	  domestic	  politics,	  
for	   ‘in	   reality,	   everything	   is	   related	   to	   everything	   else’	   (Waltz	   1979,p.8).	   As	   theory	   cannot	  
reproduce	  reality	  as	  it	  is	  in	  its	  totality,	  it	  should	  isolate	  and	  abstract	  from	  observable	  reality	  its	  
object	   of	   study	   (Waltz	   1979,	   pp.8-­‐9).	   In	   the	   case	   of	   a	   theory	   of	   international	   politics,	   if	   this	  
theory	   is	   not	   isolated	   from	   the	   observable	   reality	   of	   behaviours	   of	   units,	   one	   ends	   up	  with	  
innumerous	  variables	  (Waltz	  1979,	  p.45)	  where	  causes	  and	  effects	  are	  mixed	  up	  (Waltz	  1979,	  
p.78),	  a	  problem	  I	  identified	  earlier	  in	  Rosenau’s	  work.	  This	  can	  be	  remedied	  by	  elegance	  and	  
parsimony,	  both	  of	  which	  come	  about	  by	  ‘creatively’	  identifying	  the	  organizing	  principle	  of	  this	  
seemingly	   unrelated	   pile	   of	   variables	   (Waltz	   1979,	   pp.9-­‐10).	   This	   organizing	   principle	   in	  
international	   politics,	   according	   to	  Waltz,	   is	   anarchy,	  which	   refers	   to	   the	   absence	   of	   ‘agents	  
with	  system-­‐wide	  authority’	  (Waltz	  1979,	  p.88).	  International	  systems	  are	  characterized	  by	  the	  
functional	   likeness	   of	   units,	   unlike	   domestic	   social	   systems,	   which	   are	   organized	   by	   the	  
principle	  of	  hierarchy	  and	  a	   functional	  differentiation	  of	   and	  division	  of	   labour	   among	  units.	  
The	  structure	  of	  the	  system	  conditions	  the	  behaviour	  of	  units	  by	  punishing	  deviant	  behaviour	  
and	   encouraging	   compliant	   behaviour	   (Waltz	   1979,	   p.106).	   The	   international	   system	   is	   also	  
characterised	   by	   a	   balance	   of	   power	   politics,	   which,	   for	   Waltz,	   holds	   in	   any	   system	   which	  
meets	  two	  requirements:	  anarchy	  and	  the	  units’	  will	  to	  survival	  (Waltz	  1979,	  p.121).	  Balance	  of	  
power,	   then,	   is	  an	  unintended	  result	  of	   the	   ‘coaction’	  of	   states,	  all	  of	  which	  are	  assumed	  by	  
Waltz	  to	  be	  maximising	  their	  security	  in	  an	  anarchical	  environment.	  A	  theory	  of	   international	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politics,	   then,	   isolating	   its	   object	   of	   inquiry	   from	   those	   of	   theories	   of	   domestic	   politics	   and	  
foreign	   policy,	   makes	   assumptions	   about	   the	   behaviour	   of	   units;	   it	   does	   not	   explain	   their	  
behaviour	   (Waltz	   1979,	   pp.118-­‐119).	   To	   explain	   unit-­‐level	   processes	   requires	   a	   unit-­‐level	  
theory,	   in	   this	   case	  a	   theory	  of	   the	   state	  and	   its	   foreign	  policy.	   This	   strategy	  of	   isolating	   the	  
system	  from	  its	  constituents	  and	  everything	  else	  makes	  the	  theory	  impervious	  to	  any	  form	  of	  
falsification.	   It	   is	   the	   behaviour	   of	   states	   that,	   wittingly	   or	   unwittingly,	   gives	   rise	   to	   the	  
systemic	   conditions	   which,	   in	   turn,	   constrain	   state	   behaviour,	   yet	   it	   remains	   outside	   the	  
purview	  of	  the	  theory.	   It	   is	  the	  actions	  of	  states	  that	  change	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  system,	  yet	  
again	  they	  remain	  outside	  the	  domain	  of	  international	  politics.	  Although	  the	  number	  of	  great	  
powers	   is	   highly	   dependent	   on	   sub-­‐unit	   level	   processes,	   these	   processes	   are	   also	   left	   out.	  
Structural	   change	   depends	   on	   changes	   in	   the	   relative	   capabilities	   of	   great	   powers,	   but	   the	  
domestic	  sources	  of	  relative	  capabilities	  are	  not	  problematized	  by	  the	  theory.	  Finally,	  system	  
change	  occurs	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  change	  in	  the	  organising	  principle	  of	  the	  system	  from	  anarchy	  to	  
hierarchy,	  which	   can	   be	   identified	   by	   studying	   the	   functional	   differentiation	   of	   states	   in	   the	  
system	  and	  the	  extent	  of	  international	  division	  of	  labour	  if	  there	  is	  any,	  but	  nevertheless	  any	  
such	   study	   is	   dubbed	   reductionist	   from	   the	   outset.	   This	   ‘immunization	   strategy’	   of	  
externalising	  any	  possible	  input	  to	  explanation	  from	  the	  (sub-­‐)unit	  level	  makes	  it	  impossible	  to	  
critically	  engage	  with	  his	  work	  on	  any	  but	  the	  meta-­‐theoretical	  level	  (Teschke	  2003,	  p.15).	  The	  
crux	  of	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  by	  abstracting	  the	  explanandum	  from	  the	  explanantia,	  Waltz	  builds	  
a	   self-­‐enclosed	   theory	   which	   relies	   on	   assumptions	   about	   externalities	   (i.e.	   unit-­‐level	  
properties	  and	  relations)	  which	  happen	  to	  play	  an	  immense	  role	  in	  constituting	  the	  system	  (cf.	  
Wendt	  1999,	  pp.99-­‐105).	  Assumptions	  about	  state	  behaviour	  are	  useful,	  but	  only	  in	  the	  sense	  
that	  they	  allow	  assumptions	  about	  the	  system	  to	  be	  useful.	  This	  circularity	  not	  only	  safeguards	  
the	   theory	   from	  criticism,	  but	  also	  undermines	  any	  explanatory	  power	   it	  has	  both	   regarding	  
the	  system	  and	  the	  behaviour	  of	  units.	  
The	   empirical	   repercussions	   of	   this	   become	   more	   manifest	   in	   Waltz’s	   analyses	   of	   actual	  
international-­‐political	  developments.	  For	  many	  critics	  of	  structural	  realism,	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  
War	  struck	  it	  a	  deadly	  blow,	  and	  empirically	  demonstrated	  that	  it	  was	  markedly	  obsolete.	  This	  
was	   because	   the	   structural	   change	   from	  bipolarity	   to	   unipolarity	   originated	   at	   the	  unit-­‐level	  
when	   the	   Soviet	  Union	   collapsed.	  Waltz	   (1993)	   in	   response	   argues	   that	   the	   end	  of	   the	  Cold	  
War	  was	  due	  to	  a	  combination	  of	  structural	  and	  unit-­‐level	  causes:	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  could	  not	  
economically	  carry	  the	  burden	  of	  an	  externally-­‐induced	  arms	  race	  and	  collapsed	  after	  a	  failed	  
attempt	  at	   internal	  reorganisation	  of	   its	  economy.	  Although	  structural	  change	  brought	  about	  
by	  structural	  factors	  started	  at	  the	  unit-­‐level,	  it	  then	  began	  eroding	  the	  structure	  (Waltz	  1993,	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p.49).	   As	   unit-­‐level	   processes	   cannot	   be	   part	   of	   the	   explanation,	   erosion	   of	   the	   structure	  
explains	   the	   structural	   change.	   Furthermore,	   for	  Waltz,	   structural	   change	   from	   bipolarity	   to	  
unipolarity	  does	  not	  necessarily	  point	  at	  a	  systemic	  change,	  as	  the	  system	  remains	  anarchical,	  
but	   more	   importantly	   because	   ‘international	   politics	   abhors	   unbalanced	   power’	   just	   like	  
‘nature	   abhors	   a	   vacuum’	   (Waltz	   2000;	   see	   also	   Layne	   1993),	   and	   therefore	   balance	   will	  
naturally	  be	  restored	  by	  the	  rise	  of	  new	  powers.	  ‘Both	  friends	  and	  foes	  …	  will	  work	  to	  right	  the	  
balance’	   for	   the	   ‘present	  condition	  of	   international	  politics	   is	  unnatural’	   (Waltz	  1999,	  p.700).	  
‘Sooner	  or	  later,	  usually	  sooner’	  other	  great	  powers	  will	  emerge	  and	  restore	  the	  lost	  balance,	  
and	   if	   a	   potential	   great	   power	   restraints	   itself,	   this	   would	   constitute	   a	   structural	   anomaly	  
(2000,	  p.9)	  and	  anomalies	  are	  penalised	  by	  the	  structure.14	  Although	  Waltz	  admits	  that	  some	  
‘virtuosos’	   such	   as	   Bismarck	   can	   overcome	   systemic	   constraints	   for	   a	   given	   period	   (1986,	  
p.344)	  and	  that	  some	  potential	  great	  powers	  can	  choose	  not	  to	  be	  great	  powers,	  he	  posits	  that	  
the	  balance	  will	  be	   restored	   ‘sooner’	   rather	   than	   later.	  We	  never	  know,	  however,	  how	  soon	  
‘sooner’	   is	   after	   over	   two	   decades.	   In	   a	   word,	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   holds	   when	   there	   is	  
balance	  of	   power,	   and	   similarly,	   systemic	   constraints	  manifest	   themselves	   only	  when	   reality	  
matches	  theory,	  notwithstanding	  the	  initial	  conscious	  separation	  of	  theory	  from	  reality.	  
The	   implication	  of	  Waltz’s	   theory	  of	   international	  politics	   for	   foreign	  policy	   is	   two-­‐fold.	  First,	  
states	   uniformly	   seek	   to	   maintain	   their	   position	   and	   ensure	   their	   survival	   in	   an	   anarchical	  
environment.	  The	  self-­‐help	  system	  forces	  units	  to	  balance.	  Systemic	  imperatives	  override	  any	  
domestic	   source	   of	   foreign	   policy.	   Whatever	   foreign	   policy	   decision	   a	   state	   makes,	   it	  
intentionally	   or	   unintentionally	   serves	   to	   restore	   balance	   in	   international	   politics.	  While	   any	  
state	   behaviour	   that	   overcomes	   systemic	   pressures	   is	   a	   sign	   of	   a	   virtuoso	   in	   action,	   non-­‐
conforming	  state	  behaviour	  is	  anomalous	  and	  likely	  to	  be	  punished	  by	  the	  structure.	  The	  state,	  
as	   the	   primary	   agent	   of	   both	   foreign	   policymaking	   and	   international	   politics,	   is	   tightly	  
constrained	   by	   the	   structure.	   In	   a	   way,	   the	   agency	   is	   almost	   absolutely	   attributed	   to	   the	  
structure	  itself.	  It	   is	  no	  wonder	  that	  Waltz	  often	  refers	  to	  mainstream	  economics	  in	  clarifying	  
his	   arguments:	   building	   analogies	   between	   the	  market	   and	   international	   politics	   on	   the	   one	  
hand,	  and	  between	  the	  firm	  and	  the	  state	  on	  the	  other,	  he	  comes	  up	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  self-­‐
regulating	  international	  system	  with	  its	  balance	  of	  power,	  much	  like	  the	  self-­‐regulating	  market	  
of	   the	   mainstream	   economics	   with	   its	   invisible	   hand	   (cf.	   Rosenberg	   1994,	   pp.139-­‐42).	  
Depriving	   states	   or	   any	   other	   actor	   of	   any	   agency,	   Waltz	   does	   not	   provide	   a	   detailed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  The	  prediction	  by	  Waltz	  and	  other	  neorealists	  (e.g.	  Layne	  1993)	  as	  to	  the	  ascendance	  of	  Japan	  as	  a	  
rival	  to	  the	  US	  has	  been	  refuted	  by	  history	  and	  effectively	  by	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  US,	  and	  it	  was	  not	  the	  
structure,	  but	  the	  US,	  through	  international	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  IMF,	  that	  punished	  Japan	  for	  her	  
system-­‐conforming	  behaviour.	  See	  Gowan	  (1999a,	  p.103-­‐25)	  for	  an	  excellent	  analysis	  of	  the	  1997-­‐98	  
Asian	  crisis	  and	  the	  curbing	  of	  Japanese	  potential	  by	  the	  US.	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description	   of	   the	   structure	   and	   its	   workings,	   arguing	   that	   theory	   means	   omission,	  
simplification,	   assumption	   and	   parsimony	   (Waltz	   2004,	   pp.2-­‐4)	   and	   has	   nothing	   to	   do	   with	  
representing	  reality	   (Waltz	  1979,	  pp.8-­‐9).	  Rejecting	  unit	  and	  sub-­‐unit	   level	  explanations	  even	  
as	   inputs	   to	  a	   larger	  explanatory	   framework	  and	  placing	   the	  ultimate	  and	  exclusive	   focus	  on	  
structural	   explanation	   do	   not	   help	   Waltz	   to	   develop	   a	   better	   theory	   than	   those	   he	   labels	  
reductionist;	   this	  merely	  makes	  his	  version	  a	   reductionism	  of	  a	   larger	  scale	   (cf.	  Wendt	  1987,	  
pp.341-­‐43).	  Concomitant	   to	   this	   large-­‐scale	   reductionism,	   theoretical	   integration	  of	  different	  
levels	  is	  for	  Waltz	  not	  necessarily	  undesirable,	  but	  almost	  impossible	  notwithstanding	  the	  close	  
ontological	   proximity	   and	   interrelatedness	   of	   processes	   of	   foreign	   policy	   and	   international	  
politics.	  
It	   might	   be	   argued	   that	   Hans	   J.	   Morgenthau	   could	   be	   a	   better	   fit	   to	   inquire	   into	   the	   gap	  
between	  FPA	  and	   IR	   in	  realist	   terms	  considering	  his	  hermeneutic	  emplacement	  of	  statesmen	  
as	   agents	   of	   international	   politics	   at	   the	   intersection	   of	   foreign	   policy	   and	   international	  
relations.	  He	  recommends	  an	  empathetic	  understanding	  of	  statesmen	  and,	  where	   this	   is	  not	  
possible,	   a	   vantage	   point	   to	   look	   over	   their	   shoulders	   (Morgenthau	   1985)	   to	   sufficiently	  
appreciate	  their	  contextual	  situatedness	  (cf.	  Behr	  and	  Heath,	  2009,	  pp.327).	  This	  sensitivity	  to	  
the	  role	  of	  circumstances,	  however,	  does	  not	  automatically	  absolve	  him	  of	  the	  reductionism	  of	  
more	  structuralist	  strands	  of	  realism.	  In	  the	  final	  analysis,	  not	  only	  does	  he	  reduce	  politics	  to	  
power	   and	   power	   to	   human	   nature,	   but	   also	   this	   human	   nature	   is	   expressed	   in	   every	  
individual,	  making	   his	   notion	   of	   international	   politics	   ultimately	   a	   version	   of	  methodological	  
individualism	   (Hollis	   and	   Smith,	   1990:	   p.97).	   While	   this	   ultimate	   reliance	   on	   human	   nature	  
could	   be	   played	   down	   as	   having	   no	   central	   role	   in	   his	   theory,	   this	   would	   be	   a	   mistaken	  
conclusion	   considering	   the	   fact	   that	   Morgenthau’s	   more	   central	   notions	   of	   anarchy	   and	  
balance	   of	   power	   and	   the	   resulting	   principle	   of	   realist	   rationality	   are	   all	   emanations	   of	   it.	  
Statesmen	  as	  agents	  are	  only	  mediators	  of	  these	  perennial	  forces	  generated	  by	  the	  universal	  
‘will	   to	   power’.	   Furthermore,	   both	   classical	   realism	   of	  Morgenthau	   and	   neoclassical	   realism	  
seek	   to	   explain	   foreign	   policies	   only	  with	   limited	   regard	   for	   international	   outcomes,	   leaving	  
them,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   neoclassical	   realism,	   to	   the	   predetermined	   mechanisms	   of	   the	  
international	   system,	  while	   problematizing	   the	  mediation	   of	   systemic	  mechanisms	   by	   states	  
(Lobell,	  Ripsman	  and	  Taliaferro,	  2009,	  p.19-­‐21).	  
1.3.2.	  Michael	  Doyle	  and	  the	  Liberal	  Peace	  Thesis	  
Among	  IR	  approaches	  discussed	  in	  this	  chapter,	  Doyle’s	  liberal	  peace	  thesis	  is	  the	  most	  flexible	  
approach,	  in	  that	  it	  freely	  floats	  back	  and	  forth	  between	  levels	  of	  generality	  in	  its	  explanation	  
of	  an	  empirical	  observation	  in	  international	  relations	  in	  the	  last	  two	  centuries.	  This	  observation	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that	  “liberal	  states	  do	  not	  make	  war	  with	  each	  other”	  seeks	  the	  source	  of	  absence	  of	  war	   in	  
foreign	  policies	  of	  liberal	  states	  in	  their	  domestic	  constitution.	  Rooted	  in	  Immanuel	  Kant’s	  1795	  
essay	  ‘Perpetual	  Peace,’	  the	  claim	  is	  that	  states	  with	  republican	  constitutions	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  
resort	   to	   violent	   resolution	   of	   their	   conflicts.	   In	   his	   two-­‐part	   article	   entitled	   ‘Kant,	   Liberal	  
Legacies	   and	   Foreign	   Affairs’	   (Doyle	   1983a	   and	   1983b),	   Doyle	   entertained	   the	   idea	   that	   ‘a	  
separate	  peace	  exists	  among	  liberal	  states’.	  This	  separate	  peace	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  the	  foreign	  
policies	  of	  liberal	  states	  towards	  non-­‐liberal	  states.	  International	  relations	  between	  liberal	  and	  
non-­‐liberal	  states,	  according	  to	  Doyle,	  are	  still	  governed	  by	  the	  premises	  of	  the	  realist	  theory	  
of	  international	  politics:	  anarchy,	  self-­‐help,	  and	  balance	  of	  power.	  	  
For	  Doyle,	  liberal	  peace	  has	  three	  sources	  and	  these	  are	  the	  republican	  constitutions	  of	  liberal	  
states,	   which	   place	   checks	   on	   governments	   to	   act	   in	   restraint,	   international	   law	   within	   a	  
federation	  of	  republican	  states	  arising	  out	  of	  the	  ‘ideological	  commitment’	  of	  liberal	  states	  to	  
human	   rights	   and	   rights	   of	   other	   liberal	   states	   as	   moral	   persons,	   and	   cosmopolitan	   law	  
ensuring	  that	  all	   liberal	  states	  recognise	  that	  free	  trade	  and	  ensuing	  interdependence,	  rather	  
than	   war,	   is	   the	   best	   way	   to	   further	   the	   interests	   of	   all	   (Doyle	   1983a;	   2005).	   Furthermore,	  
claims	  Doyle,	   the	  world	  market	   partially	   ‘removes’	   rivalries	   of	   an	   economic	   nature	   from	   the	  
domain	   of	   action	   of	   states,	   thereby	   reducing	   the	   likelihood	   of	   interstate	   conflict	   between	  
liberal	   states	   (1983a,	   p.231).	   These	   three	   causal	   mechanisms	   together,	   but	   only	   together,	  
explain	  the	  absence	  of	  war	  among	  liberal	  states	  (Doyle	  2005),	  which	  according	  to	  an	  observer	  
is	  the	  closest	  thing	  ‘we	  have	  to	  an	  empirical	  law	  in	  international	  relations’	  (Levy	  1988,	  p.662).	  
They	  do,	  however,	  fight	  non-­‐liberal	  states	  for	  two	  related	  reasons.	  First,	  the	  security	  dilemma	  
caused	   by	   anarchy	   still	   reigns	   outside	   the	   pacific	   zone,	   and,	   following	   from	   this,	   ‘the	   very	  
constitutional	   restraint,	   shared	  commercial	   interests,	   and	   international	   respect	   for	   individual	  
rights	   that	   promote	   peace	   among	   liberal	   societies	   can	   exacerbate	   conflicts	   in	   relations	  
between	  liberal	  and	  non-­‐liberal	  societies’	  (Doyle	  1983b,	  pp.324-­‐25;	  1986).	  
The	   democratic	   peace	   thesis	   attracted	   a	   variety	   of	   criticisms	   ranging	   from	   statistical	  
insignificance	   (Spiro	   1994)	   to	   selectivity	   in	   choosing	   cases	   (Layne	   1994)	   and	   exhibiting	  
definitional	   problems	   (Layne	   1994;	   Owen	   1994).15	  Doyle,	   as	  mentioned	   above,	   starts	   with	   a	  
statistical	   empirical	   observation	   and	   attempts	   to	   explain	   it	   by	   proposing	   three	   causal	  
mechanisms	  which	   respectively	   operate	   at	   domestic,	   international,	   and	   transnational	   levels.	  
Confirmation	  of	  the	  thesis	  is	  made	  again	  through	  statistical	  analysis.	  The	  objections	  raised	  by	  
Layne	  and	  Owen	  about	   the	   lack	  of	  clarity	   in	  definitions	  of	  central	   concepts,	   such	  as	  war	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  For	  a	  reply	  to	  criticisms	  by	  Doyle	  and	  Russett,	  another	  proponent	  of	  democratic	  peace	  thesis,	  and	  a	  
rejoinder	  by	  the	  critics	  see	  Russett,	  Layne,	  Spiro	  and	  Doyle	  (1995).	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democracy,	   in	  the	  democratic	  peace	  thesis	  are	  significant,	  not	  because	  they	  are	  a	  product	  of	  
‘intellectual	   suppleness’	   (Layne	   1994,	   p.40),	   but	   more	   crucially	   because	   these	   concepts	   are	  
formal	  abstractions	  devoid	  of	  historical	  content.	  It	  does	  not	  bother	  Doyle,	  for	  example,	  that	  it	  
was	  the	  democratic	  constitution	  of	  Wilhelmine	  Germany	  that	  not	  only	   failed	  to	  prevent	  war,	  
but	  also	  prepared	  the	  ground	  for	  war	  through	  the	  democratic	  pursuit	  of	  interests	  by	  different	  
interest	   groups	   in	   society	   (Waltz	   1991,	   pp.669-­‐70).16	  He	   goes	   to	   great	   lengths	   to	   argue	  why	  
German	  foreign	  policy	  was	  not	  liberal	  although	  its	  domestic	  policy	  was	  (Doyle	  1983a,	  pp.216-­‐
17n8).	   The	   lack	   of	   historical	   sensitivity	   also	   partially	   vindicates	   the	   statistical	   insignificance	  
charge	  raised	  by	  Spiro	  (1994).	  ‘Wars	  are	  rare’	  (Layne	  1994)	  and	  even	  rarer	  were	  democracies	  
in	   three-­‐fourths	   of	   the	   period	   that	   the	   liberal	   peace	   thesis	   purports	   to	   account	   for.17	  The	  
matter	  is	  not	  so	  much	  that	  this	  compromises	  the	  statistical	  strength	  of	  the	  thesis;	  the	  problem	  
is	  rather	  the	  transposition	  of	  an	  observed	  statistical	  correlation	  in	  the	  contemporary	  world	  to	  a	  
period	  encompassing	  two	  centuries	  when	  not	  only	  the	  content	  of	  concepts	  such	  as	  democracy,	  
war,	  and	  peace	  varied,	  but	  also	  when	  agents	  including	  states,	  their	  strategies,	  and	  capabilities	  
of	  actors	  were	  different.	  
Empirically,	   this	  also	  underpins	   the	   failure	   to	  appreciate	  post-­‐World	  War	   II	   reorganisation	  of	  
the	   transatlantic	   international	  order	  and	   the	   role	  of	   the	  United	  States	   in	   it	   as	  a	  qualitatively	  
different	  explanation	  of	  absence	  of	  war	  among	   liberal	  states.	  Notwithstanding	  his	  awareness	  
of	   the	  preeminent	   role	   the	  US	  played	   in	  constructing	   the	   liberal	   international	  order,	  and	  the	  
potential	   dangers	   for	   liberal	   peace	   a	   declining	  American	  hegemony	  may	  pose	   (Doyle	   1983a,	  
pp.232-­‐33),	  he	  fails	  to	  drive	  this	  home	  and	  insists	  on	  the	  complementarity	  of	  his	  three	  causal	  
mechanisms	   (cf.	   Rosato	   2003).	   It	   is	   the	   historically-­‐specific	   institutional	   and	   international	  
political-­‐economic	  arrangement	  made	  after	  WW	  II	  under	  the	  aegis	  of	  the	  American	  state	  that	  
has	  underwritten	  the	  absence	  of	  wars	  among	  major	  capitalist	  liberal	  states	  since	  then	  (Panitch	  
and	  Gindin	  2005;	  cf.	  Ikenberry	  2001).	  
Methodologically,	   although	   Doyle	   (1983a;	   1986;	   1997)	   persistently	   claims	   that	   none	   of	   the	  
three	   sources	  of	   foreign	  policy	  behaviour	  of	   liberal	   states	  are	   sufficient	   to	  explain	  or	   sustain	  
peace	  among	  them	  by	  themselves,	  he	  does	  not	  show	  how	  these	  three	  causes	  are	  related.	  One	  
may	  infer	  from	  his	  definition	  of	  liberalism	  that	  for	  him	  all	  three	  causes	  are	  reducible	  to	  the	  first	  
cause.	  Liberalism	  for	  Doyle	  (1983a,	  p.206)	  is	  an	  ‘ideology’	  and	  a	  ‘set	  of	  institutions’	  organised	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Layne	  (1994,	  pp.42-­‐44)	  compares	  the	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making	  process	  of	  Wilhelmine	  Germany	  
with	  those	  of	  Britain	  and	  France	  and	  concludes	  that	  their	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  were	  as	  unchecked	  
as	  that	  of	  Germany.	  	  
17	  Russett	  (1993,	  pp.20-­‐21)	  recognises	  this	  difference	  between	  the	  first	  150	  years	  of	  ‘democratic	  peace’	  
and	  the	  peace	  of	  the	  post-­‐1945	  period,	  but	  explains	  it	  in	  reference	  to	  a	  perfection	  of	  democracies.	  	  
	  	  
24	  
around	  this	  ideology.	  Norms	  and	  values	  associated	  with	  this	  ideology,	  along	  with	  domestic	  and	  
international	   institutions	   they	   create,	   have	   the	   dual	   effect	   on	   the	   foreign	   policies	   of	   liberal	  
states:	   friendship	   towards	   liberal	   states	   and	   aggression	   towards	   non-­‐liberal	   states.	   In	   this	  
sense,	  at	  the	  root	  of	  all	   three	  causes	   lies	   liberal	   ideology.18	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  he	  admits	  that	  
the	   primary	   danger	   to	   liberal	   peace	   may	   arise	   out	   of	   diminishing	   US	   pre-­‐eminence,	   both	  
militarily	   and	   economically.	   He	   tasks	   major	   liberal	   powers	   with	   maintaining	   the	   domestic	  
constitution	  of	  other	  liberal	  states	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  change	  of	  leadership	  (Doyle	  1983a:	  234-­‐35),	  
prioritising	   one	   source	   of	   foreign	   policy	   over	   others	   and	   thereby	   undermining	   his	   own	  
tripartite	  causal	  mechanism.	  
In	   brief,	   the	   sources	   of	   foreign	   policymaking	   listed	   by	   Doyle	   are	   left	   unintegrated.	   Assessed	  
against	   actual	   history,	   their	   alleged	   complementarity	   is	   unsustainable,	   as	   are	   the	   levels	   of	  
analysis	  that	  show	  these	  causes	  as	  related	  to	  one	  another,	  although	  he	  freely	  moves	  between	  
them	   in	   picking	   causes.	   Only	   by	   inference	   can	   we	   reach	   the	   conclusion	   that	   direction	   of	  
causality	  is	  from	  the	  domestic	  to	  the	  transnational.	  The	  zones	  of	  peace	  and	  war	  compel	  liberal	  
states	   to	   act	   in	   specific	   ways,	   depriving	   them	   of	   any	   agency	   in	   their	   external	   relations.	   The	  
actions	   of	   non-­‐liberal	   states	   are	   already	   given	   by	   the	   realist	   state	   of	   nature	   with	   all	   its	  
problematic	  baggage,	  evaluated	   in	  the	  preceding	  section.	   Indifference	  to	  historical	  specificity	  
undermines	   both	   the	   explanatory	   power	   of	   the	   democratic	   peace	   thesis	   due	   to	   incorrect	  
historical	   generalisation,	   and	   its	   ability	   to	   account	   for	   the	   rich	   diversity	   of	   foreign	   policy	  
behaviour	  of	  states.	  
1.3.3.	  Alexander	  Wendt	  and	  the	  ‘Social’	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics19	  
Among	  the	  approaches	  to	  foreign	  policy	  and	  international	  relations	  we	  have	  covered	  thus	  far,	  
Alexander	   Wendt’s	   constructivist	   theory	   of	   international	   politics	   is	   by	   far	   the	   most	  
sophisticated,	   with	   its	   explicit	   problematisation	   of	   meta-­‐theoretical	   and	   theoretical	   issues	  
central	   to	   social	   scientific	   research	   in	   general,	   and	   to	   the	   study	   of	   international	   politics	   in	  
particular.	   Wendt’s	   ‘social’	   theory	   of	   international	   politics	   aims	   at	   developing	   a	   holistic	  
approach	   to	   international	   relations,	   and	   to	   that	   extent	   is	   comparable	   to	   Waltz’s	   project	   in	  
scope,	  but	  is	  richer	  in	  content	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  he	  wishes	  to	  fill	  the	  ‘empty	  vessel’	  that	  is	  the	  
anarchical	   system	   (Wendt	   1999,	   p.249)	   by	   providing	   a	   sociology	   of	   it.	   He	   develops	   his	  
argument	  building	  upon	  dichotomies	  found	  in	  implicit	  and	  explicit	  ontologies	  of	  approaches	  in	  
the	   field.	   Two	   such	   central	   dichotomies	   are	   materialism-­‐idealism	   and	   individualism-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Russett,	  for	  instance,	  admits	  that	  by	  repeating	  liberal	  norms	  as	  ‘descriptive	  principles’	  he	  aims	  to	  
‘make	  them	  true’	  (Russett	  1993,	  pp.136-­‐37).	  
19	  It	  is	  crucial	  to	  note	  from	  the	  outset	  that	  in	  Wendtian	  terms	  ‘social’	  refers	  exclusively	  to	  inter-­‐
subjectively	  constructed	  ideational	  or	  cultural	  structures.	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holism/structuralism.	  Positioning	  his	  theory	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  holism	  and	  idealism,	  Wendt	  
goes	  on	  to	  construct	  his	  structural	  idealism.	  The	  whole	  project,	  arguably,	  is	  about	  formulating	  
this	  structural	  idealism	  and	  showing	  its	  implications	  for	  the	  study	  of	  international	  politics.	  	  
Critical	  of	  neorealism’s	  exclusive	  focus	  on	  material	  determinants	  in	  explaining	  the	  structure	  of	  
the	  international	  system,	  Wendt	  is	  no	  more	  satisfied	  with	  neoliberalism’s	  introduction	  of	  ideas	  
and	  institutions	  than	  with	  their	  explanation	  of	  international	  regimes,	  albeit	  praising	  neoliberals	  
for	   seeing	   ideas	   as	   ‘relatively	   autonomous’	   factors	   (Wendt	   1999,	   pp.92-­‐93).	   More	  
fundamentally,	  Wendt	   challenges	   the	   content	  of	   the	  material	   and	   the	   ideational	   as	   they	  are	  
generally	   used	   in	   the	   social	   sciences.	   Dividing	   the	   ‘stuff’	   that	   the	   world	   is	   made	   up	   of	   into	  
categories	   of	   material	   and	   ideational,	   he	   bases	   this	   radical	   ontological	   separation	   on	   the	  
Cartesian	   separation	   of	   body	   and	  mind.	   This	   distinction	   has	   an	   important	   bearing	   upon	   his	  
resolution	  of	  the	  agent-­‐structure	  problem.	  Unconventionally,	  Wendt	  limits	  the	  content	  of	  the	  
material	  to	  what	  he	  calls	   ‘brute	  material	  forces’	  and	  expands	  the	  ideational	  to	  encompass	  all	  
else	   that	   exists.	   According	   to	   this	   view,	   although	   central	   categories	   of	   IR,	   i.e.	   power	   and	  
interests,	  stand	  on	  a	  material	  base,	  they	  are	  constituted	  by	  ideas	  because	  their	  material	  aspect	  
acquires	   meaning	   only	   through	   ideas.	   Structures,	   in	   this	   sense,	   are	   ultimately	   cultural	  
structures,	   although	   an	   analytical	   distinction	   between	   material	   structures,	   interest-­‐based	  
structures	  and	  ideational	  structures	  can	  be	  made	  (Wendt	  1999,	  p.139).	  	  
Regarding	   the	   agent-­‐structure	   problem,	  Wendt’s	   central	   claim	   about	   mainstream	   IR	   is	   that	  
they	  are	  closer	  to	  individualism	  than	  holism.	  This	  holds	  counter-­‐intuitively	  for	  Waltz’s	  systemic	  
theory	  too,	  in	  view	  of	  Waltz’s	  strategy	  of	  basing	  his	  theory	  of	  the	  system	  on	  assumptions	  about	  
units.	  Theories	  with	  individualist	  ontologies,	  Wendt	  maintains,	  prioritise	  agency	  over	  structure,	  
leading	  to	  a	  disregard	  for	  the	  constitutive	  effect	  of	  structure	  over	  agents;	  structures	  for	  Wendt	  
also	   constitute	   agents	   as	   agents.	   Structural-­‐functionalist	   theories	   such	   as	   the	   world-­‐system	  
approach	   developed	   by	   Wallerstein,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   provide	   a	   solution	   to	   the	   agent-­‐
structure	   problem	   by	   prioritising	   whole	   over	   parts,	   albeit	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   making	   agents	  
merely	   passive	   instruments	   of	   the	   structure,	   and	   their	   actions	   mere	   instantiations	   and	  
expressions	   of	   the	   whole,	   resulting	   in	   a	   reification	   of	   the	   structure.	   Against	   both	   positions,	  
Wendt	   proposes	   a	   third,	   which	   does	   not	   ontologically	   prioritise	   either	   agency	   or	   structure.	  
Instead,	  claims	  Wendt	  (1987),	  agents	  and	  structures	  should	  be	  given	  ‘equal	  ontological	  status’	  
by	  being	  posited	  as	  ‘mutually	  constituted’	  and	  ‘co-­‐determined	  entities’.20	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Elsewhere	  Wendt	  (1999,	  pp.243-­‐44)	  argues	  that	  states	  as	  agents	  are	  to	  be	  given	  ontological	  priority	  
when	  doing	  systemic	  theorising.	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Key	  to	  Wendt’s	  theorisation	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  structures	  and	  agents	  is	  the	  distinction	  he	  
makes	   between	   causation	   and	   constitution.	   While	   causal	   relations	   are	   external	   relations	  
between	   ‘self-­‐organized’	   independent	   entities,	   one	   of	   which	   is	   chronologically	   prior	   to	   the	  
other,	  constitutive	  relations	  are	  internal	  relations	  between	  a	  structure	  and	  its	  parts,	  the	  status	  
of	   the	   latter	  dependent	  on	   their	   relation	   to	   the	   former.	   Causal	   explanations	   raise	   ‘why’	   and	  
‘how’	  questions,	  whereas	  constitutive	  explanations	  raise	   ‘what’	  and	   ‘how	  possible’	  questions	  
and	   are	   interested	   in	   the	   conditions	   of	   possibility	   of	   the	  explanandum	  within	   a	   constraining	  
and	   enabling	   structure.	   The	   natural	   world	   is	   composed	   of	   entirely	   self-­‐organized,	   mind-­‐
independent	  material	  entities	  and	  the	  social	  world	  is	  composed	  of	  partly	  self-­‐organised,	  partly	  
externally	  (i.e.	   in	  Wendtian	  parlance	  ‘socially’)	  constituted	  ideational	  entities	  (such	  as	  states),	  
with	  the	  relative	  weight	  of	  this	  internal-­‐external	  constitution	  differing	  in	  degrees	  according	  to	  
the	   object	   of	   study.	   This	   does	   not	   mean,	   however,	   that	   the	  material	   world	   requires	   causal	  
explanation	  and	  the	  social	  world	  constitutive	  explanation,	  
since	   it	   is	   wrong	   to	   think	   that	  material	   conditions	   imply	   causal	   theorizing	   and	   ideas	  
imply	   constitutive	   theorizing.	   Both	   kinds	   of	   stuff	   have	   both	   causal	   and	   constitutive	  
effects.	   Ideas	   have	   constitutive	   effects	   insofar	   as	   they	  make	   social	   kinds	   possible	  ….	  
differences	  between	   those	   [causal	   and	   constitutive]	   questions	   cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	  
the	  differences	  between	  physical	  substances	  and	  ideas…	  Things	  get	  caused	  in	  society	  
just	  as	  much	  as	  things	  get	  constituted	  in	  nature	  (Wendt	  1998,	  pp.107-­‐108).	  
Constitutive	  theory	  for	  Wendt	  (1999,	  p.87)	  is	  not	  a	  rival	  to	  causal	  theory;	  rather	  it	  provides	  the	  
‘basis	  for	  causal	  explanation’.	  Ontologically	  too,	  constitution	  by	  structures	   is	  that	  which	  gives	  
agents	   their	   causal	   powers.	   Wendt’s	   structural	   approach,	   unlike	   the	   Waltzian	   version,	  
differentiates	  between	  a	  micro-­‐level	  of	   interaction	  among	  units	  and	  a	  macro-­‐level	  of	   system	  
irreducible	  to	  interactions,	  but	  constituted	  by	  them.	  The	  effect	  of	  the	  former	  structure	  on	  the	  
agents	   is	   behavioural	   and	   causal;	   the	   latter	   has	   a	   constitutive	   effect	   on	   the	   identities	   and	  
interests	  of	  agents	  (Wendt	  1999,	  pp.189-­‐90).	  	  
States,	   in	   this	   sense,	   although	  partly	   constituted	  by	   the	   international	   system	   (external	   social	  
structure),	   are	   essentially	   constituted	   in	   virtue	   of	   their	   (internal)	   self-­‐organisation,	   and	   self-­‐
organised	  entities	  ‘resist	  denial	  and	  misrepresentation’	  (Wendt	  1999,	  p.73)	  generating	  in	  time	  
external	   recognition,	   thus	  becoming	  more	   fundamentally	   constituted	  by	   the	   structure.	   State	  
behaviour	   accordingly	   is	   also	   caused	   by	   the	   structure	   to	   a	   certain	   extent.	   Taking	   states	   as	  
unitary	   and	   intentional	   actors,	  Wendt	   argues	   that	   the	   cultural	   structure	   of	   the	   international	  
political	   system	   does	   not	   directly	   constitute	   states	   until	   the	   norms	   of	   this	   culture	   (enmity,	  
rivalry	  or	  friendship)	  are	  collectively	  seen	  as	  legitimate	  –the	  ultimate	  degree	  of	  internalisation.	  
Anarchy	  defined	  as	  the	  absence	  of	  central	  authority	   lacks	  content	  and	  can	  only	  be	  filled	  by	  a	  
distribution	  of	   ideas.	   The	   structure	   of	   the	   system	  has	   its	   constitutive	   power	   not	   in	   virtue	   of	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anarchy	  per	   se,	  but	   thanks	   to	  a	  dominance	  of	  a	   shared	  set	  of	   ideas	  composing	   international	  
political	   culture.	   Structural	   change	   occurs	   when	   the	   collective	   identity	   associated	   with	   the	  
dominant	   political	   culture	   changes,	   and	   ‘master	   variables’	   of	   a	   new	   collective	   identity	  
formation	   are	   ‘interdependence,	   common	   fate,	   homogeneity,	   and	   self-­‐restraint’,	   the	   latter	  
playing	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  connection	  with	  any	  of	  the	  former	  three	  (Wendt	  1999,	  p.343).	  
Two	  problems	  crop	  up	   immediately	  and	  both	  are	   fundamental	   to	  Wendt’s	  argument:	   (1)	  his	  
radical	  ontological	  separation	  of	  the	  material	  and	  the	  ideational,	  and	  (2)	  his	  juxtaposition	  of	  a	  
dynamic	  category	  of	  agency	  constantly	  in	  motion	  with	  a	  static	  category	  of	  structure,	  ultimately	  
requiring	  a	  synthetic	  category	  of	  process.	  At	  pains	   to	  apply	  scientific	   realism	  to	   international	  
relations	   and	   social	   theory,	   and	   simultaneously	   willing	   to	   remain	   loyal	   to	   constructivist	  
premises,	  Wendt	  reduces	  human	  activity	  to	  intersubjective	  ideational	  activity.	  The	  distinction	  
made	  at	  the	  ontological	  level	  is	  not	  sustainable,	  as	  becomes	  conspicuous	  in	  Wendt’s	  conflicting	  
statements	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  separation.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  he	  maintains	  that	  material	  
forces	   in	   social	   matters	   are	   constituted	   by	   the	   ideas	   which	   give	   them	   their	   causal	   powers,	  
while	  on	  the	  other	  he	  claims	  that	  material	  forces	  have	  independent	  causal	  powers	  in	  virtue	  of	  
their	   self-­‐organised	   independent	  existence	   (cf.	   S.	   Smith	  2000).	  Nor	  does	  he	  provide	  a	  better	  
explanation	  for	  his	  retreat	  into	  the	  Cartesian	  mind-­‐body	  duality	  than	  stating	  that	  it	  is	  necessary	  
for	   want	   of	   a	   better	   way	   of	   being	   a	   scientific	   realist	   (Wendt	   1999,	   p.112).	   This	   attempt	   to	  
ontologically	  separate	  the	  material	  and	  the	  ideational	  makes	  him	  divorce	  human	  beings	  from	  
any	  relation	  to	  nature,	  aside	  from	  their	  universal	  characteristics	  as	  a	  species-­‐being.	  In	  Wendt’s	  
theory,	  only	  biologically-­‐specified	  human	  nature	  remains	  a	  material	  part	  of	  the	  explanation	  in	  
social	  life.	  	  
Secondly,	   for	   all	   his	   emphasis	   on	   the	   ‘mutual	   constitution’	   of	   agency	   and	   structure,	   there	   is	  
little	  in	  his	  work	  which	  shows	  how	  agents	  actively	  constitute	  and	  transform	  structures,	  for	  his	  
conception	   of	   structure	   is	   static,	   synchronic	   and	   ‘logical’.	   Banishing	   spatio-­‐temporality	   from	  
relations	  of	  constitution	  to	  relations	  of	  causality,	  he	  cuts	  off	  agents	   from	  structures	   in	  actual	  
history.	  A	  mediating	  category,	  process,	  is	  introduced	  to	  reconnect	  them,	  but	  it	  is	  quite	  difficult	  
to	  see	  how	  this	  will	  happen	  considering	  the	  irreducibility	  of	  macro-­‐level	  structure	  of	  culture	  to	  
micro-­‐level	   relations	   between	   units.	   His	   claim	   to	   provide	   a	   ‘social’	   theory	   of	   international	  
politics	  does	  not	   live	  up	   to	   its	  promise,	  as	  micro-­‐	  and	  macro-­‐	   level	   structures	  are	  abstracted	  
from	   unit-­‐level	   processes,	   and	   behaviours	   from	   their	   concrete	   content.	   The	   distinction	  
between	  causation	  and	  constitution	  as	  explanatory	  rather	  than	  interpretive	  modes	  of	  analysis	  
also	   generates	   problems	   for	   Wendt’s	   solution	   of	   the	   agency-­‐structure	   problem.	   While	   he	  
posits	   that	   structures	   both	   constitute	   identities	   and	   interests	   of	   agents	   and	   cause	   their	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behaviour,	   the	   ‘mechanisms’	   through	  which	   these	   effects	   of	   structures	   over	   agents	   are	   not	  
clear,	   considering	   that	   causation	   presupposes	   independent	   entities	   in	   a	   spatio-­‐temporal	  
context,	  unlike	  constitutive	  relations	  which	  presuppose	  co-­‐existence.	  
Finally,	  the	  ‘mutual	  constitution’	  claim	  fails	  to	  make	  any	  contribution	  to	  the	  discussion.	  This	  is	  
primarily	  due	   to	  a	  view	  of	   the	  agent-­‐structure	  problem	  as	  agency-­‐in-­‐general	  vs.	   structure.	   In	  
order	  to	  illustrate	  the	  relation	  of	  mutual	  constitution	  between	  states	  and	  international	  political	  
culture	   as	   the	   macro-­‐level	   structure	   of	   the	   international	   system,	  Wendt	   argues	   that	   where	  
international	  political	  culture	  is	  characterised	  by	  enmity,	  rivalry,	  or	  friendship,	  states	  will	  also	  
take	   on	   identities	   respectively	   of	   enemies,	   rivals,	   or	   friends.	   Since	   structures	   (here,	  
international	   political	   cultures)	   are	   constituted	  by	   processes	   of	   collective	   identity	   formation,	  
they	   will	   be	   characterised	   by	   enmity,	   rivalry,	   or	   friendship	   when	   states	   construct	   their	  
identities	  as	  enemies,	  rivals,	  or	  friends.	  What	  is	  claimed	  to	  be	  a	  relation	  of	  mutual	  constitution	  
seems	   in	   fact	   to	  be	  a	   relation	  of	  circularity	  and	  sameness	   (cf.	  Suganami	  2006,	  pp.68-­‐69).	  For	  
states	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  like	  units,	  and	  are	  counter-­‐posed	  in	  aggregate	  to	  the	  structure.	  This	  
failure	   is	   a	   result	   of	   Wendt’s	   inattentiveness	   to	   the	   specificity	   of	   different	   agents,	   each	   of	  
whom	  stands	   in	  a	  different	  relation	  to	  one	  another	  and	  to	  existing	   international	   institutional	  
equilibrium	   (or	   in	   Wendt’s	   terms,	   international	   political	   culture).	   Temporarily	   leaving	   aside	  
unit-­‐level	  processes	  and	  properties	  may	  be	  a	  useful	  theoretical	  strategy,	  but	  when	  the	  relation	  
between	  agents	  and	  structures	  are	  built	  on	  this	  basis,	  any	  later	  re-­‐introduction	  of	  these	  after	  
the	  constitution	  of	  agents	  and	  structures	  as	  distinct	  but	  interrelated	  entities,	  will	  not	  allow	  the	  
establishment	  of	  these	  as	  mutually	  constitutive.	  
Wendt,	  just	  like	  Waltz,	  is	  not	  directly	  interested	  in	  explaining	  state	  behaviour.	  His	  primary	  aim	  
is	   to	   develop	   a	   systemic	   theory	   of	   international	   politics.	   Although	   he	   develops	   a	   very	  
sophisticated	   and	   versed	   ontology	   of	   agency	   and	   structure,	   abstracting	   two	   higher	   levels	   of	  
analysis	   from	  a	   lower	   level	  of	  analysis,	  he	   fails	   to	  deliver	  on	  his	  promise	  of	   filling	  the	   ‘empty	  
vessel’	  of	   international	   structure	  with	  social	   content.	  Even	   though	  he	  explicitly	   registers	   that	  
his	   approach	   leaves	   out	   considerations	   of	   state	   external	   behaviour	   and	   foreign	   policy,	   his	  
explanation	   of	   the	   relation	   between	   culture	   and	   identity	  makes	   implicit	   assumptions	   about	  
foreign	  policy,	  albeit	  at	  a	  very	  general	  level.	  States,	  in	  this	  sense,	  display	  a	  disposition	  towards	  
shared	  identity	  properties	  constituted	  by	  international	  political	  structure.	  In	  this	  respect,	  with	  
no	  theory	  of	  state	  and	  domestic	  level	  processes	  states	  qua	  agents	  seem	  to	  be	  not	  constituted,	  
but	  caused	  by	  the	  system.	  
While	  Wendt’s	   interest	   in	  ontology	   is	   an	  exception	  among	   constructivists,	   he	   is	  not	   alone	   in	  
separating	   what	   is	   called	   the	   ‘brute	   or	   natural	   facts’	   from	   social	   relations	   (Guzzini,	   2000,	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p.160).	   What	   differentiates	   him	   from	   other	   constructivists	   is	   that	   he	   seeks	   to	   find	   ways	   to	  
incorporate	   ontology	   and	   epistemology	   in	   light	   of	   his	   critical	   realist	   perspective,	   however	  
unsuccessful.	   Regarding	   the	   separation	   itself,	   the	   reduction	   of	   the	   intersubjective	   social	  
content	  to	  consensual	  norm	  and	  institution	  formation	  and	  recognition	  (e.g.	  Ashley	  1984),	  and	  
the	   disregard	   for	   the	   conflictual	   nature	   of	   this	   intersubjectivity,	   other	   constructivists	   share	  
Wendt’s	  position.	  	  
1.4.	  Conclusion	  
This	  chapter	  explored	  the	  theoretical	  gap	  between	  FPA	  and	  IR	  theories.	  The	  gap	  is	  important,	  
for	   as	   the	   foregoing	   survey	  of	   literature	   shows,	  no	   student	  of	   either	   field	   can	  dispense	  with	  
what	  is	  considered	  as	  belonging	  to	  the	  other	  field,	  without	  at	  least	  making	  assumptions	  about	  
it.	  This	  generates	  a	  need	   to	   raise	   this	   issue	  particularly	   in	   reference	   to	   larger	  social	   scientific	  
concerns	   such	   as	   the	   agent-­‐structure	   and	   level	   of	   analysis	   problems,	   since	   any	   attempt	   to	  
integrate	   these	   two	   theoretical	  enterprises	  evokes	  questions	   regarding	   the	   relation	  between	  
actors	   and	   their	   contexts	   of	   action,	   status	   of	   states	   and	   individuals	   as	   agents,	   and	   relations	  
between	  multiple	  determinants.	  Most	  of	  the	  time,	  these	  questions	  have	  carried	  the	  discussion	  
to	  meta-­‐theoretical	  domains	  of	  ontology	  and	  epistemology.	  	  
One	   crucial	   conclusion	   that	   emerges	   from	   this	   literature	   review	   is	   that	   all	   authors	   surveyed	  
here	  at	   least	  make	  assumptions	  at	  every	   level,	   albeit	   focusing	  primarily	  on	  one	  of	   them	  and	  
abstracting	   it	   from	   the	  others.	  Added	   to	   this	   is	   the	   static	  nature	  of	   their	   faulty	   abstractions.	  
This	   is	   an	   indication	   that	   foreign	   policy	   and	   international	   relations	   cannot	   be	   theorised	  
separately.	  Nor	  can	  they	  be	  bridged	  after	  their	  respective	  constitution	  as	  abstract	  fields.	  They	  
should	  be	  thought	  of	   together,	  as	  parts	  of	  human	  sociality.	  A	  perspective	  that	  places	  human	  
social	  action	  at	   the	  centre	  of	   the	  analysis	   is	   required.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	   that	  human	  social	  
action	  is	  reducible	  to	  the	  actions	  of	  individuals;	  on	  the	  contrary,	  it	  calls	  for	  a	  meta-­‐theoretical	  
discussion	  of	  the	  constitution	  of	  human	  social	  action.	  Placing	  human	  social	  action	  at	  the	  centre	  
also	   problematizes	   the	   agent-­‐structure	   problem	   in	   a	   different	   way	   by	   emphasising	   the	  
specificity	  of	  agents.	  Coupled	  with	  historical	  specificity,	  such	  emphasis	  on	  agential	  specificity	  is	  
the	   key	   to	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   the	   relation	   between	   foreign	   policy	   and	   international	  
relations.	  This	  does	  not	   imply	  a	  return	  to	  historical	  single	  country	  case	  studies;	  rather	   it	  calls	  
for	   a	   research	   question-­‐guided	   inquiry	   into	   the	   specificity	   of	   agents	   (particularly	   of	   states)	  
based	   on	   their	   relations	   with	   other	   agents.	   Only	   in	   the	   context	   of	   these	   relations	   can	   we	  
genuinely	  account	  for	  the	  specificity	  of	  agents.	  The	  gap	  between	  IR	  and	  FPA,	  I	  conclude,	  arises	  
because	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  theorisation	  at	  the	  level	  of	  interaction,	  where	  interaction	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  
relations	   among	   states	   as	   like	   units,	   but	   encompasses	   the	   whole	   social	   relations	   of	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reproduction,	   thereby	   providing	   theory	   with	   genuine	   social	   content.	   A	   historical	   materialist	  
dialectic,	  as	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	   is	  the	  best	  candidate	  to	  develop	  such	  a	  research	  
perspective	  that	  can	  close	  this	  gap.	  Dialectic,	  with	  its	  focus	  on	  relations,	  its	  sensitivity	  to	  actual,	  
concrete	   historically	   specific	   relations,	   and	   its	   view	   of	   actors	   as	   standing	   in	   determinate	  
relations	   with	   other	   actors,	   will	   be	   able	   to	   integrate	   foreign	   policy-­‐making	   as	   an	   aspect	   of	  
human	   sociality,	   with	   the	   international	   as	   the	   relational	   aspect	   of	   this	   form	   of	   sociality.
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2.	  THE	  REAL	  ABSTRACT	  AND	  THE	  DIALECTIC	  OF	  THE	  CONCRETE:	  
THEORISING	  THE	  GAP	  
2.1.	  Introduction	  
The	  first	  chapter	  explored	  the	  gap	  between	  two	  ways	  of	  theorising	  that	  field	  of	  human	  activity	  
that	  involves	  relations	  between	  societies,	  namely	  FPA	  and	  IR.	  Attempts	  to	  theoretically	  bridge	  
the	   disciplinary	   gap	   between	   these	   ontologically-­‐related,	   yet	   epistemologically-­‐polarised	  
endeavours	  were	   shown	   to	   be	   unsatisfactory	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   they	   failed	   to	   represent	   the	  
ways	  in	  which	  states	  seek	  to	  control	  and	  govern	  their	  relations	  to	  one	  another,	  much	  less	  the	  
ways	   in	   which	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   determinations	   interplay	   in	   shaping	   these	   relations.	  
Notwithstanding	  fundamental	  differences	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  substantial	  claims,	  methodologies,	  
levels	  of	  analysis,	  background	  philosophical	  assumptions	  etc.,	  one	  unifying	  thread	  binds	  them	  
all:	   their	   use	   of	   abstractions.	   They	   all	   abstract	   foreign	   policy	   from	   international	   politics,	  
although	  they	  implicitly	  or	  explicitly	  make	  very	  strong	  assumptions	  about	  the	  parts	  they	  leave	  
out.	   This	   attempt	   to	  emulate	  natural	   sciences	  by	  establishing	   conceptual	   laboratories	  where	  
ceteris	   paribus	   assumptions	   are	   thought	   to	   hold,	   does	   not	   allow	   them	   to	   integrate	   the	  
variables	   they	   first	   isolate,	   then	   refine	   and	   consolidate,	   or	   reify	   as	   ontologically	   distinct.	   No	  
matter	  how	  many	  new	  variables	  they	  introduce,	  no	  matter	  the	  number	  of	  ways	  they	  strive	  to	  
show	  that	  these	  two	  ‘separate’	  fields	  are	  related,	  they	  cannot	  bridge	  the	  gap	  after	  constituting	  
these	  areas	  as	  ontologically	  separate.	  Aspects	  of	  human	  social	  life	  cannot	  be	  arbitrarily	  cut	  off	  
from	  others.	  Nor	  can	  units	  of	  analysis	   take	  on	  completely	  different	   roles	   in	  and	  according	  to	  
different	   fields	   of	   knowledge.	   We	   need	   an	   approach	   that	   conceives	   of	   foreign	   policy	   and	  
international	  relations	  as	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  conception	  of	  human	  social	  activity	  with	  abstractions	  
derived	  from	  actual	  relations	  between	  human	  beings	  and	  from	  their	  relations	  with	  nature.	  
This	   chapter	   proposes	   that	   such	   an	   approach	   needs	   to	   be	   grounded	   in	   a	   dialectical	   view	   of	  
human	   social	   existence.	   It	   develops	  a	   series	  of	   interrelated	  ontological,	   epistemological,	   and	  
methodological	  arguments	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  disciplinary	  gap	  between	  FPA	  and	  IR	  is	  a	  reflection	  
of	   the	   temporal	   and	   agential	   decoupling	   of	   individual	   states’	   purposive	   actions	   from	   the	  
cumulative	  consequences	  of	   these	  actions.	  This	  gap	   is	  contextually	  generated	  and	  bridged	   in	  
the	   concrete	   and	   contradictory	   praxes	   of	   states.	   The	   concrete	   content	   of	   foreign	   policy	   is	  
indeed	  the	   ‘ground’	  of	   international	   relations.	   In	  other	  words,	  what	  we	  call	   the	   international	  
system-­‐cum-­‐structure	   is	   the	   cumulative	   and	   unintended	   consequences	   of	   dialectically-­‐
intertwined	   foreign	   policies,	   which	   are	   socially	   produced	   and	   reproduced	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	  
contradictory	  interplay	  of	  strategies	  of	  reproduction	  of	  a	  diverse	  set	  of	  actors.	  This	  argument	  is	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developed	  in	  four	  steps.	  Section	  2	  starts	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  abstractions	  in	  human	  social	  life,	  
claiming	   that	  human	  beings	  practically	   abstract	   aspects	  of	   reality	   in	   coping	  with	   its	   vastness	  
and	  externality.	  Then	  it	  goes	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  these	  real	  abstractions	  emerge	  as	  a	  consequence	  
of	  the	  diverse	  and	  contradictory	  strategies	  of	  reproduction	  of	  a	  diverse	  set	  of	  agents	  and	  that	  
they	   appear	   to	   individual	   agents	   as	   concrete	   structures,	   misleading	   many	   scholars,	   who	  
mistake	  real	  abstractions	  for	  concrete	  structures.	   In	  the	  third	  section,	   I	  distinguish	  dialectical	  
abstractions	   from	   non-­‐dialectical	   abstractions	   and	   discuss	   two	   main	   existing	   versions	   of	  
dialectics	  to	  show	  their	  shortcomings.	  The	  section	  ends	  with	  a	  presentation	  of	  an	  alternative,	  
historical	   materialist	   dialectic	   that	   is	   based	   on	   a	   praxis-­‐oriented,	   intersubjective	   onto-­‐
epistemology.	   In	   Section	   4,	   building	   on	   this	   onto-­‐epistemology,	   I	   argue	   that	   states	   as	   real	  
abstractions,	   in	  developing	   strategies	  of	   reproduction	  and	  putting	   these	   in	  practice,	   abstract	  
aspects	  of	  reality,	  generating	  practical	  gaps	  not	  only	  between	  their	  specific	  foreign	  policies	  and	  
the	   ‘international	   system’	   as	   a	   real	   abstraction,	   but	   also	   between	   the	   economic	   and	   the	  
political,	  and	  the	  domestic	  and	  the	  external.	  These	  gaps,	  in	  turn,	  are	  practically	  bridged	  when	  
states	  respond	  to	  the	  cumulative	  unintended	  consequences	  of	  their	  own	  and	  others’	  actions.	  
The	   disciplinary	   gap,	   in	   turn,	   is	   bridged	   when	   IR	   is	   seen	   theoretically	   as	   the	   cumulative	  
consequences	  of	   the	  strategies	  of	   reproduction	  of	   states	   in	   the	   form	  of	   foreign	  policies,	  and	  
FPA	  as	  the	  ‘ground’	  of	  IR.	  	  
2.2.	  Real	  Abstraction1	  
2.2.1.	  Abstraction	  in	  Human	  Social	  Life	  
In	   the	   preceding	   section,	   I	   argued	   that	   the	   unifying	   thread	   accounting	   for	   failure	   in	   the	  
reviewed	   authors	   is	   the	   way	   they	   conceptualise	   the	   abstract	   and	   the	   concrete.	   This	   failure	  
crystallises	   in	   Hudson’s	   treatment	   of	   the	   state	   as	   a	   ‘metaphysical	   abstraction’	   and	   her	  
suggestion	  of	  the	  individual-­‐cum-­‐leader	  as	  the	  ‘concrete’	  unit	  of	  analysis	  instead.	  This	  view	  of	  
the	  concrete	  and	  the	  abstract	  lies	  at	  the	  root	  of	  the	  problem,	  for	  it	  mistakes	  the	  concrete	  for	  
the	  abstracted	  act	  of	  foreign	  policy-­‐making,	  and	  thus	  replaces	  concrete	  individuals,	  with	  all	  the	  
social	   relations	   that	   constitute	   them	   as	   individuals,	   with	   individuals	   abstracted	   from	   these	  
relations,	   stripped	   of	   their	   individuality.	   It	   is	   not	   my	   contention	   that	   abstraction	   should	   be	  
avoided	  by	  all	  means;	  rather	  my	  argument	   is	  that	  scientific/philosophical	  abstractions	  should	  
represent	  practical	  abstractions,	  and	   should	  then	  be	  concretised	   instead	  of	  being	  reified	  and	  
imposed	  on	  reality	  as	  external	  conceptual	  structures.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  It	  will	  become	  clear	  below	  (section	  2.2)	  that	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  this	  phrase	  is	  much	  wider	  in	  scope	  than	  
in	  the	  works	  of	  some	  Marxist	  scholars	  who	  reserve	  the	  term	  exclusively	  for	  labour	  under	  capitalism:	  
(e.g.	  Murray	  2000a,	  2000b;	  Toscano	  2008;	  Arthur	  2004;	  Finelli	  2007).	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This	   section,	   therefore,	   deals	  with	   abstraction	   as	   it	   occurs	   in	   everyday	   interactions	   between	  
human	   beings	   and	   nature,	   and	   among	   human	   beings.	   In	   one	   sense	   of	   the	   term,	   I	   take	  
abstraction2	  as	   a	   practical	   cognitive	   process	   by	  means	   of	   which	   human	   beings	   in	   their	   daily	  
lives	   cope	  with	   the	   enormity	   of	  what	   appears	   external	   to	   them,	   i.e.	   the	   concrete	   totality	   to	  
which	  they	  also	  belong,	  in	  producing	  and	  reproducing	  their	  lives	  by	  purposefully	  acting	  on	  it.3	  
By	   totality	   I	   refer,	   at	   this	   point,	   to	   the	   simple	   fact	   that	   in	   reality	   ‘everything	   is	   related	   to	  
everything	   else’	   (Waltz	   1979,	   p.8),	   and	   the	   quality	   of	   being	   concrete	   arises	   from	   this	  
relatedness.	  Subjects	  qua	  concrete	  individuals	  find	  themselves	  ‘thrown’	  into	  the	  world,	  or	  find	  
the	  world	   as	   given.	   This	   ‘givenness’	   of	   the	  world	   or	   ‘thrownness’	   into	   the	  world	   appears	   to	  
subjects	  as	  a	  relation	  of	  externality	  between	  them	  and	  the	  world.4	  To	  produce	  and	  reproduce	  
their	   lives,	   they	   act	   upon	   this	   seeming	   externality,	   i.e.	   nature	   and	   other	   individuals.	   This	  
activity	   is	   objective	   (or	   ‘object-­‐related’	   (Heine	   and	   Teschke	   1996))	   in	   the	   simple	   sense	   that	  
purposeful	  actions	  of	  human	  beings	  as	  subjects	  are	  ‘directed	  towards’	  what	  appears	  to	  them	  
as	  external	  objects	   (Kitching	  1988).	  However,	   this	  objective	  externality	  appears	  differently	   to	  
different	   subjects	   because	   the	   set	   of	   relations	   they	   find	   themselves	   in	   that	   given	   world	   is	  
different.	  Moreover,	  partly	  because	  of	  this	  difference,	  and	  partly	  because	  of	  any	  other	  possible	  
individual	  differences,	  purposes	  also	  differ.	  All	  this	  difference	  makes	  individual	  human	  actions,	  
including	  cognitive	  actions,	  subjective.	  However,	  as	  they	  act	  individually	  and	  collectively	  in	  the	  
world,	  their	  actions	  almost	  never	  meet	  their	  initial	  purposes,	  as	  these	  entire	  differences	  clash,	  
reinforce,	   subsume,	   transfigure,	   and	   destroy	   one	   another.	   All	   these	   modes	   of	   interaction,	  
including	   legacies	   of	   dead	   generations, 5 	  constantly	   produce	   a	   new	   and	   ever-­‐changing	  
externality	  which	  confronts	  subjects	  as	  given.	  If	  this	  simple	  sketch	  of	  the	  onto-­‐epistemology	  of	  
human	  social	  existence	  reflects	  things	  as	  they	  are,	  the	  historical	  materialist	  approach	  I	  propose	  
involves	  an	  inter-­‐subjective	  materialist	  view	  of	  social	  reality	  and	  of	  the	  process	  of	  abstraction	  
in	  practice	  (cf.	  Heine	  and	  Teschke	  1996).6	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  The	  term	  abstraction	  itself	  comes	  from	  Latin	  word	  abstractus,	  which	  is	  the	  past	  participle	  of	  
abstrahere,	  to	  pull	  from	  (Ollman	  2003).	  
3	  Purposeful	  action	  does	  not	  have	  to	  result	  in	  the	  attainment	  of	  the	  purpose.	  The	  action	  remains	  
purposeful,	  nevertheless.	  
4	  Despite	  this	  borrowing	  of	  terminology,	  the	  use	  of	  the	  concepts	  of	  ‘givenness’	  and	  ‘thrownness’	  
fundamentally	  differs	  from	  the	  way	  Heidegger	  (1996)	  used	  them,	  as	  will	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  exposition	  of	  the	  
argument.	  
5	  Kitching	  (1988,	  p.45–6)	  details	  how	  ‘circumstances’	  created	  by	  previous	  generations	  are	  experienced	  
as	  structural	  constraints	  by	  humans.	  See	  also	  Heine	  and	  Teschke	  (1996).	  
6	  Marx	  (Marx	  and	  Engels	  1998)	  makes	  this	  point	  in	  his	  Theses	  on	  Feuerbach	  and	  The	  German	  Ideology	  
where	  he	  finds	  Feuerbach’s	  ‘objective	  materialism’	  deficient	  in	  that	  it	  fails	  to	  capture	  the	  dynamic	  
aspect	  of	  reality,	  leaving	  it	  to	  Hegel’s	  dialectical	  ‘objective	  idealism’,	  and	  ignores	  the	  ‘subjective’,	  
practical	  nature	  of	  human	  activity.	  He	  therefore	  sees	  Feuerbach’s	  materialism	  as	  a	  ‘contemplative	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As	   they	   interact	  with	   this	   seeming	  externality	  –of	  which	   they	  are	  a	  part–	  humans	  perform	  a	  
double	  practical	  abstraction:	  they	  simultaneously	  abstract	  themselves	  from	  this	  externality	  as	  
subjects,	   and	   abstract	   that	   externality	   from	   themselves	   as	   objects.	   They	   thus	   practically	  
disregard	  both	  the	  part	  played	  by	  this	  externality	  in	  their	  constitution	  as	  subjects,	  and	  the	  part	  
they	   play	   in	   constituting	   what	   they	   treat	   as	   objects.	   In	   the	   sense	   that	   they	   act	   on	   this	  
externality	  as	  their	  object	  of	  action,	  this	  externality	  is	  objective.	  This	  is	  not	  mere	  illusion;	  this	  is	  
rather	  how	  things	  appear	  to	  individuals	  from	  their	  particular	  subjective	  vantage	  points.	  It	  goes	  
without	  saying,	  however,	  that	  the	  externality	  will	  appear	  differently	  to	  different	  subjects	  each	  
of	  whom,	  by	  way	  of	  acting,	  will	  ‘assume’	  other	  subjects	  to	  be	  part	  of	  that	  externality.7	  
At	  the	  very	  moment	  men	  and	  women	  abstract	  themselves	  from	  what	  they	  act	  on	  and	  abstract	  
it	  from	  themselves,	  they	  also	  abstract	  aspects	  of	  this	  objective	  world	  from	  its	  other	  aspects	  by	  
acting	  on	   them,	   i.e.	  by	  making	   them	  the	  object	  of	   their	   ‘sensuous	  activity’	   (Marx	  and	  Engels	  
1998,	   passim.).	   In	   using	   stones,	   for	   example,	   as	   weapons	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   hunting,	   they	  
make	  another	   abstraction:	   they	  abstract	   those	   stones	   from	   their	   concrete	  existence,	   that	   is,	  
from	  all	  other	  relations	  they	  have	  to	  other	  things	  in	  nature,	   including	  animate	  and	  inanimate	  
things.	  A	  piece	  of	   stone	   in	   its	  concrete	  existence	  can	  be	  potential	   soil	   to	   the	  nearby	  plant,	  a	  
part	   of	   its	   own	   to	   the	  mountain	   it	   broke	   away	   from,	   something	   blocking	   the	   river	   bed	   to	   a	  
stream,	   an	   indication	   of	   their	   decomposing	   powers	   to	   the	   sun	   and	   the	   wind,	   a	   building	  
material	  to	  a	  person,	  an	  ornament	  to	  another	  and	  so	  on	  (see	  Marx	  and	  Engels	  1986,	  pp.28–29).	  
It	   is	   all	   of	   this	   and	  more	   in	   itself.	   ‘Thing-­‐in-­‐itself’,	   in	  other	  words,	   does	  not	  possess	   inherent	  
qualities	  independent	  of	  its	  relations	  to	  other	  things,	  including	  human	  beings.	  It	  is,	  therefore,	  
abstracted	   in	  practice	  through	  being	  acted	  upon	  by	  human	  beings	   in	  a	  particular	  way.	   In	  this	  
very	  same	  moment,	  human	  beings	  also	  abstract	  a	  class	  of	  things	  as	  a	  genus.	  This	  abstraction	  is	  
also	  carried	  out	  practically.	  By	  putting	  similar	  objects	  to	  the	  same	  use,	  or	  by	  acting	  upon	  these	  
seemingly	   similar	   objects	   in	   similar	  ways,	   they	   abstract	   all	   those	   concretely	   different	   stones	  
from	  other	  objects.	  All	  flints,	  granites,	  basalts	  and	  pebbles,	  notwithstanding	  their	  differences,	  
are	  classified	  under	  the	  same	  genus	  as	  different	  species.	  This	  genus-­‐species	  type	  of	  abstraction	  
also	   reflects	   the	  way	  men	  and	  women	   interact	  with	  one	  another	   and	  nature.	  Any	   species	   is	  
also	  an	  abstraction;	  they	  are	  abstracted	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  genus	  (cf.	  Sayer	  1987,	  pp.54–5).	  
In	   short,	   any	  purposeful	   human	  action	   is	   at	   the	   same	   time	  an	   abstraction,	   a	   practical	   act	   of	  
isolating	  one	   aspect	   of	   reality	   into	  manageable	  proportions	   (cf.	  Ollman	  2003,	   p.60ff).	   This	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
materialism’	  (or	  ‘disguised	  idealism’	  (Balibar	  1995,	  p.24))	  which	  still	  tries	  to	  represent	  an	  external,	  
objective	  world	  in	  the	  contemplating	  mind	  of	  an	  abstracted	  ego.	  	  
7	  “Assuming”	  here	  does	  not	  denote	  an	  intentional	  act	  of	  reflection;	  rather	  it	  refers	  to	  a	  necessary	  
condition	  of	  purposeful	  human	  action.	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not	  a	  purely	  cognitive	  process	  that	  occurs	  in	  the	  mind	  of	  the	  thinking	  subject.	  It	  is	  a	  practical-­‐
cognitive	  process	  that	  occurs	  simultaneously	   in	  the	  mind	  and	   in	  practice	  as	  part	  of	  acting	  on	  
the	  world	   (Sayer	  1987,	  pp.85–8).	  Practically,	   though,	  most	  of	  our	  abstractions	  are	  passed	  on	  
from	  former	  generations	  in	  an	  ossified	  and	  reified	  form.	  Depending	  on	  the	  frequency	  of	  their	  
occurrence	  or	  the	  balance	  of	  social	  forces,	  they	  turn	  into	  social	  institutions;	  some	  are	  codified,	  
others	   remain	   conventional.	   These	   ossified	   legacies	   I	   broadly	   call	   real	   abstractions.8 	  The	  
modern	  state	  as	  we	  know	  it,	  for	  example,	  is	  not	  a	  ‘metaphysical	  abstraction’	  as	  Hudson	  would	  
have	  us	  believe,	  but	  a	  real	  abstraction:	  a	  cognitive-­‐practical	  outcome	  of	  the	   interactions	  of	  a	  
multiplicity	  of	  actors,	  living	  and	  dead.	  The	  state	  under	  capitalism,	  or	  ‘political	  constitution’	  in	  a	  
capitalist	   society,	   as	   an	   entity	   independent	   from	   civil	   society,	   is	   a	   product	   of	   the	   practical	  
abstraction	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  private	  and	  public	  spheres	  from	  each	  other	  (Marx	  1977,	  p.32).9	  
2.2.2.	  Social	  Origins	  of	  Real	  Abstractions	  or	  the	  Agent-­‐Structure	  Problem	  
Real	  abstractions	  are	  made,	  modified,	  and	  replaced	  by	  active	  human	  subjects	  in	  a	  given	  world	  
and	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  others,	  that	  is,	  
Men	  make	  their	  own	  history,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  make	  it	  just	  as	  they	  please;	  they	  do	  not	  
make	  it	  under	  circumstances	  chosen	  by	  themselves,	  but	  under	  circumstances	  directly	  
encountered,	   given	   and	   transmitted	   from	   the	   past.	   The	   tradition	   of	   all	   the	   dead	  
generations	  weighs	  like	  a	  nightmare	  on	  the	  brains	  of	  the	  living	  (Marx	  1972,	  p.10).	  
That	   is,	   individuals	   at	   any	   point	   in	   history	   find	   themselves	   thrown	   into	   a	   world	   which	   has	  
already	   developed	   modes	   of	   producing	   and	   reproducing	   social	   life.	   In	   short,	   ‘reality	   is…	   a	  
product	  of	  the	  preceding	  intercourse	  of	  individuals’	  (Marx	  and	  Engels	  1998,	  p.90).	  As	  these	  are	  
found	   by	   individuals	   as	   already	   existing,	   they	   appear	   to	   them	   as	   external	   ‘alien	   powers’,	   as	  
social	   structures	   constraining	   their	   actions	   (cf.	   Marx	   and	   Engels	   1988,	   1998,	   p.53).	   “To	   the	  
single	   individual”,	   for	   example,	   “distribution	   naturally	   appears	   as	   a	   social	   law,	   which	  
determines	  his	   position	  within	   [the	   system	  of]	   production	   in	  which	  he	  produces”	   (Marx	   and	  
Engels	  1986,	  p.33).	  The	  second	  reason	  why	  these	  modes	  appear	  so	  is	  that	  individuals	  also	  find	  
themselves	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  others,	  in	  definite	  forms	  of	  social	  interaction.	  Depending	  on	  the	  
social	  location	  of	  agents,	  i.e.	  the	  complex	  of	  social	  relations	  they	  find	  themselves	  thrown	  into,	  
the	  ways	  these	  ‘structures’	  appear	  to	  different	  individuals	  exhibit	  variations.	  In	  the	  face	  of	  such	  
vastness,	  however,	  these	  institutionalized	  real	  abstractions	  appear	  as	  concrete	  structures.	  It	  is	  
no	   wonder,	   then,	   that	   structuralist	   approaches	   like	   that	   of	  Waltz	   picture	   agents	   as	   passive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Constructivists	  variously	  name	  these	  social	  institutions	  ‘cultural	  structures’	  (Wendt	  1999),	  ‘social	  
conventions’	  (Kratochwil	  1991),	  etc.	  	  
9	  For	  a	  fuller	  discussion	  of	  this	  separation	  see	  Wood	  (1981).	  Rosenberg	  (1994)	  traces	  the	  development	  of	  
modern	  sovereignty	  from	  a	  historical-­‐sociological	  perspective.	  This	  will	  be	  problematized	  again	  later	  in	  
this	  chapter	  in	  section	  4.	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victims	  of	  the	  system	  and	  forget	  that	  it	  is	  the	  agents	  that	  make	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  system	  in	  the	  
first	   place.	   This	   ideological	   primacy	   of	   structure	   rests	   on	   the	   surface-­‐level	   representation	   of	  
this	   necessarily	   one-­‐sided	   perception.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   individualist	   approaches	   primarily	  
associated	   with	   followers	   of	   Weber	   (unlike	   Weber	   himself)	   abstract	   individuals	   from	   their	  
circumstances	   to	   varying	   degrees.	  What	   is	   of	  more	   concern	   to	   us	   here,	   however,	   is	   the	   via	  
media	   structurationist	   theory	   that	   agents	   and	   structures	   are	   mutually	   constitutive	   of	   each	  
other	  (e.g.	  Giddens	  1986;	  Wendt	  1987).	  
Wendt,	  it	  will	  be	  recalled,	  argued	  for	  an	  approach	  that	  gives	  ontological	  priority	  neither	  to	  the	  
agent	   nor	   to	   the	   structure;	   rather	   they	   should	   be	   given	   ‘equal	   ontological	   status’	   in	  
synthesizing	  them	  dialectically	  (Wendt	  1987).	  Claiming	  that	  agents	  and	  structures	  are	  mutually	  
constitutive,	  he	  distinguished	  causation	  from	  constitution	  (Wendt	  1998).	  For	  Wendt,	  causation	  
occurs	  between	  two	  independently	  existing	  things,	  one	  of	  which	  (cause)	  is	  temporally	  prior	  to	  
the	   other	   (effect).	   In	   this	   sense,	   causation	   is	   an	   external	   relation.	   Constitution	   in	   turn,	   is	   an	  
internal	   relation	  between	  a	   structure	  and	  an	  agent	  without	  which	  neither	   the	   structure,	  nor	  
the	   agent	   can	   exist	   as	   a	   structure	   and	   an	   agent	   respectively.	   The	   social	   world	   embodies	  
relations	   of	   both	   causation	   and	   constitution.	   To	   sustain	   this	   claim,	   Wendt	   (1998)	   has	   to	  
attribute	   causality	   to	   human	   beings’	   reasons	   for	   action;	   that	   is,	   he	   takes	   reasons	   as	   causes.	  
However,	   recognizing	   that	   human	   reasons	   are	   based	   on	   desires,	   which	   are	   constituted,	   not	  
caused,	  by	  cultural	  structures,	  and	  which	  therefore	  do	  not	  exist	  independently,	  precludes	  any	  
identification	   of	   reasons	   with	   causes,	   although	   this	   does	   not	   deter	   him	   from	   holding	   these	  
conflicting	  views	  simultaneously.10	  This	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  a	  central	  debate	  in	  social	  sciences	  
and	  I	  shall	  discuss	  this	  shortly	  in	  relation	  to	  abstraction.	  	  
Abstraction	   in	   scientific	   research	   generally	   follows	   a	   similar	   logic	   (similar	   to	   practical	  
abstractions)	   in	  dealing	  with	  phenomena.	  Apart	   from	  mathematics,	  where	  one	   is	   already	   ‘in	  
the	  realm	  of	  …	  absolute	  abstraction’	  (Whitehead	  2011,	  p.27),	  all	  sciences	  abstract	  in	  order	  to	  
isolate	   an	   aspect	   of	   reality	   into	  manageable	   proportions	   and	   to	   scrutinise	   this	   aspect	  more	  
deeply.	   Moreover,	   sciences	   also	   abstract	   theoretically,	   what	   is	   abstracted	   practically.	  
Abstraction	   in	   this	   sense	   precedes	   contemplation	   (but	   not	   cognition,	   with	   which	   it	   is	  
simultaneous).	  The	  current	  state	  of	  technology	  may	  give	  the	  illusory	  impression	  that	  we	  now	  
know	  much	  more	  about	  nature	  than	  we	  did,	  say,	  five	  hundred	  years	  ago,	  but	  we	  know	  more	  
about	   nature	   only	   in	   terms	   of	   our	   practical	   interaction	   with	   its	   aspects.	   To	   use	   the	   same	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Smith	  (2000)	  challenges	  Wendt’s	  equation	  of	  reasons	  with	  causes	  and	  still	  holds	  that	  ‘there	  are	  two	  




example,	   our	   knowledge	   about	   a	   certain	   type	   of	   stone	   must	   surely	   have	   increased	  
exponentially	  to	  this	  day.	  But	  there	  is	  no	  way	  that	  we	  can	  assume	  that	  we	  know	  what	  it	   is	   in	  
itself	   without	   the	   mediation	   of	   human	   social	   practice	   upon	   it	   any	   more	   than	   we	   did	   five	  
hundred	  years	  ago.	  Perfection	  of	  an	  aircraft	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  we	  have	  mastered	  the	  laws	  of	  
nature;	  rather,	  it	  shows	  how	  we	  historically	  and	  practically	  dealt	  with	  an	  experienced	  empirical	  
force,	  i.e.	  gravity.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  there	  are	  no	  differences	  in	  the	  ways	  natural	  and	  social	  
sciences	  approach	  reality,	  but	  at	  a	  very	  general	  level	  their	  orientation	  is	  based	  on	  the	  practical	  
relation	  of	  humans	  to	  one	  another	  and	  to	  nature,	  or	  on	  what	  Marx	  (1976,	  p.283)	  called	  ‘social	  
metabolism’.	  One	  such	  difference	  identified	  as	  fundamentally	  important	  by	  many	  is	  that	  while	  
natural	  sciences	  look	  for	  empirical	  regularities	  that	  may	  be	  raised	  to	  the	  level	  of	  general	  causal	  
laws	   in	   explaining	   phenomena	   from	   the	   subjective	   viewpoint	   of	   humanity	   to	   the	   ‘external’	  
world	  of	  objects,	  the	  social	  sciences	  historically	  have	  grappled	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  subject	  
looking	   at	   herself,	   treating	   herself	   simultaneously	   both	   as	   object	   and	   subject.	   This	   so-­‐called	  
difference	  between	  natural	  and	  social	  sciences	  (or	  ‘cultural	  sciences’	  in	  Weberian	  terminology	  
(Weber	  2011))	  also	  finds	  an	  echo	  within	  social	  sciences	  between	  explanatory	  and	  interpretive	  
methodologies.11	  
Positivist	   approaches	   in	   the	   social	   sciences,	   as	   we	   saw	   in	   the	   first	   chapter	   in	   the	   cases	   of	  
Rosenau,	  Waltz,	  and	  Doyle,	  seek	  to	  emulate	  the	  methods	  of	  natural	  sciences	  by	  externalising	  
the	  object	  of	   research	  and	   thus	  abstracting	   the	  object	   from	   the	   subject.	   They	   try	   to	   identify	  
and	   explain	   causal	   mechanisms	   in	   human	   social	   life	   also	   by	   abstracting	   objects	   of	   research	  
from	  one	  another	  in	  establishing	  variables.	  ‘Ex-­‐planation’	  itself	  suggests	  that	  the	  object	  to	  be	  
explained	   is	   external	   to	   the	   subject	   (see	   Krombach	   1997)	   and	   can	   be	   isolated	   from	   other	  
objects	  of	  explanation.	  Now,	  if	  in	  reality	  ‘everything	  is	  related	  to	  everything	  else’,	  including	  the	  
inquiring	  subject,	  how	  are	  we	  to	  externalise	  objects,	  and	  how	  are	  we	  to	  legitimately	  isolate	  the	  
object	  of	  our	  study	  from	  other	  objects	  so	  that	  we	  can	  study	  it	   in	  a	  natural-­‐scientific	  manner?	  
Positivist	  approaches	  assume	  the	  Cartesian	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  knowing	  ego	  as	  a	  response	  to	  
the	  first	  question,	  and	  elevate	  recurrent	  conjunctions	  between	  previously	   isolated	  aspects	  of	  
reality	   to	   the	   level	   of	   law-­‐like	   propositions	   as	   causal	   relations.	   Their	   answer	   to	   the	   second	  
question	  is	  to	  take	  a	  real	  abstraction	  (i.e.	  an	  actually	  existing	  abstraction	  that	  is	  an	  outcome	  of	  
the	  practical-­‐cognitive	   interaction	  of	  human	  beings	  with	  one	  another	  and	  with	  nature	  over	  a	  
period	   of	   time),	   isolate	   it	   from	   other	   abstractions	   (aspects	   of	   reality),	   and	   then	   seek	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  This	  distinction	  goes	  back	  to	  the	  works	  of	  Neo-­‐Kantians	  such	  as	  Ernst	  Cassirer	  and	  Heinrich	  Rickert.	  
William	  Dilthey	  can	  also	  be	  listed	  among	  these	  neo-­‐Kantians	  although	  he	  also	  makes	  use	  of	  Hegel’s	  
work.	  For	  a	  more	  contemporary	  treatment	  of	  the	  distinction	  and	  its	  historical	  intellectual	  roots,	  see	  
Habermas	  (1988).	  In	  the	  field	  of	  international	  relations	  the	  most	  renowned	  exposition	  is	  that	  of	  Hollis	  
and	  Smith	  (1991).	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establish	  causal	  relations	  between	  these	  isolated	  aspects	  now	  called	  variables.	  In	  this	  way	  they	  
claim	  to	  reach	  an	  objective	  account	  of	  reality.	  What	  they	  reach,	  however,	  is	  only	  one	  aspect	  of	  
this	   reality,	   by	   reducing	   the	   rich	  world	   of	   human	   subjectivity	   to	   an	   externalised	   aspect	   of	   it	  
(Kosík	  1976,	  p.11).	  	  
Interpretive	   approaches,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   provide	   ‘intentional’	   accounts	   of	   human	   social	  
action	   (e.g.	   (Wright	  2004)).	  Therefore	   they	  are	   ‘internalist’	  perspectives.	  This	  subjective	  view	  
of	  human	  action	  aims	  to	  reach	  an	  emphatic	  understanding	  of	  acting	  individuals	  and	  groups	  by	  
trying	  to	  see	  things	  from	  their	  point	  of	  view	  within	  a	  given	  sociocultural	  surrounding,	  variously	  
conceptualised	  as	   ‘being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world’	   (Heidegger	  1996),	   ‘lifeworld’	   (Husserl	  1970;	  Habermas	  
1985),	   etc.	   Unlike	   positivist	   approaches,	   they	   are	   after	   reasons	   for	   action,	   rather	   than	   its	  
causes.	   They	   thus	   abstract	   one	  point	  of	   view	   from	  others	   and,	  when	  driven	  home,	   this	  may	  
lead	  to	  a	  myriad	  of	  ways	  of	  seeing	  the	  same	  phenomenon	  without	  relating	  these	  ways	  to	  one	  
another	   and	   thus	   accounting	   for	   the	   phenomenon.	   In	   other	  words,	   it	  may	   lead	   to	   a	   radical	  
relativism	   with	   countless	   subjective	   accounts	   of	   reality.	   Then,	   attempts	   to	   complement	  
internalist	  accounts	  with	  natural-­‐scientific	  methods	  may	  result	   in	   logical	  contradictions,	  as	   in	  
the	  case	  of	  Wendt.	  	  
In	   light	   of	   this	   discussion,	   I	   will	   now	   make	   two	   counter-­‐intuitive	   claims:	   First,	   contrary	   to	  
common	  scientific	  wisdom,	  causality	  holds	  neither	  in	  the	  animate	  nor	  in	  the	  inanimate	  world.12	  
What	  is	  analytically	  accepted	  as	  a	  relation	  of	  causation	  between	  two	  ‘independent’	  things	  is	  in	  
fact	   established	   as	   a	   result	   of	   human	   endeavour	   to	   pragmatically	   cope	   with	   the	   world	   by	  
abstracting	  its	  aspects	  from	  one	  another.	  Secondly,	  and	  related	  to	  this	  first	  point,	  I	  argue	  that	  
in	   attempting	   to	   ‘understand’	   things	   from	   a	   certain	   subjective	   vantage	   point,	   internalist	  
accounts	  in	  fact	  look	  at	  a	  one-­‐sided	  externality	  and	  thereby	  ‘ex-­‐plain’	  how	  things	  appear	  from	  
that	   subjective	   vantage	   point.	   To	   ‘understand’,	   in	   this	   unconventional	   sense	   of	   the	   term,	  
requires	  bringing	  together	  these	  ‘explanations’	  from	  the	  multiple	  subjective	  vantage	  points	  of	  
relevant	  agents.13	  Willing	  to	  retain	  a	  holistic	  perspective,	  Wendt	  fails	   to	  see	  how,	   in	  practice,	  
unit	  and	  sub-­‐unit	  level	  relations	  historically	  make	  what	  he	  sees	  as	  a	  structure.	  Accordingly,	  his	  
solution	   to	   the	   agent-­‐structure	   problem	   remains	   tautological	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   agency	   is	  
conceptualised	   as	   agency-­‐in-­‐general	   as	   opposed	   to	   and	   ontologically	   equal	   to	   a	   supposed	  
structure.	   Agents	   are	   counter-­‐posed	   to	   structure	   in	   aggregate.	   In	   his	   endeavour	   to	   identify	  
‘unobservable	  entities’	  such	  as	  structures	  in	  accordance	  with	  scientific	  realism,	  he	  mistakes	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  For	  an	  alternative	  dialectical	  conceptualisation	  of	  cause	  and	  effect	  see	  Dietzgen	  (2010,	  p.56–66).	  
13	  Relevance	  is	  a	  practical	  question	  and	  should	  be	  answered	  practically	  within	  the	  specific	  framework	  of	  
a	  question-­‐guided	  research	  process.	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abstract	   for	   the	   concrete	   by	   reason	   of	   its	   real,	   practical	   character.	   His	   radical	   ontological	  
separation	  of	  the	  ideational	  and	  the	  material	  serves	  to	  disguise	  this	  mistake,	  in	  that	  the	  reality	  
of	  abstractions	  is	  presented	  as	  the	  ideality	  of	  structures.	  Moreover,	  Wendt’s	  exclusive	  interest	  
in	  collective	  identity	  formation	  disregards	  the	  conflictual	  aspects	  of	  this	  process,	   ignoring	  the	  
contradictions	  that	  constantly	  arise	  even	  when	  a	  ‘structure’	  is	  institutionalised.	  
To	  sum	  up,	  human	   individuals	   find	  themselves	  surrounded	  by	  givens	   inherited	   from	  the	  past	  
and	   in	   the	  presence	  of	   others	   at	   any	  point	   in	   their	   lives,	   and	   together	   these	   comprise	  what	  
appears	   to	   them	   as	   ‘alien’	   forces.	   In	   producing	   and	   reproducing	   their	   lives,	   these	   givens	  
institutionalise	  their	  ways	  of	  acting,	  and	   in	  acting	  upon	  what	  appears	  to	  them	  as	  an	  external	  
structure,	  their	  wills	  and	  acts	  do	  not	  necessarily	  converge	  with	  those	  of	  others	  to	  whom	  this	  
externality	   appears	   in	   different	   ways.	   Real	   abstractions	   emerge	   as	   a	   result	   of	   a	   temporary	  
stabilisation	  of	   these	  contradictory	   relations,	  when	  one	  abstraction	   is	   institutionalised	  at	   the	  
end	  of	  a	  historical	  process.	  However,	  this	  process	  is	  full	  of	  contradictions	  and	  conflicts	  as	  well	  
as	   convergences.	   The	   actions	   of	   individuals	   in	   producing	   their	   lives	   and	   in	   acting	   upon	   this	  
externality	   almost	   always	   generate	   unintended	   consequences,	   not	   only	   for	   themselves	   but	  
also	  for	  the	  others.	  Unsurprisingly,	  then,	  these	  institutions	  appear	  to	  individuals	  as	  structures,	  
for	  the	  constraints	  on	  action	  emanating	  from	  these	  institutions	  are	  quite	  real;	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
state	   is	   an	  abstraction,	   for	   example,	   is	   in	  no	  way	  an	   indication	  of	   its	   unreality	   in	  practice	   as	  
seen	   in	   the	   very	   real	  ways	   states	   organise	   the	   lives	   of	   individuals.	  Most	   crucially,	   these	   real	  
abstractions	  reflect	  the	  conjunctural	  balance	  of	  social	  forces.	  This	  real	  quality	  of	  abstractions	  is	  
dealt	  with	   in	  social	  scientific	   research	   in	  two	  equally	  misleading	  ways:	   these	  abstractions	  are	  
taken	  to	  be	  either	  concrete	  material	  structures	  or	  concrete	  ideational	  structures.	  They	  are	  and	  
still	  remain	  abstracts	  though.	  Neither	  a	  Hegelian	  objective	  idealism,	  nor	  Feuerbach’s	  and	  (later	  
positivists’)	  objective	  materialism,	  nor,	  we	  may	  add,	  a	  constructivist	   inter-­‐subjective	   idealism	  
can	  sufficiently	  reflect	  the	  dynamic,	  concrete	  and	  inter-­‐subjective	  ontos	  that	  is	  the	  world	  (see	  
Teschke	  and	  Heine	  2002,	  p.171).	  What	   is	  needed	   is	  an	  equally	  dynamic,	   inter-­‐subjective	  and	  
concrete	  theorisation	  of	  this	  world,	  and	  this	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  dialectical	  method.	  
2.3.	  Real	  Abstraction	  and	  Dialectic	  
2.3.1.	  Abstraction	  in	  Dialectical	  Method	  
In	   his	   Economic	   and	   Philosophic	   Manuscripts	   of	   1844	   Marx	   notes	   that	   political	   economy	  
abstracts	   a	   quality	   of	   human	  beings	   and	   sees	   them	  only	   as	  workers	   and	   leaves	  other	   things	  
that	   concretely	   constitute	   them	   as	   living	   human	   individuals	   to	   ‘criminal	   law,	   to	   doctors,	   to	  
religion,	  to	  the	  statistical	  tables,	  to	  politics…’(Marx	  and	  Engels	  1988,	  p.27).	  Political	  Science	  in	  
representative	  democratic	  countries	  sees	  them	  as	  voters	  and	  citizens,	  Anthropology	  sees	  them	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as	  cultural	   subjects,	  Sociology	  sees	   them	  as	   individuals	  as	  against,	  and	   in	  societies,	  Medicine	  
sees	  them	  as	  patients,	  Law	  as	  criminals,	  claimants	  or	  defendants,	  etc.	  From	  these	  disciplinary	  
perspectives	   the	   respective	   subject-­‐matters	  of	   these	   fields	  are	  doubly	  abstracted:	  both	   from	  
their	  concrete	  existence	  in	  their	  other	  roles	  and	  from	  their	  relations	  with	  others.	  The	  matter	  is	  
not	   that	   they	   abstract	   arbitrarily,	   for	   these	   abstractions	   are	   based	   on	   real	   abstractions.	   The	  
matter	   is	   that	   once	   abstracted	   from	   themselves	   and	   their	   relations,	   and	   conceptually	   and	  
theoretically	   refined	   and	   systematised,	   any	   attempt	   to	   re-­‐establish	   their	   initially	   severed	  
relations	  from	  themselves	  and	  others	  is	  futile	  because	  in	  the	  process	  of	  logical	  refinement	  it	  is	  
ignored	  that	  the	  concept	  itself	  was	  constituted	  by	  these	  concrete	  relations	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  So,	  
in	  a	  word	  although	  dialectic	  too	  abstracts,	  it	  does	  this	  in	  a	  different	  way.	  	  
‘Dialectics	  is	  after	  the	  “thing	  itself”	  ’	  (Kosík	  1976),	  much	  like	  any	  other	  view	  of	  the	  world.	  The	  
‘thing	  itself’,	   in	  the	  Kantian	  sense	  of	  the	  term,	  in	  essence,	  however,	  is	  not	  directly	  accessible,	  
not	   because	   human	   beings	   are	   unable	   to	   perceive	   it,	   but	   because	   ‘thing-­‐itself’	   itself	   is	   ‘a	  
mental	  thing’,	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  mind,	  abstracted	  from	  its	  relations	  (Dietzgen	  2010);	  and	  ‘if	  
we	  stick	  to	  the	  “mere-­‐in-­‐itself”	  of	  an	  object,	  we	  apprehend	  not	   its	   truth,	  but	  the	   inadequate	  
form	   of	   mere	   abstraction’	   (Hegel	   2010,	   p.192).14	  So,	   first	   of	   all,	   dialectical	   abstractions	   are	  
made	  with	  the	  awareness	  that	  the	  ‘thing-­‐in-­‐itself’	  is	  not	  something	  that	  exists	  independently,	  
the	   essence	   of	   which	   is	   to	   be	   discovered	   upon	   investigation.	   As	   mentioned	   above,	   what	   is	  
abstracted	  as	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  ‘thing-­‐itself’	   is	   itself	  constituted	  by	  the	  concrete	  relations	  of	  
that	   thing	   to	   other	   things	   and	   its	   other	   potential	   modes	   of	   being.	   For	   this	   reason,	   when	  
dialectical	   approaches	   abstract	   aspects	   of	   reality	   based	   on	   real	   abstractions	   such	   as	   state,	  
money,	  capital,	  international	  system,	  and	  so	  on,	  they	  do	  not	  stop	  there.	  This,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  
is	   where	   the	   actual	   contribution	   of	   dialectic	   starts.	   Instead	   of	   climbing	   up	   ‘the	   ladder	   of	  
abstraction’,	   dialectic	   uniquely	   ‘rises’	   from	   the	   abstract	   to	   the	   concrete	   (Marx	   1993,	   p.101),	  
whereby	   ‘reality	   is	   intellectually	   reproduced	  on	   all	   levels	   and	   in	   all	   dimensions’	   (Kosík	   1976,	  
p.15	  italics	  in	  original).	  The	  first	  difference	  between	  dialectical	  and	  non-­‐dialectical	  approaches,	  
then,	  is	  their	  opposite	  conceptions	  of	  the	  abstract	  and	  the	  concrete.	  
Secondly,	   while	   non-­‐dialectical	   approaches	   deal	   with	   contradictions	   logically,	   dialectics	   sees	  
contradictions	   as	   inherent	   in	   the	   complex	   existence	   of	   reality,	   and	   unlike	   non-­‐dialectical	  
methods	   it	   does	   not	   hold	   that	   abstractions	   require	   purification	   from	   their	   concrete	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  With	  Ollman	  (2003,	  p.63),	  we	  should	  note	  that	  dialectical	  abstractions	  cannot	  be	  completely	  different	  
from	  non-­‐dialectical	  abstractions,	  not	  only	  because	  it	  would	  constitute	  a	  Wittgensteinian	  ‘private	  
language’	  as	  Ollman	  says,	  but	  also	  because	  both	  dialectical	  and	  non-­‐dialectical	  abstractions	  have	  to	  start	  
with	  real,	  practical	  abstractions.	  Any	  radical	  diversion	  from	  real	  abstractions	  would	  only	  be	  an	  indication	  
of	  poor	  skills	  of	  imagination	  and	  thinking.	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contradictions.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  dialectics	  sees	  contradictions	  as	  constitutive	  of	   the	  concrete	  
existence	  of	  any	  entity.	  In	  short,	  there	  is	  a	  fundamental	  difference	  between	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  
dialectical	   and	   non-­‐dialectical	   approaches	   deal	   with	   contradictions.	   Non-­‐dialectical	   views	  
recognize	   only	   formal-­‐logical	   contradictions	   between	   two	   logical	   propositions.	   Dialectical	  
method,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   instead	   of	   wishing	   away	   real	   contradictions	   in	   the	   concrete	  
relations	  between	  things,	  deals	  with	  them.	  
Thirdly,	   and	   directly	   following	   from	   the	   second	   difference,	   while	   non-­‐dialectical	   approaches	  
reify	   real	   abstractions	   in	   the	   form	   of	   definitions,	   or	   at	   best,	   of	   ‘ideal-­‐types’,	   dialectical	  
approaches	  have	  an	  inherent	  sensitivity	  to	  change,	  and	  recognise	  that	  theory	  has	  to	  respond	  
to	   constant	   changes	   that	   take	  place	   in	   the	   concrete	   existence	  of	  what	   it	   abstracts,	   and	   that	  
these	   changes	   arise	   from	   the	   contradictory	   relations	   that	   really-­‐abstracted	   entities	   have	   in	  
reality.	  Moreover,	  as	  distinct	   from	  any	   idealist	  dialectics,	  historical	  materialist	  dialectics	  does	  
not	   expect	   these	   contradictions	   to	   be	   resolved	   conceptually	   through	   the	   reconciliation	   of	  
logical	  categories.	  For	  real,	  practical	  contradictions	  are	  not	  resolved,	  but	  temporarily	  settled	  in	  
the	  form	  of	  social	   institutions	  following	   lengthy,	  conflictual	  processes	  of	   interaction	  between	  
real	   agents.	   These	   are	   widely	   accepted	   properties	   of	   a	   dialectical	   perspective.	   Many	  
differences	   exist	   between	   extant	   dialectical	   approaches.	   Among	   these,	   two	   main	   versions	  
stand	  out,	  namely	   logical-­‐historical	  dialectics	  and	  systematic	  dialectics,	  and	  now	  I	  will	  turn	  to	  
the	  first	  of	  these.	  
2.3.2.	  Logical-­‐Historical	  Dialectic	  
Logical-­‐historical	   dialectic	   stemmed	   largely	   from	   Engels’	   interpretation	   of	   Marx’s	   method	  
(Arthur	   2004),15	  which	   found	   a	   wide	   following	   among	   Soviet	   Marxists	   (Jacoby	   2002).	   His	  
admiration	   for	   the	   nascent	   modern	   science	   led	   Engels	   to	   write	   his	   infamous	   Dialectics	   of	  
Nature,	  where	  he	   tried	   to	  establish	   the	  general	   laws	  governing	   the	  natural	  world	   (Marx	  and	  
Engels	   1987).	   Reducing	   these	   to	   the	   three	   laws	   of	   dialectics	   (‘transformation	   of	   quantity	   to	  
quality	  and	  vice	  versa’,	   ‘interpenetration	  of	  opposites’,	  and	   ‘negation	  of	   the	  negation’	   (Marx	  
and	  Engels	  1987,	  p.356)),	  he	  sought	   to	  establish	  dialectics	  as	   the	  objective	  science	  of	  nature	  
and	   society.	   Plekhanov	   (1972)	   continued	   this	   tendency	   and	   turned	   this	   positivistic	   and	  
economistic	   version	   of	   dialectical	  materialism	   into	   the	   official	   ideology	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  This	  is	  a	  very	  controversial	  topic	  among	  Marxists.	  Engels’	  interpretation	  of	  Marx	  has	  been	  seen	  as	  a	  
distortion	  by	  many	  (Lichtheim	  1961;	  Avineri	  1978).	  Others,	  however,	  have	  argued	  that	  there	  was	  a	  unity	  
in	  their	  thinking	  (Rees	  1994).	  Ollman	  (2003)	  states	  that	  it	  is	  not	  plausible	  to	  assume	  that	  Marx	  did	  not	  
know	  Engels’	  arguments	  in	  the	  Dialectics	  of	  Nature	  and	  Anti-­‐Duhring.	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This	   vulgarised	   version	  of	   dialectics	   blurred	   the	   lines	  of	   demarcation	  between	  dialectics	   and	  
positivism	  (Levine	  1975).16	  
This	  variant	  of	  ‘dialectical	  materialism’	  carried	  with	  it	  all	  the	  maladies	  of	  the	  positivist	  method	  
in	  social	  sciences.	  First	  of	  all,	   it	  held	  that	  everything	  in	  the	  natural	  and	  social	  worlds	  could	  be	  
reduced	   to	   law-­‐like	   general	   statements	   even	   though	   the	   content	   of	   these	   laws	   preach	   the	  
central	   importance	   of	   motion,	   change	   and	   contradiction.	   This	   underlies	   all	   sorts	   of	  
reductionism	   traditionally	   associated	   with	  Marxism,	   including	   the	   belief	   that	   the	   ‘economic	  
base’	   in	   every	   instance	   or	   in	   the	   last	   instance	   determined	   the	   political,	   legal,	   ideological	  
‘superstructure’,	  that	  the	  opposition	  between	  the	  forces	  and	  the	  relations	  of	  production	  would	  
cause	  revolutions,	  that	  history	  would	  follow	  a	  predetermined	  course	  and	  every	  society	  would	  
go	  through	  the	  same	  developmental	  stages,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  
Most	  important	  and	  unfortunate	  of	  all,	  it	  saw	  historical	  events	  as	  instances	  of	  these	  laws,	  that	  
is,	  it	  subordinated	  history	  to	  the	  ‘dialectical’	  laws	  of	  motion.	  The	  proponents	  of	  such	  a	  dialectic	  
assumed	   a	   perfect	   correspondence	   between	   logic	   and	   history	   when	   ‘disturbing	   accidental	  
occurrences’	   are	   excluded	   (Engels	   cited	   in	   Rosdolsky	   1977,	   p.115).	   They	   took	   dialectics	   as	  
something	  to	  be	  applied	  to	  history.	  They	  also	  claimed	  that	  this	  was	  the	  method	  used	  by	  Marx	  
himself.	   It	   reached	   the	   apex	   of	   its	   notoriety,	   under	   the	   rubric	   of	   ‘dialectical	   and	   historical	  
materialism’,	  or	  ‘diamat’,	  when	  Stalin	  (1940)	  described	  historical	  materialism	  as	  an	  extension,	  
or	  application	  of	  the	  dialectical	  materialist	  method	  to	  social	   life.	   It	  did	  not	  trouble	  them	  that	  
the	  October	  Revolution	  of	  1917	  appears	  on	  this	  account	  as	  a	  ‘disturbing	  accidental	  occurrence’,	  
defying	   the	   laws	   of	   development.17	  When	   the	   ‘laws	   of	   motion’	   did	   not	   match	   historical	  
developments,	  instead	  of	  doubting	  these	  laws,	  they	  wanted	  to	  coerce	  history	  into	  conforming	  
to	   theory,	   as	   exemplified	   by	   the	   Soviet	   Union’s	   forced	   collectivisation	   programs	   and	   purges	  
from	  the	  party.	  
All	   these	   and	  many	   other	   problems	   emanating	   from	   the	   logical-­‐historical	   reading	   of	  Marx’s	  
dialectical	  method	  are	  due	  to	  its	  separating	  theory	  from	  history	  first,	  and,	  having	  constituted	  
them	  as	  distinct,	  applying	  the	  theory	  to	  history	  later.	  These	  problems	  haunted	  not	  only	  those	  
who	   subscribed	   to	   the	   Soviet	   official	   ideology,	   but	   also	   those	   who	   developed	   much	   more	  
nuanced	  views	  of	  the	  dialectical	  method.	  For	  example,	  in	  their	  discussion	  of	  the	  capitalist	  state,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Labriola	  (1903)	  provides	  an	  excellent	  early	  critique	  of	  those	  who	  conflate	  Marx’s	  dialectical	  method	  
with	  positivism,	  or	  social	  or	  political	  Darwinism.	  
17	  Not	  the	  Revolution	  itself	  (he	  did	  not	  live	  long	  enough	  to	  see	  that),	  but	  the	  developments	  leading	  to	  it,	  
though,	  troubled	  Marx	  himself.	  In	  drafts	  of	  his	  letter	  to	  Vera	  Zasulich,	  he	  questioned	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  
the	  Russian	  developmental	  trajectory	  (Marx	  and	  Engels	  1989).	  Later	  Trotsky	  (1932)	  expanded	  on	  this	  
observation	  in	  his	  History	  of	  the	  Russian	  Revolution.	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Holloway	  and	  Picciotto	  (1991,	  p.123)	  characterise	  Marx’s	  dialectical	  method	  as	  proceeding	  ‘in	  
a	  logical-­‐historical	  manner’.	  Since	  they	  see	  this	  method	  as	  presenting	  the	  abstract-­‐logical	  and	  
the	   concrete-­‐historical	   together	   to	   complement	   one	   another,	   there	   is	   a	   wide	   discrepancy	  
between	   their	   theoretical	   work	   and	   historical	   analysis.	   Although,	   for	   instance,	   they	   see	   the	  
state	  as	  a	   ‘form	  of	  appearance’	  of	   the	  essential	  capital	   relation,	   their	  actual	  analysis	  remains	  
state-­‐centric,	  as	  correctly	  observed	  by	  Bruff	   (2009).	  This	   is	  because	  whenever	  one	  analyses	  a	  
concrete	  conjuncture	  of	  a	  specific	  state,	  one	  either	  assumes	  the	  subjective,	  one-­‐sided	  vantage	  
point	  of	  that	  state,	  and	  sees	  the	  world	  from	  that	  vantage	  point,	  or	  explains	  the	  actions	  of	  that	  
state	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  predetermined	  or	  conceptually-­‐formed	  abstract-­‐logical	  framework.	  	  
In	   a	  word,	   for	   our	   purposes	   the	   core	  problem	  with	   the	   logical-­‐historical	   view	  of	   dialectics	   is	  
that	  although	   it	  seeks	  to	  see	  theory	  and	  history	   in	  union	  with	  each	  other,	  this	  unity	   is	  only	  a	  
forced	   one,	   since	   it	   conceives	   them	   separately	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   This	   results	   in	   a	   search	   for	  
concrete	  reality	   in	   logical	  abstractions	  which	  are	  then	   imposed	  on	  reality.	  Moreover,	  seeking	  
causal	   geneses	   in	   history	   and	   logical	   geneses	   in	   theory	   are	   irreconcilable	   endeavours.	  While	  
the	   former	   requires	   the	   identification	   of	   chronological	   relations	   between	   things,	   the	   latter	  
requires	   the	  development	   from	  one	  another	  of	  conceptual	  categories	  which	  are	  only	  related	  
synchronously.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   logical-­‐historical	   notion	   of	   dialectics	   fails	   to	   overcome	   the	  
problems	  of	  positivism,	  ultimately	  coming	  up	  either	  with	  a	  conceptual	  objectivism	  that	  Marx	  
sought	   to	   dislodge	   from	   materialism,	   or	   a	   radical	   subjectivism	   which,	   in	   seeing	   the	   world	  
through	   the	   eyes	   of	   a	   single	   subject,	   leaves	   the	   subjective	   historical	   analysis	   and	   objectivist	  
conceptual	  architecture	  as	  two	  separate,	  forcibly	  related	  accounts	  of	  reality.	  	  
2.3.3.	  Systematic	  Dialectic	  
In	   response	   to	   the	  problems	  generated	  by	   this	   logical-­‐historical	   reading	  of	  Marx’s	  dialectical	  
method,	   the	   last	   two	   decades	   have	   seen	   a	   return	   to	   Hegel’s	   work	   in	   its	   relation	   to	  Marx’s	  
writings,	  and	  a	  new	  dialectical	  method	  known	  as	  ‘systematic	  dialectics’	  or	  ‘the	  new	  dialectic’	  or	  
‘New	   Hegelian	   Marxism’	   has	   been	   developed	   (Arthur	   2004,	   p.1).	   Represented	   by	   a	   diverse	  
cohort	   of	   scholars18,	   this	   approach	   finds	   its	   most	   systematic	   exposition	   in	   the	   works	   of	  
Christopher	  J.	  Arthur	  (and	  Tony	  Smith).	  Critical	  of	  logical-­‐historical	  dialectic,	  Arthur	  sets	  out	  to	  
develop	   a	   systematic-­‐dialectical	   view	  of	  Marx’s	  method	  especially	   in	  Capital.	   Authors	   in	   this	  
current	  in	  general,	  and	  Arthur	  in	  particular,	  make	  the	  distinction	  between	  logical-­‐historical	  and	  
systematic	  readings	  of	  Marx’s	  dialectic	  that	  while	  the	  former	  is	  in	  search	  of	  the	  causal	  genesis	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Arthur	  (2004,	  p.15)	  lists	  the	  names	  of	  R.	  Albritton;	  C.	  J.	  Arthur;	  J.	  Banaji;	  R.	  Bhaskar;	  M.	  Eldred;	  I.	  Hunt;	  
M.	  Lebowitz;	  J.	  McCarney;	  P.	  Murray;	  R.	  Norman;	  S.	  Sayers;	  B.	  Ollman;	  M.	  Postone;	  G.	  Reuten;	  T.	  Sekine;	  
A.	  Shamsavari;	  F.	  C.	  Shortall;	  T.	  Smith;	  H.	  Williams;	  M.	  Williams	  within	  this	  current.	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or	   historical	   origins	   of	   capitalism,	   the	   latter	   tries	   to	   systematically	   present	   the	   conceptual	  
categories	  of	  capital	  so	  as	  to	  represent	  it	  as	  an	  organic	  totality	  and	  show	  the	  interrelations	  that	  
reproduce	   it	   (T.	   Smith	   1990;	   Arthur	   2004).	   Relations	   between	   the	   moments	   or	   aspects	   of	  
capitalist	  totality	  are	  presented	  synchronically.	   In	  this	  manner,	  argue	  systematic	  dialecticians,	  
Marx	   follows	   a	   systematic	   route	   in	   presenting	   his	   concepts,	   starting	   from	   the	  most	   abstract	  
category,	   i.e.	   the	   commodity,	   and	   introducing	   step	  by	   step,	  more	   concrete	   categories	  which	  
arise	  out	  of	  the	  internal	  contradictions	  of	  the	  more	  abstract	  categories	  (Arthur	  2004,	  p.66;	  T.	  
Smith	  1990;	  Reuten	  and	  Williams	  1989,	  pp.19–20;	  cf.	  Sayer	  1979,	  pp.96–103).	  
Arthur	   (2004,	   pp.118–19)	   argues	   that	  what	   is	  more	   important	   for	  Marx	   is	   the	   ‘ability	   of	   the	  
system	   to	   constitute	   itself	   as	   a	   self-­‐reproducing	   totality’	   rather	   than	   its	  historical	  origin,	   and	  
that	  although	  this	  ‘totality	  is	  constituted	  out	  of	  its	  moments,	  …	  the	  totality	  reproduces	  itself	  in	  
and	  through	  its	  moments,	  even	  when	  the	  material	  reduced	  to	  such	  moments	  existed	  in	  some	  
sense	   prior	   to	   the	   constitution	   of	   the	   totality’.	   Moreover,	   claims	   Arthur	   (2004,	   p.9),	   as	   the	  
capitalist	   reality	  ontologically	  has	   ‘the	  shape	  of	  an	   ideality’,	  historical-­‐causal	  genesis	  plays	  no	  
part	   in	   explaining	   the	   current	   reality.	   Thus,	   systematic	   dialectical	   reading	   ‘abandons	   the	  
historical	   perspective	   with	   its	   problematic	   of	   causal	   genesis,	   in	   favour	   of	   a	   structural	  
problematic	  requiring	  an	  account	  of	  “genesis”	  in	  logical	  terms’	  (Arthur	  2004,	  p.116).	  For	  capital	  
as	  a	  totality	  has	  to	  absorb	  historical	  material	  resistive	  to	  its	  reproduction	  by	  making	  it	  aspects	  
of	  its	  reproduction.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  either	  has	  to	  bring	  into	  being	  or	  subsume	  the	  conditions	  
of	   its	   existence,	   that	   is,	   it	   has	   to	   posit	   its	   presuppositions.	   This	   ‘positing’	   of	   historical	  
preconditions	  poses	  one	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  methodological	  problems	  of	  dialectical	  social	  
theory	  (Psychopedis	  1992).19	  For	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  capital	  is	  able	  to	  posit	  its	  presuppositions	  
and	  ensure	  its	  total	  reproduction	   is	   in	  no	  way	  certain.	  Finelli	   (2007,	  p.66),	  for	   instance,	   in	  his	  
criticism	  of	  Arthur’s	  work,	  claims	  that	  capital	  as	  ‘the	  totalizing	  subject’	  does	  not	  ‘tolerate	  any	  
presupposed	  …	  element	  if	  it	  is	  not	  posited’.	  The	  abstract	  ‘world’	  of	  capital,	  for	  him,	  ‘organizes’,	  
‘pervades’,	  and	  colonizes	  ‘all	  of	  reality’,	  the	  concrete	  world,	  with	  its	  ‘need	  for	  production	  and	  
reproduction’	   (Finelli	   2007,	   pp.64–65,	   70).	   Capital	  qua	   Subject,	   in	   the	  Hegelian	   sense	   of	   the	  
term,	  can	  posit	  all	   its	  presuppositions,	  however,	  only	   logically,	   responds	  Arthur,	   for	  then	   it	   is	  
on	  its	  native	  terrain	  (see	  Arthur	  2004,	  p.10;	  see	  also	  Albritton	  2005,	  2007).	  Only	  in	  the	  logical	  
realm	   can	   it	   become	   a	   closed	   totality	  where	   all	   the	   presuppositions	   of	   its	   reproduction	   are	  
posited.	   Capital,	   in	   reality,	   has	   both	   internal	   and	   external	   ‘others’:	   labour	   and	   nature	  
respectively	  (Arthur	  2004,	  p.77;	  cf.	  Reuten	  and	  Williams	  1989,	  pp.68–69).	  These	  constitute	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  For	  a	  well-­‐articulated	  exposition	  of	  the	  conceptual	  pair	  ‘presupposing-­‐positing’	  and	  its	  Hegelian	  
foundations	  see	  Bellofiore	  and	  Finelli	  (1998),	  who	  introduced	  these	  terms	  to	  the	  English	  language.	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Arthur	   (2006,	   pp.97–98)	   the	   limits	   to	   its	   totalization,	   or	   in	   other	   words,	   although	   capital	  
subsumes	   pre-­‐capitalist	   forms	   under	   itself	   as	   its	   moments	   or	   aspects	   of	   reproduction	   and	  
‘blocks	   their	   alternative	   uses’,	   capital	   encounters	   them	   as	   ‘externality’.	   Labour	   remains	  
capital’s	   other,	   since,	   although	   it	   is	   more	   or	   less	   both	   formally	   and	   really	   subsumed	   under	  
capital	   globally,	   it	   continues	   to	   be	   recalcitrant	   to	   the	   reproduction	   of	   capital	   in	   accordance	  
with	  its	  presuppositions	  regarding	  the	  reproduction	  of	  labour	  as	  a	  technical	  input	  to	  the	  circuit	  
of	   capital.	   The	   same	   goes	  with	   nature:	   although	   land,	   natural	   resources,	   and	   raw	  materials	  
appear	  to	  capital	  as	  replenishable	  elements	  of	  production	  and	  reproduction,	  it	  does	  not	  as	  yet	  
have	  the	  means	  to	  reproduce	  them	  (see	  Foster	  2008,	  p.78).	  In	  this	  sense,	  according	  to	  Arthur	  
(2009,	   p.171),	   although	   it	   ‘really	   imposes	   itself’	   onto	   what	   it	   has	   to	   subsume	   under	   itself,	  
‘capital	   as	   an	   ideal	   totality	   cannot	   account	   for	  what	   is	   in	   excess	   of	   its	   concept	   of	   itself,	   the	  
concrete	  richness	  of	  social	  labour,	  not	  to	  mention	  that	  of	  nature’	  and	  there	  is	  an	  unbridgeable	  
gap	  between	  form	  and	  content,	  or	  the	  conceptual	  and	  the	  real.	  
Systematic	  dialectical	  presentation	  ends	  when	  all	  the	  necessary	  and	  essential	  moments	  for	  the	  
reproduction	   of	   the	   object	   totality	   are	   exposed	   with	   all	   their	   interrelations	   (Reuten	   and	  
Williams	   1989,	   p.23).	   So	   the	   systematic	   exposition	   of	   the	   capitalist	   totality	   reaches	   closure,	  
according	   to	   Arthur	   (Arthur	   2005),	   with	   the	   category	   of	   finance	   capital,	   or	   ‘interest-­‐bearing	  
capital’,	  where	  capital	   reproduces	   itself	  without	  any	  external	   condition,	  although	   in	   reality	   it	  
has	  to	   incorporate	   its	   ‘others,’	   land	  and	   labour,	  to	  achieve	  full	   totality	  (Arthur	  2005,	  pp.196–
197).	  
These	  qualifications,	  however,	  do	  not	  save	  Arthur	  and	  other	  systematic	  dialecticians	  from	  the	  
pitfalls	  of	   idealism	  (Saad-­‐Filho	  1997).	  The	  claim	  that	   the	  real	  material	  world	  has	   taken	  on	  an	  
ideal	  shape	  under	  capitalism	  because	  of	  the	  real	  abstractive	  powers	  of	  capital	  does	  not	  licence	  
one	   to	   avoid	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   real	   concrete.	   In	   true	   Hegelian	   fashion,	   Arthur	   attributes	  
Subjectivity	   to	   Capital	   and	   disregards	   ‘what	   is	   in	   excess	   of	   its	   concept	   of	   itself’.	   Moreover,	  
systematic	   dialectic	   banishes	   time	   and	   space	   from	   its	   exposition	   along	  with	   history,	   since	   it	  
deals	   with	   the	   conceptual	   categories	   that	   constitute	   the	   ‘ideality’	   of	   capitalist	   totality	   only	  
synchronically.	   Ultimately,	   he	   has	   to	   admit	   that	   there	   is	   an	   unbridgeable	   gap	   between	   the	  
conceptual	  and	  material	  existence	  of	  capital;	  nevertheless,	  he	  takes	  this	  gap	  as	  the	  ‘fatal	  flaw’	  
of	   the	   self-­‐conception	  of	   capital	   itself,	   rather	   than	  of	  his	  own	  approach	   (see	  Callinicos	  2005;	  
Arthur	  2005,	  2009).	  All	   these	  problems,	   I	  argue,	  originate	   from	  the	  one-­‐sided	  view	  of	   reality	  
only	  from	  the	  ‘subjective’	  vantage	  point	  of	  capital.	  While	  Arthur	  acknowledges	  that	  capital	  has	  
its	  material	   conditions	  of	  existence	  outside	  of	   itself,	  he	  does	  not	  drive	   this	  home	  and	  afford	  
possibility	  that	  these	  concrete	  conditions	  of	  existence	  of	  capital	  constantly	  constitute	  and	  re-­‐
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constitute	  it	  even	  in	  the	  abstract,	   in	   its	   ideality.	  Finally,	  human	  agency	  vanishes	  in	  systematic	  
dialectic	  together	  with	  time	  and	  space.	  The	  only	  agent	  that	  remains	  is	  capital	  as	  a	  ‘ghost-­‐like’	  
entity	  which	  is	  claimed	  to	  have	  transformed	  and	  be	  transforming	  the	  rich	  diversity	  of	  human	  
activity	  according	  to	  its	  reproductive	  needs.	  
Both	   logical-­‐historical	   and	   Hegelian	   systematic	   dialectics	   remain	   mired	   in	   the	   problems	   of	  
positivism	   and	   idealism.	   While	   logical-­‐historical	   dialectic	   freezes	   its	   abstractions	   historically	  
due	   to	   its	   focus	   on	   the	   causal	   genesis	   of	   its	   subject-­‐matter,	   and	   thereby	   either	   separates	  
theory	   from	   history	   or	   imposes	   theory	   upon	   history,	   systematic	   dialectic	   freezes	   its	   logical-­‐
conceptual	  abstractions,	  and	  thereby	  either	  disregards	  history	  altogether,	  or	  subsumes	  history	  
into	  theory	  by	  attributing	  a	  conceptuality	  to	  history	  itself.	  Accordingly,	  while	  in	  the	  former	  the	  
concrete	   is	   divorced	   from	   the	   abstract	   and	   left	   unaccounted	   for,	   in	   the	   latter	   the	   concrete	  
itself	   is	   claimed	   to	   be	   abstract	   and	   again	   remains	   unaccountable.	   Last	   but	   not	   least,	   in	   the	  
former,	   concrete	   agents	   exist	   either	   as	   instances	   of	   abstract-­‐logical	   relations	   or	   as	   absolute	  
subjects	  without	  any	  relation	  to	  other	  agents,	  whereas	  in	  the	  latter,	  nothing	  has	  agency	  apart	  
from	  the	  unfolding	  Subject,	  namely	  capital.	  A	  historical	  materialist	  dialectic	  is	  needed	  and	  the	  
following	  provides	  a	  picture	  of	  such	  a	  dialectic.	  
2.3.4.	  Dialectic	  of	  the	  Concrete	  
Dialectic,	   above	   all,	   is	   about	   ‘change,	   all	   change’	   (Ollman	   2003,	   p.59).	   This	   is	   not	   to	   say,	  
however,	   that	   dialectic	   deals	   with	   change	   as	   if	   it	   was	   one	   category	   among	   a	   set	   of	   other	  
categories	   of	   being.	   Rather,	   at	   an	   ontological	   level	   it	   sees	   change	   as	   inherent	   in	   the	  
constitution	  of	   things.	  Change	   takes	  manifold	   forms	   ranging	   from	  movement	   to	  quantitative	  
increase	   or	   decrease	   and	   qualitative	   transformation.	   Everything	   is	   in	   a	   constant	   process	   of	  
becoming	  something	  else.	  So	  the	  first	  ontological	  premise	  of	  dialectic	  is	  that	  nature	  (including	  
human	   beings	   and	   their	   creations)	   is	   in	   constant	   flux.	   Placing	   such	   a	   central	   emphasis	   on	  
change	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  dialectic	  takes	  this	  as	  the	  ultimate	  law	  of	  nature;	  otherwise	  such	  a	  
dialectic	   would	   at	   best	   offer	   a	   simple	   ontological	   truism,	   at	   worst	   a	   very	   extreme	   form	   of	  
reductionism	   (as	   was	   the	   case	   with	   Engels’	   dialectic	   of	   nature).	   Prioritising	   change	   over	  
equilibrium	  is	  not	  the	  exclusive	  contribution	  of	  dialectic	  to	  social	  sciences,	  however.	  Emanuel	  
Adler	   (2005,	   pp.30-­‐36),	   for	   instance,	   registered	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   equilibrium-­‐seeking	  
orientation	  of	  mainstream	  IR	  in	  its	  many	  guises.	  Social	  change,	  in	  Adler’s	  view	  of	  it,	  takes	  place	  
in	   an	   evolutionary	   way,	   as	   perceptions	   and	   cognitions	   of	   agents	   match	   material	  
transformations	   in	   the	   external	   world.	   Moreover,	   despite	   his	   ‘immanent’	   understanding	   of	  
change	   and	   his	   objection	   to	   a	   teleological	   conception	   of	   change,	   his	   evolutionary	   view	   of	  
change	  embodies	  an	   inherent	   telos	   in	   the	   form	  of	   ideational	   consensus	  among	   international	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communities	  (Adler	  2005,	  passim.,	  esp.	  ch.	  3).	  Such	  a	  view	  of	  change	  disregards	  contradictions	  
and	   contestations	   in	   the	   emergence	   and	   consolidation	   of	   social	   and	   international	   change.	  
Reflecting	   a	   common	   deficiency	   of	   the	   constructivist	   IR	   theory,	   Adler’s	   theory	   also	   seeks	  
ideationally-­‐generated	  intersubjective	  equilibria	  viewed	  as	  structures.	  
Secondly,	  then,	  and	  somewhat	  at	  a	  more	  fundamental	  level,	  dialectic	  deals	  with	  contradictions	  
and	  sees	  them	  as	  the	  source	  of	  change.	  Again,	  from	  the	  dialectical	  perspective,	  contradictions	  
are	  ontological,	   that	   is,	   they	  are	  general	  existential	  properties	  of	   things.	  They	  arise	   from	  the	  
simple	  ontological	  premise	   that	   things	  as	  abstracted	  by	  human	  beings	  are	  not	   identical	  with	  
other	  things	  even	  when	  the	  abstraction	  is	  made	  of	  a	  class	  of	  things	  (e.g.	  stones).	  At	  the	  same	  
time,	   since	   things	   are	   also	   related	   to	   one	   another	   as	   parts	   of	   a	   complex	   totality,	   they	   also	  
interact.	  Changes	  occur	  as	  a	  result	  of	  this	  unity	  in	  difference.	  In	  this	  sense,	  contra	  the	  formal-­‐
logical	   view	   of	   contradictions	   which	   holds	   that	   contradictions	   exist	   between	   two	   logical	  
statements,	   dialectic	   sees	   contradictions	   in	   reality	   and	   identifies	   them	  as	   practical,	   as	   is	   the	  
case	  with	  dialectical	  abstractions.	  Contradictions	  are	  found	  not	  ideally	  or	  conceptually,	  but	  in	  
the	  existence	  of	  (really,	  practically)	  abstracted	  aspects	  of	  reality.	  Furthermore,	  contradictions	  
cannot	   be	   resolved	   or	   even	   reconciled	   in	   thought.	   Any	   conceptual	   suggestion	   to	   resolve	   or	  
reconcile	   contradictions	   can	   only	   point	   at	   one	   of	   the	   many	   potential	   resolutions	   or	  
reconciliations.	  How	  contradictions	  unfold	  remains	  indeterminate.	  To	  keep	  the	  consistency	  in	  
examples	  I	  shall	  now	  go	  back	  to	  our	  piece	  of	  stone	  for	  an	  illustration.	  In	  its	  concrete	  existence	  
a	  piece	  of	  stone,	  as	  noted	  above,	   is	  many	  things	  at	  the	  same	  time	  depending	  on	  its	  relations	  
with	   other	   things.	   Its	   becoming	   then	   depends	   on	   the	   ways	   its	   contradictory	   relations	   with	  
other	  things	  are	  resolved.	  There	  is	  a	  real	  contradiction,	  for	  example,	  between	  its	  existence	  as	  a	  
piece	  of	  stone	  in	  nature	  and	  its	  exposure	  to	  the	  decomposing	  powers	  of	  other	  natural	  forces.	  
Simultaneously	  another	  real	  contradiction	  emerges	  when	  a	  human	  being	  makes	  an	  axe	  of	  it	  by	  
polishing	   it.	   There	   are	   as	   many	   possibilities	   of	   becoming	   as	   there	   are	   contradictions	   and	  
reconciliations.	  This	  example	  also	  helps	  us	  distinguish	  between	  a	  strict	  Hegelian	  dialectic	  and	  a	  
historical	  materialist	  dialectic	  of	  the	  concrete.	  While	  contradictory	  development	  of	  conceptual	  
categories	  in	  idealist	  dialectic	  involves,	  by	  necessity,	  the	  sublation	  of	  both	  concepts	  by	  a	  third,	  
higher	   concept,	   historical	   materialist	   dialectic	   takes	   contradictions	   as	   they	   manifest	  
themselves	   in	  concrete	  reality,	  and	  there,	  more	  than	  one	  contradiction	  may	  (and	  usually	  do)	  
exist	  simultaneously.	  Historical	  materialist	  dialectic	  may	  abstract	  contradictions	  one	  at	  a	  time	  
as	  well	   in	  analysing	  them	  at	  a	  deeper	  level,	  yet	  this	  is	  less	  an	  ontological	  and	  epistemological	  
than	   a	   methodological	   issue.	   Reuten	   and	   Williams	   (1989),	   for	   instance,	   offer	   a	   systematic	  
dialectic	  of	  capitalist	  totality	  based	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  value-­‐form	  along	  the	  strict	  Hegelian	  lines	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mentioned	   above	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   show	   the	   state	   as	   being	   in	   a	   necessary	   relation	   to	   civil	  
society.	  Starting	  from	  the	  ‘transhistorical	  universal’	  categories	  of	  ‘sociation’	  and	  ‘dissociation’,	  
they	   go	   on	   to	   derive	   ever	   more	   ‘concrete’	   dyads,	   each	   of	   which	   emerges	   from	   the	  
contradictions	   of	   the	   previous,	   more	   abstract	   dyads.	   Then	   they	   leave	   the	   real	   concrete	  
unaccounted	  for	  by	  relegating	  institutional	  differences	  among	  states	  to	  the	  level	  of	  contingent	  
differentiation	   as	   inessential	   for	   the	   reproduction	   of	   the	   ‘capitalist	   totality’	   (Reuten	   and	  
Williams	  1989,	  pp.177–180).	  Notwithstanding	  the	  etymology	  of	  the	  term,	  historical	  materialist	  
dialectic,	   by	   contrast,	   does	   not	   see	   contradictions	   as	   existing	   only	   between	   two	   things	   or	  
concepts.	  Moreover,	  it	  does	  not	  see	  things	  that	  stand	  in	  a	  contradictory	  relation	  to	  each	  other	  
as	   necessarily	   polar	   opposites;	   it	   does	   not	   accept	   polar	   opposition	   in	   the	   real	   existence	   of	  
things.	   Finally,	   historical	   materialist	   dialectic	   recognises	   that	   contradictions	   may	   be	  
antagonistic	  (existential)	  or	  non-­‐antagonistic,	  that	  is,	  they	  may	  continue	  to	  exist	  for	  prolonged	  
periods	  of	  time	  without	  any	  resolution	  or	  reconciliation,	  and	   in	  the	  real	  world	  of	  real	  human	  
agents,	  whether	  they	  will	  be	  sublated	  or	  not	  depends	  on	  the	  activities	  of	  real	  human	  agents	  (cf.	  
Brincat	  2011,	  pp.682,	  686–688).	  	  
Thirdly,	   and	   most	   importantly,	   the	   central	   category	   of	   historical	   materialist	   dialectic	   is,	  
therefore,	  praxis,	   conceived	  as	   sensuous	  and	   ‘goal-­‐directed’	  human	  activity	   (Bernstein	  1999,	  
p.43).	   It	   is	   synonymous	   with	   neither	   the	   automatic	   ‘behaviour’	   of	   conventional	   positivist	  
sociology	   that	   emerges	   in	   response	   to	   external	   stimuli,	   nor	   the	   meaningful	   ‘action’	   of	  
individuals	  in	  Weberian	  social	  theory.	  Nor	  can	  the	  more	  recent	  notion	  of	  ‘practices’	  match	  the	  
philosophical	   depth	   of	   praxis.	   Inspired	   by	   the	   ‘practice	   turn’	   in	   the	   social	   sciences	   (Schatzki,	  
Knorr	  Cetina,	  von	  Savigny	  2001),	  Emanuel	  Adler	  and	  Vincent	  Pouliot	  sought	  to	  reproduce	  this	  
turn	  in	  IR.	  The	  idea	  of	  practices	  here	  is	  very	  limited	  in	  scope,	  however:	  it	  refers	  exclusively	  to	  
the	   patterned	   meaningful	   social	   action	   of	   practitioners	   who	   act	   within	   ‘communities	   of	  
practice’	   (Adler	   2005;	   Adler	   and	   Pouliout,	   2011a	   and	   2011b)	   composed	   of	   diplomats,	  
statesmen,	   bureaucrats,	   etc.	   These	   ‘transnational	   communities’	   socialise	   their	   individual	  
members	   into	   patterned	   ways	   of	   doing	   diplomacy,	   statesmanship,	   and	   bureaucracy.	   The	  
difference	   between	   ‘praxis’	   and	   a	   ‘practice’	   is	   that	   while	   praxis	   refers	   to	   all	   human	   action,	  
practice	  is	  only	  one	  class	  of	  action	  among	  others:	  patterned	  social	  action.	  The	  notion	  of	  praxis,	  
in	  contrast,	  is	  resistant	  to	  an	  ontological	  definition	  –	  like	  the	  conception	  of	  humans	  as	  rational	  
utility	  maximisers	  –	  as	  it	  has	  to	  remain	  historically	  open	  to	  its	  many-­‐sided	  manifestations.	  
Praxis	  is	  what	  bridges	  the	  world	  and	  thinking	  (Kitching	  1988,	  p.29).	  It	   is	  the	  relay	  point	  in	  the	  
dialectic	   of	   subject	   and	   object.	   It	   constitutes	   the	   fusion	   of	   ontology	   and	   epistemology	  
providing	  instead	  an	  onto-­‐epistemology	  of	  human	  socio-­‐historical	  reality.	  It	  establishes	  human	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beings	  firmly	  inside	  nature	  without	  reducing	  their	  active	  life	  to	  it.	  In	  the	  following,	  I	  will	  discuss	  
how	  a	  historical	  materialist	  dialectic	  based	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  praxis	  can	  do	  all	  this	  drawing	  upon	  
the	  general	  discussion	  on	  abstraction	  in	  praxis	  above	  (Section	  2).	  Praxis	  before	  all	  else	  refers	  to	  
all	  activity	  that	  human	  beings	  carry	  out	  in	  producing	  and	  reproducing	  their	  life.20	  But	  praxis	  is	  
also	  what	  distinguishes	  man	  and	  woman	  as	  a	  species	  from	  other	  species	  in	  the	  animate	  world	  
in	  that	  praxis	  is	  purposive	  activity	  (Bernstein	  1999).	  Marx	  wrote:	  
A	  spider	  conducts	  operations	  which	   resemble	   those	  of	   the	  weaver,	  and	  a	  bee	  would	  
put	  many	  a	  human	  architect	  to	  shame	  by	  the	  construction	  of	  its	  honeycomb	  cells.	  But	  
what	  distinguishes	  the	  worst	  architect	  from	  the	  best	  of	  bees	  is	  that	  the	  architect	  builds	  
the	  cell	  in	  his	  mind	  before	  he	  constructs	  it	  in	  wax	  (Marx	  1976,	  p.284).	  
Both	  positivists	  and	  constructivists	  establish	  the	  human	  subject	  as	  homo	  cogitus,	  thinking	  and	  
contemplating	  about	  an	  external	  world.	  While	  in	  positivist	  epistemology	  this	  thinking	  subject	  is	  
totally	   severed	   from	  her	   object	   of	   thought,	   in	   constructivism	   either	   her	   only	   relation	   to	   the	  
material	   world	   is	   supposed	   to	   be	   the	   fact	   that	   her	   body	   has	   material,	   i.e.	   physical,	   bodily,	  
existence	  (Wendt	  1999),	  or	  the	  object	  of	  thought	  itself	  is	  reduced	  to	  the	  thought	  of	  object	  (e.g.	  
Kratochwil	  1991).	  Thinking	  in	  historical	  materialist	  dialectic	  is	  an	  integral	  aspect	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  
action.	  It	   is	  not	  a	  type	  or	  a	  class	  of	  action	  among	  other	  types	  or	  classes.	  Being	  purposive	  and	  
objective,	  i.e.	  directed	  to	  objects,	  human	  activity	  embodies	  thinking	  in	  action.	  It	  is	  this	  aspect	  
of	   historical	   materialist	   dialectic	   that	   distinguishes	   it	   both	   from	   all	   other	   philosophies,	   and	  
from	  other	  dialectical	  approaches.	   It	   is	   in	  this	   light	  that	  Marx’s	  eleventh	  thesis	  on	  Feuerbach	  
that	  ‘The	  philosophers	  have	  only	  interpreted	  the	  world	  in	  various	  ways;	  the	  point,	  however,	  is	  
to	  change	  it’	  (Marx	  and	  Engels	  1998,	  p.574)	  acquires	  another	  meaning:	  that	  philosophy	  always	  
separated	   thinking	   and	   activity	   until	   the	   ‘philosophy	  of	   praxis’	   showed	   their	   togetherness	   in	  
praxis	  (Kitching	  1988).	  
Marx	   to	   some	  extent,	   and	  many	  Marxists	   later	  on,	  however,	   failed	   to	   fully	   capitalise	  on	   this	  
notion	  of	  praxis	   that	  grounded	  Marx’s	  early	  writings	   -­‐especially	  his	  Theses	  on	  Feuerbach	  and	  
Economic	   and	   Philosophical	   Manuscripts	   of	   1844-­‐	   and	   concerned	   themselves	   with	   the	   sum	  
total	   of	   human	   activity,	   most	   of	   the	   time	   expressed	   in	   the	   categories	   of	   the	   reproductive	  
circuit	  of	  capital.	  The	  general	  tendency	  in	  justifying	  this	  move	  has	  usually	  been	  a	  reference	  to	  
the	   real	   abstract	   nature	   of	   human	   labour	   under	   capitalism.	   We	   already	   saw	   the	   extreme	  
version	   of	   this	   tendency	   in	   systematic	   dialectical	   works	   when	   they	   attributed	   ‘ideality’	   to	  
capitalist	  reality.	  The	  labour	  theory	  of	  value,	  for	  instance,	  being	  one	  of	  the	  central	  elements	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  The	  entry	  for	  ‘praxis’	  by	  Petrovic	  (1983)	  in	  A	  Dictionary	  of	  Marxist	  Thought	  (1983)	  presents	  different	  
conceptions	  of	  praxis	  both	  in	  Marxist	  and	  non-­‐Marxist	  traditions.	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Marx’s	   critique	   of	   classical	   political	   economy	   exemplifies	   this	   very	   well.	  21	  The	  magnitude	   of	  
value,	  according	  to	  Marx,	   is	  determined	  by	  the	  socially	  necessary	   labour	  time	  embodied	   in	  a	  
commodity,	  i.e.	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  it	  takes	  on	  average	  to	  produce	  a	  given	  product	  in	  a	  given	  
capitalist	  economy.	  Trying	  to	  ‘scientifically’	  show	  that	  it	  is	  labour	  that	  creates	  value,	  Marx	  puts	  
labour	  into	  a	  quantitative	  relation	  to	  constant	  capital	  (machines)	  which	  simply	  ‘transfers’	  value	  
to	   the	   commodity,	   thereby	  establishing	  both	  as	  quantitatively	  expressible	  equivalents.	  What	  
Marx	  could	  have	  simply	   said	   from	  a	  more	  ontological	   standpoint	  was	   that	   since	  only	  human	  
activity	   is	   purposive,	   it	   is	   human	  praxis	   that	   creates	   value,	   although	   the	  magnitude	   of	   value	  
could	   be	   expanded	   if	  machines	   are	   purposively	   used	   by	   human	   beings	   to	   satisfy	   capitalists’	  
desire	  to	  increase	  relative	  surplus	  value.	  Therefore,	  although	  praxis	  can	  also	  be	  conceptualised	  
in	  terms	  of	  productive	  activity,	  which	  is	  in	  itself	  creative	  and	  purposive,	  I	  take	  production	  in	  a	  
broader	  sense	  as	  production	  and	  reproduction	  of	  human	  social	  life	  (Wood	  1995;	  Sayer	  1987).	  
‘Sum	  total’,	  ‘on	  average’	  or	  ‘in	  aggregate’	  treatment	  of	  human	  activity	  may	  prove	  to	  be	  useful	  
if,	   and	   only	   if,	   the	   concrete	   praxes	   of	   human	   agents	   that	   constitute	   this	   conceptualised	  
consequence	  are	  accounted	  for	  relationally,	  for	  human	  purposes	  show	  immense	  variation	  for	  a	  
range	  of	  reasons.	  Any	  attempt,	  then,	  to	  present	  an	  aspect	  of	  human	  social	  life	  in	  ‘in	  aggregate’	  
terms,	  without	   exposing	   its	   concrete	   existence,	   necessarily	   produces	   a	   structuralist	   account.	  
The	  rich	  diversity	  and	  unintended	  quality	  of	   the	  aggregate	  results	  of	  human	  praxes	  emanate	  
from	  the	  rich	  diversity	  of	  human	  purposes	  and	  interaction,	  and	  an	  account	  of	  any	  human	  social	  
phenomenon	   requires	  a	   relational,	   that	   is,	   inter-­‐subjective	  analysis	  of	   the	   relations	   that	  give	  
rise	  to	  that	  phenomenon.	  
The	  fourth	  aspect	  of	  a	  historical	  materialist	  dialectic,	  then,	  is	  its	  view	  of	  human	  social	  reality	  as	  
inter-­‐subjectively	   constructed.	   Heine	   and	   Teschke	   (1996)	   make	  mention	   of	   inter-­‐subjectivity	  
and	  state	   its	   importance	   in	  a	  historical	  materialist	  dialectic,	  yet	   they	  do	  not	   ‘expand	  upon’	   it	  
sufficiently	  according	  to	  Brincat	  (2011,	  p.684),	  who	  himself	  calls	  for	  a	  ‘social-­‐relational’,	  that	  is,	  
inter-­‐subjectivist	   dialectical	   approach	   to	   world	   politics.	   Although	   there	   is	   a	   great	   degree	   of	  
overlap	  between	  the	  dialectical	  approach	  presented	  here	  and	   in	  Brincat’s	  work,	   there	   is	  one	  
crucial	  difference	  in	  the	  very	  distinct	  ways	  both	  approaches	  conceptualise	  inter-­‐subjectivity.	  At	  
a	   very	   fundamental	   level,	   Brincat	   sees	   inter-­‐subjectivity	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   recognition	   theory,	  
following	   Hegel	   and	   Axel	   Honneth	   (Brincat	   2011).	   Notwithstanding	   his	   criticism	   of	   idealist	  
dialectics,	   he	   comes	   dangerously	   close	   to	   a	   constructivist	   conception	   of	   inter-­‐subjectivity	  
which	   separates	   the	  mental	   and	   the	  material.	   It	   is	   not	   ‘mutual	   recognition’,	   but	   temporary	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  The	  following	  critique	  of	  labour	  theory	  of	  value	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  Marx’s	  early	  writings	  is	  
derived	  from	  Kitching	  (1988	  esp.	  ch.	  4).	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equilibrium	   of	   the	   contradictory	   praxes	   of	   human	   subjects	   that	   should	   underlie	   a	   historical	  
materialist	  dialectical	  notion	  of	  inter-­‐subjectivity.	  By	  ‘inter-­‐subjectively	  constructed’	  I	  refer	  at	  a	  
very	  basic	  ontological	  level	  to	  a	  property	  of	  human	  reality,	  namely	  that	  it	  is	  formed	  as	  a	  result	  
of	   clashes,	   convergences,	   partial	   overlaps,	   and	   antagonistic	   conflicts	   between	   the	   praxes	   of	  
differently	   situated	   and	   motivated	   subjects.	   Any	   social	   phenomenon	   that	   gives	   rise	   to	   a	  
‘puzzle’,	   or	   a	   research	   question	   is	   in	   reality	   constituted	   inter-­‐subjectively	   through	   relations	  
between	  humans.	  How	  these	  different	  relations	  will	  be	  acted	  out	  so	  as	  to	  give	  rise	  to	  the	  social	  
phenomenon	   in	  question	  cannot	  be	  predetermined	   in	  any	  way,	  but	  can	  only	  be	  analysed	  on	  
the	  basis	  of	  its	  concrete	  historical	  existence	  as	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  social	  context.	  
Fifthly,	   then,	   historical	   materialist	   dialectic	   sees	   social	   phenomena	   as	   part	   of	   a	   complex	   of	  
relations.	   This	   totality,	   at	   first	   glance,	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   mess	   of	   things	   where	   everything	   is	  
related	   to	   everything	   else	   chaotically	   (Marx	   and	   Engels	   1986,	   p.37).	   To	   ‘rise’	   then	   from	   this	  
chaotic	  abstract	   totality	   to	   the	  concrete,	  historical	  materialist	  dialectic	   first	  abstracts	  a	  social	  
phenomenon	   from	   this	   totality	   along	   the	   lines	   it	   is	   really,	   practically	   abstracted	   by	   acting	  
human	  subjects.	  Next	   the	  activities	  of	   those	  who	   really	   constituted	   this	  practical	   abstraction	  
and	   the	   relations	   between	   this	   and	   other	   abstractions	   must	   be	   historicised	   in	   order	   to	  
concretely	   show	   how	   this	   abstraction	   came	   into	   being	   in	   the	   first	   place,	   and	   how	   it	   is	  
concretely	   related	  with	  other	   abstractions.	   This	  notion	  of	  dialectical	   totality	   rejects	  Hegelian	  
forms	  of	  expressive	  or	  genetic	   totality	   (Lukács,	  1971),	  whereby	   the	  social	  whole	   is	  organised	  
around	   and	   expresses	   a	   central	   unifying	   principle	   –	   the	   so-­‐called	   central	   contradiction	   of	  
capitalist	  production	  between	  the	  forces	  and	  relations	  of	  production.	  Nor	  does	  it	  resemble	  an	  
autopoietic	  system	  that	  reproduces	  itself	  self-­‐referentially	  (Luhmann,	  1982;	  Waltz	  1979).	  Both	  
systems-­‐theories	   and	   expressive	   notions	   of	   totality	   propose	   close	   and	   self-­‐reproducing	  
systems	   and	   deny	   the	   subjective	   capacity	   of	   agents	   to	   act.	   A	   hermeneutically-­‐informed	  
dialectical	   notion	   of	   totality,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   is	   based	   on	   the	   ‘situational	   consciousness	   of	  
acting	   individuals	   themselves’	   (Habermas,	   1976,	   p.139).	   This	   ‘situational’	   nature	   of	   human	  
activity	  provides	  the	  context	  of	  analysis	  from	  the	  vantage	  point	  of	  the	  ‘acting	  individuals’.	  	  
2.4.	  States,	  Foreign	  Policies,	  International	  Relations	  
2.4.1.	  The	  State	  as	  a	  Real	  Abstraction	  
What	  does	  all	  this	  have	  to	  do	  with	  the	  disciplinary	  gap	  between	  FPA	  and	  IR?	  Let	  us	  retrace	  the	  
argument	   so	   that	  we	   can	   see	   its	   direction.	   I	   argued	   that	   the	  existing	   theories	  of	   FPA	  and	   IR	  
either	   totally	   abstract	   one	   from	   the	   other	   or	   artificially	   integrate	   them	   after	   their	   initial	  
analytical	   separation.	   The	   integration	   remains	   unsuccessful	   since	   the	   initial	   abstraction	   is	  
frozen	   conceptually	   as	   a	   result	   of	   mistaking	   the	   analytical	   separation	   for	   an	   ontological	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separation.	   The	   end	   result	   is	   either	   to	   admit	   that	   this	   is	   a	   ‘hopeless	   task’,	   or	   to	   juxtapose	  
reifications	   as	   factors	  or	   variables.	   To	   solve	   the	  problem	  at	   its	   root,	   this	   chapter	  questioned	  
their	  method	  of	   abstraction,	   and	   compared	  and	  contrasted	   it	  with	   the	  dialectical	  method	  of	  
abstraction.	   In	   the	  process,	   abstraction	   in	  human	   social	  praxis	  was	   inquired	   into	  at	   an	  onto-­‐
epistemological	   level.	   Then	   praxis	   itself	   was	   presented	   as	   the	   central	   aspect	   of	   a	   historical	  
materialist	   dialectic.	   Following	   from	   this,	   it	   was	   argued	   that	   reality	   was	   constructed	   inter-­‐
subjectively	  through	  the	  contradictorily	  related	  praxes	  of	  human	  subjects.	  
This	   section	   looks	   at	   the	   state	   as	   a	   real	   abstraction,	   as	   the	   social	   location	  where	   the	   act	   of	  
foreign	   policy	  making	   crystallises	   and	   as	   the	   subject,	   accordingly,	   of	   international	   relations.	  
Drawing	  upon	  the	  preceding	  discussion,	  my	  argument	  is	  that	  it	  is	  the	  activity	  of	  human	  beings	  
that	  both	  abstracts	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  from	  their	  cumulative	  outcomes,	  
and	   integrates	   them.	  More	   specifically,	   it	   is	   the	   inter-­‐subjective	   activity	   of	   states	   and	   other	  
individual	  and	  collective	  human	  agents	  that	  really	  abstracts	  and	  concretely	  integrates	  FPA	  and	  
IR.	  
To	   say	   that	   the	   state	   is	   a	   real	   abstraction	   is	   to	   point	   at	   the	   manifold	   ways	   in	   which	   this	  
institutional	   aggregate	   affects	   the	   lives	   of	   human	   subjects.	  Weber	   defines	   the	   state	   as	   ‘the	  
form	  of	  human	  community	  that	  (successfully)	  lays	  claim	  to	  the	  monopoly	  of	  legitimate	  physical	  
violence	  within	  a	  particular	  territory’.	  Historically,	  for	  Weber	  (2004,	  pp.37–38),	  
the	  modern	  state	  begins	  to	  develop	  wherever	  the	  monarch	  sets	  in	  train	  the	  process	  of	  
dispossessing	  the	  autonomous,	  “private”	  agents	  of	  administrative	  power	  who	  exist	   in	  
parallel	  to	  him,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  all	  the	  independent	  owners	  of	  the	  materials	  of	  war	  and	  
the	  administration,	  financial	  resources,	  and	  politically	  useful	  goods	  of	  every	  kind.	  The	  
entire	  process	  provides	  a	  perfect	  analogy	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  capitalist	  enterprise	  
through	   the	   gradual	   expropriation	   of	   independent	   producers.	   We	   end	   up	   with	   a	  
situation	   in	   which	   in	   the	   modern	   state	   control	   of	   the	   entire	   political	   means	   of	  
production	  is	  concentrated	  in	  a	  single	  culminating	  point	  so	  that	  not	  a	  single	  official	   is	  
left	  who	  personally	  owns	   the	  money	  he	   spends,	  or	   the	  buildings,	   supplies,	   tools	  and	  
military	  equipment	  that	  are	  under	  his	  control.	  	  
The	  analogy	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalism	  is	  instructive.	  The	  language	  Weber	  uses	  resembles	  that	  
of	   Marx	   (1976)	   in	   narrating	   the	   emergence	   of	   capitalism,	   whereby	   independent	   producers	  
were	   completely	   separated	   from	   and	   deprived	   of	   the	   means	   of	   production.	   If,	   as	   Weber	  
maintained,	   this	   is	   what	   marks	   the	   rise	   of	   the	   modern	   state,	   England,	   not	   continental	  
monarchies,	   represents	   the	   first	  modern	   state	   (Teschke	  2005,	   p.15).22	  It	  was	   also	   in	   England	  
that	   the	   real	   abstraction	   of	   the	   political	   from	   the	   economic	   took	   place	   in	   the	   shape	   of	   an	  
institutional	  differentiation	  of	  the	  market	  and	  the	  state	  through	  the	  reproductive	  struggles	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Weber	  himself,	  and	  later	  Weberians	  kept	  on	  leaving	  out	  “the	  English	  case”	  as	  not	  representing	  the	  
modern	  state	  (e.g.	  Poggi	  1978).	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social	  agents	  over	  rule	  (Gerstenberger	  2007).	  Centralisation	  of	  rule	  in	  the	  Parliament	  and	  as	  a	  
corollary	  the	  depersonalisation	  of	  power	  (Teschke	  2003)	  combined	  with	  the	  ‘internalisation’	  of	  
the	  absolutist	   legacy	  of	  ‘bounded	  territoriality’	  (Lacher	  2006)	  characterise	  what	  we	  call	  today	  
the	   modern	   state.	   The	   form	   of	   this	   state,	   which	   first	   emerged	   in	   England,	   has	   been	  
universalised	   through	   war,	   colonisation,	   structural	   adjustment	   programs,	   emulations,	  
geopolitical	  competition,	  economic	  competition,	  etc.	  and	  today	  world	  geography	  is	  organised	  
along	  territorial	   lines,	  so	  much	  so	  that	   there	   is	  almost	  no	  piece	  of	   land	  that	   is	  not	  under	  the	  
jurisdiction	  of	  this	  or	  that	  state.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say,	  after	  this	  much	  discussion	  on	  the	  pitfalls	  of	  
any	  structuralism,	  that	  states	  in	  the	  end	  are	  really	  ‘functionally	  like	  units’	  as	  Waltz	  would	  have	  
us	  believe;	   rather,	   all	   states	  have	  become	   ‘like	  units’	  only	   formally,	   as	  a	   result	  of	  protracted	  
historical	  contradictions	  they	  faced	  in	  reproducing	  themselves.	  Moreover,	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  
other	   states	   approximated	   the	   original	   English	   case	   differs	   according	   to	   the	   way	   they	   dealt	  
with	  these	  contradictions.	  All	  we	  can	  say	  at	  such	  a	  general	  level	  is	  that	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  this	  
form	  of	  state	  is	  universalised	  show	  immense	  variations	  in	  every	  case	  (Badie	  2000).	  
Now,	  both	  FPA	  and	  IR	  take	  the	  state	  thus	  abstracted	  as	  their	  primary	  unit	  of	  analysis	  and	  the	  
primary	  agents	  of	  these	  fields.	  The	  agency	  of	  the	  state,	  however,	  constitutes	  a	  central	  problem	  
in	  both	  fields	  although	  there	   is	  broad	  agreement	  that	  the	  state	  has	  a	  quality	  of	  personhood.	  
Wendt	   (2004,	   p.289)	   notes,	   “in	   a	   field	   in	   which	   almost	   everything	   is	   contested,	   this	   [state	  
personhood]	   seems	   to	   be	   one	   thing	   on	  which	   almost	   all	   of	   us	   agree.”	   But	  most	   scholars	   of	  
world	  politics,	  especially	   those	  of	  empiricist	  and	  positivist	  orientations,	  accept	   the	  state	  as	  a	  
person	  only	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  a	  useful	  scientific	  abstraction,	  and	  they	  proclaim	  that	  ‘the	  state	  does	  
not	   really	   exist’	   (Gilpin	   1986,	   p.318).	   This	   makes	   it	   extremely	   difficult	   for	   them	   to	   justify	  
attributing	  agency	  to	  the	  state.	  Wendt	  (2004)	  tries	  to	  solve	  this	  problem	  by	  literally	  attributing	  
personhood	  to	  the	  state,	  and	  compares	  the	  state	  to	  real	   individuals	   in	  psychological	  terms	  in	  
substantiating	   his	   argument.	   Besides	   being	   superfluous,	   this	   conceptualisation	   of	   the	   state	  
generates	  problems	  in	  treating	  human	  agents	  themselves	  (Wight	  2004,	  p.270).	  Instead,	  argues	  
Wight,	  we	  should	  see	  states	  as	   ‘complex	   institutional	  ensembles’,	  as	   ‘structures’,	  or	  contexts	  
for	   action.	   For	   the	   fact	   that	   people	   act	   ‘as	   if’	   states	   exist	   should	   not	   in	   itself	   be	   a	   sufficient	  
reason	  for	  students	  of	  the	  state	  to	  accept	   its	  existence	  without	  question,	  according	  to	  Wight	  
(2004).	  Referring	  to	  Marx’s	  (1990,	  p.956)	  dictum	  that	  ‘all	  science	  would	  be	  superfluous	  if	  the	  
form	  of	  appearance	  of	  things	  directly	  coincided	  with	  their	  essence’,	  he	  claims	  that	  reality	  is	  not	  
‘exhausted	   by	   appearances’	   and	   science	   is	   needed	   to	   go	   beyond	   appearances	   (Wight	   2004,	  
p.271).	   It	  will	   be	   remembered	   from	  our	  preceding	  discussion	   that	   structures	   themselves	   are	  
appearances,	   but	   this	   does	   not	   make	   them	   any	   less	   real.	   Institutions	   are	   inter-­‐subjectively	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constructed	  (by	  contradictory	  purposive	  actions	  of	  previous	  generations),	  and	  reproduced	  and	  
contested	   (by	   contradictory	   purposive	   actions	   of	   contemporary	   human	   subjects)	   real	  
abstractions.	  Wight,	  just	  like	  Wendt,	  mistakes	  the	  real	  for	  the	  concrete,	  and	  this	  is	  a	  common	  
denominator	  of	  critical	  realist	  epistemology.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  states	  do	  not	  have	  agency,	  
but	   that	   state	  agency	   is	   concretely	   constituted	  by	  human	  agents	   in	   reproducing	   themselves.	  
The	  fact	  that	  states	  act	  purposively	  may	  not	  bestow	  upon	  them	  personhood	  in	  the	  literal	  sense,	  
but	  it	  gives	  a	  status	  of	  an	  agent	  capable	  of	  purposive	  action	  no	  matter	  how	  ‘thin’	  this	  remains	  
as	  a	   ‘criterion	   for	  personhood’	   (Wendt	  2004).	  Furthermore,	   the	  conception	  of	   the	   state	  as	  a	  
structure	  presupposes	  predetermined	  conceptual	  constraints	  on	  human	  action,	  a	  hallmark	  of	  
structuralist	   thinking.	   It	   is	   true	   that	   there	   are	   constraints	   on	   human	   action	   at	   all	   times,	   but	  
these	  cannot	  be	  accounted	  for	  in	  abstracto	  without	  looking	  at	  the	  concrete	  conjuncture.	  It	  is,	  
in	   any	   case,	   the	   actions	   of	   human	   agents	   that	   inter-­‐subjectively	   constitute	   these	   concrete	  
conjunctures.	  
Besides	   being	   purposive,	   states	   are	   generally	   considered	   to	   share	   some	   common	   formal	  
properties.	  These	  are	  generalisation	  of	  rule	  (a	  feudal	  legacy),	  territoriality	  (an	  absolutist	  legacy),	  
and	  the	  abstraction	  of	  politics	  from	  economy	  (a	  legacy	  of	  the	  transition	  to	  capitalism).	  As	  real	  
abstractions,	   these	   are	   nominally	   recognised,	   but	   this	   recognition,	   itself	   being	   practical,	   is	  
practically	   challenged	  and	  contested	  at	  all	   times.	  All	   real	   abstractions,	   I	   argued,	  are	   created,	  
reproduced,	   contested,	   modified	   or	   replaced	   by	   the	   inter-­‐subjective	   and	   contradictorily	  
related	  praxes	  of	  agents.	  These	  are	  no	  exception,	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  be	  taken	  as	  structural	  
constraints	  that	  predetermine	  to	  this	  or	  that	  extent	  the	  concrete	  praxes	  of	  states.	  This	   is	  not	  
some	  methodological	  mantra,	  constantly	  repeated	  but	  not	  really	  given	  heed	  to;	   it	   is	   rather	  a	  
precondition	  of	  any	  theorisation	  if	  theory	  is	  to	  represent	  reality.	  
Take	  the	  abstraction	  of	  the	  economic	  and	  the	  political	   from	  each	  other	  under	  capitalism,	   for	  
example.	  Building	  upon	  Brenner’s	  work	  (1985a,	  1985b),	  Ellen	  Wood	  (2002)	  shows	  how	  England	  
was	  the	  first	  country	  to	  institute	  such	  separation,	  and	  claims	  that	  the	  distinguishing	  feature	  of	  
capitalism	   is	   that	   the	   state	   and	   the	   market	   are	   abstracted	   from	   each	   other	   which	   enables	  
‘economic	  agents’	  to	  pump	  the	  surplus	  out	  of	  producers	  through	  ‘economic’	  means.	  Teschke	  
(2003,	   2005)	   provides	   a	   compelling	   argument	   as	   to	   how	   this	   unique	   institutional	   form	  was	  
adopted	   by	   other	   states	   under	   the	   strain	   of	   military	   competition	   with	   the	   ‘military-­‐fiscal’	  
English	  state	   (Brewer	  1989).	  The	  problem	   is	   that,	   seen	  as	   the	  verification	  of	   the	  existence	  of	  
capitalism,	   this	   criterion,	   when	   ‘applied’	   to	   other	   cases,	   ultimately	   proves	   formalistic.	   The	  
desire	   to	   challenge	   the	   structural	   Marxist	   orthodoxy	   generates	   a	   Weberian	   ideal-­‐typical	  
thinking	  where	  the	  English	  case	  serves	  as	  the	  ideal	  type.	  Can	  one	  say,	  with	  a	  clear	  conscience,	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that	   India	  or	  China,	  where	  the	  state	   is	  directly	   in	  the	  business	  of	  pumping	  the	  surplus	  out	  of	  
producers,	   is	   not	   capitalist	   (Banaji	   2010)?	   One	   could	   instead	   argue	   that	   different	   states	  
respond	  differently	  to	  pressures	  emanating	  from	  capitalist	  property	  relations	  (which,	  it	  is	  to	  be	  
remembered,	  appear	  differently	  to	  different	  states)	  in	  reproducing	  themselves,	  and	  therefore	  
effect	  this	  separation	  to	  this	  or	  that	  extent,	  or	  remain	  recalcitrant	  to	   it	  as	  much	  as	  they	  can.	  
The	  existence	  of	  ‘imperatives’	  does	  not	  licence	  one	  to	  expect	  states,	  or	  any	  other	  social	  agent	  
for	   that	  matter,	   to	   abide	   by	   them,	   and	   such	   theorising	   is	   reminiscent	   of	   structuralism	   (e.g.	  
Brenner	  2004).	  	  
Similarly,	   generalisation	   or	   institutional	   centralisation	   of	   rule	   has	   been	   challenged	   since	   its	  
inception	  as	  a	  real	  abstraction,	  directly	  by	  other	  disenfranchised	  social	  forces,	  but	  also	  through	  
the	   actual	   struggles	   of	   some	   social	   actors	   who	   do	   not	   necessarily	   challenge	   it	   directly	   but	  
through	   their	   practical	   utilisation	   of	   institutional	   mechanisms	   that	   this	   real	   abstraction	  
provides	   in	   reproducing	   themselves.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   in	   reproducing	   themselves	  within	   what	  
seems	  to	  be	  the	  internal	  logic	  of	  this	  institutional	  complex,	  the	  intercourse	  of	  social	  actors	  may,	  
and	   often	   does,	   modify	   or	   change	   that	   institutional	   logic	   itself. 23 	  A	   political	   party	   in	   a	  
representative	  democratic	  polity,	  for	  example,	  in	  trying	  to	  reproduce	  itself	  within	  the	  logic	  of	  
electoral	   politics	   by	   utilising	   populist	   discourse,	   can	  unleash	   social	   forces	   that	   it	  may	  not	   be	  
able	   to	  direct,	  giving	   rise	   in	   the	  end,	   to	  a	   transformation	  of	   the	   form	  of	  electoral	  politics,	  or	  
even	  the	  whole	  social	  order.	  
For	   our	   purposes,	   the	   most	   important	   aspect	   of	   what	   is	   generally	   accepted	   as	   modern	  
statehood	   is	   territoriality,	   since	   it	   is	   closely	   related	   to	  what	  appears	   internal	   and	  external	   to	  
states.	  The	  discussion	  above	  holds	  also	  for	  territoriality,	  first	  of	  all,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  although	  
world	   geographical	   space	   is	   organised	   along	   territorial	   lines,	   this	   territorialisation	   came	   into	  
being	  as	  a	  result	  of	  constant	  clashes.	  Moreover,	  the	  really	  abstracted	  territorial	  boundedness	  
is	   constantly	   contested	   both	   by	   other	   territorially-­‐bounded	   states	   and	   by	   different	   social	  
groups.	  Most	  crucially,	   states	  willingly	  or	  unwillingly	   suspend,	  or	  even	  partially	  give	  up,	   their	  
nominally	   absolute	   territorial	   sovereignty	   when	   they	   join	   international	   organisations,	   make	  
treaties,	   sign	   agreements,	  make	  wars,	   etc.	  My	  argument	   is	   simply	   that	  what	   constitutes	   the	  
internal	  and	  the	  external	  changes	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  concrete	  actions	  of	  states	  in	  relation	  
to	   other	   states	   within	   given	   historical	   conjunctures.	   When,	   for	   instance,	   a	   state	   intends	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  The	  generalisation	  of	  rule	  itself	  historically	  emerged	  as	  a	  result	  of	  reproductive	  struggles	  of	  social	  
forces,	  and	  the	  process	  is	  marvellously	  depicted	  by	  Gerstenberger	  (2007).	  An	  example	  of	  a	  process	  in	  
which	  social	  actors	  transformed	  what	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  system	  through	  their	  struggles	  to	  reproduce	  
themselves	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  social-­‐reproductive	  logic	  of	  that	  ‘system’	  is	  the	  transition	  to	  
capitalism	  in	  the	  English	  countryside	  (Brenner	  1985a,	  1985b).	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make	  a	  foreign	  policy	  decision,	  its	  action	  may	  well	  have	  domestic	  consequences	  and	  vice	  versa,	  
as	   all	   scholars	   reviewed	   in	   the	   first	   chapter	   are	  well	   aware.	   States,	   therefore,	   do	   not	  make	  
decisions	   and	   take	   actions	   in	   a	   vacuum	   as	   really	   abstracted	   territorial	   units	   of	   human	  
collectivity.	   Interstate	   relations	   are	   thus	   also	   inter-­‐subjective	   and	   it	   is	   this	   inter-­‐subjective	  
quality	  of	  interstate	  relations	  to	  which	  we	  now	  turn	  our	  attention.	  
2.4.2.	  States,	  Foreign	  Policies,	  International	  Relations	  
I	   argued	   in	   the	   first	   chapter	   that	   there	   was	   a	   disciplinary	   gap	   between	   FPA	   and	   IR.	   This	  
disciplinary	  gap,	  I	  maintained,	  is	  a	  result	  of	  the	  respective	  vantage	  points	  of	  these	  endeavours.	  
While	   FPA	  assumes	   the	   subjectivist	   vantage	  point	  of	   a	   given	   state	   in	  order	   to	   reconstruct	   in	  
thought	  how	  it	  sees	  the	  world	  around	  it	  so	  as	  to	  explain	  why	  and	  how	  specific	  foreign	  policy	  
decisions	  are	  made,	  IR	  assumes	  the	  objectivist	  vantage	  point	  of	  the	  ‘international	  system’	  and	  
tries	   to	   present	   the	   general	   working	   of	   the	   system	   itself.	   But	   once	   the	   aim	   is	   to	   explain	   a	  
foreign	  policy	  decision	  of	  a	   specific	   state,	   the	  world	  around	   it	   is	  necessarily	   seen	   through	   its	  
eyes,	  as	   it	   is	  the	  subjective	  activity	  of	  that	  state	  that	   is	  accepted	  as	  requiring	  an	  explanation.	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   once	   the	   aim	   is	   to	   posit	   objectively	   how	   international	   relations	   work	  
without	   taking	   into	   consideration	   the	   subjective	   actions	   of	   states	   that	   constitute	   it,	   later	  
inclusion	   of	   this	   into	   the	   theoretical	   construct	   does	   not	   really	   add	   up.	   For	   in	   both	   cases	  
analytical	   abstraction	   of	   an	   aspect	   of	   reality	   is	   assumed	   to	   be	   an	   ontological	   abstraction,	  
radically	   influencing	   the	  way	   reality	   is	   seen.	   If	   two	   things	  are	  assumed	   to	  be	   really	   separate,	  
then	   the	   relation	   between	   them	   is	   necessarily	   seen	   as	   a	   relation	   of	   causality.	   But	   as	   noted	  
above,	  agents	  constitute	  and	  are	  constituted	  by	  what	  appear	  to	  them	  as	   ‘structures’,	   i.e.	  the	  
actions	  of	  other	  agents,	  both	  living	  and	  dead.	  And	  as	  agents	  of	  foreign	  policy	  and	  international	  
relations,	  states	  are	  constituted	  not	  only	  by	  the	  actions	  of	  those	  over	  whom	  they	  lay	  claim	  to	  
sovereignty,	   but	   also	   by	   those	   of	   other	   states	   and	   ‘external’	   agents,	   all	   of	  whom	   enter	   into	  
contradictory	  intercourses	  with	  others	  in	  reproducing	  themselves.	  So	  are	  their	  foreign	  policies.	  	  
Both	   international	   relations	   and	   foreign	   policies,	   therefore,	   ontologically	   have	   an	   inter-­‐
subjective	   quality	   (Ruggie	   1982;	   Kratochwil	   and	  Ruggie	   1986;	   cf.	   Brincat	   2011).	   To	   reiterate,	  
however,	   this	   inter-­‐subjectivity	   is	   not	   based	  on	   some	   ideational	   criteria	   such	   as	   ‘convergent	  
expectations’	   (Krasner	   1983)	   or	   ‘recognition’	   (Brincat	   2011);	   rather,	   it	   is	   based	   on	   the	  
interrelations	  of	  concrete	  praxes	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  social	  actors,	  including	  states.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  
this	   inter-­‐subjectivity	   is	   not	   only	   about	   ‘convergence’	   but	   also	   about	   contradiction.	   Real	  
abstractions,	   or	   ‘structures’	   in	   the	   common	   social-­‐scientific	   discourse,	   as	   I	   argued	   in	   this	  
chapter,	   emerge	   when	   contradictory	   strategies	   of	   reproduction	   of	   different	   agents	   reach	   a	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temporary	  equilibrium,	  and	  they	  keep	  being	  contested,	  intentionally	  and	  unintentionally,	  even	  
after	  they	  take	  entrenched	  institutional	  forms.	  
Real	   contradictions,	   however,	   cannot	   be	   reconciled	   or	   resolved	   conceptually.	   Real	  
contradictions	  play	  out	  in	  the	  real	  praxes	  of	  social	  agents.	  Therefore,	  one	  cannot	  automatically	  
derive	   results	   about	   what	   is	   commonly	   called	   ‘the	   international	   system’	   from	   the	   inter-­‐
subjective	  quality	  of	  international	  relations	  per	  se.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  universalised	  properties	  
of	   real	   abstractions	   such	   as	   territoriality	   and	   rule-­‐generality	   of,	   and	   the	   separation	   of	   the	  
economic	   and	   the	   political	   in,	   ‘the	  modern	   state’,	   while	   useful	   in	   analytically	   distinguishing	  
states	   as	   a	   genus	   from	   trees,	   NGOs,	   professional	   associations,	   etc.,	   do	   not	   conceptually	  
predetermine	  what	  states	  actually	  do.	  
All	  this	  requires	  a	  research-­‐question-­‐guided	  and	  agency-­‐based	  analysis	  in	  FPA	  and	  IR,	  as	  in	  all	  
other	   social	   sciences,	   since	   only	   such	   an	   analysis	   can	   remedy	   the	   problems	   associated	  with	  
both	  structuralism	  and	  constructivism	  by	  providing	  a	  well-­‐defined	  context	  around	  the	  agents	  
the	   research	   question	   identifies.	   In	   the	   process,	   one	   may	   have	   to	   step	   out	   of	   the	   context-­‐
definition	  of	  the	  research	  question,	  but	  this	  should	  happen	  only	  in	  pursuit	  of	  the	  agents	  who	  
constitute	  this	  context	   through	  their	  contradictory	  praxes.	  This	  has	   fundamental	   implications	  
for	   the	  unit	  and	   level	  of	  analysis	  problem.	  Both	   in	  FPA	  and	   IR	   it	   is	  again	   the	  praxes	  of	   social	  
agents	  that	  determine	  the	  unit	  and	  level	  of	  analysis.	  An	  influential	   individual,	  a	  social	  class,	  a	  
group	  of	  bureaucrats,	   a	  minister,	   a	   state,	   etc.	  may	  be	   the	  unit	  of	   analysis	  depending	  on	   the	  
concrete	  praxes	  of	  these	  social	  agents	  within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  given	  matter	  of	  foreign	  policy	  or	  
international	  relations.	  The	  opening	  of	  a	  new	  border	  crossing	  point	  between	  two	  neighbouring	  
states,	   for	   example,	  may	   be	   the	   result	   of	   an	   intention	   to	   increase	   local,	   cross-­‐border	   trade	  
where	   small	   producers	   inhabiting	   the	   border	   towns	  may	   turn	   out	   to	   be	   the	   primary	   unit	   of	  
analysis:	  a	  local	  association	  of	  small	  producers.	  The	  same	  action	  in	  another	  context,	  where	  two	  
states	  with	  historical	  animosities	  open	  a	  new	  crossing	  point,	  may	  simply	  be	  an	  indication	  of	  a	  
rapprochement	  attempt,	  states	  or	  governments	  being	  the	  primary	  unit	  of	  analysis.	  Therefore,	  
FPA	  and	  IR	  should	  not	  attempt	  to	   identify	  a	   ‘system-­‐wide’	  type	  of	  unit	  that	  can	   invariably	  be	  
taken	   as	   the	   primary	   unit	   and	   level	   of	   analysis.	   Identifying	   the	   primary	   unit	   of	   analysis	  
depending	  on	  the	  context,	  however,	  does	  not	  exhaust	  the	  agential	  content	  since	  the	  primary	  
agent	   itself	   is	   constituted	  by	  other	  agents	  at	   the	  same	  or	  different	  unit	   levels.	  This	  does	  not	  
mean	  that	  the	  interactions	  of	  states	  are	  absolutely	  indeterminate	  and	  therefore	  untheorisable.	  
Insofar	   as	   states	   act	   as	   if	   real	   abstractions	   such	   as	   international	   institutions,	   rules	   of	  
engagement,	  trade	  regimes	  are	  concrete	  structures,	  these	  can	  constitute	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  
the	  theorisation,	  subject	  to	  later	  historicisation.	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States	  as	  agents,	  then,	  also	  find	  themselves	  surrounded	  by	  historically-­‐inherited	  givens	  at	  any	  
point	   in	   time.	   These	   givens	   constitute	   for	   them	   an	   externality	   upon	   which	   they	   act	   in	  
reproducing	   themselves	   as	   states.	   Just	   like	   individuals,	   states	   abstract	   aspects	  of	   reality	   into	  
manageable	  proportions	  as	  well.	  These	  abstractions	  manifest	  themselves,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  
form	  of	   state	   departments	  which	   are	   commissioned	   to	   deal	  with	   aspects	   of	   reality.	  What	   is	  
external,	  or	   foreign,	   to	  a	  particular	   state	  appears	  as	  a	   structure,	  an	   ‘alien	  power’,	  or	  what	   is	  
called	  in	  the	  literature	  ‘the	  international	  system’,	  from	  its	  subjective	  vantage	  point.	  Abstracted	  
as	   the	   system,	   this	  externality	  presents	   itself	   in	  different	  ways	   to	  different	   states	  generating	  
particular	  conditions	  of	  reproduction	  in	  a	  given	  conjuncture.	  Through	  the	  same	  practical	  act	  of	  
abstracting	  the	  external	  as	  ‘the	  international	  system’,	  states	  also	  abstract	  themselves	  from	  the	  
‘system’.	  That	   is,	  by	  acting	  upon	  this	  externality	   in	  reproducing	  themselves,	  states	  practically	  
abstract	   their	   actions	   as	   ‘foreign	   policies’	   from	   the	   ‘international	   system’,	   i.e.	   the	   actions	   of	  
others.	  Partly	  because	  of	  particular	  conditions	  of	  reproduction	  they	  find	  themselves	  in,	  partly	  
because	   of	   other	   indeterminate	   subjective-­‐conjunctural	   reasons,	   strategies	   of	   reproduction	  
show	   immense	   variations.	   These	   differences	   generate	   contradictions	   in	   the	   sense	   explained	  
above	  (Section	  3.4),	  as	  different	  states	  develop	  different	  strategies	  of	  reproduction.	  Purposive	  
activities	  of	  states	  may	  or	  may	  not	  generate	  the	  initially	  intended	  consequences	  for	  individual	  
states,	  but	  in	  the	  end	  they	  certainly	  change	  the	  conditions	  of	  reproduction	  by	  creating	  a	  new	  
foreign	  policy	  conjuncture,	  or	  a	  new	  externality	  for	  every	  individual	  state.	  The	  disciplinary	  gap	  
between	   FPA	   and	   IR	   is	   a	   reflection	   of	   this	   divergence	   between	   individual	   states’	   purposive	  
actions	   and	   the	   cumulative	   consequences	   of	   these	   and	   previous	   actions	   and	   their	   practical	  
abstraction	  in	  the	  process	  of	  their	  actions	  and	  the	  actions	  of	  others.	  So	  my	  argument	  is	  simply	  
that	  this	  gap	  is	  contextually	  generated	  and	  bridged	  in	  the	  concrete	  and	  contradictory	  praxes	  of	  
states,	  which	  are	  themselves	  results	  of	  the	  interplay	  of	  the	  concrete	  and	  contradictory	  praxes	  
of	  other	  agents	   including	  state	  elites,	   individual	  and	  collective	  agents,	  other	  states	  and	  other	  
institutional	  agents.	  	  
This	  dynamic	  and	  complex	   reality	   is	  presented	   in	  an	  extremely	   static	  manner	  by	   the	  existing	  
approaches	   in	  the	  field.	  Theory,	  however,	  must	  reflect	   this	  dynamism	  and	  complexity.	  This,	   I	  
argue,	   is	   possible	   through	   a	   historical	   materialist	   dialectic.	   Such	   dialectic,	   in	   answering	   a	  
question	   about	   an	   aspect	   of	   reality,	   starts	   from	   agents	   before	   all	   else.	   This	   enables	   it	   to	  
provide	  a	  context-­‐definition	  by	  presenting	  how	  the	  reality	  appears	  to	  that	  particular	  agent,	  in	  
our	  case	  a	  particular	  state.	  Agents,	  however,	  are	  not	  taken	  as	  abstract	  and	  general	  categories	  
with	   abstractly	   conceptualised	   properties	   (such	   as	   ‘the	   state’,	   ‘the	   individual’,	   or	   ‘the	  
bureaucrats’).	  Rather	   their	   actions	   constituting	   them	  as	  agents	   should	  be	  of	  primary	   import.	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Therefore	   the	   inter-­‐subjective	   constitution	   of	   that	   particular	   state	   that	   establishes	   it	   as	   an	  
agent	   should	   be	   analysed	   through	   identifying	   how	   contradictory	   relations	   between	   social	  
agents	   are	   resolved,	   reconciled,	   or	   set	   aside.	   In	   the	   process,	   the	   vantage	   point	  will	   have	   to	  
constantly	  change,	  along	  with	  the	  specific	  agent	  the	  theory	  is	  dealing	  with.	  This	  shall	  make	  it	  
possible	  to	  see	  how	  ‘the	  domestic’	  is	  abstracted	  from	  ‘the	  international’,	  ‘the	  economic’	  from	  
‘the	  political’,	  and	  foreign	  policy	  from	  international	  relations	  through	  the	  interaction	  of	  states	  
and	  other	  social	  actors.	  
Nevertheless,	  like	  all	  purposive	  actions,	  foreign	  policies	  are	  directed	  to	  ‘objects’	  of	  action,	  that	  
is,	   they	   objectify	   the	   subjective	   existence	   of	   other	   agents.	   Other	   states,	   however,	   find	  
themselves	  in	  different	  sets	  of	  relations	  and	  conditions	  of	  reproduction,	  and	  therefore	  devise	  
different	  ways	   of	   dealing	  with	   externality,	   namely	   different	   foreign	   policies.	   In	   view	   of	   this,	  
theory	  must	  also	  represent	  how	  the	  world	  appears	  to	  other	  states	  objectified	  by	  the	  first	  state	  
as	   subjects	   of	   the	   same	   conjuncture,	   since	   they	   also	   act	   upon	  what	   is	   external	   to	   them	   by	  
implementing	  their	  foreign	  policies.	  Furthermore,	  the	  interpretation	  of	  states	  and	  other	  agents	  
of	   these	   objectified	   appearances	  may	   be	   diverse	   resulting	   in	   further	   differentiation	   in	   their	  
foreign	  policies-­‐cum-­‐reproductive	   strategies.	  The	  next	   foreign	  policy	  conjuncture	   they	  create	  
inter-­‐subjectively	   for	   themselves,	   for	   one	   another,	   and	   for	   the	   reproduction	  of	   the	   concrete	  
totality	   has	   an	   unintended	   quality	   precisely	   because	   of	   this	   inter-­‐subjective	   nature	   of	   the	  
cumulative	  consequence.	  
2.5.	  Conclusion:	  Explaining	  and	  Understanding,	  or	  Foreign	  Policy	  and	  
International	  Relations	  
The	   first	   chapter	   problematized	   the	   theoretical	   gap	   between	   FPA	   and	   IR.	   The	   review	   of	   the	  
literature	  showed	  that	  those	  who	  have	  attempted	  to	  bridge	  this	  gap	  have	  failed	  to	  do	  so	  for	  
various	   reasons.	   Notwithstanding	   the	   differences	   among	   them	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   substantive	  
arguments,	  they	  converged	  in	  their	  use	  of	  abstractions.	  The	  problem	  was	  that	  they	  all	  reified	  
their	   abstractions	   and	   failed	   to	   concretise	   them.	   In	   order	   to	   overcome	   this	   problem,	   the	  
second	  section	  of	  this	  chapter	  presented	  an	  account	  of	  how	  human	  beings	  abstract	  aspects	  of	  
reality	   practically	   and	   how	   these	   real	   abstractions	   emerge	   and	   are	   inherited	   from	   previous	  
generations	   so	   that	   they	   appear	   to	   individuals	   as	   structures,	   i.e.	   ‘alien	   powers’	   constraining	  
them.	  In	  doing	  this,	  the	  section	  also	  attempted	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  famous	  ‘agent-­‐structure’	  
problem	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  in	  general.	  	  
The	   third	   section	   provided	   an	   alternative	   mode	   of	   theoretical	   abstraction	   informed	   by	   the	  
dialectical	  approach.	  It	  then	  analysed	  two	  variants	  of	  the	  dialectical	  approach,	  namely	  logical-­‐
historical	  and	   systematic	  dialectics.	  These,	   I	   argued,	   remain	  undialectical	  ultimately,	  because	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while	  the	  former	  tries	  to	  graft	  theory	  onto	  history,	  the	  latter	  attributes	  a	  theoretical	  quality	  to	  
history.	   This	   brings	   them	   respectively	   closer	   to	   positivism	   and	   idealism,	   instead	   of	   dialectic.	  
Finally,	  the	  section	  presented	  a	  third,	  historical	  materialist	  version	  of	  dialectic	  which	  provides	  a	  
unique	   view	   of	   reality	   with	   change,	   contradiction,	   praxis,	   inter-­‐subjectivity,	   and	   totality	  
constituting	  its	  central	  aspects.	  A	  discussion	  of	  these	  in	  relation	  to	  one	  another	  was	  presented	  
at	  both	  onto-­‐epistemological	  and	  methodological	  levels.	  
The	   fourth	   section	   treated	   the	   contemporary	   state	   with	   its	   general	   properties	   as	   a	   real	  
abstraction.	   These	   properties,	   I	   maintained,	   themselves	   historical	   inter-­‐subjective	  
constructions,	  are	  inherited	  from	  different	  historical	  periods	  and	  constitute	  the	  state	  as	  a	  real	  
abstraction.	  Pace	  Hudson,	  who	  sees	  the	  state	  as	  a	  metaphysical	  abstraction,	  states	  can	  still	  be	  
agents	   by	   reason	   of	   their	   capability	   to	   act	   purposively.	   Contradictions	   arising	   from	   the	  
differences	   in	   the	   ways	   the	   world	   appears	   to	   them	   and,	   following	   from	   this,	   from	   their	  
different	   concrete	   praxes	   in	   reproducing	   themselves	   constitute	   the	   context	   for	   action.	   It	   is	  
through	   this	   inter-­‐subjective	   encounter	   of	   praxes	   that	   states	   abstract	   foreign	   policy	   from	  
international	   relations	   and	   bridge	   them,	   and	   theory	   must	   reflect	   this	   practical	   nature	   of	  
relations	  among	  states	  in	  concrete	  historical	  conjunctures.	  
In	   international	   relations	   ‘there	   are	   always	   two	   stories	   to	   tell’,	   remarked	   Hollis	   and	   Smith	  
(1991):	  one	  inside,	  the	  other	  outside.	  These	  two,	  they	  claimed,	  were	  unbridgeable.	  I	  argue,	  on	  
the	  contrary,	  that	  there	  are	  as	  many	  stories	  to	  tell	  as	  there	  are	  agents.	  For	  stories	  are	  but	  one-­‐
sided	  representations.	  There	  are	  always	  other	  sides	  to	  stories.	  However,	  the	  concrete	  content	  
of	  the	  field	   is	  not	  exhausted	  no	  matter	  how	  many	  stories	  are	  told.	  These	  reflect	  merely	  how	  
the	  world	  appears	  to	  the	  agent	  in	  question	  and	  how	  that	  agent	  ‘ex-­‐plains’	  the	  world	  external	  
to	  itself.	  This	  can	  only	  be	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  the	  investigation.	  If	  reality	  is	  inter-­‐subjective,	  in	  
order	  to	  mentally	  reproduce	  reality	  we	  need	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  ‘ex-­‐planations’	  of	  other	  
subjects	  so	  that	  we	  have	  a	  concrete	  picture	  of	  it.	  We	  come	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  reality	  only	  
by	   identifying	   the	   relations	   connecting	   ‘ex-­‐planations’.	   Praxis,	   as	   the	   unity	   of	   thinking	   and	  
action,	  as	  purposive	  activity,	  is	  the	  most	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  this	  reconstruction.	  For	  it	  is	  not	  the	  
contemplative	  ego,	  but	  the	  real,	  flesh	  and	  blood	  individual	  that	  acts	  in	  reproducing	  herself.	  	  
So	  much	   discussion	   on	   praxis,	   inter-­‐subjectivity	   and	   concreteness	   remains	   unfulfilling	   when	  
these	  theoretical	  points	  are	  not	  illustrated	  in	  practice.	  Therefore,	  the	  next	  three	  chapters	  will	  
try	  to	  reconstruct	  in	  thought	  a	  specific	  foreign	  policy	  conjuncture:	  developments	  leading	  to	  the	  
2003	  invasion	  of	  Iraq	  by	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  allies.	  Three	  counter-­‐intuitive	  foreign	  policy	  
actions	   by	   the	   US,	   Turkey,	   and	   Iraq	   will	   be	   analysed	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   present	   an	   inter-­‐
subjective	   account	   of	   the	   formation	   of	   each	   state,	   developments	   prior	   to	   the	   (in)actions	   of	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states,	   and	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   new	   reality	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   clash	   of	   their	   contradictory	  
strategies	   of	   reproduction.	   As	   vehemently	   argued	   in	   this	   chapter,	   however,	   the	   practical	  
actions	  of	  agents	  are	  not	  instances	  of	  abstract	  general	  theories.	  Therefore,	  first	  and	  foremost,	  
the	   following	   three	   chapters	   individually	   illustrate	   that	   foreign	   policy	   strategies	   of	   states,	   as	  
part	  or	  result	  of	  their	  wider	  reproductive	  strategies,	  are	  made	  inter-­‐subjectively	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  
agents,	   who	   perceive	   and	   experience	   what	   is	   external	   to	   them	   in	   diverse	   ways	   and	   who	  
therefore	  develop	  different	  strategies	  of	  reproduction.	  This	  diversity	  requires	  a	  ‘thick	  narrative’	  
rather	   than	  predetermined	  conceptual	  apparati	   so	   that	   the	  diverse	  praxes	  are	  put	   into	   their	  
specific	  contexts	  for	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  their	  dialectical	  making.	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3.	  THE	  US	  AND	  THE	  WORLD	  OR	  ‘US	  AGAINST	  THEM’	  
3.1.	  Introduction	  
In	  order	  to	  illustrate	  the	  theoretical	  argument	  developed	  in	  the	  preceding	  chapter,	  this	  and	  the	  
following	  two	  chapters	  will	  examine	  three	  apparently	  counter-­‐intuitive	  foreign	  policy	  decisions	  
by	   three	   states,	   namely	   the	   United	   States,	   Turkey,	   and	   Iraq.	   This	   chapter	   will	   analyse	   the	  
decision	   by	   the	   US	   government	   to	   invade	   Iraq	   in	   2003.	   The	   next	   chapter	   will	   focus	   on	   the	  
decision	  by	  the	  Turkish	  state	  to	  block	  the	  American	  request	  to	  use	  Turkish	  soil	  as	  a	  launchpad	  
for	   the	   invasion	   of	   Iraq	   from	   the	   North,	   purportedly	   a	  much	   safer	   option	   for	   the	   American	  
forces.	   The	   fifth	   chapter	   will	   problematise	   the	   decision	   by	   the	   Iraqi	   government	   to	   reject	  
further	   cooperation	  with	   the	   International	  Atomic	   Energy	  Agency	   (IAEA)	   and	  United	  Nations	  
Monitoring,	  Verification	  and	  Inspection	  Commission	  (UNMOVIC)	   in	  rebuffing	  the	  claim	  that	   it	  
was	  in	  possession	  of	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction	  (WMDs).	  The	  first	  of	  these	  three	  acts	  defies	  
the	   realist	   and	   liberal	   cost-­‐benefit	   analysis.	   The	   second	   ‘violates’	   the	   liberal	   ‘bandwagoning’	  
principle,	  while	  the	  third	  challenges	  the	  very	  core	  of	  much	  IR	  and	  FPA	  thinking,	  i.e.	  the	  will	  to	  
survival.	   From	   a	   traditional	   IR	   or	   FPA	   perspective,	   these	   foreign	   policy	   decisions	   by	   three	  
different	  states	  may	  appear,	  at	  best	  reckless,	  and	  at	  worst	  hostile.	  An	  evaluation	  of	  these	  acts	  
in	  their	  specific	  contradictory	  complexity	  along	  the	   lines	  developed	  in	  the	  preceding	  chapter,	  
however,	   will	   demonstrate	   that	   they	   not	   only	   represent	   various	   ‘reasonable’	   motives	   and	  
reasons	  of	  the	  actors,	  but	  also	  serve	  to	  help	  understand	  the	  contradictory	  ways	  in	  which	  both	  
these	   motives	   and	   reasons,	   and	   their	   inter-­‐subjectively	   constructed	   yet	   unintended	  
consequences	  interrelate.	  	  
This	   chapter	   problematizes	   the	   American	   decision	   to	   invade	   Iraq.	   It	   inquires	   why,	   amidst	  
protests	  by	  a	  range	  of	  actors,	   including	  former	  statesmen,	  academics,	   journalists,	  states,	  and	  
publics,	  and	  despite	  the	  counterintuitive	  nature	  of	  the	  decision	  from	  a	  realist	  perspective,	  the	  
US	  invaded	  Iraq.	  The	  argument	  of	  the	  chapter	  is	  that	  the	  invasion	  was	  a	  specific	  application	  of	  
the	   long-­‐standing	  American	   grand	   strategy	   of	   primacy	   by	   a	   group	   of	   neo-­‐conservatives	  who	  
came	   to	   hold	   key	   foreign	   policy-­‐making	   positions	   in	   the	   George	   W.	   Bush	   administration.	  
However,	   rather	   than	   a	   necessary	   or	   natural	   extension	  of	   this	   strategy,	   the	   decision	  was	   an	  
active	  and	  purposeful	   intervention	  by	  a	  group	  of	   individuals	   in	   the	  Bush	  Administration	  who	  
came	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  strategy	  of	  primacy	  is	  better	  served	  by	  more	  proactive	  engagement	  
with	  reorganisation	  of	  the	  world.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  strategy	  of	  primacy	  provided	  the	  context	  
for	   action	   for	   the	  neoconservatives	   in	   the	  Bush	  Administration,	   rather	   than	  determining	   the	  
way	   in	   which	   they	   pursued	   primacy.	   American	   primacy,	   I	   argue,	   consists	   of	   a	   strategy	   of	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binding	  the	  reproductive	  strategies	  of	  other	  states	  to	  that	  of	  the	  American	  state.	  This	  strategy,	  
however,	  is	  not	  the	  result	  of	  a	  process	  of	  contemplation	  by	  a	  group	  of	  strategists	  or	  statesmen	  
who	  are	  above	  and	  beyond	  history;	  on	  the	  contrary,	   it	  has	  been	   in	  the	  making	  since	  the	   late	  
19th	  century	  and	  has	  taken	  on	  its	  current	  shape	  through	  successful	  and	  unsuccessful	  responses	  
to	  world-­‐historical	  developments,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  are	  the	  results	  of	  the	  praxes	  of	  other	  states.	  
The	   protracted	   character	   of	   this	   process	   is	   captured	   in	   the	   successive	   reformulations	   and	  
different	  implementations	  of	  policies.	  While	  a	  more	  isolationist	  stance	  was	  taken	  in	  response	  
to	  developments	  in	  Europe	  during	  the	  inter-­‐war	  years,	  the	  US	  took	  a	  much	  more	  proactive	  and	  
order-­‐building	  role,	  as	   it	  was	  very	  much	  aware	  of	  the	  huge	  capability	  gap	  between	   itself	  and	  
the	  other	  major	  powers,	  by	  institutionalising	  its	  position	  through	  integrated	  trade,	  monetary,	  
and	  security	  arrangements.	  The	   threatening	  presence	  of	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  helped	   the	  United	  
States	  to	  consolidate	  cohesion,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  prevented	  the	  US	  strategy	  of	  tying	  every	  
state	   to	   its	   reproductive	   strategies	   on	   a	   global	   scale.	   When	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   collapsed,	  
neoconservatives	  in	  the	  US	  wanted	  to	  be	  more	  assertive	  and	  proactive	  to	  globalise	  the	  reach	  
of	   American	   primacy,	   although	   their	   attempts	  were	   blocked,	   first	   by	   the	   realist	  wing	   of	   the	  
Bush	  Sr.	  administration,	  and	   then	  by	   the	  Clinton	  administration.	  Following	   the	  9/11	   terrorist	  
attacks,	  neoconservatives	  found	  the	  opportunity	  to	  push	  through	  their	  agenda	  and	  coercively	  
compel	  a	  series	  of	  states,	  starting	  with	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq,	  to	  integrate	  themselves	  into	  the	  
American-­‐led	  capitalist	  order.	  
In	   order	   to	   make	   sense	   of	   this	   specific	   application	   of	   a	   long-­‐standing	   grand	   strategy,	   this	  
chapter	   provides	   a	   historical	   reconstruction	   of	   the	   developments	   that	   institutionalised	   US	  
primacy.	   In	   line	   with	   the	   onto-­‐epistemological	   and	  methodological	   principles	   set	   out	   in	   the	  
preceding	  chapter,	   the	  primary	  agent	  of	   the	  decision	   is	   initially	  and	  temporarily	   taken	  as	  the	  
American	  state	  as	  an	  institutional	  complex	  to	  be	  later	  subjected	  to	  socio-­‐historical	  unpacking.	  
Throughout	  WW	   II	   and	   in	   its	   immediate	   aftermath,	   the	   American	   political	   elite	   consciously	  
established	  foreign	  policy-­‐making	  as	  an	  exclusive	  domain	  of	  the	  executive,	  limiting	  input	  of	  the	  
wider	  society	  and	  even	  the	  legislative	  organs	  of	  the	  Federal	  State.	  Furthermore,	  apathy	  of	  the	  
American	  electorate	  towards	  issues	  of	  foreign	  policy	  consolidated	  the	  role	  of	  the	  executive	  as	  
the	   locus	   of	   foreign	   policy-­‐making.	   Therefore,	   the	   abstraction	   of	   the	   American	   state	   as	   the	  
primary	  agent	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy	  reflects	  its	  reality,	  more	  than	  it	  would	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
any	  other	  state.	  Reflective	  of	  this	  consensus	  in	  the	  American	  public,	  the	  notion	  of	  primacy	  has	  
constituted	  the	  thread	  of	  continuity	  in	  American	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  since	  the	  end	  of	  WW	  II,	  
with	   roots	   going	  back	   to	  President	  Wilson’s	   time.	  As	   the	   general	   public	   became	   increasingly	  
excluded	  from	  the	  domain	  of	  foreign	  policy,	   isolationism	  and	  deep-­‐seated	  cultural	  notions	  of	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anti-­‐imperialism	  waned	  toward	  the	  end	  of	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  The	  political	  
elite	  and	  the	  top	  brass	  of	  the	  business	  world	  were	  keenly	  aware	  of	  the	  need	  to	  engage	  with	  
the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  this	  consensus	  was	  maintained	  by	  the	  Bush	  
and	   Clinton	   administrations,	   and	   reached	   its	   apogee	   at	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   millennium	   when	  
members	  of	  the	  Bush	  Administration	  increasingly	  felt	  that	  the	  US	  now	  had	  a	  much	  freer	  hand	  
to	  pursue	   this	   strategy.	  Therefore,	   first	  and	   foremost,	   this	  chapter	   seeks	   to	  show	  historically	  
how	  the	  strategy	  of	  establishing	  and	  maintaining	  American	  primacy	  came	  to	  be	  the	  continuous	  
thread	   of	   American	   foreign	   policy-­‐making.	   The	   context	   for	   action,	   or	   the	   totality	   of	   inter-­‐
subjective	   social	   relations	   that	   historically	   contributed	   to	   the	   making	   of	   the	   strategy	   of	  
primacy,	   however,	   does	   not	   by	   itself	   tell	   us	  why,	   instead	   of	   resorting	   to	  many	   options	   that	  
were	  available	  at	   the	  time,	  policy-­‐makers	  chose	   invasion.	  Contextualising	  the	  decision	  within	  
this	  strategy,	   the	  chapter	  offers	   the	  answer	  that	  while	   this	  strategy	  was	  also	  adopted	  by	  the	  
Bush	   Jr.	   Administration	   and	   the	   neoconservatives,	   their	   subjective	   view	   of	   the	   world	  
underpinned	   the	  decision	   to	   invade	   Iraq,	   since	   they	   thought,	   unlike	   the	  preceding	  post-­‐Cold	  
war	  US	  administrations,	  they	  should	  and	  could	  pursue	  this	  strategy	  proactively	  and	  unilaterally	  
and	  bring	  down	  Saddam’s	  regime	  through	  the	  military	  option.	  	  
The	  argument	  is	  developed	  in	  four	  sections.	  The	  next	  section	  reviews	  the	  limited	  literature	  on	  
the	  Iraq	  war.	  FPA	  literature	  on	  the	  Iraq	  war	  offered	  explanations	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  personalities,	  
leadership	   styles,	   or	   belief	   systems	   of	   the	   foreign	   policy	   leadership.	   While	   these	   might	   be	  
helpful	   in	   understanding	   the	   motivation	   of	   foreign	   policy-­‐makers	   within	   a	   larger	   socio-­‐
historical	   context,	   FPA	   literature	   abstracts	   a	   very	   limited	   spatiotemporal	   section	   of	   reality,	  
confining	   itself	   to	   the	   immediate	   spatial	   and	   temporal	   context	   of	   the	   decision.	   The	   IR	  
literature,	   in	   turn,	   assessed	   the	   invasion	   against	   a	   set	   of	   predetermined	   conceptual	   and	  
structural	   logics.	   Even	  more	   historically-­‐aware	   approaches	   tended	   to	   reduce	   the	   invasion	   to	  
the	  requirements	  of	  geopolitical,	  geoeconomic	  or	  cultural	  ‘structures’.	  The	  third	  section	  turns	  
to	   the	   immediate	   context	   of	   the	   decision	   and	   discusses	   how	   the	   world	   appeared	   to	   the	  
American	   state	   in	   the	   early	   2000s,	   and	   concludes	   that	   the	   American	   state	   found	   itself	   in	   a	  
position	   of	   primacy	   at	   the	   time	   although	   this	   position	   faced	  multiple	   challenges.	   The	   fourth	  
section	   provides	   a	   historical	   reconstruction	   of	   the	   formation	   and	   development	   of	   American	  
primacy.	  This	  ‘thick’	  description	  traces	  the	  emergence	  of	  this	  world-­‐historical	  development	  in	  
the	   twentieth	   century	   and	   demonstrates	   how	   what	   appeared	   to	   be	   the	   ‘structure	   of	   the	  
international	   system’,	   i.e.	   American	   unipolarity,	   was	   indeed	   a	   result	   of	   protracted	   historical	  
developments,	  a	  cumulative	  consequence	  of	   the	   inter-­‐subjective	  and	  contradictory	  praxes	  of	  
innumerable	   agents	   including	   American	   big	   capital,	   working	   classes,	   other	   states,	   and	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international	  and	  national	   institutions.	  The	   fifth	   section,	   in	   turn,	   shows	  how	  the	   longer-­‐term	  
strategy	  of	  the	  American	  state	  was	   inherited	  and	   implemented	   in	  a	  specific	  way	  by	  the	  Bush	  
Administration.	   It	   also	   shows	   that	   the	   strategy	   of	   primacy	   was	   both	   inherited	   as	   a	   ‘real	  
abstraction’	   and	   remade	   as	   a	   proactive	   strategy	   of	   worldwide	   domination	   by	   this	  
Administration,	  and	  that	  the	  war	  on	  Iraq	  was	  conceived	  as	  part	  of	  this	  strategy.	  The	  decision	  to	  
invade	   Iraq,	   therefore,	   was	   neither	   made	   by	   free-­‐floating	   statesmen	   nor	   a	   functional	  
emanation	  of	  the	  strategy	  of	  primacy;	  rather,	   it	  was	  an	  active	  and	  subjective	  decision	  by	  the	  
Bush	  Administration.	  
3.2.	  The	  War	  on	  Iraq:	  Contending	  Explanations	  
3.2.1.	  FPA	  on	  Iraq	  War	  
The	  decision	   to	   invade	   Iraq	   has	   been	   subject	   to	  many	   journalistic	   accounts	   and	   to	   a	   limited	  
number	  of	  scholarly	  analyses	  (Mitchell	  and	  Massoud	  2009).1	  These	  mostly	  failed	  to	  match	  the	  
analytical	   requirements	   of	   scholarly	   explanation,	   as	   ‘polemicism’,	   rather	   than	   analytical	  
perspective	  held	  sway	  (Dodge	  2006,	  p.454).	  FPA	  approaches	  limited	  themselves	  mostly	  to	  the	  
analysis	   of	   leadership	   styles,	   character	   traits,	   worldviews,	   and	   the	   perceptions	   and	  
personalities	   of	   the	   members	   of	   the	   Bush	   Administration.	   Shannon	   and	   Keller	   (2007)	   for	  
example,	   take	   the	   leadership	   styles	   of	   the	   foreign	   policy	   bureaucracy	   (except	   Rice)	   as	   their	  
main	   variable	   and	  measure	   their	   traits	  based	  on	   their	   lexical	   output.	   Similarly,	  Dyson	   (2009)	  
measured	  Rumsfeld’s	  trait	  scores	  to	  determine	  the	  role	  of	  his	  leadership	  style	  on	  the	  decision.	  
Perception	  of	   ‘rogue	  states’	  by	   the	   individuals	   in	   the	  Bush	  administration	   is	  also	   taken	  as	  an	  
explanatory	   factor	   (O’Reilly	   2007).	   Michael	   Mazarr	   (2007)	   utilised	   the	   agenda-­‐setting	  
framework,	   whereby	   policy	   agendas	   of	   policy	   communities	   make	   their	   way	   into	   the	   higher	  
echelons	  of	  governmental	  power	  in	  the	  form	  of	  actual	  policies.	  For	  him,	  regime	  change	  in	  Iraq	  
was	   such	   an	   agenda,	   long	   pursued	   by	   Rumsfeld,	  Wolfowitz,	   Cheney	   and	   others	   in	   the	   Bush	  
administration,	   and	   the	   9/11	   terrorist	   attacks	   provided	   the	   window	   of	   opportunity	   for	   the	  
realisation	  of	  this	  agenda	  (Mazarr	  2007).	  
Mitchell	   and	   Massoud	   (2009)	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   strived	   to	   incorporate	   conventional	   FPA	  
frameworks	  into	  one	  overarching	  ‘integrative’	  model,	  based	  on	  a	  combination	  of	  insights	  from	  
small-­‐group	   decision-­‐making	   analysis,	   leadership	   typologies	   and	   bureaucratic	   politics.	  
Categorising	  Bush’s	   leadership	  style	  as	   formal,	   they	  go	  on	  to	  argue	  that	   formal	  management	  
styles	   cause	   ‘anticipatory	   compliance’	  on	  part	  of	   advisors,	   and	  bureaucratic	   infighting	  within	  
the	  ranks	  of	  the	  administration.	  Anticipatory	  compliance,	  particularly	  by	  the	  National	  Security	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  These	  journalistic	  accounts	  most	  prominently	  include	  Mann	  (2004),	  Woodward	  (2004),	  Fallows	  (2006),	  
and	  Ricks	  (2007).	  	  
	  	  
66	  
Adviser	  Condoleezza	  Rice,	  but	  also	  by	   figures	   such	  as	  General	  Tommy	  Franks,	  precluded	  any	  
assessment	  of	  the	  value	  of	  the	  preferred	  decision	  itself,	  and	  led	  the	  bureaucrats	  to	  limit	  their	  
input	   to	   the	   execution	   of	   the	   plan.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   bureaucratic	   infighting,	   especially	  
between	   State	   and	  Defense	  departments	   in	   the	  persons	  of	   Powell	   and	  Rumsfeld	   resulted	   in	  
defects	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   leading	   up	   to	   the	   invasion	   (Mitchell	   and	   Massoud	  
2009).	  
For	  all	   their	  differences,	   these	  approaches	   fit	   squarely	   into	   the	   tradition	  of	  FPA,	   in	   that	   they	  
abstract	   one	   aspect	   in	   the	  decision-­‐making	  process,	   and	   this	   aspect	   is	  mostly	   related	   to	   the	  
psychology,	   worldview,	   or	   belief	   system	   of	   a	   handful	   of	   individuals.	   FPA	   approaches	   to	   US	  
foreign	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  therefore	  remain	  mostly	  ‘first	  image	  explanations’	  (Flibbert	  2006,	  p.	  
318).	  Although	  Mitchell	  and	  Massoud’s	  (2009)	  approach	  has	  a	  wider	  scope,	  it	  leaves	  out	  more	  
than	   it	   lets	   into	   the	  analysis.	   In	   this	   respect,	  decision-­‐making	  models	   reproduce	  many	  of	   the	  
limitations	  of	   traditional	  FPA.	  Moreover,	  because	  of	   this	  narrow	  scope,	   they	   fail	   to	  see	  what	  
lies	   beyond	   the	   immediate	   policy-­‐formulating	   environment	   of	   the	   leaders.	   This	   results	   in	   an	  
almost	  complete	  disregard	   for	   the	  historical	  origins	  of	  American	   foreign	  policy,	   leaving	  many	  
other	  determinations	  outside	  the	  purview	  of	  the	  analysis,	  and	  the	  impression	  that	  everything	  
started	  with	   the	  Bush	  administration.	  Relatedly,	   the	   constitutive	   influence	  of	   the	  position	  of	  
the	   American	   state	   in	   world	   politics	   and	   global	   political	   economy	   does	   not	   figure	   in	   these	  
models.	  	  
3.2.2.	  IR	  on	  Iraq	  War	  
The	   realist	   discussion	   of	   the	   American	   invasion	   of	   Iraq	   revolved	   around	   the	   Cold	  War	   dual	  
conception	  of	  deterrence	  and	  containment.	  Realists	  of	  offensive	  and	  defensive	  strands	  found	  
the	  war	  unnecessary	  (Mearsheimer	  and	  Walt	  2003;	  Mearsheimer	  2005).2	  The	  realist	  discussion	  
of	  the	  war,	  however,	  never	  went	  beyond	  advice	  as	  to	  how	  the	  American	  state	  should	  behave,	  
and	   did	   not	   feature	   any	   attempt	   to	   explain	   why	   the	   US	   wanted	   to	   invade	   Iraq.	   As	   they	  
generally	  explain	  wars	  with	  reference	  to	  systemic	  qualities	  of	  international	  politics,	  i.e.	  anarchy	  
and	  balance	  of	  power,	  states,	  for	  realists,	  follow	  the	  rationality	  dictated	  by	  the	  ‘international	  
system’.	   The	   decision	   to	   go	   to	  war	  with	   Iraq	  was	   irrational	   (Hinnebusch	   2007),	   because	   the	  
rationality	   of	   the	   system	   would	   require	   the	   states	   to	   act	   prudently	   and	   resort	   to	   instead	  
containment	  and	  deterrence	   in	   the	   face	  of	   threat.	  Containment	  and	  deterrence	  would	  work,	  
because	  the	  historical	  record	  shows	  that	  it	  worked	  in	  the	  past,	  against	  both	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  The	  names	  of	  both	  offensive	  and	  defensive	  realists,	  along	  with	  a	  cohort	  of	  other	  IR	  scholars	  appeared	  
on	  a	  paid	  advertisement	  in	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  of	  26	  September	  2002	  recommending	  prudence,	  and	  
providing	  reasons	  as	  to	  why	  the	  United	  States	  should	  not	  go	  to	  war	  with	  Iraq.	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and	   Saddam	  Hussein	   himself	   in	   the	   decade	   following	   the	   Gulf	  War	   (Mearsheimer	   and	  Walt	  
2003).	   The	   irrationality	   of	   the	   decision	   was	   due	   to	   the	   extremism	   and	   the	   ideologically-­‐
motivated	   character	   of	   a	   group	   of	   ‘hawks’	   who	   happened	   to	   seize	   power	   in	   the	   Bush	  
administration	  (Hinnebusch	  2007).	  	  
Given	   that	   Bush	   did	   not	   heed	   the	   realists’	   advice,	   one	  wonders	   how	   realism	   can	   sustain	   its	  
claim	  to	  represent	  the	  reality	  ‘as	  it	  really	  is’.	  The	  matter	  is	  not	  so	  much	  that	  they	  failed	  to	  make	  
their	   voice	  heard	   in	   the	   ranks	  of	   the	  Bush	  administration;	   rather	   it	   is	   that	  when	   their	   policy	  
recommendations	  were	  ignored,	  instead	  of	  questioning	  their	  ability	  to	  account	  for	  reality,	  they	  
put	   the	   blame	   on	   the	   irrationality,	   imprudence,	   and/or	   the	   extremist	   ideologies	   of	   foreign	  
policy	  officials.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  undermine	  the	  morally-­‐admirable	  quality	  of	  the	  realist	  warnings	  
regarding	   the	   war	   on	   Iraq,	   but	   if	   normativity	   is	   to	   serve	   as	   the	   criterion	   of	   truth	   in	   realist	  
explanations	  of	  foreign	  policy	  decisions,	  realists	  may	  need	  to	  revise	  their	  claims	  to	  scientificity,	  
and	  revisit	  the	  works	  of	  Morgenthau,	  who	  proposed	  a	  reconciliation	  of	  universal	  morality	  with	  
a	  constraining	  reality	  in	  a	  ‘practical	  morality’	  (A.	  Murray	  1996).	  
Mearsheimer	   was	   drawing	   attention	   to	   the	   liberal	   internationalist	   character	   of	   Bush	  
administration	  foreign	  policy	  when	  he	  described	  it	  as	  ‘Wilsonianism	  with	  teeth’	  (Mearsheimer,	  
2005).	  After	  all,	  it	  made	  explicit	  reference	  to	  ‘making	  the	  world	  safe	  for	  American	  democracy’.	  
Liberal	   scholars	  of	   IR	  were	  also	  worried	   that	   ‘the	   crisis	  of	  Bush	   foreign	  policy	  had	  become	  a	  
crisis	  of	  liberal	  internationalism’	  (Ikenberry	  2009,	  p.4).	  While	  some	  liberals	  supported	  the	  war	  
against	   Iraq, 3 	  others	   saw	   it	   as	   a	   radical	   rupture	   from	   Wilsonianism,	   and	   lamented	  
multilateralist	   diplomacy	   being	   replaced	   by	   a	   unilateralist	   exertion	   of	   American	   power.	   The	  
foreign	   policy	   of	   the	   Bush	   administration,	   for	   Ikenberry,	   as	   well	   as	   for	   other	   liberal	  
internationalists	   such	   as	   Anne-­‐Marie	   Slaughter	   and	   Thomas	   J.	   Knock,	   constituted	   a	   ‘radical	  
break’	   in	   US	   foreign	   policy	   (Ikenberry	   et	   al	   2009).	   Wilsonian	   principles,	   although	   openly	  
subscribed	  to	  by	  the	  Bush	  administration,	  were	  betrayed	  when	  the	  American	  state	  decided	  to	  
act	   on	   a	   unilateral	   basis	   following	   the	   events	   of	   9/11,	   especially	   when	   it	   did	   not	   seek	   the	  
support	   of	   other	  powers	   in	   starting	   the	  war	   against	   Iraq.	   Tony	   Smith,	   also	   a	   self-­‐proclaimed	  
liberal,	  is	  highly	  critical	  of	  the	  way	  these	  liberal	  internationalist	  authors	  assign	  such	  a	  high	  level	  
of	  centrality	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  multilateralism	  in	  liberal	  internationalism	  as	  the	  most	  important	  
determinant	   of	   discontinuity	   between	   the	   American	   internationalist	   foreign	   policy	   tradition	  
and	   Bush	   Administration	   practices	   (T.	   Smith	   2009,	   pp.57-­‐60).	   Moreover,	   ‘the	   intellectual	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Those	  liberals	  who	  came	  to	  be	  called	  ‘the	  liberal	  hawks’	  included	  Thomas	  Friedman,	  Fareed	  Zakaria,	  
George	  Packer,	  Jeffrey	  Goldberg,	  Richard	  Cohen,	  Paul	  Berman,	  Christopher	  Hitchens	  and	  Kenneth	  
Pollack.	  Some	  of	  these	  authors	  revised	  their	  opinions	  long	  after	  the	  invasion,	  but	  were	  ardent	  
supporters	  during	  the	  prelude	  to	  war.	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heavy-­‐lifting’	   for	   the	  Bush	  Doctrine	  was	  undertaken	  mostly	   by	   those	  neoliberals	   of	   different	  
traditions,	  ranging	  from	  democratic	  transition	  theorists,	  liberal	  peace	  theorists,	  liberal	  political	  
philosophers,	  and	  liberal	  internationalists	  (T.	  Smith	  2007,	  p.143,	  passim.;	  2009,	  p.66).	  T.	  Smith	  
shows	   not	   only	   that	   the	   Bush	   Doctrine	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   new	   form	   of	   neoliberal	  
internationalism,	   but	   also	   that	   both	   Ikenberry	   and	   Slaughter	   subscribe	   to	   a	   foreign	   policy	  
strategy	  that	   largely	  concurs	  with	  this	  Doctrine.	  The	  only	  difference	  of	  opinion	  with	  the	  Bush	  
administration	   is	   their	   emphasis	   on	   multilateralism	   instead	   of	   the	   Bush	   Administration’s	  
limited	  unilateralism.	  The	  reason	  why	  Ikenberry	  claims	  that	  Bush	  Doctrine	  is	  a	  deviation	  from	  
the	   long-­‐standing	   American	   tradition	   is	   that	   he	   simply	   confuses	  means	   with	   ends	   (T.	   Smith	  
2009,	  p.84).	  
Constructivist-­‐ideational	  explanations	  unsurprisingly	  attribute	  causal	  primacy	  to	  the	  formation,	  
diffusion	  and	  establishment	  of	  a	  set	  of	  ideas	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  post-­‐9/11	  American	  state	  of	  
affairs.	  Flibbert	  (2006),	  for	  one,	  argues	  that	  it	  was	  a	  set	  of	  shared	  ideas,	  and	  not	  psychological,	  
domestic,	  or	   international	   systemic	   factors	   that	  was	   the	  primary	   reason	   for	   the	  war	  on	   Iraq.	  
Flibbert	   reproduces	  Wendt’s	   theoretical	   failures	   in	   the	   context	   of	   an	   analysis	   of	   a	   practical	  
situation.	  First,	  just	  like	  Wendt,	  he	  abstracts	  what	  he	  calls	  ideational	  and	  material	  factors	  and	  
prioritises	   the	   former	   over	   the	   latter.4	  Secondly,	   he	   almost	   attributes	   agency	   to	   these	   ideas	  
which	   almost	   replace	   real,	   living	   human	   beings,	   and	   bestows	   explanatory	   power	   to	   these	  
ideas.	   Finally,	   even	   though	   he	   accepts	   that	   ideas	   are	   contested	   before	   they	   are	   established	  
(Flibbert	   2006,	   p.328),	   true	   to	   the	   constructivist	   view,	   he	   assumes	   a	   resolution	   of	   these	  
contestations	  in	  his	  account.	  State	  actions,	  however,	  represent	  not	  a	  shared	  idea	  about	  a	  given	  
policy	   issue,	   but	   a	   temporary	   equilibrium	   of	   contradictory	   strategies	   of	   different	   agents,	  
reflecting	  not	  even	  simply	  the	  strongest	  idea,	  but	  a	  dialectical	  mix	  of	  contradictory	  positions.	  
What	   all	   these	   explanations	   share	   (with	   the	   partial	   exception	   of	   Mazarr’s	   (2007)	   agenda-­‐
setting	  approach)	  is	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  short-­‐sightedness	  that	  underlies	  their	  effort	  to	  locate	  the	  
source	   of	   the	   decision	  within	   a	   time	   period	   that	   spans	   one	   and	   a	   half	   years	   from	   the	   9/11	  
attacks.	   This	   lack	   of	   ‘historically	   grounded	   analysis’	   (Dodge	   2006,	   p.456),	   is	   a	   trademark	   of	  
what	  Robert	  Cox	  (1981)	  once	  called	  ‘problem-­‐solving’	  approaches	  in	  IR.	  They	  fail	  to	  appreciate	  
not	  only	  the	  historically	  specific	  character	  of	  the	  decision,	  but	  also	  the	  inter-­‐subjective	  making	  
of	   it.	   Studies	  with	   historical	   awareness,	   on	   the	  other	   hand,	   generally	   fall	   into	   two	  modes	  of	  
explanation:	   (geo)economic	   and	   (geo)political.	   The	   former	   usually	   refers	   to	   the	   interests	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  But	  unlike	  Wendt,	  he	  considers	  his	  constructivist	  account	  complementary	  to	  other	  mainstream	  
accounts	  (Flibbert	  2006).	  Such	  a	  position,	  however,	  is	  susceptible	  to	  Mearsheimer’s	  (1994)	  criticism	  that	  
this	  kind	  of	  theorisation	  is	  problematic	  for	  its	  relapse	  back	  into	  ‘materialism’	  notwithstanding	  its	  strong	  
subscription	  to	  ‘idealism’,	  undermining	  intellectual	  coherence.	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groups	   of	   people	   who	   are	   influential	   in	   American	   politics	   and	   who	   shape	   decisions	   of	   the	  
American	  state	  directly	  through	  their	  connections	  in	  the	  government,	  think-­‐tanks	  and	  media,	  
and	  campaign-­‐financing,	  as	  well	  as	  indirectly	  through	  their	  functional	  role	  in	  the	  reproduction	  
of	  general	  capital	  accumulation.	  The	  influence	  of	  the	  military-­‐industrial	  complex	  over	  the	  Bush	  
administration	  was	  one	  such	  explanation	  provided	  for	  the	  Iraq	  war	  (e.g.	  Hossein-­‐zadeh	  2007).	  
A	   second	   line	   of	   geo(economic)	   argument	   involves	   oil	   as	   the	   primary	  motive	   for	  war.	   These	  
arguments	   variously	   refer	   to	   the	   personal	   and	   corporate	   interests	   of	   some	  members	   of	   the	  
Bush	  government,	  American	  dependence	  on	  foreign	  oil,	  and	  the	  geo-­‐economic	  importance	  of	  
controlling	   the	  world	   oil	  market	   (Mercille	   2010).5	  Geo(political)	   arguments	   cite	   variously	   the	  
appeal	  of	  foreign	  adventures	  in	  light	  of	  the	  domestic	  problems	  Bush	  faced,	  the	  demonstration	  
effect	  for	  other	  ‘rogue	  regimes’	  or	  potential	  rivals,	  the	  creation	  of	  permanent	  military	  bases	  in	  
the	   region,	   and	   most	   prominently,	   the	   reproduction	   and	   perpetuation	   of	   American	  
primacy/hegemony/empire	  in	  the	  world.6	  
There	  are	  also	  those	  who	  try	  to	  combine	  these	  two	  perspectives	  by	  demonstrating	  the	  political	  
in	   the	   economic	   and	   the	   economic	   in	   the	   political.	   Take	   the	   ‘war	   for	   oil’	   explanations,	   for	  
example.	  Mercille	   (2010)	   convincingly	  argues	   that	   the	  US	   is	   interested	   in	   the	  Middle	  East	  oil	  
not	  for	  its	  domestic	  consumption	  or	  to	  further	  the	  interests	  of	  American	  oil	  companies,	  but	  as	  
part	   of	   its	   long-­‐standing	   strategy	   to	   control	   the	  world	   oil	   supply.	  Moreover,	   claims	  Mercille	  
(2010),	   the	   US	   wanted	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   its	   military	   power	   was	   unsurpassable	   and	   that	  
even	   attempting	   to	   challenge	   it	   would	   be	   in	   vain.7	  Mercille,	   in	   short,	   combined	   geopolitical	  
with	  geo-­‐economic	  analysis.	  This	  analytical	   framework	  goes	  back	  to	  Giovanni	  Arrighi’s	   (1994)	  
distinction	  between	  ‘capitalist	  and	  territorialist	   logics	  of	  power’.	  More	  recently,	  David	  Harvey	  
(2003)	  and	  Alex	  Callinicos	  (2009)	  reached	  the	  same	  conclusion	  that	  imperialist	  practices,	  such	  
as	  the	  war	  in	  Iraq,	  take	  place	  when	  territorial	  and	  capitalist	  logics	  intersect.	  These	  two	  logics,	  
for	   them,	   are	   two	   sources	   of	   power	   and	   cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	   each	   other.	   This	   way,	   they	  
establish	  preordained	   logics	   for	   state	  action	   that	   invariably	  apply	   to	  all	   states,	  and	   therefore	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  American	  dependence	  on	  oil	  was	  cited,	  most	  prominently	  by	  Klare	  (2004,	  2008),	  as	  the	  main	  reason	  for	  
war	  on	  Iraq.	  The	  “war	  for	  oil”	  explanation	  found	  a	  large	  audience	  among	  critics	  of	  the	  Bush	  
administration.	  See	  Mercille	  (2010)	  for	  a	  survey	  of	  the	  relevant	  literature.	  	  
6	  These	  two	  sets	  of	  explanations	  do	  not	  necessarily	  mutually	  exclude	  one	  another	  and	  are	  separated	  
here	  only	  for	  analytical	  purposes.	  The	  notion	  of	  primacy	  is	  explored	  in	  Gowan	  (2006).	  While	  ‘hegemony’	  
became	  the	  central	  conceptual	  tool	  to	  designate	  the	  American	  position	  in	  the	  world	  for	  many,	  including	  
liberals	  (Keohane,	  1984,	  1991;	  Ikenberry,	  2001),	  realists	  (Gilpin,	  1981),	  and	  neo-­‐Gramscians	  (Cox,	  1981;	  
Morton,	  2007,	  van	  der	  Pijl	  1984),	  albeit	  with	  a	  very	  wide	  margin	  of	  difference,	  empire	  and	  imperialism	  
are	  also	  utilised	  as	  explanatory	  devices	  by	  Panitch	  and	  Gindin	  2004;	  2005),	  Harvey	  (2003),	  Wood	  (2003),	  
and	  Callinicos	  (2009)	  among	  others.	  
7	  The	  1992	  Defense	  Policy	  Guidance	  Draft	  Document	  and	  the	  2002	  National	  Security	  Strategy	  of	  the	  




separate	   real	   practices	   of	   differently	   positioned	   states	   from	   these	   predetermined	   logics.	  
Finally,	   Ellen	   Wood’s	   account	   of	   the	   ‘war	   on	   terror’	   reduces	   the	   war	   to	   a	   structural	  
requirement	   of	   capital	   accumulation,	   and	   thereby	   fails	   to	   represent	   the	   richness	   of	   the	  
practice	   itself	   (Wood	   2003).	   Predetermined	   logics	   of	   action	   are,	   at	   best,	   abstractions	   that	  
cannot	  be	   invariably	  applied	   to	  all	   states	   in	   the	  world.	   It	   is	   in	   the	   inter-­‐subjective	  and	  socio-­‐
historical	  specificity	  of	  the	  event	  itself	  that	  we	  should	  look	  for	  answers.	  	  
3.3.	  The	  World	  as	  It	  Appeared	  to	  the	  American	  State:	  The	  Position	  of	  
the	  US	  in	  the	  World	  in	  2001	  
This	   section	  discusses	   the	  American	   state	  as	  a	   collective	  abstract	  agent	  made	  at	   the	   time	  or	  
rather	  before	  the	  invasion.	  The	  American	  state	  in	  2001	  maintained	  its	  superiority	  over	  the	  rest	  
of	   the	   major	   powers	   according	   to	   many	   indexes.	   Military	   spending	   in	   the	   US,	   although	  
stagnating	   in	   the	  preceding	  decade,	  was	   still	  much	  higher	  compared	   to	  other	  major	  powers,	  
not	  to	  mention	  the	  technological	  superiority	  of	  the	  US	  forces,	  especially	  due	  to	  the	  so-­‐called	  
‘revolution	   in	  military	  affairs’	   (RMA).	  The	  picture	  was	  similar	   in	   terms	  of	  economic	  data.	  The	  
volume	  of	  the	  economies	  of	  next	  five	  countries	  combined	  could	  not	  match	  that	  of	  the	  US.	  Its	  
command	  over	  finance	  gave	  it	  enormous	  leverage	  in	  the	  world	  market.	  The	  major	  role	  the	  US	  
played	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  international	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  United	  Nations,	  IMF,	  World	  
Bank	   and	   NATO	   continued	   during	   the	   1990s	   and	   into	   the	   2000s.	   Indeed,	   through	   NATO	  
enlargement,	  the	  US	  brought	  more	  countries	  under	  its	  security	  umbrella.	  With	  no	  challengers	  
on	  the	  horizon	  following	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  bloc,	  US	  primacy	  seemed	  secure.	  A	  tamed	  
Japan	  could	  no	  longer	  present	  a	  threat.	  The	  European	  Union,	  thought	  to	  be	  the	  only	  potential	  
competitor	   to	   the	   US	   by	   those	   who	   believed	   from	   the	   1970s	   onwards	   that	   the	   US	   was	   in	  
decline,	  was	  bound	   to	   the	  American-­‐led	   international	  order,	  politico-­‐militarily	   through	  NATO	  
(Gowan	  1999a),	  and	  economically	  through	  international	  institutions	  (Bromley	  2008;	  Ikenberry	  
2001;	  Panitch	  and	  Gindin	  2004).	  Russia	  was	  nowhere	  near	  its	  former	  glory,	  either	  economically	  
or	  militarily.	  The	  only	  imaginable	  contender	  was	  China,	  and	  it	  was,	  as	  yet,	  very	  far	  from	  rising	  
to	   the	   challenge	   at	   least	  militarily,	   although	   it	  was	   fast	   developing	   capabilities	   economically	  
and	  financially	  (Harvey	  2003).	  	  
The	  picture	  was	  not	  all	  bright,	  however.	  Nine	  years	  of	  economic	  growth	  was	  coming	  to	  an	  end	  
in	   the	   first	   quarter	   of	   2001.	  Unemployment,	   increasing	   steadily	   throughout	   2001,	  was	   again	  
becoming	   a	   central	   issue	   in	   the	  US	   economy.	   The	   dotcom	  bubble	   of	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	  
1990s	   was	   finally	   bursting,	   as	   dotcom	   companies	   went	   down	   one	   by	   one	   without	   realising	  
expected	   future	   profits,	   which	   had	   kept	   their	   shares	   high	   on	   the	   stock	   market	   for	   a	   long	  
enough	  time.	  Other	  sectors	  also	  saw	  equity	  prices	  pushed	  upwards	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  expected	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future	   profits.	   Most	   notably,	   energy	   companies	   used	   this	   strategy	   to	   increase	   their	   equity	  
prices,	  resulting	  in	  corporate	  corruption	  scandals	  that	  shook	  public	  opinion	  in	  2001.8	  Years	  of	  
support	  by	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  to	  keep	  equity	  prices	  high	  was	  not	  sustainable	  indefinitely.	  The	  
downward	  pressure	  on	  equity	  prices	  as	  a	  whole	  hit	  both	  corporations	  and	  households	  making	  
it	   difficult	   to	   find	   liquidity	   for	   productive	   investment	   or	   consumption	   respectively,	   and	   both	  
consumer	   and	   investment	   demand	   was	   falling	   (Brenner	   2002,	   p.251).	   On	   2	   October	   the	  
Federal	  Reserve,	  reversing	  the	  course	  it	  had	  followed	  in	  the	  12	  months	  from	  June	  1999	  to	  May	  
2000,	  decreased	   interest	   rates	   for	   the	  ninth	   time	   in	  2001	   to	   a	   record	   low	  2.5%	   to	   stimulate	  
both	   consumer	   and	   business	   demand	   as	   consumer	   confidence	   tumbled. 9 	  Manufacturing	  
output	   growth	   stabilised	   at	   negative	   percentages,	   and	   manufacturing	   capacity	   utilisation	  
continued	  the	  decline	  that	  had	  started	  in	  mid-­‐2000,	  undermining	  the	  position	  of	  US	  exporters.	  
The	   trade	  deficit	  was	  breaking	   record	  after	   record	  and	   reached	   its	  highest	   level	   in	  American	  
history.	  
Internationally,	   too,	   then,	   American	   primacy	   faced	   some	   formidable	   challenges.	   The	   US	  
recorded	  immense	  foreign	  trade	  deficits	  with	  almost	  all	  developed	  capitalist	  countries.	  China	  
was	   enjoying	   high	   annual	   growth	   rates,	   increasing	   its	   exports	   constantly.	   Sino-­‐Russian	  
cooperation	   took	   on	   institutional	   form	   when	   the	   Shanghai	   Five	   (China,	   Russia,	   Kazakhstan,	  
Kyrgyzstan,	  and	  Tajikistan),	  along	  with	  Uzbekistan,	  declared	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  
Cooperation	  Organization	  in	  mid-­‐2001.	  Although	  China	  was	  projected	  to	  surpass	  all	  advanced	  
capitalist	  powers	  economically	  in	  the	  next	  few	  decades,	  the	  primary	  perceived	  challenge	  to	  US	  
primacy	  was	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU).	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  common	  threat,	  such	  as	  that	  from	  
the	  USSR	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  the	  American	  state	  feared	  that	  the	  EU	  could	  contend	  with	  it,	  at	  
least	   economically.	   The	   institution	   of	   the	   Euro	   as	   the	   common	   currency	   of	   the	   Euro	   Area	  
(commonly	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   Eurozone)	   in	   1998	   was	   a	   significant	   step	   in	   coordinating	   a	  
common	   European	   monetary	   and	   economic	   policy.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   French-­‐British	  
summit	   in	  Saint	  Malo	   in	   late	  1998	  constituted	  a	  move	   towards	   further	   integration	   in	   foreign	  
policy	  and	  security	  within	  the	  existing	  framework	  of	  the	  Common	  Foreign	  and	  Security	  Policy	  
(CFSP),	  with	  the	  explicit	  aim	  of	  creating	  the	  conditions	  of	  a	  common	  institutional	  structure	  for	  
European	   security	   independent	   of	   NATO.	   Combined	   with	   the	   increasing	   calls	   for	   a	   more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  The	  Enron	  and	  Worldcom	  scandals	  were	  the	  most	  infamous	  examples	  among	  corporate	  corruption	  
scandals,	  but	  one	  should	  note	  that	  other	  energy	  companies	  such	  as	  Dynegy	  and	  Reliant	  Energy	  used	  
similar	  accounting	  practices.	  	  
9	  In	  November	  the	  Fed	  would	  cut	  interest	  rates	  further	  to	  2%	  and	  fears	  of	  recession	  dominated	  many	  
analyses.	  At	  the	  time,	  many	  analysts,	  and	  even	  Fed	  itself,	  put	  the	  blame	  for	  the	  problems	  the	  American	  
economy	  was	  going	  through	  on	  the	  terrorist	  attacks	  of	  9/11.	  However,	  the	  first	  7	  cuts	  had	  come	  before	  
the	  attacks	  allegedly	  hit	  the	  US	  economy.	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independent	   Japanese	   economic	   policy,	   the	   rise	   of	   a	   China	   fast	   embracing	   the	   rules	   of	   the	  
capitalist	   game,	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   resurgent	   Russia,	   and	   European	   aspiration	   to	   an	  
independent	  role	  in	  the	  world,	  the	  challenge	  to	  US	  primacy	  could	  not	  be	  simply	  brushed	  aside	  
as	  insignificant.	  
Last	  but	  not	  least,	  the	  challenge	  from	  smaller	  states	  with	  regional	  aspirations	  went	  against	  the	  
semi-­‐institutionalised	  US-­‐led	  global	  order.	  Shortly	  after	  the	  9/11	  attacks,	  these	  states	  were	  to	  
be	  called	  the	   ‘axis	  of	  evil’	  by	  President	  Bush.10	  Iran	  and	   Iraq	  were	  competing	   for	   influence	   in	  
the	  Middle	   East,	   and	   their	   designs	   for	   the	   region	   ran	   counter	   to	   those	   of	   the	  US.	   The	   third	  
country	  that	  was	  designated	  as	  part	  of	  the	  ‘axis	  of	  evil’	  was	  North	  Korea,	  which	  was	  seeking	  to	  
become	  a	  nuclear	  power	  despite	   the	   rapprochement	  between	   the	   two	   countries	   since	  1994	  
when	  they	  signed	  the	  Agreed	  Framework.	  From	  the	  American	  perspective,	  what	  distinguished	  
these	  states	   from	  other	  states	  outside	   the	  purview	  of	   the	  American-­‐led	  global	  order	  such	  as	  
Somalia,	  Burma,	  Chad,	  etc.	  was	  that	  these	  latter	  states	  were	  inward-­‐looking	  and	  did	  not	  have	  
capacity	   to	   challenge	   this	  order,	  even	  at	  a	   regional	   level.	  Unlike	   these	   failed	   states,	   Iran,	   for	  
example,	   wanted	   to	   expand	   its	   influence	   throughout	   the	   Middle	   East,	   and	   had	   both	   the	  
military	   and	   the	   economic	   capacity	   to	   do	   so.	   Similarly,	   and	   in	   competition	   with	   Iran,	   Iraq	  
wanted	   to	  bring	   together	   the	  Sunni	  world	  under	   its	  banner,	  presenting	   itself	   as	   the	  bulwark	  
against	   both	   Iran’s	   and	   Israel’s	   perceived	   expansionary	   tendencies.	   North	   Korea’s	   nuclear	  
program,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  was	  taken	  to	  constitute	  a	  threat	  to	  Pacific	  security.	  	  
In	   short,	   at	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	  millennium	   the	  American	   state	   found	   itself	   in	   a	  position	  of	  
primacy	   in	   the	  world	  with	   an	   unmatched	   relative	   capability	   in	   terms	  of	   both	  military	   power	  
and	  economic	  sway.	  Based	  on	  this	  practical	  abstraction,	  the	  main	  goal	  of	  the	  American	  state,	  
above	  all,	  was	  to	  reproduce	   its	  position	  of	  primacy	   in	  the	  world	   in	  the	  broadest	  sense	  of	  the	  
word.	   This	   strategy	  of	   reproduction,	   however,	   faced	  multifarious	   contradictions	   arising	   from	  
the	   fact	   that	   it	  was	  developed	   at	   the	  highest	   level	   of	   social	   complexity,	   and	   at	   such	   a	   level,	  
social	  relations	  of	  reproduction	  among	   innumerable	  agents	  necessarily	  create	  contradictions.	  
To	   account	   for	   this	   complexity,	   the	   following	   section	   will	   reconstruct	   the	   historical	  
development	  of	  the	  American	  position	  of	  primacy	  in	  the	  world,	  retracing	  it	  to	  the	  collapse	  of	  
the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  which	  generated	  triumphalist	  accounts	  such	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  These	  same	  countries	  were	  included	  in	  the	  ‘rogue	  states’	  of	  the	  Clinton	  administration,	  although	  the	  
concept	  was	  abandoned	  in	  2000.	  The	  concept	  ‘outlaw	  states’	  was	  coined	  by	  the	  Reagan	  government	  
and	  referred	  to	  by	  the	  Bush	  Sr.	  administration,	  yet	  it	  was	  Anthony	  Lake,	  the	  National	  Security	  Advisor	  to	  
President	  Clinton,	  who	  elaborated	  on	  the	  concept	  in	  1994	  (Lake	  1994).	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Fukuyama’s	  now-­‐defunct	   ‘end	  of	  history’	   thesis	   (Fukuyama	  2012).11	  To	  keep	   the	   research	  on	  
track,	  a	   few	  questions	  and	  a	   few	  short	  answers	  will	  be	  provided	  here	   tentatively:	  Why	   Iraq?	  
Why	  War?	  Why	  in	  2003?	  Why	  invasion?	  The	  first	  question	  will	  find	  its	  answer	  given	  already	  in	  
the	  early	  1990s	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  first	  Gulf	  crisis.	  The	  selection	  of	  Iraq	  as	  the	  target	  of	  US	  
action	  goes	  back	   to	   these	  years	  and	  regime	  change	  was	   the	  desired	  result.	  As	   to	   the	  second	  
question,	  one	  could	   immediately	  say	  that	  war	  came	  when	  all	  other	  options	  available	   for	   this	  
purpose,	  including	  toppling	  Saddam	  through	  military	  coup	  with	  covert	  CIA	  support,	  organising	  
oppositional	   forces	   to	   take	   him	   down,	   and	   imposing	   sanctions	   to	   force	   his	   hand,	   were	  
exhausted. 12 	  Why	   in	   2003?	   Because	   the	   September	   11	   attacks	   opened	   a	   window	   of	  
opportunity	  to	  mould	  the	  region	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  fitted	   into	   larger	  American	  strategic	  goals.	  
Finally,	   the	   invasion	  was	  perceived	   to	  be	  necessary	   from	   the	  vantage	  point	  of	   the	   impatient	  
neoconservatives	   in	   the	   Bush	   Administration.	   These	   will	   be	   elaborated	   in	   section	   5,	   after	   a	  
discussion	  of	  the	  sources	  of	  American	  power	  and	  of	  maintaining	  primacy	   in	  the	  world	  as	  the	  
primary	  strategy	  of	  the	  American	  state.	  	  
3.4.	  The	  Strategy	  of	  Reproduction	  of	  the	  American	  State:	  Enduring	  
Primacy	  
3.4.1.	  Sources	  of	  American	  Power	  during	  the	  Cold	  War:	  1945-­‐1990	  
On	   25	   December	   1991,	   when	   Gorbachev	   resigned	   from	   his	   post	   and	   passed	   the	   nuclear	  
controls	  to	  Yeltsin	  and	  the	  flag	  of	  the	  Union	  was	  replaced	  with	  the	  Russian	  tricolor	  in	  Moscow,	  
the	  US	  found	  itself,	  to	  its	  own	  and	  everyone	  else’s	  surprise,	  the	  sole	  superpower	  in	  the	  world.	  
Even	  before	   these	  historic	  events,	  Gorbachev	  and	  Bush	  Sr.	  declared	  a	   ‘New	  World	  Order’	  of	  
superpower	  cooperation.	  But	  developments	  in	  the	  last	  days	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  leading	  to	  its	  
disintegration	  signalled	  that	  in	  the	  coming	  years	  this	  ‘New	  World	  Order’	  would	  have	  only	  one	  
superpower	  at	  the	  helm:	  the	  US.	  In	  another	  sense,	  now	  the	  whole	  world	  became	  its	  sphere	  of	  
influence.	  While	  the	  sources	  of	  American	  primacy	  lie	  in	  its	  unchallenged	  status	  after	  the	  Cold	  
War,	   it	  went	  through	  two	  other	  historical	   ‘formative	  moments’	  (N.	  Smith	  2003,	  p.5):	  the	  first	  
two	  decades	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  and	  the	  post-­‐WW	  II	  period.	  
The	  first	  formative	  period	  came	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  when	  the	  American	  state	  was	  
no	  longer	  able	  to	  expand	  in	   ‘absolute	  space’	  (N.	  Smith	  2003,	  pp.12-­‐15).	  Westward	  expansion	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Although	  the	  conditions	  of	  US	  primacy	  took	  shape	  in	  world	  history	  long	  before	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  
War,	  the	  US	  genuinely	  found	  itself	  as	  the	  leader	  of	  a	  global	  order	  only	  after	  its	  sole	  rival	  for	  this	  position,	  
the	  USSR,	  was	  decisively	  left	  out	  of	  the	  competition.	  
12	  Indeed	  the	  idea	  of	  toppling	  Saddam	  was	  spoken	  of	  within	  the	  Bush	  administration	  even	  before	  the	  
First	  Gulf	  War	  (Khadduri	  and	  Ghareeb	  1997).	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was	  almost	  complete13	  and	  the	  US	  ruling	  classes	  faced	  an	  existential	  contradiction.	  While	  they	  
enjoyed	   the	   reinvestment	   opportunities	   of	   continuous	   geographical	   expansion	   under	   the	  
banner	  of	  Manifest	  Destiny,	  they	  increasingly	  felt	  the	  pressure	  of	  overaccumulation	  and	  a	  lack	  
of	  profitable	  outlets	  for	  the	  investment	  of	  surplus	  capital	  (N.	  Smith	  2003,	  p.15).	  Although	  other	  
imperial	  powers	  had	  faced	  and	  were	  still	  facing	  such	  problems,	  the	  options	  available	  to	  them	  
were	   not	   available	   to	   the	   US	   at	   the	   time.	   At	   any	   rate,	   it	   was	   the	   US	   government	   who	  
developed	  the	  doctrine	  of	  Open	  Door	  and	  who	  harshly	  opposed	  colonialism,	  particularly	  in	  the	  
Western	  Hemisphere,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Monroe	  Doctrine.	  Indeed,	  the	  strategy	  of	  opening	  doors,	  
while	  keeping	   frontiers	   closed,	   that	  would	   serve	   the	  United	  States	  particularly	  well	  after	   the	  
Second	  World	  War	  (see	  Colas	  2008),14	  was	  first	  experimented	  with	  in	  the	  case	  of	  international	  
trade	  with	  China,	  where	  the	  US	  maintained	  that	  China	  should	  not	  be	  an	  exclusive	  domain	  for	  
any	  power.	   The	  US	   attempt	   to	   establish	   an	  open	  door	   system	   internationally	   failed	  because	  
the	   major	   powers	   stuck	   to	   their	   19th	   century	   geopolitical	   guns	   during	   the	   Paris	   Peace	  
Conference.	  President	  Wilson’s	   failure	   to	  gain	  Senate	  approval	   to	   join	   the	  League	  of	  Nations	  
resulted	   in	   the	   shelving	   of	   the	   idea	   later	   completely.	   The	   US	   would	   pursue	   a	   non-­‐
interventionist	  policy	  in	  the	  inter-­‐war	  period	  and	  well	  into	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  That	  the	  US	  
grand	  strategy	  throughout	  and	  after	  the	  Cold	  War	  was	  maintaining	  its	  primacy	  should	  not	  be	  
taken	  as	   an	   indicator	  of	   a	   linear	  unfolding	  of	   the	   realisation	  of	   this	   strategy	   (N.	   Smith	  2003,	  
p.24).	   The	   US	   Senate	   blocking	   League	   of	   Nations	   membership,	   later	   Republican	   presidents	  
refraining	   from	   engaging	   with	   the	   Eurasian	   landmass	   in	   the	   1920s,	   the	   Great	   Depression	  
limiting	  opportunities	  to	  engage,	  and	  internal	  opposition	  preventing	  earlier	  intervention	  in	  the	  
Second	  World	  War	  must	  all	  serve	  as	  indicators	  that	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  US	  at	  the	  apex	  of	  a	  
world	  order	  was	  the	  result	  of	  a	  protracted	  historical	  development.	  	  
Almost	  completely	  unscathed	  in	  WW	  I,	  and	  triumphing	  in	  WW	  II,	  the	  US	  emerged	  as	  the	  best-­‐
positioned	  state	  to	  lead	  a	  world	  of	  territorial	  states	  by	  1945.	  Moreover,	  by	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  
century,	  the	  domain	  of	  foreign	  policy-­‐making	  was	  successfully	  monopolised	  by	  the	  executive,	  
with	  the	  ‘provincialism’	  and	  the	  apathy	  of	  the	  electorate	  further	  contributing	  to	  this	  exclusivity	  
(Anderson	  2013,	  pp.	  5-­‐9).	  While	   the	  distaste	   for	   internationalism	  was	   still	   very	   strong	   in	   the	  
agricultural	  Western	  and	  Southern	  hinterland,	   large-­‐scale	  industrial	  manufacturers	  and	  banks	  
of	   the	   Northeast,	   understanding	   that	   their	   very	   prosperity	   depended	   upon	   incursion	   into	  
Eurasian	  markets,	  lined	  up	  significant	  support	  for	  Roosevelt’s	  post-­‐war	  vision	  (Anderson	  2013,	  
p.20).	  Initially,	  this	  vision	  was	  based	  on	  an	  assumed	  security	  framework	  under	  the	  leadership	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  It	  would	  be	  fully	  complete	  when	  Arizona	  was	  incorporated	  into	  the	  Federal	  State	  in	  1912.	  
14	  Colás	  (2008)	  argues	  that	  this	  two-­‐sided	  strategy	  generates	  tensions	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  US	  invasion	  of	  Iraq,	  
which	  represents	  direct	  political	  control	  of	  a	  territory	  and	  population.	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of	   the	   ‘four	   policemen’	   and	   an	   open	   and	   free	   world	   market;	   both	   mechanisms,	   Roosevelt	  
thought,	  would	  work	  to	  the	  advantage	  of	  the	  US	  (Anderson	  2013;	  Gowan	  2003).	  In	  short,	  the	  
American	  state	  had	  both	  the	  capacity	  and	  the	  will	  to	  extend	  its	  sway	  beyond	  its	  borders.	  
The	  attempt	  by	  the	  US	  to	  rule	  through	  the	  United	  Nations,	  however,	  failed	  in	  the	  face	  of	  Soviet	  
defiance	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  free	  world	  market	  and	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  (Gowan	  2003).	  The	  
response	  to	  this	  failure	  was	  to	   limit	  American	  rule	  to	  Western	  European	  and	  Japanese	  states	  
while	   containing	   the	  USSR,	   thus	   giving	   rise	   to	   two	   different	   orders:	   the	   ‘containment	   order’	  
and	  the	  liberal	  capitalist	  order	  (Ikenberry	  2001,	  p.170).	  The	  containment	  order	  was	  devised	  to	  
prevent	   the	   expansion	   of	   communism,	   and	   in	   the	   context	   of	   this	   perceived	   threat	   from	   the	  
Soviet	   Union,	   the	   US	   institutionalised	   an	   ‘American-­‐led	   liberal	   order’	   in	   the	   capitalist	   world	  
through	  military	   and	  economic	   integration	   (Bromley	  2008).	  Militarily,	   through	  NATO,	   the	  US	  
provided	  a	  security	  umbrella	  to	  capitalist	  states	  upon	  their	  request,	  earning	  itself	  the	  epithet	  
of	   ‘empire	   by	   invitation’	   (Lundestad	   1986).	   Economically,	   the	  US	  undertook	   responsibility	   to	  
reconstruct	  other	  capitalist	  societies	  through	  the	  Marshall	  Plan	  and	  Bretton	  Woods	  institutions	  
in	  order	  to	  prevent	  the	  economic	  rivalry	  among	  them	  that	  had	   led	  to	  two	  devastating	  World	  
Wars	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  What	  many	  called	  US	  hegemony	  in	  this	  period	  
consisted	  of	  locking	  capitalist	  states	  in	  an	  institutional	  framework	  that	  accrued	  benefits	  to	  all	  
(Ikenberry	  2001	  passim.).	  
The	  roots	  of	  American	  power	  from	  the	  1940s	  to	  the	  early	  1970s	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  way	  these	  
institutions	  bound	   the	   conditions	  of	   reproduction	  of	  Western	  European	  and	   Japanese	   states	  
tightly	   to	   the	  reproduction	  of	   the	  US-­‐led	   liberal	  capitalist	  order.	   In	  other	  words,	   these	  states	  
needed	   the	   US	   more	   urgently	   than	   the	   US	   needed	   them	   to	   ward	   off	   the	   perceived	   Soviet	  
threat	  and	  a	  possible	  resurgence	  of	  Germany	  as	  well	  as	   to	  rebuild	  their	  economies.	  The	  pre-­‐
war	  economic	  fragmentation	  was	  to	  be	  replaced	  by	  a	  tight	  integration.	  As	  part	  of	  the	  Bretton	  
Woods	  framework,	  free	  trade,	  capital	  controls,	  fixed	  exchange	  rates	  with	  the	  US	  dollar	  pegged	  
against	   gold	   serving	   as	   the	   international	   reserve	   currency	   were	   the	   norms	   to	   regulate	  
economic	   relations	   among	   these	   countries.	   The	   integration	  of	   the	   capitalist	  world,	   or	   rather	  
the	  ‘penetration’	  of	  other	  states	  and	  their	  social	  relations	  by	  the	  American	  state	  (Panitch	  and	  
Gindin	   2004),	   institutionalised	   American	   primacy	   in	   several	   ways.	   First	   of	   all,	   free	   trade	  
provided	   open	   markets	   for	   American	   companies	   at	   a	   time	   when	   US	   manufacturing	   output	  
accounted	  for	  almost	  half	  of	  total	  world	  output.	  The	  reconstruction	  of	  war-­‐torn	  European	  and	  
Japanese	  economies	  not	  only	  increased	  the	  productive	  capacity	  of	  these	  countries	  but	  also,	  as	  
a	   result,	   brought	   about	   effective	   demand	   for	   American	   products.	   Europe’s	   share	   in	   total	  
American	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  went	  up	  to	  30%	  (Barratt	  Brown	  1974	  cited	  in	  Panitch	  and	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Gindin	  2004;	  Gowan	  2002,	  p.5).	  Moreover,	  American	  surplus	  capital	  found	  a	  profitable	  outlet	  
of	   reinvestment	   in	   European	   and	   Japanese	   markets.	   The	   increase	   in	   competitiveness	   of	  
German	  and	  Japanese	  exporters	  enabled	  the	  American	  state	  to	  provide	  cheaper	  imports	  for	  its	  
consumers,	  contributing	  to	  the	  political	  legitimacy	  of	  its	  international	  strategy	  of	  reproduction.	  
Decreasing	  profitability,	  however,	  generated	  tensions	  among	  major	  capitalist	  powers	  (Brenner,	  
2004).	  Furthermore,	  the	  deficit	  this	  caused	  in	  American	  balance	  of	  payments	  was	  made	  worse	  
by	  increasing	  military	  spending	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  These	  tensions,	  along	  with	  
disputes	  involving	  the	  role	  of	  the	  dollar,	  did	  not	  result	  in	  an	  existential	  challenge	  to	  the	  role	  of	  
the	  American	  state	  in	  the	  world,	  although	  they	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  crisis	  of	  the	  early	  1970s.	  	  
Resolution	   of	   the	   crisis	   in	   the	   1970s	   mainly	   involved	   the	   abolition	   of	   capital	   controls	   and	  
freeing	   the	   dollar	   from	   the	   gold	   anchor.	   Despite	   negative	   reaction	   from	   all	   other	   major	  
capitalist	  powers,	   the	  US	  went	  on	   to	   reconstitute	   its	  dominance	   through	   free	   financial	   flows	  
which	  benefited	  American	  finance	  disproportionately.	  What	  Gowan	  (1999a)	  called	  the	  ‘Dollar-­‐
Wall	  Street	  Regime’	  would	  constitute	  the	  new	  source	  of	  American	  power	   in	   the	  next	  several	  
decades.	  Penetration	  of	  European	  and	  East	  Asian	  financial	  markets	  by	  American	  finance	  in	  this	  
period	   complemented	   the	   earlier	   integration	   of	   capitalist	   states	   and	   societies.	   This	   did	   not	  
happen	   without	   contradictions,	   though.	   The	   balance	   between	   manufacturing	   capital	   and	  
finance	   capital	   strongly	   tilted	   towards	   the	   latter,	   much	   to	   the	   dismay	   of	   American	  
manufacturers	  as	   the	  Chairman	  of	   the	  Federal	  Reserve,	  Paul	  Volcker	   increased	   interest	   rates	  
dramatically	   in	   1979.	   To	   register	   this	   change	  does	   not	  mean	   that	   this	  was	   a	   ‘financial	   coup’	  
against	  manufacture,	  however	  (Panitch	  and	  Gindin	  2004,	  p.21);	  rather,	  manufacturing	  capital	  
as	   a	   whole	   would	   later	   enjoy	   the	   discipline	   imposed	   by	   financial	   capital	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	  
worldwide	  crisis	  of	  profitability	  that	  locked	  the	  export-­‐oriented	  economies	  of	  Japan,	  Germany	  
and	   the	   US	   in	   the	   same	   vicious	   circle	   of	   secular	   decline	   of	   rates	   of	   manufacturing	   profits	  
(Brenner	  2004).	  	  
The	  1970s	  also	  saw	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  ‘Sunbelt’	  in	  the	  Southern	  and	  Western	  hinterland	  of	  the	  US	  
(Davis,	  1984).	  The	  barren,	  impoverished	  hinterland	  of	  the	  rich,	  industrial	  Northeast	  in	  the	  past,	  
these	  regions	  enjoyed	  industrial	  development	  in	  the	  high-­‐tech	  and	  science-­‐based	  sectors	  such	  
as	  aerospace	  and	  electronics,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  industrialised	  agriculture.	  The	  development	  of	  these	  
sectors	  was	   funded	  by	   the	   state,	  with	  military	   spending	   at	   the	  helm	   (Davis	   1984,	   pp.12-­‐13).	  
The	  subsidised	  sectors	  of	  military	  industry,	  electronics,	  aerospace,	  agriculture	  and	  oil	  were	  all	  
concentrated	   in	   this	   region	   and	   contributed	   to	   the	   competitiveness	   of	   American	   industry	  
against	   German	   and	   Japanese	   manufacturers	   (N.	   Smith	   2005,	   p.14).	   The	   emergent	   political	  
consensus	   between	   the	   region’s	   disciplined	   and	   conservative	   labour-­‐force	   and	   nascent	   big	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capital	   would	   later	   constitute	   the	   socio-­‐political	   base	   of	   the	   neoconservatives	   in	   the	  
Republican	  Party	  (N.	  Smith	  2005,	  pp.21-­‐22).	  	  
The	  consensual	  nature	  of	  American	  leadership	  of	  the	  capitalist	  world	  led	  scholars	  to	  argue	  that	  
it	  was	  a	  positive-­‐sum	  game	  (Bromley	  2008,	  passim).	  Ikenberry	  (2001,	  p.210)	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  
argue	   that	   this	   order	   showed	   ‘constitutional	   characteristics’	   because	   it	   was	   established	   by	  
democratic-­‐constitutional	  states,	  and	  that	  the	  order	  could	  be	  sustained	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  
an	  hegemonic	  power	  such	  as	  the	  United	  States	  as	  it	  was	  based	  on	  a	  set	  of	  ‘binding	  institutions’.	  
Institutional	   orders,	   however,	   constitutional	   or	   not,	   are	   nothing	   more	   than	   an	   obscured	  
expression	  of	  underlying	  social	  power	  relations,	  although	  these	  institutions	  do	  not	  necessarily	  
represent	  an	  exact	  mirror	  image	  of	  them	  (cf.	  Gilpin	  1981).	  As	  I	  argued	  in	  the	  preceding	  chapter,	  
institutional	   orders	   are	   real	   abstractions	   that	   emerge	   as	   a	   temporary	   equilibrium	   of	   the	  
contradictory	  coexistence	  of	  divergent	   social	   strategies	  and	   relations	  of	   reproduction.	  This	   is	  
not	   to	   be	   confused	  with	   realist	   system-­‐theory	   or	   hegemonic	   stability	   theory,	   both	   of	  which	  
assume	  a	  smooth	  and	  contradiction-­‐free	  correlative	  reflection	  of	  power	  capabilities	  of	  states	  in	  
institutions.	  Relational	  social	  constructs	  almost	  always	  generate	  dynamics	  which	  cannot	  reflect	  
the	   powers	   of	   agents	   in	   an	   exact	   fashion.	   Bretton	   Woods	   institutions,	   for	   example,	   were	  
designed	   to	   give	   the	   US	   enormous	   leverage	   and	   for	   a	   period	   they	   indeed	   did,	   yet	   the	  
institutional	   framework	   they	   provided	   collapsed	   when	   the	   gold	   standard	   was	   not	   in	   the	  
interests	  of	   the	  US	  anymore	  as	  a	  result	  of	   the	  actions	  of	  a	  set	  of	  other	  states.	  This	   leaves	  us	  
with	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘empire’	  which	  dominated	  writings	  on	  the	  US	  after	  the	  ‘unilateral	  turn’	  of	  the	  
Bush	   administration.15	  This	   characterisation	   has	   a	   certain	   academic	   purchase,	   yet	   remains	  
problematic,	  in	  that	  it	  evokes	  historical	  images	  of	  imperial	  practices	  which	  have	  almost	  nothing	  
to	  do	  with	   the	  current	  stature	  of	   the	  United	  States	   insofar	  as	   it	  denotes	  a	   form	  of	   territorial	  
expansion.	  While	  some	  figures	  such	  as	  Ignatieff	  (2003)	  and	  Ferguson	  (2004)	  were	  explicitly	  in	  
favour	   of	   a	   liberal	   American	   empire,	   apologists	   for	   American	   power	   in	   the	   world,	   such	   as	  
Ikenberry	  (2004),	  Keohane	  (1991)	  and	  Baker	  (2010),	  along	  with	  Donald	  Rumsfeld	  and	  George	  
W.	  Bush	  (Daalder	  &	  Lindsay,	  2003b),	  argued	  against	  such	  designations.	  Although	  the	  primary	  
motive	  of	   liberal	   institutionalists	  and	   internationalists	  was	  apologetic,	   they	  had	  an	   important	  
point:	   that	   empire	   was	   not	   a	   useful	   category	   to	   account	   for	   the	   specificity	   of	   the	   form	   of	  
American	  power.	  Wood	  (2003),	  among	  others,	  was	  acutely	  aware	  of	   this	  problem,	  which	   led	  
her	  to	  distinguish	  the	  American	  exercise	  of	  power	  in	  the	  world	  from	  historical	  empires,	  albeit	  
in	   a	   rather	   schematic	   framework.	   This	   generated	   tensions	   between	   her	   wish	   to	   historically	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  In	  the	  six-­‐month	  period	  preceding	  their	  time	  of	  writing,	  Ivo	  H.	  Daalder	  and	  James	  M.	  Lindsay	  (2003b)	  
observed	  that	  the	  word	  ‘empire’	  was	  used	  by	  over	  one	  thousand	  news	  reports.	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specify	  the	  form	  of	  American	  power	  and	  the	  formalistic	  tendencies	  that	  haunt	  any	  schematic	  
classification.	  To	  differentiate	  the	  contemporary	  from	  the	  historical,	  she	  overemphasised	  the	  
economic	   nature	   of	   the	   ‘American	   empire’	   ending	   up	   with	   a	   structuralist	   account.	   Harvey	  
(2003)	  designated	  the	  condition	  as	  ‘new	  imperialism’	  to	  distinguish	  it	  from	  historical	  empires;	  
his	   description	   of	   imperialism,	   however,	   as	   noted	   above,	   utilised	   predetermined	   logics	   to	  
account	  for	  his	  indeterminate	  historical	  object.	  Finally,	  in	  a	  series	  of	  articles	  Panitch	  and	  Gindin	  
provide	   a	   more	   nuanced	   approach	   to	   US	   ‘informal	   empire’,	   which	   is	   characterised	   by	  
‘penetration’	  of	  the	  institutional	  complexes	  of	  other	  states	  by	  the	  American	  state	  (Panitch	  and	  
Gindin	   2004,	   2005).	   Panitch,	   however,	   admits	   that	   he	   ‘wanted	   to	   retain’	   the	   word	   only	  
because	   it	   was	   used	   passionately	   by	   many	   on	   the	   left,	   although	   he	   is	   well	   aware	   of	   the	  
tendencies	  to	  conflate	  this	  with	  a	  classical	  Leninist	  notion	  of	  imperialism	  (Gowan,	  Panitch	  and	  
Shaw	  2001).	  A	  Gramscian	  notion	  of	  hegemony,	  in	  turn,	  may	  capture	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  role	  the	  
US	  plays	   in	   the	  world,	   in	   that	   the	  rule	  of	   the	  order	   is	  partly	  consensual	  on	  the	  part	  of	  major	  
European	   powers.	   Notwithstanding	   the	   immense	   contribution	   to	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	  
nature	  of	  the	  American-­‐led	  capitalist	  order,	  this	  notion	  of	  hegemony,	  however,	  relates	  ‘ideas’	  
and	  ‘institutions’	  externally	  as	  separate	  ‘spheres	  of	  activity’	  (Bieler	  and	  Morton	  2005,	  p.88).	   I	  
prefer	  for	  all	  intents	  and	  purposes,	  to	  follow	  Gowan	  (2006),	  and	  use	  the	  term	  ‘primacy’	  as	  the	  
long-­‐term	   strategic	   goal	   of	   the	   American	   state.	   Unlike	   empire	   or	   hegemony,	   the	   notion	   of	  
primacy	   is	   a	   more	   accurate	   designation,	   since	   it	   emphasises	   the	   formal	   likeness	   and	  
multiplicity	  of	  states	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  real	  abstract	  existence.	  It	  also	  emphasises	  the	  position	  of	  
the	   American	   state	   as	   the	   primus	   inter	   pares	   among	   states.	   Finally,	   it	   reflects	   the	   self-­‐
perception	  of	  both	  American	  state	  elites	  and	  its	  ‘foreign	  policy	  experts’,	  thereby	  also	  indicating	  
the	  subjective	  and	  inter-­‐subjective	  character	  of	  American	  rule.	  What	  is	  obvious	  is	  that	  the	  role	  
played	  by	  the	  US	  characterised	  the	  whole	  Cold	  War	  period	  
3.4.2.	  The	  Strategy	  of	  Reproduction	  of	  the	  American	  State	  after	  the	  Cold	  War:	  
Maintaining	  Primacy	  
When	   Bush	   Senior	   took	   over	   the	   Presidency	   from	   an	   ailing	   Reagan,	   he	   faced	   immense	  
challenges.	  Comprehensive	   tax	   cuts	  and	  massive	   spending	   in	  armaments	   to	  deter	   the	  Soviet	  
Union	   had	   turned	   the	   United	   States	   into	   ‘world’s	   leading	   debtor’	   nation	   during	   the	   Reagan	  
period	  (Cohen	  2005).	  Free	  flow	  of	  financial	  funds	  had	  made	  possible	  the	  servicing	  of	  US	  debt	  
by	   countries	  with	   current	   account	   surplus.	   Yet	   this	  did	  not	  help	  mitigate	   concerns	   regarding	  
the	  soaring	  US	  balance	  of	  payments	  deficit.	  Although	  finance	  underwrote	  American	  power	  in	  
the	   world,	   it	   also	   generated	   considerable	   volatility	   as	   exemplified	   by	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	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Savings	  and	  Loan	  framework	  in	  1989,	  resulting	  in	  a	  bailout	  of	  savings	  and	  loan	  institutions	  by	  
the	  Bush	  Administration.	  	  
The	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  caught	  almost	  everyone	  by	  surprise,	  including	  IR	  theorists	  and	  foreign	  
policy-­‐making	   circles.16	  As	   Soviet	   power	   was	   unravelling,	   Bush	   Sr.	   did	   not	   at	   the	   time	   fully	  
appreciate	  the	  extent	  of	  this,	  largely	  because	  of	  continuing	  Cold	  War-­‐based	  strategic	  concerns.	  
As	   it	  was	   trying	   to	   come	   to	   grips	  with	   this	   new	  unfolding	   situation,	   it	   looked	   like,	   as	   Cohen	  
(2005)	  put	   it,	   the	  American	  state	  was	   ‘in	   search	  of	  a	  compass’.	  The	  unravelling	  of	   the	  Soviet	  
Union	   gave	   rise	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   order	   among	   states	   in	   the	   world,	   to	   which	   the	   Bush	  
government’s	  initial	  response	  was	  a	  notion	  of	  ‘superpower	  cooperation’.	  This	  idea	  had	  a	  very	  
short	   life	   span	   as	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   fully	   collapsed.	   The	   Bush	   Sr.	   Administration	   generally	  
responded	   erratically	   to	   these	   challenges	   as	   developments	   largely	   outside	   the	   control	   and	  
reach	  of	   the	  American	   state	   (Gowan	  1999a).	   The	   lack	  of	   the	   ‘vision	   thing’	  would	   turn	   into	  a	  
trademark	  designation	  of	  the	  father	  Bush.	  	  
This	   designation	   is,	   at	   the	   very	   least,	   an	  underestimation	  of	  American	   strategic	   thinking	   and	  
action,	  however.	  Although	  Bush	  Sr.	  may	  have	  lacked	  the	  ‘vision	  thing’,	  he	  brought	  together	  a	  
team	   of	   defence,	   security	   and	   foreign	   policy	   veterans	   with	   a	   vision.	   The	   leaked	   1992	   Draft	  
Defense	   Planning	   Guidance	   Document	   (DPG),	   prepared	   by	   Zalmay	   Khalilzad	   under	   the	  
supervision	   of	   the	   then	   undersecretary	   of	   defense	   policy	   Paul	   Wolfowitz,	   explicitly	   made	  
preventing	   the	  emergence	  of	  another	   rival	   that	  would	  challenge	  US	  power	   its	   strategic	  goal.	  
This	  strategic	  goal	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  NSC-­‐68	  of	  1950,	  which	  was	  in	  fact	  a	  response	  to	  
the	  possibility	  of	  the	  USSR	  having	  acquired	  nuclear	  technology,	  but	  did	  not	  refrain	  from	  noting	  
that	  ‘the	  absence	  of	  order	  among	  nations	  was	  becoming	  less	  and	  less	  tolerable’	  indicating	  that	  
the	  world	  needed	  an	  American-­‐led	  world	  order.	  DPG	  1992	  generated	   intense	  uproar	  when	  it	  
was	   leaked	  to	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  and	   the	  Pentagon	  had	  to	   revise	  and	  republish	   it	   in	  1993	  
after	   toning	   down	   remarks	   on	   US	   primacy.	   The	   underlying	   logic	   and	   the	   main	   strategic	  
objective	  (i.e.	  creating	  a	  world	  order	  conducive	  to	  American	  ‘values’	  and	  a	  military	  capability	  
which	   would	   be	   so	   strong	   that	   other	   states	   would	   be	   deterred	   even	   from	   conceiving	   of	  
challenging	  it),	  however,	  were	  all	  the	  same.	  	  
The	  developments	  surrounding	  the	  publication	  of	  this	  document	  reflected	  divisions	  in	  the	  Bush	  
Sr.	   Administration	   between	   neoconservatives	   and	   republican	   realists.	   More	   importantly,	   it	  
reflected	  the	  unpreparedness	  and	  confusion	  of	  the	  American	  state	  in	  its	  responses	  to	  the	  new	  
situation	  in	  the	  world.	  The	  American	  strategic-­‐conceptual	  abstraction	  of	  the	  Cold	  War-­‐world	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  As	  Gaddis	  (1992)	  observed,	  IR	  theory	  had	  mostly	  failed	  to	  predict	  this	  world-­‐historical	  development.	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two	  rival	  superpowers	  failed	  to	  capture	  the	  inter-­‐subjectively	  made	  new	  real	  abstraction.	  Two	  
international	  crises	  broke	  out	  even	  before	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  ceased	  to	  exist.	  Two	  former	  allies	  
of	   the	   United	   States,	   Manuel	   Noriega	   in	   Panama	   and	   Saddam	   Hussein	   in	   Iraq	   had	   become	  
sources	   of	   nuisance	   for	   the	   US.	   Despite	   international	   outrage,	   the	   US	   swiftly	   deposed	   and	  
arrested	  Manuel	  Noriega,	  who	  had	  served	  American	   interests	  well	   in	  the	  region	  for	  decades.	  
The	   next	   incident	   was	   the	   invasion	   of	   Kuwait	   by	   a	   defiant	   Saddam	  Hussein.	   Supported	   and	  
encouraged	  by	  the	  Arab	  states	  and	  the	  US,	   Iraq	  had	  been	  at	  war	  with	   Iran	  from	  1980-­‐8.	   Iraq	  
was	  seen	  both	  by	  Sunni	  Arab	  states	  and	  the	  US	  as	  a	  bulwark	  against	  the	  export	  of	  revolution	  
from	  a	  Shiite	   Iran.	   Iraq	  emerged	   ‘victorious’,	   though	  exhausted,	   from	  the	  war,	  as	   its	  oilfields	  
were	  completely	  destroyed	  and	  much-­‐needed	  oil	  money	  planned	  to	  be	  spent	  on	  infrastructure	  
had	   been	   lost	   (Khadduri	   and	   Ghareeb	   1997).	   After	   the	   war	   ended,	   the	   US	   wanted	   to	   keep	  
normal	  ties	  with	  Iraq,	  considering	  the	  security	  of	  oil	  supply	  and	  stability	  in	  the	  region.	  National	  
Security	  Directive	  26	  of	  October	  1989,	  declassified	   in	  1999,	   read:	   ‘Normal	   relations	  between	  
the	  United	  States	  and	  Iraq	  would	  serve	  our	  longer-­‐term	  interests	  and	  promote	  stability	  in	  both	  
the	  Gulf	  and	  the	  Middle	  East’	  (The	  White	  House,	  1989).	  No	  more	  than	  a	  year	  later,	  on	  2	  August	  
1990,	   Iraq	   launched	   a	   full-­‐scale	   invasion	  of	   Kuwait	   after	   its	   claims	  on	  Kuwaiti	   territory	  were	  
strictly	   rejected	   by	   Kuwait.	   The	  main	   reason	   for	   this	   aggression	  was	   to	  make	   up	   for	   lost	   oil	  
revenues,	   and	   the	   Iraqi	   government	   strongly	   believed	   that	   in	   return	   for	   its	   preventing	   the	  
expansion	  of	  Iranian	  influence	  and	  power	  in	  the	  region,	  it	  deserved	  compensation	  by	  the	  Arab	  
states	  in	  the	  Gulf	  region.	  The	  larger	  strategic	  goal	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  state	  was	  to	  become	  the	  leading	  
power	  in	  the	  Islamic	  world	  and	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  
The	  US	  reaction	  to	  Iraqi	  military	  build-­‐up	  near	  the	  Kuwaiti	  border	  conveyed	  mixed	  messages.	  It	  
was	  widely	  reported	  that	  when	  Saddam	  wanted	  to	  see	  what	  the	  Americans	  would	  do	  in	  case	  of	  
an	  invasion,	  he	  was	  relieved	  to	  hear	  from	  April	  Glaspie,	  then	  US	  Ambassador	  to	  Iraq,	  that	  the	  
US	  did	  not	  have	  a	  strong	  opinion	  on	  conflicts	  between	  Arab	  nations.	  As	  noted	  by	  Mearsheimer	  
and	   Walt	   (2003),	   the	   US	   ‘may	   not	   have	   intended	   to	   give	   Iraq	   the	   green	   light,	   but	   that	   is	  
effectively	  what	  it	  did.’	  Even	  if	  it	  did,	  the	  US	  was	  strongly	  against	  a	  regional	  superpower	  in	  the	  
Middle	   East,	   and	  an	   Iraq	  with	   the	   combined	   reserves	  of	   Iraq	   and	  Kuwait	  would	   constitute	   a	  
threat	  not	  only	  to	  a	  US	  dependent	  on	  Middle	  Eastern	  oil	  for	  its	  domestic	  consumption	  as	  well	  
as	  in	  the	  form	  of	  petrodollars,	  but	  also	  to	  other	  advanced	  capitalist	  countries	  who	  were	  even	  
more	   dependent	   on	   the	   region.	   This	   would	   presumably	   give	   Iraq	   enormous	   leverage	   in	   its	  
external	  relations	  and	  a	  considerable	  level	  of	  control	  over	  the	  price	  of	  oil	  in	  the	  world	  market.	  
After	  a	  series	  of	  negotiations	   in	   the	  ensuing	   five	  months,	   the	  US	  acted	  swiftly	  and	  decisively	  
when	   Saddam	   rejected	   withdrawing	   his	   forces	   unconditionally.	   The	   ability	   to	   do	   this	   was	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bestowed	   on	   the	   American	   state	   first	   by	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   Soviet	   bloc,	   and	   then	   by	   a	  
unanimous	  decision	  in	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  (UNSC)	  that	  produced	  UNSCR	  678,	  authorising	  
the	  use	  of	  military	  force	  against	  Iraq.	  After	  a	  very	  successful	  air	  campaign	  against	  Iraqi	  forces	  
and	   infrastructure,	   the	  US	  was	  able	   to	  deploy	  ground	   forces	   to	  ensure	  a	   substantial	  blow	   to	  
Iraqi	  military	   capability.	  American	   forces	  did	  not	   go	   so	   far	   as	   to	  occupy	   Iraq	  and	   change	   the	  
regime,	   although	   there	   were	   elements	   in	   the	   Bush	   administration	   who	   wanted	   to	   remove	  
Saddam	   from	  power.	   This	  was	   largely	   because	   the	  US	  needed	  a	   stable	   Iraq	   against	   a	   strong	  
Iran.	  The	  Kurds	  could	  deliver	  this	  stability,	  yet	  they	  not	  only	  constituted	  a	  small	  minority	  in	  Iraq	  
as	  a	  whole,	  but	  also	  were	  considered	  a	  threat	  by	  close	  US	  ally	  Turkey,	  which	  had	  a	  sizable	  and	  
restive	  Kurdish	  minority	  of	  its	  own	  and	  was	  concerned	  about	  possible	  spill-­‐over	  effects	  of	  any	  
formal	  status	  for	  Kurds	  in	  Iraq.	  The	  Shia	  had	  both	  the	  demographic	  advantage	  and	  a	  strong	  will	  
to	  replace	  Saddam,	  who	  had	  persecuted	  them	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Kurds	  for	  years.	  Both	  the	  Shia	  and	  
the	  Kurds	  rebelled	  against	  Saddam	  during	  the	  coalition	  campaign	  hoping	  that	  he	  was	  going	  to	  
be	  overthrown.	  When	  the	  coalition	  forces	  ceased	  fire,	  Saddam	  was	  left	  in	  power	  and	  the	  only	  
shields	  to	  protect	  the	  Kurds	  and	  the	  Shia	  from	  his	  retribution	  were	  two	  no-­‐fly	  zones,	  one	  in	  the	  
North	  and	  one	   in	  the	  South,	  but	   Iraqi	  helicopters	  were	  exempted.	  These	  helicopters	  and	  the	  
rest	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  military	  launched	  a	  brutal	  campaign	  to	  suppress	  the	  rebellions	  and	  liquidated	  
both	  of	  them	  in	  a	  short	  time.	  
Clinton	  inherited	  many	  of	  the	  problems	  the	  American	  state	  faced	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  
Among	  these	  were	  US	  involvements	  in	  Somalia	  and	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina.	  Although	  Africa	  was	  a	  
theatre	   of	   operations	   during	   the	   Cold	  War,	   the	   fall	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   caused	   a	   change	   in	  
American	  strategic	  priorities,	  which	  were	  now	  focused	  less	  on	  containing	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  
Soviet	  system	  and	  more	  on	  the	  absence	  of	  order	  both	  within	  former	  Soviet-­‐style	  regimes	  and	  
in	   other	   regions	   of	   the	   world.	   In	   line	   with	   the	   post-­‐Cold	   War	   cooperative	   practices,	   US	  
involvement	   in	  Somalia	  did	  not	  cause	  significant	  dispute	  among	  major	  capitalist	  powers.	  The	  
problem	  with	  US	  involvement	  in	  Somalia	  was	  rather	  a	  problem	  of	  continuing	  an	  operation	  that	  
was	  costing	  the	  lives	  of	  American	  soldiers	  without	  a	  significant	  strategic	  objective	  or	  gain.	  The	  
second	  US	  involvement	  was	  in	  Yugoslavia.	  Held	  together	  by	  Tito	  in	  the	  1970s,	  Yugoslavia	  was	  
crumbling	  as	  a	  result	  of	  economic	  crises	  throughout	  the	  1980s	  after	  his	  death.	  As	  the	  Cold	  War	  
was	   approaching	   its	   end,	  Western	   capitalist	   powers	  wanted	   to	   integrate	   Yugoslavia	   into	   the	  
capitalist	  order	  at	  once.	  The	  US,	  UK	  and	  France	  were	  primarily	  interested	  in	  full	  capital	  account	  
liberalisation,	  while	  a	  reunified	  Germany,	  Austria	  and	  Hungary	  wanted	  both	  liberalisation	  and	  
the	  breaking	  up	  of	   Yugoslavia.	  When	  Croatia	   and	  Slovenia	  declared	   independence,	  Germany	  
pushed	   the	  members	   of	   the	   European	   Community	   to	   recognise	   these	   countries,	   but	   the	  US	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waited	   to	   see	   if	   it	   could	  help	   to	  maintain	  Yugoslavian	  unity.	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina	  declared	   its	  
independence	   as	  well	   after	   strong	   encouragement	   from	   the	  Bush	  Administration	   and	   it	  was	  
also	  recognised	  as	  an	  independent	  country	  by	  the	  EC;	  the	  following	  day	  the	  US	  recognised	  all	  
three	  countries	  and	  they	  were	  given	  seats	  at	  the	  UN	  on	  22	  May.	  	  
The	  lack	  of	  will	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  US	  in	  these	  two	  wars	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  unpopularity	  
they	  generated	   for	  Bush	  as	  presidential	  elections	   loomed.	  The	  war	   in	   Iraq	  earned	  Bush	   large	  
electoral	   popularity.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   however,	   the	   reunified	   Germany,	   with	   its	   newly-­‐
acquired	  confidence,	  had	  already	  started	  posing	  problems	  for	  the	  emerging	  order	   in	  the	  East	  
of	   the	   Atlantic.	   The	  Maastricht	   Treaty	   came	   to	   fruition	   in	   1991,	   and	   the	   Single	  Market	  was	  
established	  on	  1	  January	  1993.	  Further	  integration	  of	  the	  EU	  was	  desired	  by	  the	  US,	  but	  both	  
the	  US	   and	  other	   European	  major	   capitalist	   states	   such	   as	   the	  UK	   and	   France	  were	  wary	   of	  
German	  motivations.	   The	  UK	  maintained	   its	   distance,	   yet	   France	   and	  other	  members	   of	   the	  
European	  Union	  were	  increasingly	  pulled	  into	  the	  orbit	  of	  German	  power.	  Unable	  to	  compete	  
with	  the	  US	  and	  Japan,	  Germany	  sought	  to	  create	  the	  conditions	  for	  improving	  its	  position	  by	  
integrating	  Europe	  under	  its	  leadership.	  Simultaneously,	  with	  the	  Soviet	  threat	  now	  removed,	  
it	  sought	  to	  create	  a	  European	  military	  force	  independent	  from	  NATO.	  	  
This	   was	   anathema	   to	   the	   US	   strategy	   of	   reproduction.	   The	   US,	   under	   the	   Clinton	  
administration,	   would	   respond	   to	   this	   throughout	   the	   1990s	   through	   a	   two-­‐tiered	   strategy	  
involving	   as	   its	  main	   strategic	   instruments	   the	   expansion	  both	  of	  NATO	  and	   the	  US	  hold	   on	  
world	   financial	  markets.	   So,	   although	   the	  Clinton	  Administration	  was	   also	  muddling	   through	  
regarding	  the	  crises	  in	  Somalia	  and	  Yugoslavia,	  and	  it	  relied	  on	  economic	  election	  promises	  in	  
securing	   the	   presidential	   vote,	   it	   came	   to	   realise	   that	   it	   could	   not	   depend	   solely	   on	   its	  
economic	  power	  to	  reproduce	  itself	  as	  the	  most	  powerful	  state	  in	  the	  world.	  To	  demonstrate	  
its	  willingness	  to	  lead,	  or	  as	  Anthony	  Lake,	  then	  National	  Security	  Advisor	  to	  Clinton	  put	  it,	  to	  
establish	   its	   own	   and	  NATO’s	   ‘credibility’	   (Daalder	   1998),	   the	   US	   took	   the	   lead	   in	   liberating	  
Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina	   within	   a	   NATO	   framework.	   In	   Somalia,	   however,	   under	   public	   pressure	  
following	   the	   famous	   Black	   Hawk	   incident,	   the	   US	   pulled	   out,	   leaving	   that	   country	   in	   a	  
condition	  of	  instability	  that	  would	  last	  decades	  and	  earn	  it	  the	  label	  of	  a	  failed	  state.	  
The	  intervention	  in	  Bosnia	  served	  a	  double	  purpose.	  First,	  it	  demonstrated	  that	  NATO	  was	  still	  
a	  relevant	  player,	  despite	   it	  being	  rendered	  unnecessary	  as	  a	  collective	  security	  arrangement	  
by	   the	   disappearance	   of	   the	   perceived	   threat	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union.	   Secondly,	   it	   served	   as	   a	  
display	  of	  American	  leadership,	  without	  which,	  apparently,	  Europe	  could	  not	  take	  care	  of	  even	  
the	  European	  heartland.	  The	  US	  was	  taking	  every	  opportunity	  to	  re-­‐establish	  NATO’s	  waning	  
significance	  in	  Europe,	  including	  in	  conflicts	  in	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  and	  elsewhere.	  ‘Partnerships	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for	  Peace’	  would	  be	  set	  up	  with	  non-­‐member	  states,	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  the	  later	  incorporation	  
of	  states	  in	  South-­‐	  and	  North-­‐Eastern	  Europe	  as	  part	  of	  NATO	  expansion.	  The	  US	  simply	  would	  
not	   let	   NATO	   be	   irrelevant,	   and	   Germany	   came	   to	   terms	   with	   this	   and	   NATO	   expansion	  
eastward	  was	  agreed	  upon	  in	  1994	  (Gowan	  1999b).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  Uruguay	  round	  and	  
the	   ensuing	   establishment	   of	   the	  World	   Trade	   Organisation	   created	   ‘a	   new	   unity’	   between	  
Germany	   and	   the	   United	   States	   (Gowan	   1999b,	   p.96),	   as	   it	   served	   the	   interests	   of	   both	  
governments	   in	   a	   time	   of	   crisis	   and	   opportunity	   by	   opening	   up	   not	   only	   former	   communist	  
states	  and	  other	  formerly	  non-­‐aligned	  countries	  to	  the	  operations	  of	  foreign	  capital,	  but	  also	  
by	  deepening	  financial	  interlinks	  among	  the	  core	  capitalist	  countries.17	  
The	  opening	  up	  of	  these	  markets	  offered	  new	  value	  creation	  opportunities	  through	  FDI.	  New	  
export	   markets	   would	   also	   absorb	   surplus	   product,	   and	   liberalisation	   of	   capital	   accounts	   in	  
these	   new	   market	   societies	   would	   generate	   new	   opportunities	   for	   finance	   adding	   to	   its	  
dominance	   in	   the	   world	   market.	   The	   IMF	   and	   the	   World	   Bank	   served	   as	   institutional	  
mechanisms	  through	  which	  the	  markets	  of	  other	  states	  were	  opened	  up,	  with	  the	  active	  role	  
played	  by	  the	  US	  Treasury	  (Konings	  2008).	  Financialisation	  also	  meant	  an	  enormous	  increase	  in	  
debt,	   both	  public	   and	  private.	   In	   the	   1990s,	   government,	   consumer	   and	   corporate	   spending	  
became	   increasingly	   dependent	   on	   the	   availability	   of	   liquidity,	   and	   its	   provision	   via	   a	  
continuous	   rise	   in	   equity	   prices	   was	   a	   priority	   of	   the	   Clinton	   Administration.	   Constant	  
availability	   of	   funds	   continuously	   increased	   both	   productive	   and	   unproductive	   consumption,	  
leading	  to	  skyrocketing	  levels	  of	  trade	  deficit.	  The	  chronically-­‐increasing	  American	  trade	  deficit,	  
which	   would	   be	   deadly	   for	   any	   other	   economy,	   turned	   out	   to	   be	   manageable,	   and	   indeed	  
essential	  to	  the	  reproduction	  of	  global	  capitalism	  and	  with	   it	  American	  primacy	   in	  the	  world.	  
The	  servicing	  of	  US	  debt	  was	  mostly	  undertaken	  by	  states	  that	  had	  trade	  surpluses	  with	  the	  US.	  
These	   countries	   bought	   US	   Treasury	   securities	   both	   to	   protect	   their	   financial	   markets	   from	  
external	   shocks,	   and	   to	   keep	   the	   value	   of	   the	   dollar	   high	   against	   their	   currencies,	   which	  
benefitted	   them	   for	   purposes	   of	   export.	   The	   high	   value	   of	   the	   dollar,	   in	   turn,	   enabled	  
‘American	   consumers	   and	   businesses	   to	   import	   foreign	   goods	   cheaply’	   (Panitch	   and	   Gindin	  
2008,	   p.42)	   and	   helped	   to	   keep	   inflation	   low.	   This	   created	   a	   ‘virtuous	   circle’	   binding	   the	  
conditions	  of	  reproduction	  of	  aspiring	  economic	  rivals	  to	  American	  strategies	  of	  reproduction.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  One	  should	  note	  that	  at	  the	  time	  although	  Germany	  was	  enjoying	  the	  geopolitical	  advantages	  of	  
German	  reunification,	  the	  Kohl	  government	  was	  trying	  hard	  to	  contain	  the	  economic	  pangs	  that	  came	  
with	  it.	  At	  pains	  to	  maintain	  his	  legitimacy,	  he	  chose	  not	  to	  rely	  solely	  on	  taxes	  to	  cover	  the	  costs	  of	  
reunification.	  Facing	  this	  problem,	  the	  Bundesbank	  saw	  no	  other	  option	  but	  to	  increase	  interest	  rates	  to	  
attract	  more	  capital.	  Germany	  would	  suffer	  from	  years	  of	  recession	  and	  the	  European	  Monetary	  Union	  
would	  collapse	  in	  the	  meantime.	  	  
	  	  
84	  
Penetration	  of	  the	  world	  financial	  markets	  by	  American	  financial	  capital	  assisted	  the	  ascent	  of	  
American	  financial	  regulators	  such	  as	  the	  US	  Treasury	  and	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  along	  with	   its	  
private	   financial	   operators.	   The	   deepening	   of	   financial	  markets	  worldwide	   benefited	   the	  US	  
both	   when	   these	   markets	   were	   stable	   and	   in	   crisis.	   In	   cases	   of	   stability,	   American	   private	  
operators	  could	  get	  good	  and	  fast	  returns	  for	  their	  investments.	  When	  erratic	  crises	  occurred,	  
capital	   fleeing	   from	   the	   host	   country	   would	   take	   shelter	   in	   the	   relatively	   safe	   American	  
financial	   markets.	   When	   the	   East	   Asian	   crisis	   of	   1997	   broke	   out,	   these	   patterns	   would	   be	  
repeated,	   but	   it	   would	   also	   be	   seen	   that	   financial	   problems	   taking	   place	   in	   other	   localities	  
could	  also	  be	  dangerous	  for	  the	  US,	  and	  indeed	  the	  whole	  financial	  system	  of	  the	  world	  amidst	  
such	  a	  high	  level	  of	  financial	  integration.	  
The	  East	  Asian	  crisis	  would	  also	  mark	  the	  fall	  of	  Japan,	  from	  its	  position	  of	  economic	  contender	  
with	  American	  power	   to	   irrelevance.	   This	  was	  not	   simply	  a	   side	  effect	  of	   the	   crisis;	   rather	   it	  
was	  long	  in	  the	  making,	  as	  the	  US	  grew	  intolerant	  of	  Japan’s	  former	  position	  as	  the	  showcase	  
of	  an	  export-­‐oriented	  ally.	  The	  raising	  of	   interest	   rates	  by	  Paul	  Volcker	   in	  1979	  and	  the	   fight	  
against	   inflation	   from	   1980-­‐1985	   by	   the	   Reagan	   government	   caused	   an	   appreciation	   in	   the	  
value	   of	   the	   dollar	   against	   other	   major	   currencies.	   Although	   this	   would	   underwrite	   the	  
financial	  nature	  of	  American	  power	  in	  the	  coming	  decades,	   it	  was	  hitting	  American	  exporters	  
hard.	  After	  extensive	  campaigning	  by	  some	  key	  sectors	  of	  manufacturers,	  the	  US	  pushed	  other	  
core	  capitalist	  states	  to	  accept	  the	  Plaza	  Accord	  of	  1985,	  which	  depreciated	  the	  value	  of	  dollar	  
against	  other	  currencies,	  but	  whose	  primary	  target	  was	  the	  Japanese	  yen.	  An	  appreciating	  yen	  
resulted	   in	  a	  state-­‐induced	  bubble	   in	  equity	  prices	   (especially	   in	  the	  real	  estate	  market)	  with	  
the	  ease	  of	  acquiring	  credit,	  which	  later	  burst	  (Brenner	  2002,	  pp.110–111)	  and	  initiated	  what	  is	  
widely	   called	   the	   Japanese	   economy’s	   ‘lost	   decade’.	   From	   1985	   onwards,	   some	   Japanese	  
manufacturers	  started	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  rising	  value	  of	  yen	  by	  moving	  their	  production	  to	  East	  
Asian	  countries,	  whose	  currencies	  were	  pegged	  against	  US	  dollars,	  and	  this	  trend	  gained	  speed	  
during	  the	  recession	  of	  1991-­‐95	  (Brenner	  2002,	  p.156).	  This	  way	  they	  could,	  to	  a	  certain	  extent,	  
protect	  themselves	  against	  the	  fall	  in	  the	  value	  of	  the	  dollar.	  
This	  was	  all	   reversed	  when	  the	  US	  and	  Japanese	  governments	  accepted	  what	  was	  called	  the	  
Reverse	   Plaza	   Accord	   in	   1995,	   depreciating	   the	   yen	   against	   the	   dollar	   to	   save	   Japanese	  
manufacturing.	  The	  move	  envisaged	  funding	  of	  American	  consumption	  of	  Japanese	  exports	  by	  
surplus	  Japanese	  capital.	  This	  played	  a	  role	  in	  the	  East	  Asian	  crisis	  along	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  capital	  
controls	  in	  these	  markets.	  Currencies	  of	  the	  East	  Asian	  countries	  including	  Thailand,	  Malaysia,	  
Indonesia	   and	   later	   South	   Korea	   collapsed	   following	   speculative	   attacks	   by	   American	   hedge	  
funds	  (Gowan	  1999a).	  What	  is	  of	  more	  interest	  here	  for	  our	  purposes	  is	  that	  the	  US	  was	  able	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to	   prevent	   the	   consolidation	   of	   what	   Gowan	   (1999a,	   p.51)	   called	   a	   dynamic	   ‘new	   growth	  
center’	  emerging	  in	  East	  Asia	  and	  possibly	  a	  ‘yen-­‐zone’.	  The	  Japanese	  proposal	  to	  bailout	  East	  
Asian	  economies	  by	  establishing	  an	  East	  Asian	  equivalent	  of	   the	   IMF	  was	   rejected	  by	   the	  US	  
and	  swiftly	  removed	  from	  the	  table.	  Thus,	  Japan	  increasingly	  found	  itself	  subject	  to	  the	  whims	  
of	  American	   institutions	  and	  private	   financial	  operators.	   The	  US	  was	  able	   to	  neutralise	  what	  
could	  become	  a	  threat	  to	  American	  primacy	  in	  the	  world	  before	  it	  materialised.	  	  
European	  integration	  in	  this	  period	  could	  have	  been	  much	  more	  challenging	  to	  the	  US,	  for	  the	  
European	   states	  were	   taking	   very	   concrete	   steps	   toward	   economic	   and	   political	   integration,	  
including	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Schengen	  Area	  in	  1995,	  signing	  of	  the	  Amsterdam	  Treaty	  in	  1997,	  
and	  the	  launching	  of	  Euro.	  A	  strong	  impetus	  to	  create	  and	  expand	  the	  ground	  and	  capability	  of	  
a	  common	  European	  military	  force	  was	  present	   in	  Germany	  and	  France.	  The	  US	  appeared	  to	  
support	  common	  foreign	  policy	  and	  security	  arrangements,	  although	  it	  insisted	  that	  European	  
security	  should	   tightly	   lock	   into	  a	  NATO	  framework.	  The	  US	  demonstrated	   its	   leadership	   this	  
time	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Kosovo,	   and	   through	   the	   bombing	   of	   Yugoslavia,	   it	   established	   the	  
credibility	   and	   usefulness	   of	   NATO	   once	   again.18	  Earlier	   in	   the	   same	   month,	   the	   eastward	  
expansion	  of	  NATO	  had	  started	  with	  membership	  of	  the	  Czech	  Republic,	  Poland	  and	  Hungary.	  
Although	   Russia	   protested,	   it	  was	   in	   no	   position	   to	   challenge	   the	  American	   drive	   to	   expand	  
NATO	  to	  its	  detriment.	  	  
3.5.	  US	  Primacy	  and	  the	  Invasion	  of	  Iraq	  
The	  story	  of	   the	  reproduction	  of	   the	  United	  States	   from	  the	  end	  of	   the	  Cold	  War	  onwards,	   I	  
claimed,	  was	  a	  story	  of	  the	  American	  state	  trying	  to	  perpetuate	  its	  primacy	  by	  institutionalising	  
its	   position,	   and	   tying	   the	   conditions	   of	   reproduction	   of	   other	   states	   to	   its	   strategy	   of	  
reproduction.	   This	   is	   not	   an	   innovation	   per	   se	   within	   the	   different	   strands	   of	   historical	  
materialist	   literature	  on	  American	  power	  as	  exemplified	  by	   the	  works	  of	  Panitch	  and	  Gindin,	  
Gowan,	   and	  Harvey	   among	  others.	   Indeed,	   this	   chapter	  makes	   immense	  use	  of	   their	  works.	  
What	  it	  does	  differently	  is	  to	  theoretically	  incorporate	  the	  2003	  invasion	  of	  Iraq	  into	  this	  wider	  
American	  strategy	  of	  reproduction.	  Panitch	  and	  Gindin,	  while	  they	  incessantly	  and	  accurately	  
point	  at	  the	  political	  nature	  of	  apparently	  economic	  decisions,	  remain	  in	  the	  traditional	  field-­‐
definition	  of	  political	  economy	  most	  of	   the	  time.	  Harvey,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  provides	  a	  very	  
credible	  explanation	  for	  the	  American	  decision	  to	  invade	  Iraq	  by	  arguing	  that	  the	  US	  wanted	  to	  
control	   global	   oil	   supplies	   in	   order	   to	   exercise	   control	   over	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   major	   capitalist	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  This	  time	  it	  was	  Madeleine	  Albright	  who	  was	  referring	  to	  the	  ‘credibility’	  of	  the	  US	  and	  NATO.	  
Credibility	  once	  again	  would	  denote	  a	  willingness	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  United	  States	  to	  intervene	  when	  
things	  develop	  in	  a	  way	  it	  sees	  as	  undesirable	  to	  itself.	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powers,	  who	  were	  much	   in	  need	  of	   the	  Middle	  Eastern	  oil,	  and	   thus	  potentially	  prevent	   the	  
rise	   of	   a	   challenger	   to	   its	   power.	   Theoretically	   too,	   he	   does	   justice	   to	   both	   aspects	   by	  
postulating	   a	   dialectic	   of	   two	   externally-­‐related	   preconceived	   logics	   at	   the	   intersection	   of	  
which	   such	   imperial	   interventions	   take	   place	   (Harvey,	   2003).	   This	   theoretical	   straitjacket,	  
however,	  is	  predetermined	  and	  violently	  grafted	  onto	  actual	  history.	  Gowan	  does	  a	  fascinating	  
job	  in	  bringing	  together	  every	  aspect	  of	  the	  American	  drive	  to	  achieve	  global	  primacy	  (Gowan	  
1999a).	   His	   presentation	   of	   American	   strategies	   and	   tactics	   to	   achieve	   this	   goal,	   as	   if	   every	  
moment	  was	  intended,	  carefully	  planned,	  and	  implemented	  by	  the	  American	  state,	  however,	  
is	   problematic.	   This	   is	   not	   and	   cannot	   be	   the	   case,	   even	   for	   the	  most	   powerful	   state	   in	   the	  
world.	   Failures	   to	   predict	   important	   developments	   haunted	   American	   policy	   elites.	   Gowan	  
(2006,	   p.133)	   further	   claims	   that	   ‘[t]he	   attacks	   on	   Afghanistan	   and	   Iraq	   were	   to	   be	   tactical	  
means	   in	  a	  global	  strategy	  for	  global	  programmatic	  goals’	  and	  that	   ‘[t]he	  war	  on	  Afghanistan	  
and	  then	  Iraq	  as	  well	  as	  the	  other	  campaigns	  against	  the	  axis	  of	  evil	  and	  the	  Palestinian	  armed	  
resistance	  should	  thus	  be	  seen	  as	  steps	  towards	  the	  goal	  of	  asserting	  US	  disciplinary	  power	  at	  
the	  global	   level’,	   indicating	  that	  the	  real	  target	  was	  potential	  challengers	  of	  American	  power.	  
As	  true	  as	  this	  may	  seem	  in	  the	  first	  instance,	  such	  a	  claim	  remains	  problematic	  as	  well.	  When	  
put	  in	  such	  a	  perspective,	  every	  action	  of	  the	  United	  States	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  the	  US	  grand	  
strategy,	   which	   may	   very	   well	   be	   true	   also,	   and	   would	   not	   be	   a	   problem	   in	   itself,	   if	   the	  
question	   guiding	   the	   research	   was	   not	   the	   specific	   event	   of	   invasion	   of	   Iraq	   by	   the	   United	  
States.	   At	   a	   deeper	   epistemological	   level,	   positing	   specific	   events	   as	   instances	   of	   a	   more	  
general	   abstraction,	   one	   may	   lose	   sight	   of	   the	   very	   specificity	   of	   that	   event.	   Gowan’s	  
explanation,	  although	  extremely	  compelling,	  cannot	  bring	  together	   the	  grand	  strategy	  of	   the	  
American	   state	   with	   this	   specific	   event	   without	   sacrificing	   its	   specificity.	   It	   is	   this	   bringing	  
together	  the	  general	  and	  the	  particular	  that	  this	  section	  will	  attempt	  to	  do.	  	  
After	   the	   Cold	  War,	   the	   US	   was	   the	   only	   remaining	   superpower.	   The	   ‘New	  World	   Order’	   it	  
envisaged	   was	   also	   based	   on	   tying	   the	   conditions	   of	   reproduction	   of	   other	   states	   to	   its	  
strategies	  of	  reproduction.	  In	  some	  ways,	  this	  was	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  US	  
and	  Western	  European	  and	  Japanese	  states	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	   In	  other	  ways,	  especially	   in	  
that	  the	  US	  was	  now	  able	  to	  push	  forward	   its	  agenda	  more	  freely	  as	  the	  sole	  superpower,	   it	  
was	   new.	   Throughout	   the	   Cold	  War,	   the	   US	   had	   successfully	   subjected	   other	   states	   in	   the	  
capitalist	   world	   to	   take	   part	   in	   the	   world	   market	   by	   transforming	   their	   institutional	  
configuration	  to	  embrace	  market	  relations.	  This	  neoliberal	  drive	  of	  opening	  markets	  went	  on	  
apace	  with	   the	   incorporation	  of	  Russia	  and	   former	  communist	  states	  of	  Eastern	  Europe,	  and	  
the	   deepening	   of	   the	   reach	   of	   US	   financial	   capital	   throughout	   the	  world	   during	   the	   Clinton	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term.	  Although	  it	  is	  true	  that	  opening	  up	  the	  markets	  of	  other	  states	  has	  ‘given	  continuity’	  to	  
US	   foreign	   policy	   throughout	   the	   twentieth	   century	   (Dodge	   2006,	   p.459;	   cf.	   N.	   Smith	   2005,	  
pp.11-­‐12,	   25-­‐26),	  what	   needs	   accounting	   for	   is	   how	   this	   central	   thread	   of	   US	   foreign	   policy	  
figured	  in	  the	  decision	  to	  invade	  Iraq.	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  see	  the	  invasion	  of	  Iraq	  in	  2003	  as	  part	  of	  
this	   long-­‐standing	  strategic	  goal	  with	  a	   ‘tactical	   flection’,	  as	  Gowan	  does,	  but	  the	   issue	   is	  not	  
that	  clear-­‐cut.	  In	  any	  case,	  while	  this	  strategy	  was	  in	  place	  for	  a	  long	  time	  and	  Iraq	  remained	  
recalcitrant,	   at	   least	   since	   the	   invasion	   of	   Kuwait,	   it	   was	   not	   the	   Bush	   Sr.	   or	   the	   Clinton	  
government	  that	  resorted	  to	  the	  option	  of	  invasion.	  The	  wider	  strategy	  of	  maintaining	  primacy	  
does	   not	   directly	   translate	   into	   foreign	   policy	   choices,	   and	   it	   is	   mediated	   by	   the	   strategic	  
decisions	  of	  administrations.	   In	  the	  case	  of	  US	  foreign	  policy	  toward	   Iraq,	  this	  grand	  strategy	  
manifested	   itself	   in	   the	   form	  of	  a	   containment	  and	  deterrence	   strategy	  during	  Clinton’s	   two	  
presidential	  terms.	  	  
The	  Baathist	  regime	  in	  Iraq	  had	  outlived	  its	  usefulness	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  war,	  during	  
which	   it	   had	  helped	   the	  US	   to	   contain	   the	   revolutionary	   Iranian	   regime,	   and	  now	  became	  a	  
nuisance	  for	  it.	  The	  US	  and	  coalition	  intervention	  in	  the	  first	  Gulf	  crisis	  aimed	  to	  prevent	  two	  
interrelated	  results:	  a	  strong	  regional	  power	  that	  could	  threaten	  much-­‐needed	  stability	  in	  the	  
Middle	  East	  and	  challenge	  US	  primacy	   regionally,	   and	  Baathist	  hold	  over	  world	  oil	  prices.	  At	  
the	  time,	  Saddam	  was	  extremely	  unhappy	  about	  the	  price	  of	  oil,	  which	  fluctuated	  around	  USD	  
20	   a	   barrel	   The	   US	   was	   very	   well	   aware	   of	   the	   potential	   effects	   of	   oil	   price	   volatility	   on	  
international	  markets;	  however,	  starting	  from	  the	  1970s,	  it	  had	  managed	  to	  institutionalise	  the	  
recycling	  of	  petrodollars	  through	  American	  financial	  instruments,	  and	  later	  to	  make	  Gulf	  states	  
compensate	   for	   any	   instabilities	   arising	   from	   the	   actions	   of	   other	   oil-­‐producing	   countries.	  
Throughout	  the	  1990s,	   the	  US	  tried	  every	  means	  at	   its	  disposal	   to	  change	  the	  regime	   in	   Iraq	  
and	   establish	   a	   friendly	   government	   who	   would	   contribute	   to	   stability	   in	   the	   region.	   The	  
Clinton	   administration	   implemented	   a	   ‘dual	   containment’	   strategy,	  which	   sought	   to	   prevent	  
any	  expansion	  from	  both	  Iran	  and	  Iraq.	  In	  the	  meantime	  the	  US	  went	  on	  trying.	  It	  hoped	  that	  a	  
sanction-­‐stricken	  Saddam	  would	  lose	  his	  grip	  on	  power,	  yet	  he	  was	  able	  to	  turn	  the	  sanctions	  
to	  his	  advantage,	  thanks	  to	  the	  immense	  levels	  of	  autonomy	  from	  wider	  social	  relations	  of	  the	  
Iraqi	  state	  (Dodge	  2006).	  Thus,	  although	  sanctions	  eroded	  Iraq’s	  power-­‐projecting	  capabilities	  
in	   the	   region,	   they	  did	  not	  weaken	  Saddam’s	  hold	  on	  power	   in	   Iraq,	  and	  even	  entrenched	   it	  
(Dodge	   2010).	   The	   US	   even	   supported	   military	   officers	   to	   stage	   a	   coup,	   but	   Saddam’s	  
penetrating	  internal	  intelligence	  uncovered	  the	  plot.	  The	  US	  also	  supported	  Iraqi	  exile	  groups	  
in	   the	  US,	  hoping	   that	   they	  could	  organise	   the	   Iraqi	  opposition	  and	  one	  day	  even	  overthrow	  
Saddam.	  In	  1998,	  under	  the	  Clinton	  government,	  came	  the	  Iraqi	  Liberation	  Act,	  which	  officially	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declared	  regime	  change	  as	  the	  strategic	  objective	  of	  US	  foreign	  policy	  toward	  Iraq.	  Moreover,	  
throughout	  the	  1990s,	  the	  US	  would	  hit	  Iraqi	  targets	  on	  several	  occasions,	  including	  following	  
the	   alleged	   assassination	   attempt	   against	   Bush	   Sr.	   in	   1993	   and	   the	   hindrance	   of	   UNSCOM	  
inspection	  work	  by	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  in	  1998,	  hoping	  that	  this	  would	  undermine	  Saddam’s	  
grip	  on	  power,	   and	  pledged	   to	  work	  with	   Iraqi	   opposition	   forces	  until	   the	   change	  of	   regime	  
(Weiner	   1998).	   The	   Clinton	   Administration,	   however,	   did	   not	   go	   so	   far	   as	   to	   invade	   the	  
country.	   Instead,	   it	  adopted	  a	  strategy	  of	   ‘neoliberal	   incrementalism’,	  something	  despised	  by	  
the	   incumbent	   neoconservatives	   (N.	   Smith	   2005,	   p.	   20).	   Iraq	   had	   long	   been	   on	  Wolfowitz’s	  
agenda	  (Mann	  2004,	  pp.80-­‐81),	  and	  he	  was	  critical	  of	  Bush	  Sr.	  administration’s	  unwillingness	  
to	  march	  into	  Baghdad	  and	  oust	  Saddam	  Hussein	  (Daalder	  and	  Lindsay	  2003a,	  pp.26-­‐27).	  War	  
came	   when	   the	   9/11	   terrorist	   attacks	   on	   the	  WTC	   buildings	   and	   the	   Pentagon	   created	   the	  
opportunity	   (Gowan	  2006).	   The	   assertive	  unilateralism	  of	   the	  Bush	  Administration,	   although	  
aiming	   at	   the	   same	   strategic	   goal	   that	   the	  Clinton	   government	   had	  pursued	   throughout	   the	  
1990s	  working	  with	  other	  major	  powers	  as	  long	  as	  it	  suited	  its	  goals,	  believed	  it	  could	  impose	  
whatever	  it	  wanted,	  and	  let	  it	  be	  known	  that	  negative	  responses	  would	  be	  unacceptable	  and	  
attract	  the	  formidable	  military	  might	  of	  the	  US.	  War	  could	  now	  be	  seen	  not	  necessarily	  as	  an	  
instrument	  of	  last	  resort,	  but	  an	  alternative	  that	  was	  constantly	  on	  the	  table.	  	  
The	  wider	  strategic	  goal	  of	  ensuring	  US	  leadership	  of	  the	  world	  through	  binding	  the	  conditions	  
of	  reproduction	  of	  other	  states	  to	  its	  strategies	  of	  reproduction	  was	  largely	  inherited	  both	  by	  
Bush	  Sr.	   and	  Clinton	  governments.	   It	  was	   in	   the	  making	   throughout	   the	  20th	  century,	  partly	  
institutionalised	  after	   the	  Second	  World	  War,	   and	  coming	   to	   fruition	  by	   the	  end	  of	   the	  Cold	  
War,	   when	   the	   US	   became	   the	   sole	   remaining	   superpower.	   The	   administration	   of	   Bush	   Sr.	  
responded	  to	  developments	  erratically,	  but	  it	  was	  never	  unaware	  of	  the	  opportunities	  that	  the	  
fall	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  present;	  it	  was	  simply	  being	  prudent.	  The	  Clinton	  administration	  
was	   freer	   to	   exercise	  American	  power	   and	   it	   did	   so,	   although	   its	   primary	  method	  was	  what	  
Gowan	  (1999a)	  called	  ‘economic	  statecraft’.	  The	  1990s,	  consequently,	  saw	  a	  strengthening	  of	  
the	  US	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  other	  centres	  of	  power.	  By	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century,	  the	  US	  had	  managed	  to	  tie	  
the	   conditions	   of	   reproduction	   not	   only	   of	   its	   allies,	   but	   also	   of	   its	   former	   rivals,	   to	   its	   own	  
wider	  strategies	  of	  reproduction.	  The	  new	  government	  led	  by	  George	  W.	  Bush,	  both	  aware	  of	  
the	  ‘unprecedented…	  strength	  and	  influence’	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  worried	  about	  potential	  
challengers,	  was	  bent	  on	  making	  the	  world	  ‘not	  just	  safer	  but	  better’	  (NSS	  2002).	  As	  the	  2002	  
National	  Security	  Strategy	  Document	  amply	  demonstrates,	  the	   invasion	  of	   Iraq	  could	  achieve	  
this	  aim	   in	  several	  ways.	  First	  of	  all,	   the	  American	  state	  showed	  the	  rest	  of	   the	  world	  that	   it	  
could	   go	   it	   alone	   or	   with	   compact	   and	   ad	   hoc	   ‘coalitions	   of	   the	   willing’	   (NSS	   2002),	   by	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disregarding	   vocal	   opposition	   not	   only	   from	   its	   traditional	   rivals	   China	   and	   Russia,	   but	   also	  
from	  its	   traditional	   ‘allies’	  France	  and	  Germany.	  Secondly,	   it	  demonstrated	  to	  the	  rest	  of	   the	  
smaller	  powers	  with	  regional	  aspirations,	  also	  known	  in	  American	  government	  parlance	  as	  the	  
‘rogue	  states’,	  that	  they	  either	  had	  to	  be	  incorporated	  into	  the	  American-­‐led	  capitalist	  order	  or	  
be	   coercively	   compelled	   to	   do	   so	   (Dodge	   2013,	   p.1191).	   Thirdly,	   and	   most	   importantly,	   it	  
signalled	  an	  unending	  war,	  not	  only	  against	  ‘terrorist	  networks’,	  but	  also	  against	  a	  series	  of	  so-­‐
called	  ‘harboring’	  states	  including	  Syria,	  Lebanon,	  Libya,	  Somalia,	  Sudan	  and	  Iran.19	  This	  was	  in	  
line	  with	  the	  NSS	  2002,	  which	  saw	  ‘failing’	  and	  ‘rogue’	  states	  as	  the	  greatest	  threat	  (NSS	  2002)	  
and	  declared	   sovereignty	   as	   something	   conditional	   upon	   the	  ability	  of	   these	   states	   to	   adapt	  
themselves	  to	  the	  strategic	  goals	  outlined	  in	  the	  NSS	  2002	  (Dodge	  2006).	  
Fourthly,	   in	   addition	   to	   these	   two	   ‘demonstration	   effects’	   and	   the	   larger	   plan	   to	   reshape	  
‘unfriendly’	  states	  so	  that	  they	  were	  also	  integrated	  into	  the	  American	  led	  capitalist	  order,	  the	  
invasion	  and	  reconstruction	  of	  Iraq	  would	  pass	  control	  of	  a	  large	  percentage	  of	  the	  world’s	  oil	  
supply	   to	   the	   American	   state.20	  This	   would	   further	   enable	   the	   US	   to	   tie	   the	   conditions	   of	  
reproduction	  of	  not	  only	  a	  new	  Iraqi	  regime	  and	  other	  Middle	  Eastern	  states,	  but	  also	  those	  of	  
larger	  European	  and	  Asian	   states	  with	   the	  potential	   to	   challenge	  American	   leadership	   in	   the	  
world,	   to	   its	   wider	   strategy	   of	   reproduction.	   Fifthly,	   the	   war	   on	   Iraq	   prevented	   a	   would-­‐be	  
regional	   superpower	   from	   emerging.	   Such	   a	   development	   would	   not	   only	   destabilise	   the	  
region	   and	   the	  world	   oil	  market;	   it	   could	   also	   undermine	  American	   primacy	   in	   the	  world.	   A	  
possible	   Iraqi	  control	  of	  all	  Gulf	  oil	   reserves	  would	  also	  destabilise	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  and	  
this	  was	   something	   the	   ‘Vulcans’,	   particularly	  Wolfowitz,	   had	   been	  worried	   about	   since	   the	  
late	  1970s	  (Mann	  2004,	  p.26-­‐27).	  Sixthly,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  US	  government,	  the	  Iraq	  
question	   had	   to	   be	   resolved	   one	   way	   or	   another.	   Sanctions	   were	   taking	   their	   toll	   on	   the	  
general	  population	  rather	  than	  hurting	  Saddam	  Hussein,	  and	  this	  was	  generating	  problems	  of	  
legitimacy.	   Sanctions	   simply	   could	   not	   be	   imposed	   indefinitely.	   The	   American	   state	   had	   the	  
resources,	  the	  capability	  and	  the	  will	  to	  end	  this	  problem	  once	  and	  for	  all	  and	  that	  was	  what	  it	  
attempted	   to	   do	   as	   part	   of	   a	   larger	   campaign	   to	   change	   regimes	   in	   several	   other	   countries.	  
What	   is	   of	   more	   significance,	   is	   that	   all	   these	   were	   planned	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   the	  
notorious	   ‘Rebuilding	   America’s	   Defenses’	   document	   (PNAC	   2000),	   prepared	   by	   a	   group	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  In	  an	  interview	  conducted	  by	  Amy	  Goodman,	  US	  General	  Wesley	  Clark	  noted	  that	  he	  saw	  a	  memo	  
from	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense	  enumerating	  the	  states	  on	  the	  hitlist	  of	  the	  US	  Government	  along	  with	  
Iraq.	  	  
20	  It	  must	  be	  noted	  here	  again	  that	  the	  US	  was	  not	  primarily	  interested	  in	  loosening	  the	  pressure	  of	  its	  
energy	  dependency,	  contrary	  to	  claims	  by	  radical	  or	  left-­‐liberal	  pundits.	  Acquiring	  the	  needed	  oil	  from	  
Iraq	  through	  the	  market	  would	  cost	  much	  less	  political	  and	  economic	  capital	  than	  through	  an	  invasion.	  
See	  Mercille	  (2010).	  Cf.	  Dodge	  (2006)	  and	  N.	  Smith	  (2005,	  p.24).	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neo-­‐conservatives,	  who	  aptly	  called	  their	  think-­‐tank	  The	  Project	  for	  the	  New	  American	  Century	  
and	  of	  whom	  many	  would	   later	  assume	  key	  positions	   in	   the	  Bush	  Administration.	  The	  PNAC	  
echoed	  many	  of	  the	  recommendations	  of	  the	  1992	  DPG	  document,	  including	  the	  necessity	  to	  
preclude	   the	   rise	   of	   any	   rival	   to	   the	   US	   by	   establishing	   a	   ‘full	   spectrum	   dominance’,	   as	  
formulated	  in	  the	  2000	  ‘Joint	  Vision	  2020’	  Defense	  Department	  Document,	  including	  in	  space	  
and	   cyberspace.	  All	   these	   recommendations	  were	   reflected	   in	   the	  NSS	   2002	  document,	   and	  
the	  first	  stage	  of	  implementation	  was	  the	  invasion	  of	  Iraq.	  
In	   short,	  although	   the	  central	   thread	  of	   the	  US	  grand	  strategy	  had	   long	  been	   to	  expand	  and	  
maintain	  US	  primacy	  in	  an	  integrated	  world	  market,	   it	  was	  not	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  
that	   neoconservatism,	   in	   the	   making	   for	   a	   while,	   could	   make	   its	   presence	   felt	   in	   the	  
formulation	   of	   US	   foreign	   policy	   and	   grand	   strategy.	   Furthermore,	   only	   when	   the	   Clinton	  
administration	  was	   replaced	  by	   the	  Bush	  administration,	   could	   they	  assume	  key	  positions	   in	  
the	   government.	   While	   maintaining	   American	   primacy	   through	   tying	   the	   conditions	   of	  
reproduction	  of	  other	   states	   to	   its	  wider	   strategy	  of	   reproduction	   continued	   to	  be	   the	  main	  
strategy	  of	  the	  American	  state,	  capitalising	  on	  the	  window	  of	  opportunity	  opened	  by	  the	  9/11	  
attacks,	   the	   new	   Bush	   administration	   set	   out	   to	   implement	   the	   blueprints	   provided	   in	   the	  
neoconservative	  1992	  DPG	  and	  2000	  PNAC	  documents.	  Regime	  change	   in	   Iraq	  was	  therefore	  
intended	   to	   be	   a	   first	   step	   in	   the	   attempt	   to	   establish	   full	   spectrum	   dominance,	   based	   on	  
American	  pre-­‐eminence	  at	  every	  military	  venue,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  continuing	   financial	  power	  of	  
the	  American	  state	  and	  capital.	  	  
3.6.	  Conclusion	  
This	  chapter	  was	  intended	  to	  constitute	  one	  part	  of	  a	  three-­‐part	  illustration	  of	  the	  theoretical	  
points	  made	   in	  the	  preceding	  chapter.	   I	  argued	   in	  the	  preceding	  chapter	  that	  every	  research	  
question	   in	   itself	   provides	   an	   immediate	   definition	   of	   its	   context,	   including	   relevant	   agents,	  
relevant	  units	  and	  levels	  of	  analysis,	  and	  relevant	  spatial	  and	  temporal	  sections	  of	  reality.	  This	  
immediacy	   provides	   insight	   into	   widespread	   abstractions	   about	   the	   issue	   that	   the	   question	  
raises.	  This	  chapter,	  therefore,	  started	  from	  challenging	  these	  abstractions	  in	  terms	  of	  all	  these	  
aspects.	   First	   of	   all,	   the	   temporal	   section	   of	   reality	   that	   was	   generally	   abstracted	   in	   the	  
literature	  was	   the	  period	   from	  9	   September	  2001	   to	  March	  2003,	   although	   the	   roots	  of	   the	  
decision	  required	  us	  to	  go	  back	  to	  1989,	  and	  then	  to	  the	  ‘formative	  moments’	  of	  the	  American	  
grand	  strategy,	  and	  trace	  the	  development	  of	  conditions	  that	  finally	  led	  to	  the	  event	  in	  2003.	  
The	  temporal	  abstraction	  I	  made	  here	  reflected	  the	  relational	  abstractions	  made	  practically	  by	  
a	  series	  of	  agents,	  but	  primarily	   the	  American	  and	   Iraqi	   states,	   through	  the	  consequences	  of	  
their	   contradictory	   strategies	   of	   reproduction.	   Secondly,	   the	   spatial	   abstractions	   in	   the	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literature	   consisted	   almost	   exclusively	   of	   a	   very	   tiny	   locality:	   White	   House,	   Capitol	   Hill	   or	  
Washington.	   Although	   this	   may	   constitute	   a	   starting	   point,	   the	   American	   state’s	   spatial	  
strategy	  covers	  the	  whole	  world	  and	  this	  chapter	  reflected	  this	  spatial	  abstraction	  by	  focusing	  
on	  regions	  such	  as	  the	  Middle	  East,	  East	  Asia,	  Western	  Europe,	  former	  territories	  of	  Yugoslavia	  
and	  Somalia,	  insofar	  as	  these	  were	  the	  spaces	  that	  the	  United	  States	  directly	  acted	  upon,	  or	  its	  
actions	  partially	  determined	  by,	   throughout	   the	  time	  period	   in	  question.	  Thirdly,	   the	   level	  of	  
analysis	  was	  determined	  practically;	   accordingly	  when	   the	  matter	  at	  hand	  was,	   for	  example,	  
the	  Plaza	  Accord,	   the	   level	   of	   analysis	  moved	   from	  and	   to	   the	   international	   order	   and	   state	  
levels,	   and	   when	   it	   was	   financialisation	   in	   the	   US,	   it	   focused	   on	   the	   policies	   of	   the	   Federal	  
Reserve,	  the	  American	  state,	  private	  finance	  capital	  and	  manufacturing	  capital.	  Fourthly,	  and	  
following	  from	  the	  third,	  the	  unit	  of	  analysis	  changed	  along	  with	  the	  level	  of	  analysis.	  Fifthly,	  in	  
contrast	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  topic,	  which	  mostly	  takes	  George	  W.	  Bush,	  his	  government,	  or	  
certain	   individuals	   in	   the	   government	   as	   the	   primary	   agent,	   the	   main	   agent	   in	   the	   present	  
chapter	  has	  been	  the	  American	  state,	  essentially	  because	  it	  was	  never	  seriously	  challenged	  in	  
its	   decisions	   by	   any	   other	   social	   power	   capable	   of	   providing	   considerable	   input	   to	   the	  
decision.21	  While	  there	   is	  a	  comprehensive	   literature	  on	  the	  age-­‐long	  evolution	  of	  the	  role	  of	  
the	  American	  state	  in	  the	  world	  providing	  good	  empirical	  accounts	  of	  aspects	  of	  this	  historical	  
evolution,	  what	  is	  missing	  is	  the	  theoretical	  dynamism	  that	  a	  dialectical	  perspective	  offers.	  At	  
any	  rate,	  although	  there	  is	  significant	  correspondence	  between	  approaches	  with	  preconceived	  
theoretical	  frameworks	  or	  models	  and	  the	  case	  at	  hand,	  this	  is	   less	  due	  to	  the	  ability	  of	  their	  
frameworks,	   but	   to	   the	   sharp	   skills	   of	   observation	   and	   analytical	   competence	   of	   their	  
respective	  authors.	  Regardless	  of	  preconceived	   frameworks,	  dialectic	  offers	   a	   ‘kaleidoscopic’	  
view	   of	   complexity,	   moving	   from	   vantage	   point	   to	   vantage	   point.	   Accordingly,	   when	   there	  
were	   significant	   differences	   between	   different	   administrations,	   the	   agent	   analysed	   was	   the	  
specific	   administration	   in	   question.	   However,	   when	   second	   order	   questions	   other	   than	   the	  
primary	   question	   of	   this	   chapter	   (concerning	   the	   invasion	   of	   Iraq)	   were	   addressed,	   other	  
agents	  and	  their	  relations	  with	  the	  American	  state	  were	  also	  evaluated.	  	  
This	  last	  point	  is	  crucial	  for	  the	  central	  theoretical	  premise	  of	  this	  research.	  Reflecting	  how	  the	  
world	  appeared	  to	  the	  United	  States	  and	  how	  it	  acted	  upon	  its	  abstractions	  of	  this	  world,	  this	  
chapter	  still	   remains	  a	  one-­‐sided	  representation	  of	  the	  aspect	  of	  reality	   in	  question	  from	  the	  
vantage	   point	   of	   the	   American	   state.	   The	   next	   two	   chapters	   will	   serve	   to	   complement	   the	  
picture,	  by	  presenting	  the	  subject	  matter	  from	  the	  vantage	  point	  of	  the	  Turkish	  and	  Iraqi	  states,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  The	  lack	  of	  any	  domestic	  challenge	  in	  the	  1990s	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  availability	  of	  credit	  for	  all,	  
including	  corporations,	  individuals	  and	  the	  state,	  and	  the	  secular	  growth	  of	  the	  American	  economy	  in	  
this	  period.	  	  
	  	  
92	  
with	   the	   aim	   of	   reproducing	   a	   concrete	   picture	   of	   the	   whole	   episode,	   but	   before	   that,	   the	  
specific	   significance	  of	   the	  US	  must	  be	  emphasised	   in	   illustrating	   the	   integrated	  character	  of	  
foreign	   policy	   and	   international	   relations	   in	   the	   actions	   of	   states.	   The	   US	   is	   specifically	  
important	  because	  of	  its	  unique	  position	  in	  the	  world,	  which	  allows	  it	  to	  easily	  move	  back	  and	  
forth	   between	   really	   abstracted	   domestic	   and	   international	   spheres.	   As	   demonstrated	  
throughout	   the	   chapters,	   the	  American	   state	  has	   the	  unique	  ability	   to	   change	   the	   course	  of	  
events	  by	  simply	  enacting	  a	  law	  in	  its	  national	  legislative	  organs,	  raising	  or	  cutting	  its	  interest	  
rates,	   etc.	   Moreover,	   almost	   all	   foreign	   policy	   decisions	   of	   the	   American	   state	   have	   both	  
immediate	  and	   long-­‐term	  effects	  on	  what	  mainstream	  IR	  calls	   the	   ‘the	   international	  system’.	  
Although	  this	  chapter	  is	  not	  enough	  by	  itself	  to	  illustrate	  the	  theoretical	  argument,	  the	  unique	  




4.	  TURKEY	  AND	  THE	  IRAQ	  WAR	  OF	  2003:	  TRANSITIONS	  AND	  
TRANSFORMATIONS	  
4.1.	  Introduction	  
As	   the	   second	   leg	   of	   a	   three-­‐chapter	   illustration	   of	   the	   theoretical	   argument	   advanced	   in	  
Chapter	  2,	  this	  chapter	  examines	  the	  decision	  of	  Turkey	  to	  deny	  passage	  and	  basing	  rights	  to	  
the	   invading	   troops	   of	   the	   United	   States	   as	   well	   as	   to	   refuse	   a	   troop	   contribution	   to	   the	  
notorious	   ‘coalition	  of	   the	  willing’	   to	  see	  how	  this	  decision	  was	  made	  as	   the	   inter-­‐subjective	  
consequence	   of	   the	   asynchronous	   and	   contradictory	   praxes	   of	   a	   diverse	   group	   of	   agents.	   1	  
March	   2003,	   the	   day	  when	   the	   Turkish	   Parliament	  made	   this	   decision,	   has	   been	   commonly	  
seen	  as	  a	  turning	  point	  in	  Turkish	  foreign	  policy	  in	  general	  and	  in	  Turkish-­‐American	  relations	  in	  
particular	   (Bila	   2004;	   Hale	   2007).	   When	   the	   motion	   was	   brought	   to	   the	   parliament	   floor,	  
officially	   titled	   Türkiye	   Büyük	   Millet	   Meclisi,	   or	   Turkish	   Grand	   National	   Assembly	   (TGNA),	  
authorising	  the	  government	  to	  decide	  whether	  and	  under	  what	  conditions	  it	  would	  allow	  the	  
US	  to	  use	  its	  territory,	  bases,	  and	  airspace,	  it	  was	  rejected	  on	  a	  widely	  debated	  technicality.	  Of	  
550	  MPs	  eligible	  to	  vote	  (360	  of	  them	  members	  of	  the	  governing	  Adalet	  ve	  Kalkınma	  Partisi,	  or	  
Justice	  and	  Development	  Party	  (JDP),	  178	  members	  of	  the	  opposition	  Cumhuriyet	  Halk	  Partisi,	  
or	  Republican	  People’s	  Party	   (RPP),	  and	  9	   independents),	  533	  of	   them	  cast	   their	  vote.	  When	  
the	  vote	  count	  ended,	  then	  speaker	  of	  parliament,	  Bülent	  Arınç,	  who	  himself	  was	  against	  the	  
resolution,	   announced	   the	   result:	   264	   ayes,	   250	   nays	   and	   19	   abstentions,	   along	   with	   17	  
absences.	  Technically	  speaking,	  this	  was	  not	  an	  outright	  rejection.	  The	  TGNA	  charter	  stipulates	  
that	  a	  decision	   requires	   the	   support	  of	  a	  majority	  of	   those	  present,	   that	   is,	   in	   this	   case,	  267	  
votes	  for	  or	  against	  the	  resolution,	  meaning	  the	  resolution	  fell	  short	  of	  approval	  by	  three	  votes	  
only.	   In	   the	   case	  of	   any	  other	  motion,	   the	   speaker	  of	   the	  parliament	  would,	   considering	  his	  
links	   to	   the	   government1,	   reschedule	   the	   voting,	   or	   the	   government	   would	   bring	   it	   to	   the	  
parliament	  once	  again.	   Instead,	  Arınç	  quickly	  announced	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  motion	  and	  the	  
government	  shelved	  it	  without	  much	  ado.	  	  
Successive	  American	  governments	  since	  the	  Korean	  War	  had	  taken	  for	  granted	  Turkish	  support	  
in	   each	   and	   every	   world	   political	   issue,	   and	   the	   Bush	   government	   was	   doing	   likewise	   in	   its	  
negotiations	  with	  Turkey.	  This	  expectation	  that	  Turkey	  would	  always	  side	  with	  the	  US	  was	  so	  
entrenched	   in	  American	   foreign	  policy	   circles	   that	  a	   report	   in	  The	  Observer	   titled	   ‘Inside	   the	  
Pentagon’	  noted	  that	  although	  the	  American	  state	  shifted	  from	  a	  strategy	  of	  collective	  security	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Then	  speaker	  of	  the	  parliament,	  Bülent	  Arınç,	  was	  one	  of	  the	  three	  leading	  founders	  of	  JDP,	  along	  with	  
Recep	  Tayyip	  Erdoğan	  and	  Abdullah	  Gül.	  
	  	  
94	  
with	  fixed	  alliances	  in	  the	  NATO	  framework	  to	  ad	  hoc	  ‘coalition[s]	  of	  the	  willing’,	  at	  the	  centre	  
of	   these	   new	   shifting	   coalitions,	   ‘where	   all	   the	   circles	   overlap’,	   three	   countries	   remained	  
unchanged:	  ‘US,	  Britain,	  and	  Turkey’	  (cited	  in	  Wood	  2005,	  p.145).	  How,	  then,	  are	  we	  to	  explain	  
the	  wafer-­‐thin	   rejection	   of	   the	  motion	   in	   the	   TGNA,	   the	   apparent	   indecisiveness	   of	   various	  
political	  power	  centres	  within	  the	  Turkish	  state	  in	  early	  2003,	  and	  the	  ensuing	  break	  with	  five	  
decades	  of	  near-­‐automatic	  pro-­‐US	  Turkish	  foreign	  policy	  alignments?	  
The	  argument	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  that	  this	  decision	  must	  be	  put	  into	  its	  concrete	  context,	  which	  
could	   be	   described	   in	   terms	   of	   an	   unstable	   socio-­‐political	   equilibrium,	   as	   much	   of	   the	  
contemporary	   commentary	   and	   later	   scholarly	   FPA	   and	   IR	   analyses	   suggest.	   However,	   this	  
chapter,	  in	  contrast	  to	  this	  dominant	  ahistorical	  tendency	  in	  the	  literature,	  re-­‐historicises	  this	  
more	   immediate	   context	   of	   decision-­‐making	  by	  placing	   it	   in	   the	  wider	   trajectory	  of	   Imperial	  
and	   Republican	   state-­‐formation.	   Through	   this	   move,	   the	   chapter	   demonstrates	   that	   the	  
accumulated	  institutional	  and	  socio-­‐political	  consequences	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  Ottoman-­‐
Turkish	  history	  generated	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  absence	  of	  strong	  leadership	  over	  the	  issue	  
of	   the	  US	   request	   appears	   less	   an	   explanation	  by	   default,	   but	   as	   a	   specific	   act	   of	   calculated	  
party-­‐political	  diplomacy	  rather	  than	  state	  failure.	  Therefore,	  the	  subjective	   indecisiveness	  of	  
political	  actors	  is	  re-­‐anchored	  in	  a	  specific	  conjuncture,	  which	  was	  exploited,	  if	  by	  inaction,	  to	  
enable	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  governing	  JDP.	  In	  short,	  the	  apparent	  passivity	  of	  key	  policy-­‐makers	  
and	  power-­‐blocs	  within	  the	  state	   in	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  March	  2003	  vote	  should	  be	  re-­‐read	  as	  
the	  active	  and	  conscious	  grasping	  of	  a	  very	  uneasy	  and	  fragile	  political	  stand-­‐off,	  brewing	  since	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  between	  the	  secularist	  military	  establishment	  and	  new	  social	  forces,	  
represented	  by	  the	  newly	  elected	  JDP.	  This	   led	  to	  the	  delegation	  –	  highly	  unusual	  by	  Turkish	  
standards	  –	  of	  the	  decision	  to	  the	  Parliament,	  a	  tactic	  that	  enabled	  ultimately	  the	  survival	  and	  
consolidation	  of	  the	  JDP	  in	  government.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  ultimate	  explanatory	  locus	  for	  the	  
break	  with	  US	  demands	  has	  to	  be	  sought	  in	  the	  history	  of	  domestic	  Turkish	  politics	  that	  framed	  
the	  decision-­‐making	   context.	  More	   specifically,	   although	  unwilling	   to	   cooperate	  with	   the	  US	  
over	  the	  invasion	  of	  Iraq,	  the	  JDP,	  due	  to	  strong	  existential	  challenges	  to	  its	  rule,	  still	  took	  the	  
motion	  to	  parliament	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  securing	  the	  grace	  and	  support	  of	  the	  US	  government	  as	  
well	  as	  not	  alienating	   the	  all-­‐powerful	  military	  and	   its	   institutional	  allies	   in	   the	  high	   judiciary	  
and	  bureaucracy,	  resulting	  in	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  motion	  in	  the	  parliament	  over	  a	  technicality.	  
As	  will	  be	  seen	  below,	  the	  literature	  on	  this	  specific	  episode	  of	  Turkish	  foreign	  policy	  is	  based	  
on	   either	   a	   variety	   of	   existing	   theoretical	   models	   of	   foreign	   policy	   analysis	   or	   conventional	  
modes	  of	  analyses	  of	  various	  mainstream	  IR	  approaches,	  all	  of	  which	  fail	  to	  account	  for	  or	  take	  
for	  granted	  the	  institutional	  equilibrium	  that	  generated	  the	  deadlock	  in	  the	  months	  leading	  to	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the	  invasion.	  They	  treat	  the	  real	  abstract	  qualities	  of	  the	  Turkish	  state,	  particularly	  the	  sway	  of	  
the	  military,	  as	  the	  real	  concrete	  nature	  of	  it.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  role	  the	  military	  
came	   to	   play	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   decision	   is	   the	   contradictory	   and	   unintended	   result	   of	   the	  
social	   struggles	   of	   a	   set	   of	   actors,	   including	   fractions	   of	   the	   capitalist	   class,	   urban	   working	  
classes,	   and	   their	   alliances	   with	   the	   military-­‐bureaucratic	   establishment	   or	   elected	   and	  
appointed	   officials	   as	  well	   as	  with	   other	   states.	   This	   role	   cannot	   be	   appreciated	   sufficiently	  
without	  a	  historical	  unpacking	  of	   the	  processes	   that	   led	   to	   the	  entrenchment	  of	   the	  military	  
order	  in	  Turkey	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  military-­‐bureaucratic	  establishment	  as	  
the	  central	  actor	  of	  the	  Turkish	  state	  starting	  from	  the	  late	  19th	  and	  early	  20th	  centuries.	  This	  
historical	   unpacking	   will	   serve	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   the	   unintended	   consequences	   of	   the	  
contradictory	  practices	  of	   reproduction	  of	  a	  set	  of	   social	   forces	  put	   the	  military-­‐bureaucratic	  
establishment	   in	  a	  crucial	  role	   in	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Turkish	  state,	  a	  role	   it	  would	   jealously	  
embrace	   until	   the	   21st	   century.	   In	   the	   end,	   none	   of	   these	   social	   forces	   achieved	   their	   aims;	  
instead,	  the	  nascent	  military-­‐bureaucratic	  cadres	  emerged	  as	  the	  locus	  of	  power	  representing	  
the	  dialectical	  outcome	  of	  these	  19th	  century	  social	  struggles.	  Furthermore,	  it	  will	  demonstrate	  
how	   religion,	   having	   been	   relegated	   to	   the	   individual	   lives	   of	   the	   rural	   masses,	   came	   to	  
dominate	   the	   political	   scene	   starting	   from	   the	   1970s,	   and	   increasingly	   in	   the	   1990s,	   as	   an	  
unintended	  consequence	  of	  the	  clash	  of	  different	  reproductive	  strategies	  of	  the	  working	  and	  
capitalist	   classes,	   and	   particularly	   as	   a	   result	   of	   attempts	   by	   the	   military-­‐bureaucratic	  
establishment	   to	   ward	   off	   the	   so-­‐called	   communist	   threat.	   The	   combination	   of	   the	   anti-­‐
Kurdish,	   anti-­‐left,	   and	   pro-­‐US	   stance	   of	   the	   military	   establishment	   further	   entrenched	   the	  
position	  of	  the	  military	  in	  the	  1990s.	  Having	  thwarted	  the	  communist	  threat	  and	  marginalised	  
the	   Kurdish	   threat,	   the	   military’s	   only	   contender	   became	   the	   Islamists	   who	   capitalised	   on	  
public	  discontent	  with	  the	  economy,	  with	  the	  subordination	  of	  religion	  to	  secularism	  and	  with	  
the	  perceived	  failures	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  whole	  to	  deliver	  social	  and	  economic	  goods.	  These,	  in	  
turn,	  will	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  understand	  why	  and	  how	  the	  military	  and	  the	  JDP	  did	  what	  they	  
did	   in	   early	   2003	   when	   the	   US	   government	   expected	   a	   response	   from	   Turkey.	   Both	   the	  
hesitation	   of	   the	  military	   and	   the	   lack	   of	   strong	   commitment	   in	   the	   governing	   JDP	   are	   the	  
result	  of	  the	  long-­‐term	  historical	  development	  of	  the	  Turkish	  state	  and	  the	  specific	  ways	  these	  
institutionalised	  manifestations	  of	  social	  forces	  responded	  to	  these	  developments.	  
To	  do	  this,	   I	  will	   roughly	  follow	  the	  same	  steps	  as	   in	  the	  preceding	  chapter.	  The	  next	  section	  
will	  summarise	  the	  limited	  literature	  on	  this	  specific	  episode	  of	  Turkish	  foreign	  policy	  and	  point	  
at	   its	   shortcomings.	   The	   following	   section	   will	   provide	   a	   snapshot	   of	   the	   world-­‐political	  
conjuncture	  from	  the	  vantage	  point	  of	  the	  Turkish	  state	  and	  particularly	  the	  governing	  JDP	  and	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the	   military-­‐bureaucratic	   establishment	   as	   the	   primary	   agents	   involved	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	  
decision.	   The	   fourth	   section,	   then,	   will	   historicise	   aspects	   of	   this	   picture	   in	   the	   historical	  
development	  of	  the	  Turkish	  state	  and	  its	  foreign	  policy	  tradition.	  As	  the	  central	  section	  of	  this	  
chapter,	  the	  fourth	  section	  will	  first	  argue	  that	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  military-­‐bureaucratic	  rule	  
was	  the	  unintended	  consequence	  of	  the	  reproductive	  strategies	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Palace	  which	  
sought	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   challenge	   posed	   by	   the	   European	   great	   powers	   and	   the	   local	  
notables.	  Having	  inherited	  this	  institutional	  configuration,	  the	  Republic	  continued	  to	  establish	  
the	  military-­‐bureaucratic	  elite	  as	  the	  sole	  locus	  of	  rule;	  even	  the	  nascent	  capitalist	  class	  could	  
exert	  power	  only	  insofar	  as	  they	  were	  incorporated	  into	  this	  regime.	  Entrenching	  itself	  as	  the	  
sole	   source	   of	   power	   in	   the	   1990s,	   the	   establishment	   faced	   its	   latest	   challenge	   from	   the	  
Islamists.	  Finally,	  in	  the	  fifth	  section	  I	  will	  place	  this	  seemingly	  counter-­‐intuitive	  foreign	  policy	  
decision	   into	   its	   theoretical	   and	   historical	   context,	   and	   show	   how	   this	   specific	   moment	   in	  
Turkish	  history	  unfolded	  as	  the	  differently	  situated	  and	  motivated	  agents	  responded	  to	  what	  
appeared	  to	  them	  as	  external	  structures.	  
4.2.	  Decision	  or	  Indecision?	  Contending	  Explanations	  	  
As	   was	   the	   case	   with	   the	   US	   decision	   to	   invade	   Iraq,	   Turkey’s	   decision	   to	   deny	   passage	   to	  
American	   forces	   attracted	   little	   attention	   from	   academics2	  and	   the	   best	   accounts	   of	   this	  
episode	  of	  Turkish	  foreign	  policy	  remain	  journalistic,3	  although	  it	  was	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  
a	  turning	  point	  in	  the	  orientation	  of	  Turkish	  foreign	  policy.	  Some	  analyses	  provided	  catalogues	  
of	  reasons	  as	  to	  why	  the	  motion	  was	  rejected	  (Bal	  2004).	  Many	  accounts	  limited	  themselves	  to	  
the	   immediate	   temporal	   and	   spatial	   context	   of	   the.	   Rubin	   (2005	   p.71),	   for	   instance,	   argued	  
that	   the	   result	   of	   the	   vote	   was	   caused	   by	   ‘a	   combination	   of	   AKP	   disorganization,	   internal	  
political	  machinations,	   and	  misguided	  American	  diplomacy’.	   Kapsis	   (2006)	  provided	  a	   similar	  
explanation	   adding	   internal	   divisions	   and	   confusion	  within	   the	   general	   staff.	   These	   accounts	  
generally	   reflected	   the	   Report	   for	   Congress	   by	   the	  Middle	   East	   specialist	   Carol	   Migdalovitz	  
(2003),	  who	  cited	  the	  ‘inexperienced	  leadership’	  of	  the	  governing	  AKP,	  ‘competing	  influences’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  This	  holds	  even	  more	  for	  this	  case	  than	  in	  the	  American	  decision	  to	  invade	  Iraq.	  This	  may	  in	  part	  be	  
because	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  willingness	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  current	  government	  to	  declassify	  the	  minutes	  of	  the	  
parliamentary	  debates	  on	  the	  issue.	  The	  problem	  of	  access	  to	  primary	  sources	  in	  studying	  recent	  
developments	  remains	  a	  significant	  challenge	  for	  students	  of	  FPA	  across	  the	  board	  (Kapsis	  2006).	  
3	  By	  far	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  and	  impartial	  story	  of	  the	  period	  is	  told	  in	  Yetkin	  (2004),	  which	  
provides	  an	  excellent	  starting	  point.	  Among	  other	  journalistic	  accounts	  are	  Bila	  (2007),	  which	  relates	  the	  
debates	  revolving	  around	  the	  issue	  to	  the	  wider	  power	  struggles	  in	  Turkish	  politics,	  and	  Mahalli	  (2006),	  
which	  offers	  a	  highly	  opinionated	  and	  moralistic	  story	  of	  the	  event.	  The	  memoirs	  of	  the	  ultra-­‐nationalist	  
Bölükbaşı	  (2008),	  who	  served	  as	  the	  chief	  negotiator	  at	  the	  time,	  provide	  an	  insight	  into	  the	  inner	  




and	  the	  strong	  public	  opposition	  to	  the	  bill	  as	  the	  source	  of	  the	  rejection	  (cf.	  Robins	  2007).	  In	  
this	  sense,	  they	  also	  reflected	  the	  American	  reception	  of	  this	  development.	  
Among	  FPA-­‐oriented	  analyses	  of	  the	  decision,	  Kesgin	  and	  Kaarbo	  (2010)	  raise	  the	  question	  of	  
the	   influence	   of	   parliaments	   over	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making	   in	   parliamentary	  
democracies.	  Rather	  than	  accounting	  for	  the	  decision	  itself,	  they	  focus	  on	  the	  puzzling	  role	  of	  
the	   parliament	   in	   blocking	   the	  motion,	   and	   they	   test	   whether	   and	   how	   parliaments	   (in	   the	  
abstract)	   are	   influential	   in	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making.	   Their	   explanation	   consists	   of	   an	  
eclectic	   blend	   of	   abstractly	   formulated	   ‘factors’	   such	   as	   ‘leadership,	   intraparty	   politics’,	   and	  
public	   pressure,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   parliament.	   In	   line	   with	   this	   eclectic	  
predetermined	  model,	   their	   explanation	   rests	  on	   the	  division	  within	   the	  governing	  AKP,	   and	  
the	  ensuing	  lack	  of	  strong	  leadership	  as	  the	  cause	  of	  parliamentary	  influence	  over	  this	  specific	  
foreign	  policy	  decision.	  
Ozdamar	   and	   Taydas	   (2012),	   in	   turn,	   utilise	   Herman’s	   (2001)	   ‘decision-­‐units	   framework’	   in	  
order	   to	   capture	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	   case.	  Herman’s	   framework,	   in	   their	   view,	   provides	   a	  
more	   comprehensive	   approach	   than	   other	   foreign	   policy	   models	   in	   that	   it	   can	   employ	   a	  
combination	  of	  individual	  models	  in	  an	  eclectic	  manner.	  This	  way,	  they	  believe,	  the	  theoretical	  
framework	  can	  match	  the	  dynamic	  nature	  of	  reality.	  Although	  the	  question	  they	  raise	  concerns	  
the	  reasons	  for	  the	  decision	  in	  question,	  their	  answer	  attributes	  the	  indecision	  to	  the	  absence	  
of	   strong	   leadership.	   Instead	   of	   examining	   the	   practical	   problem,	   they	   look	   for	   the	  
predetermined	   limits	  of	   the	  possible	   (Ozdamar	  and	  Taydas	  2012,	  p.16)	   in	  an	  otherwise	  good	  
empirical	   discussion.	   They	   seek	   to	   place	   the	   historically	   specific	   act	   of	   the	   decision	   into	  
preordained	   theoretical	   pigeonholes	   and	   when	   the	   actual	   reality	   does	   not	   fit	   into	   those	  
categories,	  they	  explain	  this	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  something.	  	  
As	  was	  the	  case	  with	  the	  analyses	  of	  the	  US	  decision	  to	   invade	  Iraq,	  FPA	  models	  derive	  their	  
abstractions	  not	  from	  really	  existing	  social	  relations,	  but	  from	  extant	  decision-­‐making	  models	  
and	  frameworks.	  As	  a	  result,	  they	  fail	  to	  overcome	  the	  usual	  problems	  of	  FPA,	  although	  they	  
seek	   to	   provide	   more	   comprehensive	   and	   more	   eclectic	   models	   with	   more	   variables.	   This	  
effort,	  however,	  does	  not	  produce	  a	  more	  integrated	  account	  of	  the	  subject	  matter;	  rather	  it	  
leads	   to	   a	   reproduction	   of	   the	   problems	   that	   haunted	   behaviouralists	   in	   the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  
century,	  namely,	  endless	  typologies	  trying	  to	  cover	  all	  possibilities.	  Even	  then,	  they	  all	  refer	  to	  
‘divided	  leadership’	  as	  the	  primary	  reason	  why	  the	  Turkish	  state	  rejected	  American	  request	  to	  
use	   its	   territory	  and	  bases	   in	   its	  war	  against	   Iraq.	  This	  demonstrates	   that	  FPA	  remains	  short-­‐
sighted,	  in	  that	  it	  cannot	  see	  beyond	  the	  immediate	  agential,	  spatial	  and	  temporal	  context	  of	  
the	  decision.	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IR	  approaches	  fare	  no	  better	  in	  accounting	  for	  the	  Turkish	  reaction.	  A	  realist	  evaluation	  of	  the	  
incident	  referred	  to	  ‘soft-­‐balancing’	  as	  a	  regulatory	  rule	  governing	  the	  relations	  of	  two	  states	  
with	  unmatchable	   capabilities	  where	  Turkey,	  unable	   to	  balance	  American	  power	   in	   terms	  of	  
conventional	   power	   capabilities	   and	   unwilling	   to	   bandwagon,	   went	   for	   the	   option	   of	   soft-­‐
balancing	   (Yesiltas	   2009).	   While	   liberals	   with	   economic	   concerns	   supported	   the	   motion,	  
worried	   about	   the	   financial	   and	   economic	   ramifications	   of	   a	   possible	   rejection,	   those	   with	  
human	  rights	  concerns	  strongly	  opposed	  it	  along	  with	  almost	  all	  other	  NGOs	  (Ozkazanc	  2005).	  
Interestingly	   enough,	   identity-­‐based	   accounts	   similarly	   emphasised	   the	   absence	   of	   strong	  
leadership	  and	  internal	  divisions	  within	  the	  AKP	  leadership	  as	  the	  primary	  determinant	  of	  the	  
(in)decision.	  Kardaş	  (2006),	  for	   instance,	  claimed	  that	  although	  the	  AKP	  leadership	  purported	  
to	  follow	  an	  interest-­‐based,	  pragmatic	  approach	  to	  foreign	  policy,	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  ‘escape’	  
from	  identity-­‐based	  concerns	  in	  the	  end.	  The	  AKP’s	  seeming	  pragmatism,	  in	  short,	  gave	  way	  to	  
ideational	   determinants,	   underlying	   the	   final	   indecision	   and	   the	   internal	   division	   of	   the	  
government	   (Kardaş	   2006,	   p.326).	   In	   a	   traditionally	   constructivist	   manner,	   however,	   Kardaş	  
abstracts	  what	  he	  sees	  as	  ideational	  from	  interest-­‐based	  concerns,	  and	  counterposes	  these	  as	  
opposites.	  	  
Notwithstanding	   the	   diversity	   of	   their	   theoretical	   frameworks	   and	   empirical	   emphases,	   all	  
these	   explanations	   shared	   the	   claim	   that	   it	   was	   the	   division	   in,	   or	   even	   the	   absence	   of,	  
leadership	   that	   caused	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   motion.	   As	   noted	   in	   the	   preceding	   chapters,	   this	  
convergence	   in	   different	   approaches	   is	   an	   indication	   of	   a	   common	   failure	   in	   the	   literature,	  
namely	  faulty	  abstractions.	  The	  most	  common	  manifestation	  of	  these	  faulty	  abstractions	  is	  the	  
tendency	   to	   limit	   one’s	   examination	   of	   events	   to	   their	   immediate	   spatial,	   temporal	   and	  
agential	   environment.	   The	  accompanying	   tendency	   to	  examine	  historical	   developments	  with	  
reference	   to	  a	   set	  of	  predetermined	  categories	   further	  undermines	   the	  existing	  analyses.	  To	  
make	  up	  for	  these	  problems,	  this	  chapter	  will	  place	  this	  episode	  of	  Turkish	  foreign	  policy	  into	  
its	  wider	  spatiotemporal	  and	  agential	  context	  by	  reconstructing	  the	  history	  of	  the	  formation	  of	  
the	  specific	  configuration	  of	  social	  relations	  of	  power	  and	  reproduction	  that	  was	  in	  place	  in	  the	  
early	  2000s.	  Before	  doing	  this,	  however,	  a	  snapshot	  of	  the	  immediate	  context	  of	  decision	  is	  in	  
order,	  so	  that	  we	  know	  what	  to	  trace	  in	  history.	  
4.3.	  The	  World	  as	  it	  Appeared	  to	  the	  JDP	  Government	  and	  the	  Turkish	  
State:	  Turkey	  in	  Transition	  	  
The	   November	   2002	   elections	   broke	   a	   cycle	   of	   weak	   coalition	   governments	   that	   had	  
dominated	  the	  political	  scene	  of	  Turkey	  in	  the	  1990s,	  and	  brought	  the	  moderate	  Islamist	  JDP	  
to	   power	   with	   a	   landslide	   victory.	   While	   this	   might	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   sign	   of	   coming	   years	   of	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stability,	  things	  were	  not	  that	  smooth,	  neither	  for	  the	  governing	  JDP	  nor	  for	  the	  country	  as	  a	  
whole.	  The	  leader	  of	  the	  JDP,	  Recep	  Tayyip	  Erdogan,	  had	  been	  barred	  from	  active	  politics	  for	  
reciting	  a	  poem	  which	  was	  hardly	  subtle	  in	  its	  Islamist	  tones,	   in	  addition	  to	  being	  imprisoned	  
for	   ‘enticing	   hatred	   and	   enmity’. 4 	  The	   new	   government,	   moreover,	   had	   to	   oversee	   the	  
recovery	  of	  the	  country	  from	  the	  worst	  financial	  crisis	  in	  its	  history,	  following	  the	  prescription	  
of	  the	  IMF-­‐blessed	  senior	  World	  Bank	  technocrat	  Kemal	  Derviş.	  	  
The	   secularist-­‐nationalist	   establishment	   posed	   the	   biggest	   challenge,	   however.	   The	  
establishment	   consisted	   of	   the	   military	   represented	   by	   the	   General	   Staff,	   high	   judiciary	  
including	   the	   Constitutional	   Court,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   of	   Appeals	   (Yargıtay),	   the	   Council	   of	  
State	   (Danıştay),	   the	  Supreme	  Board	  of	   Judges	  and	  Prosecutors	   (Hakimler	  ve	  Savcılar	  Yüksek	  
Kurulu	  –	  HSYK),	  the	  Presidency,	  the	  National	  Intelligence	  Organisation	  (Milli	  İstihbarat	  Teşkilatı	  
–	   MİT),	   the	   Council	   of	   Higher	   Education	   (Yüksek	   Öğretim	   Kurulu	   –	   YÖK),	   the	   Radio	   and	  
Television	  Supreme	  Council	  (Radyo-­‐Televizyon	  Üst	  Kurulu	  –	  RTÜK),	  media	  tycoons,	  big	  capital,	  
and	  shady	  networks	  of	  individuals	  who	  represented	  what	  came	  to	  be	  called	  the	  ‘deep	  state’,	  or	  
‘state	  within	  the	  state’.	  The	  JDP	  was	  fearful	  of	  what	  these	  institutions	  were	  capable	  of,	  and	  the	  
historical	  record	  suggested	  that	   it	  had	  every	  reason	  to	  be	  worried.	  The	  military	  had	  deposed	  
four	   governments	   in	   the	   previous	   four	   decades:	   the	   1960	   military	   coup,	   the	   1971	   coup	   by	  
memorandum,	   the	   1980	   military	   coup,	   and	   finally	   the	   1997	   ‘postmodern	   coup’.	   This	   last	  
instance	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  military	  was	  able	  to	  utilise	  other	  means	  than	  direct	  takeover	  
when	  it	  perceived	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  secular	  character	  of	  the	  Republic.	  Throughout	  the	  1990s,	  the	  
National	  Security	  Council	  (Milli	  Güvenlik	  Kurulu	  –	  NSC)	  acted	  as	  the	  conduit	  through	  which	  the	  
military	   imposed	   its	   will	   on	   elected	   officials.	   Although	   the	   primary	   threat	   came	   from	   the	  
military,	   the	   JDP	   leadership	   were	   acutely	   aware	   of	   the	   capabilities	   of	   other	   establishment	  
institutions.	  The	  Constitutional	  Court,	  for	  example,	  was	  no	  less	  heavy-­‐handed	  when	  it	  came	  to	  
‘protecting	  the	  Republic’.	   It	  had	  turned	  the	  country,	   in	  the	  words	  of	   the	  current	  chairman	  of	  
the	  Court,	  Haşim	  Kılıç,	  ‘	  into	  a	  graveyard	  of	  [political]	  parties’	  having	  closed	  25	  of	  them	  (mostly	  
pro-­‐Kurdish	  or	  Islamist)	  by	  2000	  (Radikal	  2013).	  The	  Presidency	  was	  endowed	  with	  powers	  to	  
dissolve	   the	   parliament,	   to	   appoint	   a	   significant	   number	   of	   members	   to	   judicial	   and	  
supervisory	  boards,	  to	  veto	  resolutions	  passed	  by	  the	  parliament	  and	  to	  take	  these	  resolutions	  
to	   the	  Constitutional	  Court	  or	   to	   referendum.	  Other	   institutions	   served	  diverse	   functions,	  all	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  He	  could	  lead	  his	  party	  as	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  only	  after	  he	  was	  elected	  an	  MP	  when	  the	  results	  for	  a	  
southeastern	  province,	  Siirt,	  were	  contested	  and	  cancelled	  due	  to	  irregularities	  and	  the	  Supreme	  
Electoral	  Council	  held	  a	  by-­‐election	  on	  March	  9th.	  By	  then,	  however,	  the	  motion	  had	  already	  failed.	  This	  
means	  that	  the	  JDP	  indeed	  lacked	  strong	  leadership,	  as	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  party	  was	  barred	  from	  politics	  
at	  the	  time.	  This	  lends	  a	  degree	  of	  empirical	  credence	  to	  the	  mainstream	  accounts	  of	  the	  indecision,	  
although	  is	  not	  in	  itself	  a	  sufficient	  explanation.	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intended	   to	   keep	   a	   tight	   leash	   on	   elected	   governments.	   While	   YÖK	   served	   to	   discipline	  
academics	  and	  students,	  RTÜK	  did	  the	  same	  in	  the	  case	  of	  TV	  and	  radio	  stations.	  RTÜK	  was	  not	  
the	  only	  constraint	  over	  the	  press,	  however.	  Large	  media	  conglomerates	  either	  self-­‐censored	  
for	  fear	  of	  reprimand,	  actively	  ruled	  by	  boards	  staffed	  with	  actively	  serving	  or	  retired	  generals,	  
or	  served	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  establishment	  to	  win	  lucrative	  contracts	  for	  their	  enterprises	  in	  
other	  areas.5	  
The	   legacy	   of	   the	   Kemalist	   state,	   moreover,	   haunted	   the	   JDP	   government	   with	   a	   series	   of	  
thorny	   issues	   of	   domestic	   and	   foreign	   policy,	   ranging	   from	   the	   Cyprus	   problem	   to	   historical	  
matters	  such	  as	  the	  long-­‐denied	  Armenian	  genocide	  and	  a	  low-­‐intensity	  warfare	  with	  the	  PKK,	  
or	   Kurdistan	   Workers’	   Party	   (Partiya	   Karkerên	   Kurdistan).	   The	   Kemalist	   establishment	   who	  
controlled	   the	  most	  of	   the	  policy-­‐making	  devices	  of	   the	  state	  knew	  no	  strategy	  other	   than	  a	  
paradigm	  of	  national	  security	  squarely	  based	  on	  a	  very	  strict	  notion	  of	  national	   interest:	  stay	  
under	   the	  Western	   security	   umbrella	   and	   pursue	   the	  most	   immediate	   traditional	   territorial	  
and	   economic	   security	   concerns.	   Throughout	   the	   1990s,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   post-­‐Cold	  War	  
setting,	   this	   traditionalist	   view	   of	   national	   interest	   resulted	   in	   the	   isolation	   of	   Turkey	   with	  
Europe	   sceptical	   about	   the	   prospects	   of	   its	   Cold	   War	   alliance	   with	   Turkey,	   Arab	   countries	  
suspicious	  of	  Turkey’s	  close	  relations	  with	  Israel	  and	  the	  US,	  and	  the	  US	  unsure	  regarding	  the	  
potential	   use	   of	   Turkey	   in	   a	   new	   world	   order,	   following	   Turkey’s	   loss	   of	   its	   Cold	   War	  
geopolitical	   value.	   Relations	   with	   Greece	   were	   at	   best	   sour	   because	   of	   on-­‐going	   territorial	  
waters	   and	   airspace	   disputes.	   The	   border	   with	   Armenia,	   which	   had	   been	   closed	   since	   the	  
Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	   war	   between	   Armenia	   and	   Azerbaijan,	   was	   still	   closed	   and	   Turkish-­‐
Armenian	  relations	  kept	  deteriorating	  in	  the	  shadow	  of	  the	  historical	  debate	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  
mass	  killing	  and	  deportation	  of	  Armenians	  by	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  during	  WWI	  amounted	  to	  
genocide.	  To	  the	  southeast,	  Iran	  constituted	  a	  double	  challenge	  to	  the	  Kemalist	  Republic,	  both	  
as	  an	  aspirant	   regional	  hegemon	  and	  as	  a	  model	   for	   the	   supporters	  of	  an	   Islamic	   theocracy.	  
Furthermore,	   the	  Kurdish	  question	  had	   fast	   become	   internationalised	  during	   the	  1990s,	   and	  
the	  first	  steps	  towards	  an	  autonomous	  Kurdistan	  were	  taken	  (Robins	  2003,	  p.312ff)	  generating	  
problems	  both	  with	  Iraq	  and	  Syria.	  The	  issue	  of	  the	  volume	  of	  water	  to	  be	  released	  by	  Turkey	  
from	  the	  Tigris	  and	  Euphrates	  rivers	  also	  occasionally	   increased	  tension	  between	  Turkey	  and	  
these	   two	   countries.	   Turkey,	   in	   a	   word,	   was	   ‘surrounded	   by	   enemies	   on	   four	   sides’	   as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  A	  recent	  interview	  with	  a	  former	  media	  boss,	  Cem	  Uzan,	  revealed	  that	  Hurşit	  Tolon,	  former	  chief	  of	  
general	  staff	  who	  has	  recently	  been	  sentenced	  to	  aggravated	  life	  imprisonment,	  determined	  the	  
headlines	  of	  a	  major	  national	  newspaper	  in	  the	  late	  1990s.	  Veteran	  columnist	  Yavuz	  Baydar	  evaluates	  
the	  interview	  in	  English:	  Yavuz	  Baydar,	  ‘Confessions	  of	  a	  fugitive	  media	  mogul’,	  Today’s	  Zaman	  [Daily],	  




Kemalists	  would	   love	   to	  claim,	  and	   the	  primary	  motive	  of	  all	   these	  enemies	  was	   to	  carve	  up	  
some	   territory	   from	   Turkey	   for	   themselves.	   This	   existential	   paranoia	   was	   legitimised	   with	  
reference	  to	  the	  1920	  Treaty	  of	  Sévres,	  which	  stipulated	  the	  dismemberment	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  
Empire.	  Although	  the	  treaty	  was	  never	  implemented,	  it	  left	  a	  persistent	  scar	  on	  the	  collective	  
psyche	  of	  the	  Turkish	  people,	  primarily	  because	  of	  continuous	  efforts	  by	  the	  Kemalist	  regime	  
to	  keep	  this	  paranoia	  alive	   (Oran	  2010,	  pp.667-­‐68).	  This	  national	  security	  approach	   found	   its	  
reflection	  in	  relations	  between	  Turkey’s	  socio-­‐political	  forces	  leading	  some	  Western	  diplomats	  
to	   call	   Turkey	   ‘the	   last	   Stalinist	   regime’	   in	  Europe	   in	   the	   late	  1990s	   (Robins	  2003,	  p.13).	   The	  
practical	   expression	   of	   this	   approach	   was	   repressive	   policies	   against	   the	   citizenry.	   To	   the	  
establishment	  the	  main	  internal	  threat	  to	  the	  Republic	  came	  from	  the	  Kurds	  and	  the	  Islamists.	  	  
It	  is	  under	  these	  circumstances	  that	  Erdoğan	  and	  the	  JDP	  came	  to	  power	  in	  late	  2002	  and	  were	  
faced	  with	  the	  US	  request	  as	  the	  first	  foreign	  policy	  crisis	  to	  be	  defused	  and	  the	  1	  March	  vote	  
took	   place	   in	   this	   context.	   The	   President	   and	   the	   General	   Staff,	   both	   staunchly	   secularist	  
republicans,	   did	   not	   make	   it	   any	   easier	   for	   the	   government	   and	   refrained	   from	   publicly	  
supporting	   the	   cabinet	   position.	   Alone	   against	   the	   full	   power	   of	   the	   American	   state,	   the	  
government	   reluctantly	   brought	   the	   motion	   to	   parliament	   floor.	   To	   fully	   account	   for	   the	  
positions	   taken	   in	   the	   months	   leading	   to	   the	   parliamentary	   vote	   on	   the	   so-­‐called	   1	   March	  
Permit,	  this	   institutional	  configuration	  must	  be	  analysed	   in	  detail,	  and	   its	  historical	  roots	  and	  
evolution	  must	  be	  laid	  bare.	  	  
4.4.	  The	  Formation	  of	  the	  Turkish	  State	  Complex	  and	  the	  Strategies	  of	  
Reproduction	  of	  Social	  Forces	  	  
4.4.1.	  The	  Social-­‐Historical	  Sources	  of	  the	  Power	  of	  the	  Turkish	  Military-­‐
Bureaucratic	  Establishment	  
As	   noted	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   communist	   bloc	   caught	   everyone	  
unprepared	   and	   Turkey	   was	   no	   exception.	   Integrating	   itself	   into	   the	   capitalist	   order	   in	   the	  
aftermath	  of	  WWII,	  Turkey	  enjoyed	  the	  security	  provided	  by	  NATO	  and	  the	  US	  throughout	  the	  
Cold	  War.	   As	   the	   Soviet	  Union	  dismantled	   itself	   piece-­‐by-­‐piece,	   Turkey’s	   increasing	   sense	  of	  
isolation	  was	  due	  to	  the	  recognition	  that	  it	  could	  not	  anymore	  serve	  as	  the	  southern	  flank	  of	  
NATO	   (Robins	  2003).	  No	   longer	  of	   such	  geopolitical	  value	   for	   the	  US,	  Turkey	  had	   to	   reorient	  
the	  main	  pillars	  of	   its	  foreign	  policy,	  which	  had	  been	  in	  the	  making	  since	  late	  Ottoman	  times	  
and	  institutionalised	  after	  WW	  II.	  	  
Anyone	  studying	  Turkish	  politics	  or	  foreign	  policy	  can	  immediately	  discern	  the	  role	  the	  military	  
and	   bureaucracy	   have	   come	   to	   play	   (e.g.	   Ahmad	   1993).	   The	   origins	   of	   this	   elevated	   role	   of	  
state	  bureaucracy	  can	  be	  accounted	  for	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  social	  relations	  of	  reproduction	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in	   the	   late	   Ottoman	   Empire.	   The	  Ottoman	   state	   reproduced	   itself	   primarily	   on	   three	   bases:	  
direct	  extraction	  of	  surplus	  from	  independent	  agricultural	  producers	  through	  its	  functionaries,	  
territorial	  expansion,	  and	  control	  over	  long-­‐distance	  trade	  routes	  (Keyder	  1987,	  p.14).	  The	  loss	  
of	   control	   over	   long-­‐distance	   trade	   as	   a	   result	   of	   European	   discoveries	   of	   alternative	   trade	  
routes	   was	   accompanied	   by	   the	   loss	   of	   access	   to	   agricultural	   taxes	   to	   the	   ayans	   (the	   local	  
notables);	   the	   central	   authority	   was	   now	   dependent	   on	   the	   ayans	   both	   for	   purposes	   of	  
taxation	  and	  for	  troops	  (Zürcher	  2004).	  Autonomy	  of	  the	  ayans	  reached	  such	  proportions	  that	  
Mohammad	  Ali,	  the	  former	  Roumelia	  ayan	  and	  later	  the	  wali	  (governor)	  of	  Egypt,	  defeated	  the	  
Imperial	   army	   several	   times	   and,	   had	   it	   not	   been	  not	   for	   intervention	  by	   the	  Great	   Powers,	  
could	  possibly	  have	  seized	  the	  capital.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  inability	  to	  raise	  taxes	  to	  feed	  its	  
huge	  military	  crippled	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  state	  to	  expand	  territorially.	  The	  failed	  siege	  of	  Vienna	  
in	   1683	   had	   already	   demonstrated	   the	   limits	   of	   territorial	   expansion	   as	   a	   strategy	   of	  
reproduction.	  By	  the	  19th	  century,	  it	  became	  obvious	  that	  the	  Ottoman	  military	  was	  no	  match	  
for	   the	   armies	   and	   navies	   of	   the	   major	   European	   Powers.	   Both	   to	   match	   the	   geopolitical	  
challenge	  and	  to	  curb	  the	  power	  of	  the	  ayans,	  the	  Ottoman	  Palace	  tried	  to	  reform	  the	  military,	  
which	  by	  resulting	  in	  a	  series	  of	  reforms	  around	  the	  military,	  also	  served	  to	  create	  a	  new	  group	  
of	  bureaucrats	  and	  state	  functionaries.	  	  
Combined	   with	   the	   reformed	   military,	   this	   new	   class	   of	   functionaries	   constituted	   a	   strong	  
social	   force	   in	   the	   Empire,	   and	   they	   were	   able	   to	   force	   Sultan	   Abdülhamid	   to	   declare	   a	  
constitutional	   monarchy,	   temporarily	   as	   it	   turned	   out,	   in	   1876,	   consolidating	   their	   position	  
gradually	   as	  a	   ruling	  elite.	   In	   the	  meantime,	   the	  disparity	  between	   the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  and	  
the	  Great	  Powers	  reached	  unbridgeable	  levels.	  Indeed,	  the	  Empire	  could	  have	  collapsed	  in	  the	  
19th	  century	  had	  it	  not	  been	  for	  the	  British	  balancing	  strategy	  against	  Russia	  and	  France,	  and	  
the	   Palace	   successfully	   exploited	   this	   (Hale	   2000,	   pp.18-­‐21).	   The	  Western-­‐oriented	  military-­‐
bureaucratic	  elite	   finally	  acquired	  full	  control	  of	   the	  state	   in	  1908,	   turning	  the	  once-­‐absolute	  
rule	   of	   the	   Sultan	   into	   a	   ceremonial	   monarchy	   that	   now	   functioned	   as	   a	   legitimisation	  
mechanism.	   In	   brief,	   the	   central	   role	   the	   military-­‐bureaucratic	   elite	   would	   come	   to	   play	   in	  
Turkish	  politics	  was	  an	  unwitting	   result	  of	   the	   interplay	  of	  a	  set	  of	  contradictory	  praxes	  by	  a	  
series	   of	   actors	   including	   the	   ayans,	   the	   Palace,	   the	   Great	   Powers,	   the	   peasantry	   and	   the	  
tradesmen,	  all	  of	  whom	  acted	  with	  different	  purposes	  in	  mind.	  	  
The	  Republican	  regime	   inherited	  this	   institutional	  configuration,	  and	  when	  the	  sultanate	  and	  
the	   caliphate	  were	   abolished	   along	  with	   the	   conservative	   segments	   of	   the	   bureaucracy,	   the	  
military-­‐bureaucratic	   class	   acquired	   unchallenged	   dominance.	   This	   enabled	   the	   state	   to	  
propagate	  nationalism	  as	   the	  unifying	   ideology	  of	   the	   society	   instead	  of	   religion,	   albeit	  with	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limited	  success;	  the	  introduction	  of	  Western	  mores	  did	  not	  penetrate	  sufficiently	  into	  the	  daily	  
life	   of	   the	   nascent	   citizenry,	   driving	   a	  wedge	  between	   rural	   and	  urban	  populations.	   Religion	  
would	   remain	   a	   strong	   undercurrent	   regulating	   and	   informing	   the	  way	   social	   relations	  were	  
conducted.	  Both	  religious	  and	  Kurdish	  opposition	  were	  liquidated	  in	  a	  series	  of	  bloody	  purges	  
and	  massacres.	  The	  central	  state	  continued	  to	  extract	  the	  surplus	  of	  direct	  producers	  without	  
any	   alternative	  power	   centres	   in	   the	  provinces.	   Liberal	   development	   strategies	  of	   the	  1920s	  
were	   designed	   to	   create	   an	   indigenous	   (read	   Turkish-­‐Muslim)	   capitalist	   class	   to	   replace	  
deported,	  massacred	  or	   emigrated	  minorities	  who	  had	   steered	   the	   financial	   system	  and	   the	  
Empire’s	   external	   trade,	   albeit	   under	   state	   bureaucracy	   control.	   In	   this	   period	   of	   primitive	  
accumulation,	  the	  state	  transferred	  public	  wealth	  to	  private	  individuals,	  provided	  cheap	  credit	  
to	   entrepreneurs,	   and	   encouraged	   foreign	   direct	   investment	   in	   cooperation	   with	   a	   Turkish	  
partner,	  provided	  no	  political	  demands	  were	  attached	  (Boratav	  1981,	  p.168).6	  The	  result	  was	  a	  
‘politically	   strengthened’	   party-­‐state	   ‘combating	   rival	   principles	   of	   social	   cohesion,	   while	  
allowing	   development	   of	   the	   market’	   (Keyder	   1987,	   p.90).	   State	   control	   over	   the	   new	  
entrepreneurs	   continued	   in	   the	   étatist	   1930s,	   although	   the	   position	   of	   the	   industrialists	  
improved	   remarkably,	   with	   wages	   suppressed	   continuously.	   Yet	   they	   could	   not	   consolidate	  
their	   position	   in	   a	   way	   that	   would	   enable	   them	   to	   challenge	   the	  military-­‐bureaucratic	   class	  
(Aydın	  2005,	  p.27).	  Indeed	  the	  state	  entered	  the	  market	  with	  state	  economic	  enterprises,	  but	  
only	   in	   areas	  where	  private	   investment	  was	  not	  possible.	   The	  net	   result	  of	   the	   reproductive	  
strategies	   of	   the	   late	   Ottoman	   and	   the	   early	   Republican	   Turkish	   state	   was	   the	   new	  
developmental	   state	   with	   Western-­‐oriented	   and	   secularist,	   yet	   inward-­‐looking	   and	  
ultranationalist,	  military-­‐bureaucratic	   cadres	   dominating	   not	   only	   foreign	   policy-­‐making,	   but	  
also	  the	  whole	  of	  socioeconomic	  life.	  Furthermore,	  Islamic	  religion	  was	  side-­‐lined	  and	  reduced	  
to	   a	   cultural	   element	   of	   rural	   life.	   This	   way,	   the	   socio-­‐historical	   seeds	   of	   the	   institutional	  
configuration	   we	   observe	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   2003	   decision	   were	   sown,	   with	   the	   military-­‐
bureaucratic	  elites	  successfully	  barring	  any	  entry	  of	  newly-­‐emerging	  and	  extant	  social	  forces	  to	  
the	  mechanisms	  of	  rule.	  
The	  integration	  of	  Turkey	  into	  the	  American-­‐led	  capitalist	  order	  also	  served	  the	  consolidation	  
of	  the	  military-­‐bureaucratic	  rule,	  although	  it	  was	  a	  painful	  process.	  The	  Republic	  had	  inherited	  
the	   strategy	  of	   reproduction	  of	   the	  Empire	   in	   its	  external	   relations,	  and	   tried	   to	  balance	   the	  
influences	  of	  the	  Great	  Powers.	  Relations	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  who	  helped	  the	  Republic	  in	  its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  This	  period	  was	  liberal	  not	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  state	  did	  not	  interfere	  in	  the	  economy;	  it	  was	  liberal	  in	  
that	  the	  state	  was	  not	  directly	  active	  in	  the	  processes	  of	  capital	  accumulation.	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War	  of	  Independence	  and	  in	  its	  economic	  planning,	  were	  good.7	  The	  claims	  advanced	  by	  Stalin	  
over	   Turkish	   territory	   and	   the	   Straits,	   however,	   overshadowed	   these	   friendly	   relations. 8	  
Turkey’s	  neutrality	  in	  WWII	  had	  isolated	  the	  country	  internationally,	  and	  the	  state	  at	  the	  time	  
was	  desperate	  to	  build	  an	  alliance	  with	  the	  Western	  bloc.	  The	  Truman	  Doctrine	  was	  the	  first	  
confirmation	  of	  the	  incorporation	  of	  Turkey	  to	  the	  anti-­‐communist	  bloc,	  and	  it	  was	  followed	  by	  
the	   inclusion	  of	  Turkey	   in	  the	  Marshall	  Plan	  (officially	  European	  Recovery	  Program)	  and	   later	  
the	  Organisation	  for	  European	  Economic	  Cooperation	  (OEEC).	  The	  country	  also	  joined	  the	  IMF	  
and	  the	  World	  Bank	  in	  1947	  and	  pledged	  to	  liberalise	  its	  economy.	  Funds	  delivered	  to	  Turkey	  
were	   primarily	   used	   to	  modernise	   the	  military	   in	   case	   of	   Soviet	   attack.	   This	  was	   not	   a	   total	  
relief	  for	  the	  Turkish	  state,	  however,	  as	  Turkey	  was	  keen	  to	  secure	  American	  commitment	  to	  
its	  security	  against	  a	  possible	   intervention	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  and	  the	  government	  thought	  
this	  was	  possible	  only	  through	  full	  membership	  of	  NATO.	  At	  pains	  to	  join	  the	  alliance,	  Turkey	  
sent	  a	  brigade	  to	  Korea	  in	  1950	  to	  fight	  alongside	  the	  allied	  forces	   in	  the	  Korean	  War.	   It	  was	  
even	  ready	  to	  change	  its	  single-­‐party	  political	  system	  to	  a	  multi-­‐party	  one,	  and	  in	  1946	  Turkey	  
had	  its	  first	  general	  multi-­‐party	  elections,	  which,	  despite	  widespread	  irregularities	  detrimental	  
to	  the	  newly-­‐founded	  Democratic	  Party,	  (DP)	  resulted	  in	  its	  dealing	  a	  humiliating	  blow	  to	  the	  
governing	   RPP.	   Both	   pressure	   from	   the	   US	   and	   the	   World	   Bank,	   and	   opposition	   from	   the	  
Democratic	   Party	   between	   1946	   and	   1950	   had	   already	   pushed	   the	   RPP	   to	   veer	   from	  
protectionism	   towards	   further	   liberalisation.	   Widespread	   discontent	   among	   the	   population	  
because	  of	  the	  state’s	  repressive	  policies	  and	  its	  condescending	  view	  of	  the	  religious	  masses,	  
very	   high	   levels	   of	   inflation	   during	   the	  war	   and	   the	   perception	   of	   instability	   in	   the	   business	  
environment	  among	  the	  capitalists	  due	  to	  the	  notorious	  Wealth	  Tax	  of	  1942,9	  brought	  the	  DP	  
to	  power	   in	  1950.	   If	   the	  first	  steps	  of	   integration	   into	  the	  American-­‐led	  capitalist	  order	  were	  
taken	  between	  1945	  and	  1950	  by	  the	  RPP	  (Yalman	  2009,	  p.198),	  further	  incorporation	  into	  this	  
order	  took	  place	  under	  the	  DP.	  Mechanisation	  of	  agricultural	  production	  created	  a	  surplus	  of	  
labour	  who	  were	  granted	  new	   lands	  by	   the	  government.	   It	  also	  enabled	   the	  peasantry,	  who	  
continued	   to	  be	   families	  of	   independent	  producers,	   to	   send	   family	  members	   to	   the	   cities	   to	  
work	  as	  wage	  labourers.	  The	  second	  half	  of	  the	  decade	  saw	  a	  return	  to	  protectionist	  measures	  
(Keyder	  1987,	  p.134).10	  Intent	  on	  keeping	  the	  economy	  growing,	  the	  DP	  government	  sought	  to	  
provide	   external	   financing	   in	   the	   form	  of	   aid	   and	   loans.	   Economic	   difficulties	   and	   increasing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Turkey	  received	  extensive	  support	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  sketching	  and	  implementing	  the	  First	  5-­‐
Year	  Development	  Plan	  in	  the	  form	  of	  expertise,	  machinery,	  etc.	  	  
8	  On	  whether	  Stalin’s	  threats	  were	  genuine	  see	  Leffler	  (1985);	  and	  Mark	  (2005).	  
9	  The	  Wealth	  Tax	  was	  introduced	  to	  further	  nationalise/Turkify	  the	  economy	  by	  eliminating	  the	  
influence	  of	  minorities	  (Aktar	  2000).	  
10	  In	  any	  case,	  Turkey	  had	  never	  completely	  abandoned	  étatism	  or	  protectionism,	  even	  in	  the	  liberalised	  
period	  of	  1950-­‐3,	  despite	  increasing	  pressure	  from	  the	  IMF,	  WB	  and	  US	  (Yalman	  2009,	  p.202-­‐10).	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authoritarianism	  planted	   the	   seeds	   of	   discontent	   among	   the	   population,	   but	   this	   discontent	  
could	  not	  translate	  itself	  into	  electoral	  reaction	  as	  the	  democratic	  process	  was	  interrupted	  by	  
the	  military	   in	  1960.	  While	  the	  establishment	  had	  lost	  political	  rule	  to	  the	  more	  conservative	  
DP,	  the	  DP	  never	  challenged	  the	  main	  parameters	  of	   its	  wider	  position	  as	  the	  final	  arbiter	  of	  
strategic	  decisions	   regarding	   the	  social	  organisation	  and	   foreign	  policy	  orientation	  of	  Turkey.	  
The	  post-­‐war	  period,	   in	   short,	   saw	   the	   integration	  of	  Turkey	   into	   the	  American-­‐led	  capitalist	  
order	   under	   the	   aegis	   of	   the	   all-­‐powerful	   military-­‐bureaucratic	   establishment,	   who	  
consolidated	   its	   rule	   both	   through	   a	   military	   coup	   and	   a	   new	   constitution,	   and	   through	   its	  
newly-­‐forged	  alliance	  with	  the	  US.	  
In	  the	  liberal	  and	  relatively	  prosperous	  atmosphere	  created	  by	  the	  1961	  Constitution,	  socialist	  
student	  movements	  and	  the	   labour	  movement	  flourished.	  They	  took	  up	  arms,	  and	  civil	  strife	  
spread	  across	  the	  country.	   In	  response,	  the	  military	  staged	  another	  coup	  (by	  memorandum),	  
and	  three	  revolutionaries	  were	  executed.	  In	  the	  meantime,	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Necmettin	  
Erbakan,	   the	   National	   Order	   Party	   emerged	   in	   1970	   as	   the	   first	   Islamist	   party	   to	   represent	  
those	   small	   Anatolian	   capitalists	   who	   were	   alienated	   by	   the	   import-­‐substituting	  
industrialisation	  (ISI)	  strategy	  that	  favoured	  big	  industrial	  capital	  (Gülalp	  2001),	  and	  left	  out	  of	  
government	  mechanisms	  (Buğra	  1998,	  p.525).	  	  
If	   the	   years	   following	   the	   1960	   military	   coup	   saw	   high	   growth	   rates	   and	   across-­‐the-­‐board	  
prosperity,	   they	  were	  also	  marked	  by	  a	  continuous	  escalation	  of	  class	  conflict	   (Yalman	  2009,	  
p.214).	   The	   successes	   of	   the	   ISI	   strategy	   were	   undone	   when	   the	   1973	   world	   oil	   crisis	   hit	  
Turkey,	  especially	  after	  the	  Turkish	  invasion	  of	  the	  northern	  half	  of	  Cyprus	  in	  1974	  due	  to	  the	  
ensuing	  embargo	  by	  the	  US.	   Increasing	  upward	  pressure	  on	   labour	  costs	  among	  other	  things	  
rendered	   the	   ISI	   strategy	   unsustainable.	   A	   network	   of	   military	   personnel,	   ultranationalist	  
paramilitaries	   (known	  as	   the	  Grey	  Wolves),	  members	  of	   the	   judiciary	   and	  other	   elements	   in	  
the	  state	  constituted	  what	  is	  commonly	  called	  the	  ‘deep	  state’,	  whose	  main	  task	  was	  to	  take	  
illegal	   measures	   to	   combat	   the	   left.	   Armed	   conflict	   cost	   a	   growing	   number	   of	   lives	   and	  
contributed	  to	  the	  instability	  of	  the	  country.	  Finally	  on	  12	  September	  1980	  the	  military	  staged	  
another	   coup,	   citing	   the	   inability	   of	   elected	   officials	   to	   ensure	   stability.	   The	   coup	   and	   the	  
emergence	   of	   the	   ‘deep	   state’	   helped	   the	  military-­‐bureaucratic	   establishment	   to	   thwart	   the	  
challenge	  to	  its	  exclusive	  rule	  from	  the	  working	  classes	  and	  revolutionary	  movements.	  
The	  decade	  following	  the	  1980	  military	  coup	  was	  characterised	  by	  a	  full	  frontal	  class	  attack	  on	  
the	  workers	   in	  order	   to	   ‘restructure	   the	  state’	  and	  eliminate	  class	   struggle	   from	  the	  political	  
scene	   (Yalman	   2009,	   p.298-­‐99).	   One	   aspect	   of	   this	   policy	   to	   counterbalance	   left-­‐wing	  
tendencies	  was	  strengthening	  the	  role	  of	  religion	   in	  social	  relations,	  which	  would	  give	  rise	  to	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the	  re-­‐entry	  of	  Islamic	  parties	  to	  the	  political	  arena	  in	  the	  1990s.	  In	  the	  meantime,	  the	  Kurdish	  
national	  movement,	  which	  acted	  in	  unison	  with	  the	  Turkish	  socialist	  left	  in	  the	  1970s,	  was	  the	  
only	  remaining	  contester	  of	  the	  new	  rule,	  not	  least	  because	  they	  were	  subjected	  to	  the	  most	  
horrendous	   forms	   of	   torture	   at	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   military	   regime.	   Reformed	   as	   a	   national	  
liberation	   movement	   after	   the	   coup,	   the	   Kurdish	   left	   increasingly	   established	   itself	   as	   a	  
formidable	  opponent	  of	  central	  Turkish	  rule,	  and	  in	  1984	  the	  PKK	  began	  its	  armed	  campaign.	  
The	  state	  responded	  with	  a	  scorched-­‐earth	  strategy	  to	  root	  out	  the	  organisation,	  including	  the	  
use	  of	  criminal	  gangs	  who	  had	  been	  members	  of	  the	  deep	  state	  in	  the	  1970s.	  To	  increase	  the	  
level	   of	   penetration	   into	   and	   control	   over	   society,	   the	   military	   junta	   established	   or	  
restructured	  many	  of	  the	  institutions	  (see	  Section	  3	  above)	  that	  would	  go	  on	  to	  have	  extensive	  
political	   influence	   throughout	   the	   1990s	   and	   the	   early	   2000s.	   These	   helped	   the	   military-­‐
bureaucratic	  establishment	  not	  only	  to	  consolidate	  its	  rule,	  but	  also	  to	  institutionalise	  it	  so	  that	  
it	  did	  not	  have	  to	  directly	   intervene	   in	  politics.	   In	  the	  meantime,	   it	  unwittingly	  helped	  create	  
the	  next	  contester	  to	  its	  rule,	  i.e.	  the	  Islamists.	  
For	  all	  the	  attempts	  by	  the	  military	  junta	  to	  institutionalise	  its	  reign	  over	  society,	   its	  rule	  was	  
contested,	  albeit	  not	  openly.	  In	  1983,	  in	  the	  first	  general	  elections	  after	  the	  coup,	  none	  of	  the	  
parties	   established	   or	   supported	   by	   the	   military	   gathered	   the	   votes	   necessary	   to	   form	   a	  
government.	  A	  third	  party,	  Turgut	  Özal’s	  economically	  liberal,	  social	  conservative	  centre-­‐right	  
Motherland	   Party	   (Anavatan	   Partisi	   –	   MP),	   won	   the	   elections	   by	   a	   comfortable	   margin.	  
Although	   Özal	   was	   a	   trusted	   bureaucrat	   who	   had	   masterminded	   the	   pre-­‐coup	   stabilisation	  
policies	  and	  had	  been	  tasked	  with	  economic	  affairs	  by	   the	   junta,	   the	  generals	  had	   in	  mind	  a	  
bipartisan	  system	  with	  the	  two	  parties	  they	  created.	  In	  any	  case,	  however,	  the	  junta	  gave	  Özal	  
a	   free	   hand	   to	   restructure	   the	   economy	   along	   neoliberal	   lines,	  while	   it	   continued	   to	   ensure	  
political	  stability	  by	  crushing	  any	  opposition.	  In	  return,	  Özal	  tolerated	  or	  overlooked	  the	  illegal	  
activities	  of	  the	  deep	  state,	  who	  now	  controlled	  gambling,	  drug-­‐trafficking,	  money-­‐laundering	  
and	  other	  organised	  crime	  activities.	  Having	  crushed	  labour,	  the	  Özal	  government	  pursued	  an	  
export-­‐oriented	   growth	   strategy	   throughout	   the	   1980s	   that	   it	   hoped	   would	   resolve	   the	  
balance	  of	  payments	  crisis	  of	   the	   late	  1970s.	  Across-­‐the-­‐board	   incentives	   for	  exporters	  were	  
provided,	  although	   larger	   capitalists	  would	  have	  preferred	  a	  more	   selective	   implementation,	  
and	   ‘phantom	   exports’	   soared	   as	   entrepreneurs	   moved	   to	   get	   their	   ‘fair	   share’	   of	   the	  
incentives.	  Although	  the	  export-­‐oriented	  growth	  strategy	  was	  hailed	  as	  the	  ‘Turkish	  miracle’,	  it	  
failed	   to	   produce	   the	   declared	   aims	   of	   the	   programme.	   The	   single	  most	   important	   positive	  
outcome	  of	  the	  economic	  policies	  of	  the	  decade	  was	  the	  diversification	  of	  exports	   in	  general	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and	  the	  shift	  in	  trade	  partners	  from	  Europe	  to	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  in	  particular	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
Iran-­‐Iraq	  War.	  	  
Another	  upshot	  of	   the	  policies	   pursued	  by	  Özal	  was	   to	  prepare	   the	   ground	   for	   the	   rise	  of	   a	  
group	  of	  new	  capitalists	   in	  the	  Anatolian	  heartland,	   later	  to	  be	  known	  variously	  as	  ‘Anatolian	  
Tigers’,	  or	  Islamic	  Calvinists	  (Yavuz	  2003,	  p.89),	  who	  would	  later	  be	  the	  ones	  to	  challenge	  the	  
military-­‐bureaucratic	  establishment.	  While	  the	  Anatolian	  small	  and	  medium	  size	  capitalists	  and	  
their	   religious	  networks	  would	  constitute	   the	   social	  and	  electoral	  base	  of	   the	  governing	  MP,	  
the	   government’s	   export-­‐promotion,	   market	   liberalisations	   and	   anti-­‐labour	   policies	   helped	  
them	   to	   utilise	   an	   underpaid	   and	   in	   most	   cases	   unregistered	   workforce,	   produce	   for	  
multinational	   companies,	   and	   increase	   their	   political	   influence.	   Moreover,	   these	   small	  
capitalists,	  who	  came	  to	  enjoy	  exclusive	  state	  patronage,	  constituted	  a	  formidable	  rival	  to	  the	  
big	   capitalists.	   Özal’s	   preferential	   treatment	   of	   these	   smaller	   capitalists,	   his	   favouritism	  
towards	   family	  members	   and	   Islamic	  networks,	   general	   instability,	   chronic	   inflation,	   and	   the	  
like	   irritated	   the	   big	   capitalists,	   mainly	   represented	   by	   TÜSİAD	   (Turkish	   Industrialists'	   and	  
Businessmen's	  Association),	  and	  led	  it	  to	  exclude	  these	  newly-­‐emerging	  Anatolian	  capitalists.11	  
In	   response,	   smaller	   Anatolian	   capitalists	   established	   the	   Independent	   Industrialists	   and	  
Businessmen	   Association	   (Müstakil	   Sanayici	   ve	   İşadamları	   Derneği	   –	   MÜSİAD)	   to	   represent	  
their	   interests.12	  The	  members	  of	  MÜSİAD	  not	  only	  enjoyed	  support	   from	  the	  government	   in	  
many	  forms,	  but	  also	  benefitted	  from	  religion	  and	  religious	  networks	  in	  disciplining	  labour,	  in	  
generating,	   supplying	   and	   disbursing	   financing	   for	   their	   investments,	   and	   in	   servicing	   their	  
debts.	  	  
In	   short,	   the	   1980s	   saw	   a	   complete	   reconfiguration	   of	   social	   relations	   in	   Turkey.	  Open	   class	  
war	  between	  the	  bloc	  of	  fascist	  paramilitaries,	  capitalists	  and	  the	  state	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  
labour	  and	  the	  militant	  left	  on	  the	  other	  was	  brought	  to	  an	  end	  by	  the	  military	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  
former	  bloc	  (Bedirhanoğlu	  and	  Yalman	  2010).	  While	  the	  national	  security	  framework	  created	  
by	   the	  military	   junta	   continued	   to	   suppress	  any	  opposition	  even	   slightly	   resembling	   the	   left,	  
the	  Özal	  government	  broke	  the	  back	  of	   labour	   (Ercan	  2002,	  p.25).	  Liberalising	  external	   trade	  
and	  domestic	  prices,	  Özal	  fully	  integrated	  Turkey	  into	  the	  American-­‐led	  capitalist	  order	  under	  
the	  aegis	  of	   the	   IMF.	  To	   cap	   it	   all,	   Turkey	   fully	   liberalised	   capital	   accounts	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  The	  sense	  of	  exclusion	  of	  the	  founders	  of	  MÜSİAD	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  the	  motivation	  for	  establishing	  the	  
organisation	  and	  reached	  its	  apogee	  when	  some	  later	  members	  of	  MÜSİAD	  were	  blocked	  from	  
participating	  in	  an	  international	  business	  meeting	  organised	  by	  the	  Association	  of	  Foreign	  Economic	  
Relations	  (Buğra	  1998:	  529).	  
12	  Conveniently,	  the	  Turkish	  word	  for	  ‘Independent’,	  that	  is	  ‘Müstakil’,	  had	  been	  considered	  to	  refer	  to	  




decade.	  Most	  importantly	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  chapter,	  the	  1980s	  saw	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  
new	  fraction	  of	  the	  capitalist	  class,	  who	  increasingly	  sought	  not	  only	  to	  further	  their	  interests,	  
but	  also	  to	  have	  a	  say	  in	  the	  socio-­‐political	  organisation	  of	  the	  country.	  However,	  the	  military-­‐
bureaucratic	  establishment	   institutionalised	   itself	  as	   the	   final	  arbiter	  of	  political	   rule	  and	   the	  
exclusive	  locus	  of	  foreign	  policy.	  The	  story	  of	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Turkish	  state	  until	  the	  1990s	  
was	   therefore	  a	   story	  of	   the	  emergence,	   consolidation	  and	   institutionalisation	  of	   the	   rule	  of	  
the	  military-­‐bureaucratic	   establishment.	  Now,	   I	   turn	   to	   Turkey’s	   ‘lost	   decade’	   to	   understand	  
the	  nature	  of	  the	  challenge	  that	  this	  establishment	  would	  face	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  century	  and	  
the	  rise	  of	  its	  main	  challenger,	  the	  Islamist	  movement	  that	  would	  culminate	  in	  the	  JDP	  rule.	  	  
4.4.2.	  ‘The	  Lost	  Decade’	  and	  after:	  the	  Entrenchment	  of	  Ultranationalist	  
Military	  Republicanism	  and	  the	  Rise	  of	  its	  Contenders	  	  
Just	  as	  Prime	  Minister	  Özal	  resigned	  from	  his	  post	  to	  become	  the	  President	   in	   late	  1989,	  the	  
fall	  of	  the	  Berlin	  Wall	  signalled	  a	  new	  world	  order.	  As	  Özal	  strengthened	  his	  position	  and	  the	  
re-­‐civilianisation	  of	  political	  life	  continued,	  the	  military	  and	  the	  deep	  state	  would	  register	  their	  
discontent	  at	  every	  turn.	  Economic	  growth	  had	  already	  slowed	  down	   in	  the	   last	  years	  of	   the	  
1980s,	  and	  this	   translated	   into	   lower	  electoral	  support	   for	   the	  Motherland	  Party	   in	   the	  1989	  
local	   elections,	  where	   it	   can	  only	   came	   third	   after	   the	   centre-­‐left	   Social	  Democratic	  Populist	  
Party	   (Sosyal	  Demokrat	  Halkçı	   Parti	   -­‐	   SDPP)	   and	   the	   centre-­‐right	   True	   Path	   Party	   (Doğru	   Yol	  
Partisi	   –	   TPP)	   (Hale	   1994,	   pp.281-­‐82).	   Özal’s	   fallout	   with	   the	   military,	   when	   in	   1987	   he	  
appointed	  Necip	  Torumtay	  as	   the	  Chief	  of	  General	   Staff	   (Robins	  2003,	  p.55),	  would	   serve	  as	  
one	  of	  the	  first	  signs	  of	  his	  strongman	  status.	  Moreover,	  he	  wanted	  a	  peaceful	  solution	  to	  the	  
Kurdish	  problem.	  He	  would	  not	  confront	  the	  military	  directly,	  however,	  as	  exemplified	  by	  his	  
authorisation	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	   the	  Gendarmerie	   Intelligence	  and	  Counterterror	  Group	  
Command	   (Jandarma	   İstihbarat	   ve	   Terörle	   Mücadele	   Grup	   Komutanlığı	   –	   JİTEM),	   which	  
coordinated	  the	  illegal	  activities	  of	  the	  state	  in	  combatting	  the	  PKK	  and	  the	  Revolutionary	  Left	  
(Devrimci	   Sol).13	  Simultaneously,	   a	   reinvigorated	   labour	  movement,	   manifesting	   itself	   in	   the	  
form	  of	  waves	  of	  strike	  action	  in	  the	  late	  1980s,	  forced	  the	  government	  to	  shelve	  its	  large-­‐scale	  
privatisation	   plans.	   Escalation	   in	   the	   low-­‐intensity	   warfare	   in	   the	   Southeast	   and	   the	  
redefinition	  of	   the	  Kurdish	  question	  as	  a	  matter	  of	   identity,	  along	  with	   the	  entry	  of	   Islam	  to	  
political	  and	  social	  life	  (partly	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  military	  junta’s	  policies	  of	  counterbalancing	  the	  
left	  with	   religion)	   brought	   identity	   politics	   centre	   stage.	   ‘The	   last	   Stalinist	   regime	   in	   Europe’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Authorities	  continuously	  denied	  the	  existence,	  let	  alone	  the	  illegal	  activities,	  of	  JİTEM	  until	  the	  late	  
1990s.	  Although	  the	  organisation	  was	  officially	  disbanded,	  it	  continued	  to	  operate	  in	  a	  similar	  function	  
with	  the	  British	  MRF	  (Mobile	  Reconnaissance	  Force),	  which	  conducted	  a	  series	  of	  extrajudicial	  killings.	  A	  
series	  of	  court	  documents	  listing	  the	  terroristic	  activities	  of	  JİTEM	  and	  other	  branches	  of	  the	  deep	  state	  
have	  recently	  been	  compiled	  by	  TESEV	  (2013).	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increasingly	  felt	  isolated	  as	  its	  Cold	  War	  allies	  were	  celebrating	  a	  new	  age	  marked	  by	  the	  rise	  
of	  human	  rights	  and	  democracy.	  As	  the	  West	  was	  debating	  whether	  NATO	  was	  now	  necessary	  
or	  not,	  Turkey	  ardently	  supported	  its	  continued	  existence	  (Robins	  2003,	  pp.20-­‐21).	  	  
In	  these	  challenging	  times,	  Iraq’s	  invasion	  of	  Kuwait	  presented	  itself	  both	  as	  a	  challenge	  and	  an	  
opportunity	   for	   Turkey.	  Özal	  wanted	   to	   re-­‐establish	   Turkey’s	   geopolitical	   indispensability	   for	  
the	  US.	  Although	  involvement	  would	  be	  very	  costly	  considering	  the	  trade	  volume	  between	  the	  
two	   countries,	   the	   flow	   of	   oil	   through	   the	   Kirkuk-­‐Yumurtalık	   pipeline	   and	   the	   formidable	  
military	   capabilities	  of	   Iraq,	  Özal	   thought	  Turkey	  could	  be	  part	  of	  George	  H.	  W.	  Bush’s	   ‘New	  
World	   Order’.	   Furthermore,	   he	   wished	   to	   establish	   a	   presence	   in	   Northern	   Iraq,	   an	   oil-­‐rich	  
Kurdish-­‐majority	  area,	  which	  would	  also	  considerably	  ameliorate	  border	  security,	  especially	  by	  
curbing	  PKK’s	  influence.	  In	  doing	  this,	  he	  acted	  as	  the	  sole	  decision-­‐maker,	  alienating	  the	  Chief	  
of	   General	   Staff	   Torumtay,	   PM	   Akbulut,	   Foreign	   Minister	   Ali	   Bozer	   and	   others	   in	   the	  
government.14	  While	  Özal	  wanted	  to	  support	  the	  coalition	  forces	  with	  a	  Turkish	  contingent,	  his	  
strongman	  status	  was	  challenged	  by	  the	  backbenchers	  of	  his	  former	  party	  led	  by	  Mesut	  Yılmaz,	  
who	   managed	   to	   block	   a	   government	   motion	   to	   deploy	   military	   forces	   abroad.	   The	   whole	  
episode	  saw	  the	  resignations	  of	  Bozer	  and	  Torumtay.	  In	  the	  end,	  Turkey	  did	  not	  contribute	  to	  
the	  coalition	  forces	  in	  the	  face	  of	  mounting	  domestic	  political	  challenges	  to	  Özal’s	  policies	  and	  
confined	  its	  contribution	  to	  opening	  bases	  to	  US	  and	  British	  forces,	  as	  well	  as	  massing	  troops	  in	  
the	  border	  region	  to	  tie	  down	  several	  divisions	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  in	  the	  North.	  	  
The	  immediate	  cost	  of	  the	  war	  was	  over	  2	  billion	  US	  dollars	  a	  year	  for	  Turkey,	  as	  it	  significantly	  
damaged	  revenues	  from	  exports,	  the	  Kirkuk-­‐Yumurtalık	  pipeline,	  and	  construction	  contracts	  as	  
well	  as	  tourism.	  More	  importantly,	  the	  Kurdish	  question	  was	  increasingly	  internationalised	  as	  
Iraqi	  Kurds	  fled	  from	  attacks	  by	  the	  regime.	  The	  influx	  of	  Kurdish	  refugees	  challenged	  Turkey	  in	  
two	  ways.	  First,	  Turkey	  was	  not	  able	   to	  handle	   such	  a	  massive	   inflow	  of	   refugees	   logistically	  
and	   financially.	   Second,	   the	   Turkish	   state	   feared	   that	   Kurdish	   regions	   of	   Turkey	   could	   be	  
adversely	   affected	   by	   rising	   Kurdish	   nationalism.	   To	   counter	   both,	   and	   under	   increasing	  
international	  humanitarian	  pressure,	  Turkey	  proposed	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  buffer	  zone	  in	   Iraqi	  
Kurdistan	   to	  be	  supervised	  by	   the	  US,	   the	  UK	  and	  Turkey.	  Özal’s	   strongman	  status	  would	  be	  
dealt	  a	  final	  blow	  when	  the	   liberal	  backbencher	  Mesut	  Yılmaz	  seized	  leadership	  of	  the	  MP	  in	  
1991,	   alienating	   conservatives,	   who	   would	   veer	   towards	   the	   Islamist	   Welfare	   Party	   (Refah	  
Partisi	   –	   WP),	   the	   inheritor	   of	   the	   pre-­‐coup	   National	   Salvation	   Party.	   The	   1991	   general	  
elections	  also	  saw	  the	  resurgence	  of	  the	  National	  Outlook	  tradition,	  with	  Erbakan’s	  WP	  getting	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Özal	  would	  not	  even	  let	  Bozer	  in	  on	  negotiations	  with	  President	  Bush	  during	  their	  visit	  to	  Washington	  
(Hale	  1992).	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almost	  17%	  of	  the	  votes,	  and	  representation	  of	  the	  pro-­‐Kurdish	  People’s	  Labour	  Party	  (Halkın	  
Emek	   Partisi	   –	   PLP)	   among	   SDPP	   ranks,	   both	   thorns	   in	   the	   side	   of	   the	  military.	   The	   rise	   of	  
political	  Islam	  was	  partly	  the	  making	  of	  the	  military,	  who	  propagated	  Islam	  as	  a	  counterweight	  
to	  the	  left.	  What	  worried	  the	  generals	  most,	  however,	  was	  Özal’s	   independent	  and	  proactive	  
style	  of	  governing.	  However,	  the	  establishment	  managed	  to	  keep	  him	  in	  check	  and	  continued	  
to	  consolidate	  itself	  as	  the	  ‘guardian’	  of	  the	  regime.	  
As	   the	   Kurdish	   insurgency	   gained	   momentum,	   the	   counter-­‐guerrilla	   forces	   increasingly	  
employed	   special	   warfare	   tactics.	   Although	   terrorising	   the	   Kurdish	   masses	   was	   the	   primary	  
activity	  of	  the	  counter-­‐guerrilla	  forces,	  they	  saw	  the	  state	  of	  emergency	  in	  the	  Southeast	  as	  an	  
opportunity	  to	  fill	  their	  coffers	  as	  well.	  In	  addition	  to	  extrajudicial	  killings,	  widespread	  torture,	  
and	   forced	   disappearances,	   they	  were	   also	   involved	   in	   drug	   trafficking,	   extortion,	   and	   arms	  
trading,	   feeling	  safe	   in	   the	  knowledge	  that	   they	  could	   impute	  all	   these	  crimes	   to	   the	  PKK.	   In	  
response	  to	  politicisation	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  question,	  counter-­‐guerrilla	  units	  assassinated	  Kurdish	  
political	   figures,	   journalists,	   and	   opinion	   leaders	   starting	   from	   1991	   (von	   Bruinessen	   1996).	  
Authorities	  mostly	  turned	  a	  blind	  eye	  to	  these	  gangs	  for	  fear	  of	  reprimand.	  Özal	  still	  wanted	  to	  
resolve	   the	   Kurdish	   question	   peacefully	   and	   reached	  out	   to	   Jalal	   Talabani,	   the	   leader	   of	   the	  
Patriotic	  Union	  of	  Kurdistan	  (Yeketî	  Niştîmanî	  Kurdistan	  –	  PUK),	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  convincing	  PKK	  
leader	   Abdullah	   Öcalan	   to	   cease	   hostilities.	   Öcalan	   responded	   positively	   and	   declared	  
ceasefire,	   pending	   a	   resolution	   proposal	   by	   Özal.	   Both	   Özal	   and	   Eşref	   Bitlis,	   a	   general	   who	  
proposed	  a	  roadmap	  for	  solution	  of	  the	  problem,	  died	  under	  suspicious	  circumstances	  in	  1993.	  
The	  next	  year	  would	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  worst	  years	  in	  Turkey’s	  ‘lost	  decade’	  under	  full	  
control	   of	   the	   military	   and	   the	   deep	   state.	   Conflict	   with	   the	   PKK	   cost	   thousands	   of	   lives,	  
including	  over	  a	  thousand	  members	  of	  the	  security	  forces.	  Besides	  that,	  the	  economy	  was	  hit	  
by	  a	  devastating	  currency	  crisis	  as	  a	   result	  of	  mounting	  public	  debt,	  an	   import	  boom	  and	  an	  
overreliance	   on	   the	   Central	   Bank	   to	   finance	   the	   fiscal	   deficit.	   When	   Moody’s	   downgraded	  
Turkey’s	  sovereign	  creditworthiness	  below	  investment	  grade,	  a	  full-­‐blown	  financial	  crisis	  broke	  
out.	  Full	  account	  liberalisation	  in	  1989	  would	  take	  its	  first	  toll	  when	  speculative	  foreign	  capital,	  
expecting	  devaluation,	  left	  their	  Turkish	  lira	  positions.	  Cheap	  credit	  from	  abroad	  had	  ignited	  an	  
import	  boom,	  resulting	   in	  a	  widening	  trade	  deficit	  and	  a	  record-­‐level	  current	  account	  deficit.	  
To	  increase	  confidence	  in	  the	  banking	  sector,	  the	  Savings	  Deposit	  Insurance	  Fund	  guaranteed	  
all	  deposits,	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  the	  2001	  banking	  crisis.	  Increasing	  isolation	  of	  the	  country	  led	  
the	  government	   to	  seek	  allies	   in	   Israel,	   reversing	  a	  decades-­‐long	  policy	  of	  neutrality	   in	  Arab-­‐
Israeli	  matters	  and	  entrenching	  its	  international	  status	  as	  a	  nominally-­‐democratic-­‐cum-­‐military	  
regime	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   the	   US.	   The	   Arab-­‐Israeli	   peace	   process	   culminating	   in	   the	   1993	   Oslo	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Accords	   made	   it	   easier	   for	   Turkey	   to	   legitimise	   Turkish-­‐Israeli	   rapprochement,	   both	   to	  
domestic	  and	  Middle	  Eastern	  Muslim	  public	  opinion	  (Altunisik	  2000).	  Securing	  the	  support	  of	  
the	  US	  gave	  the	  establishment	  a	  free	  hand	  to	  continue	  oppressing	  its	  own	  citizens	  and	  ensure	  
its	  dominance.	  	  
The	  1995	  general	  elections	  saw	  Erbakan’s	  Islamist	  Welfare	  Party	  winning	  a	  plurality.	  This	  was	  
due	  to	  its	  ability	  to	  represent	  the	  rising	  Islamic	  small	  and	  medium	  size	  capital	  in	  Anatolia,	  and	  
the	   urban	   poor,	   alienated	   by	   the	   failed	   promises	   of	   the	   SDPP	   and	   finding	   new	   hope	   in	  
Welfare’s	   promise	   of	   a	   ‘just	   order’	   (Gülalp	   2001).15	  The	   1994	   local	   elections	   had	   already	  
indicated	   the	   rise	   of	   political	   Islam	   and	   been	   marked	   by	   the	   ascent	   of	   a	   group	   of	   local	  
politicians	  who	  would	  later	  constitute	  the	  backbone	  of	  the	  JDP,	  including	  the	  current	  President	  
Recep	   Tayyip	   Erdoğan.	   Under	   Erdoğan’s	   term	   as	   metropolitan	   mayor	   in	   İstanbul,	   water	  
shortages,	  air	  pollution,	  fiscal	  problems	  of	  the	  municipality,	  and	  many	  other	  problems	  of	  urban	  
life	  were	  either	   solved	  or	   significantly	  ameliorated,	  and	   this	  would	  give	  a	  hint	  as	   to	  what	  he	  
could	  manage	  if	  he	  governed	  the	  country.	  Having	  emerged	  in	  the	  early	  1970s	  in	  reaction	  to	  its	  
exclusion	  from	  political	  and	  economic	  life,	  the	  National	  Outlook	  movement	  had	  capitalised	  in	  
the	  1980s	  on	  the	  social	  conservatism	  of	  the	  rural	  masses,	  the	  exclusion	  of	  Islamic	  capital	  from	  
economic	  life,	  the	  failure	  of	  social	  democrats	  and	  the	  centre-­‐right	  to	  deliver	  on	  their	  promises	  
of	  prosperity,	  and	  social	  networks	  of	  solidarity.	  Despite	  a	  variety	  of	  unlawful	  obstructions,	  the	  
WP	  could	  finally	  form	  a	  coalition	  with	  the	  centre-­‐right	  TPP.	  
On	  3	  November	  1996	  at	  7.25	  pm,	  as	  truck	  driver	  Hasan	  Gökçe	  was	  leaving	  an	  intercity	  service	  
area	  near	  Susurluk,	  a	  Mercedes	  600	  SEL	  crashed	  into	  his	  truck.	  There	  were	  four	  people	  in	  the	  
car:	  Abdullah	  Çatlı,	   a	   state-­‐employed	   terrorist	   and	  his	   girlfriend	  Gonca	  Us,	   Sedat	  Bucak,	   TPP	  
MP	   and	   a	   tribal	   chieftain	  whose	   tribe	   fought	   against	   the	   PKK,	   and	  Hüseyin	   Kocadağ,	   former	  
İstanbul	  Deputy	  Chief	  of	  Police.	  It	  was	  not	  only	  the	  convergence	  of	  paths	  of	  state	  officials	  and	  
terrorists	  that	  aroused	  interest;	  an	  inventory	  of	  the	  car’s	  contents	  revealed	  a	  much	  larger	  web	  
of	   relations	  among	  state	  officials,	  ministers,	  police	  chiefs,	  members	  of	  parliament,	   terrorists,	  
drug	  traffickers,	  money	  launderers,	  extorters	  etc.,	  along	  with	  automatic	  weapons.	  The	  scandal	  
rocked	  the	  country	  and	  a	  deep-­‐seated	  hatred	  of	  these	  mafia-­‐state-­‐counter-­‐guerrilla	  networks	  
surfaced	  among	   the	   citizenry.	  A	   research	   commission	   to	   investigate	   these	   criminal	  networks	  
was	   established	   in	   the	   TGNA,	   and	   although	   its	   findings	   incriminated	   many,	   no	   higher	   rank	  
military	   personnel	   or	   police	   were	   tried.	   MİT	   and	   the	   General	   Staff	   did	   not	   provide	   any	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  As	  Gülalp	  (2001)	  notes,	  the	  name	  of	  the	  party,	  Welfare,	  reflects	  its	  promises	  to	  the	  urban	  poor	  and	  
the	  rural	  shopkeepers	  and	  artisans,	  referring	  partly	  to	  a	  pre-­‐industrial,	  Ottoman	  social	  order.	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information	   to	   the	   commission	   at	   all,	   as	   they	   saw	   ‘themselves	   as	   the	   owners	   of	   the	   state’	  
(TGNA	  Susurluk	  Commission	  Report	  1997).	  
A	   citizen	   initiative	   was	   organised	   by	   lawyer	   Ergin	   Cinmen	   with	   the	   motto	   ‘One	   minute	   of	  
darkness	  for	  lasting	  light’,	  which	  asked	  people	  to	  turn	  off	  their	  lights	  every	  night	  at	  9.00	  for	  a	  
minute	   in	  protest.	  The	  size	  of	   the	  protests	   reached	   immense	  proportions	  and	  people	  hit	   the	  
streets,	   peacefully	   and	   hesitantly	   marching	   against	   the	   deep	   state.	   The	   government	   was	  
unrepentant,	  however.	  Çiller	  openly	  defended	   the	  criminal	  networks,	  as	  her	  party	  became	  a	  
hotbed	   for	   their	   accomplices,	   and	   her	   coalition	   partner	   Erbakan	   played	   down	   the	   matter,	  
expecting	  that	  the	  deep	  state	  would	  cover	  it	  up	  in	  any	  case.	  Erbakan	  had	  pressing	  problems	  of	  
his	   own	   at	   hand,	   originating	   in	   the	   military’s	   full-­‐court	   press	   on	   the	   so-­‐called	   reactionary	  
activities	  of	  his	  party,	  and	  Çiller	  supported	  him,	  partly	  because	  she	  wanted	  to	  become	  Prime	  
Minister	   for	   the	  next	   two	  years	  as	  per	   their	  coalition	  agreement.	  The	  General	  Staff	  had	   long	  
been	   irritated	   by	   what	   it	   saw	   as	   the	   creeping	   Islamisation	   of	   the	   country	   under	   Erbakan’s	  
premiership.	   It	   successfully	   channelled	   the	   social	   unrest	   toward	   an	   anti-­‐government	  
movement.	  	  
When	  the	  NSC	  convened	  on	  28	  February	  1997,	  it	  forced	  the	  government	  to	  implement	  policies	  
targeting	   what	   the	   General	   Staff	   saw	   as	   reactionary	   and	   fundamentalist	   activities.	   The	  
recommendations	   of	   the	   Council	   included	   stricter	   supervision	   and	   closing	   down	   of	   Quran	  
courses	   for	   children,	   curbing	   the	   number	   of	   religious	   schools,	   and	   exclusion	   of	   Islamic	  
capitalists	  from	  state	  tenders	  and	  contracts	   in	  a	  bid	  to	  undermine	  the	  social	  base	  of	  the	  WP.	  
When,	   in	   June,	   Erbakan	   resigned	   as	   part	   of	   the	   coalition	   arrangement	   to	   hand	   the	   prime	  
ministry	  to	  Çiller,	  President	  Demirel	  did	  not	  authorise	  Çiller	  to	  form	  the	  government	  although	  
the	  two	  parties	  had	  a	  majority	  in	  the	  TGNA.	  Effectively,	  then,	  the	  months-­‐long	  campaign	  of	  the	  
military	  forced	  Erbakan	  and	  Çiller	  out	  of	  government.	  As	  there	  was	  no	  direct	  military	  takeover,	  
the	  coup	  was	  to	  be	  called	  a	  ‘postmodern	  coup’.	  	  
Following	   the	   coup	   the	   top	   generals	   exercised	   complete	   control	   over	   policymaking	   through	  
their	   decisive	   control	   of	   the	   National	   Security	   Council.	  Meanwhile,	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	  
closed	  down	  the	  WP	  on	  16	  January	  1998	  for	  its	  activities	  against	  the	  secular	  character	  of	  the	  
Republic,	   barring	   its	   leaders	   from	   politics.	   The	   party	   cadres	   regrouped	   later	   in	   the	   year	   to	  
establish	  the	  Virtue	  Party	  (Fazilet	  Partisi	  –	  VP).	  The	  government	  also	  faced	  criticism	  for	  its	  lack	  
of	   resolve	   in	   dealing	   with	   the	   criminal	   networks	   uncovered	   in	   the	   Susurluk	   scandal.	   The	  
minority	  government	  fell	   following	  corruption	  claims	  over	  the	  privatisation	  of	  a	  state	  bank	  in	  
January	   1999.	   Ecevit	   established	   a	   caretaker	   government	   to	   take	   the	   country	   to	   general	  
elections	   in	   April	   1999.	   In	   February	   1998,	   in	   the	   most	   unlikely	   turn	   of	   events,	   PKK	   leader	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Abdullah	   Öcalan	   was	   captured	   in	   Kenya’s	   Greek	   Consulate	   by	   a	   team	   of	   Special	   Forces,	  
allegedly	  with	  the	  assistance	  of	  Israeli	  and	  US	  intelligence	  services	  (Robins	  2003).	  As	  expected,	  
this	  boosted	   the	  electoral	   fortunes	  of	   Ecevit’s	  DLP	  as	  well	   as	   those	  of	   the	  Nationalist	  Action	  
Party	   (NAP),	  which	  came	  respectively	   first	  and	  second	   in	   the	  general	  elections.	  Although	   the	  
VP	   lost	   electoral	   support	   to	   parties	   across	   the	   spectrum,	   it	   still	   maintained	   a	   core	   of	   16%	  
electoral	  support,	  securing	  several	  metropolitan	  mayoralties	   including	   İstanbul	  and	  Ankara	   in	  
the	  local	  elections	  held	  simultaneously.	  
The	   new	   DLP-­‐NAP-­‐MP	   coalition	   government	   had	   two	   priorities	   at	   the	   time:	   reversing	   the	  
economic	  fortunes	  of	  the	  country,	  and	  getting	  closer	  to	  the	  EU	  by	  acquiring	  the	  official	  status	  
of	   a	   candidate	   country.	   Chief	   of	   General	   Staff	   Hüseyin	   Kıvrıkoğlu,	   however,	   had	   a	   different	  
agenda,	  and	  warned	  PM	  Ecevit	   that	  the	  28	  February	  policies	  would	  have	  to	  be	   implemented	  
for	   another	   1000	   years	   if	   necessary.	   With	   these	   three	   agendas	   at	   hand,	   the	   government	  
groped	   its	   way	   back	   and	   forth	   between	   authoritarianism	   and	   democracy.	  Making	   economic	  
revival	  a	  priority,	  the	  government	  had	  agreed	  with	  the	  IMF	  on	  a	  disinflation	  programme	  based	  
on	   decreasing	   the	   budget	   deficit,	   controlling	   inflation	   around	   25%,	   and	   continuing	  
privatisations	  as	  well	  as	  fighting	  widespread	  corruption.	  The	  programme	  failed,	  however.	  The	  
fragility	  of	  the	  Turkish	  financial	  system,	  caused	  primarily	  by	  the	  deregulated	  financial	  market	  
with	  speculative	  flows	  of	  capital	  controlling	  asset	  markets	  was	  even	  contributed	  to	  by	  the	  IMF-­‐
led	   disinflation	   programme	   (Cizre	   and	   Yeldan	   2005).	   The	   first	   wave	   of	   the	   crisis	   came	   in	  
November	  2000	  in	  the	  form	  of	  capital	  flight.	   In	  response,	  the	  IMF	  released	  USD	  7.5	  billion	  as	  
part	   of	   a	   stabilisation	   package.	   The	   second	   wave	   came	   in	   February	   2001	   following	   a	   spat	  
between	  the	  President	  and	  the	  PM.	  Based	  on	  the	  assumption	  of	  a	  stable	  political	  environment,	  
the	  IMF	  programme	  collapsed	  as	  news	  of	  political	  crisis	  spread.	  Unable	  to	  prevent	  the	  ensuing	  
capital	  flight	  through	  Central	  Bank	  foreign	  exchange	  sales,	  the	  government	  initiated	  a	  floating	  
exchange	   rate	   regime	  which	   resulted	   in	   a	  doubling	  of	   the	   value	  of	   the	  US	  dollar	   against	   the	  
Turkish	  lira.	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  year	  saw	  a	  volatile	  economy,	  with	  World	  Bank	  official	  Kemal	  Derviş	  
joining	   the	   government	   as	   Minister	   of	   State	   for	   Economic	   Affairs	   and	   overseeing	   the	  
implementation	   of	   a	   new	   IMF	   programme.	   The	   November	   2002	   early	   general	   elections	  
followed	  from	  this	  general	  crisis	  of	  government.	  
No	   party	   from	   the	   preceding	   legislative	   period	   made	   it	   into	   the	   new	   one.	   The	   unpopular	  
austerity	  programme	  took	  its	  toll	  on	  members	  of	  the	  coalition	  government.	  The	  JDP	  garnered	  
support	   from	   the	   former	  electoral	  base	  of	   the	  WP,	  as	  well	   as	   from	  disillusioned	  centre-­‐right	  
voters.	   It	   mobilised	   the	   urban	   poor	   and	   small	   landholders	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   now-­‐
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disenfranchised	  Anatolian	  capitalists.	  The	  rise	  of	  the	  JDP	  and	  its	  leader	  Erdoğan	  was	  no	  secret,	  
and	  indeed	  disturbed	  the	  establishment.	  	  
5.	  ‘A	  Fine	  Balance’:	  Foreign	  Policy	  in	  the	  Shadow	  of	  the	  Military	  
From	  28	  February	  1997	   to	   the	  2002	  general	  elections,	   the	  military	  made	   its	  presence	   felt	  all	  
over	   the	   country.	   The	   clandestine	   West	   Working	   Group	   (Batı	   Çalışma	   Grubu	   –	   WWG)	  
established	   by	   the	   top	   brass	   to	   supervise	   the	   so-­‐called	   struggle	   against	   reactionary	  
movements,	   illegally	   indexed	   personal	   information	   on	  millions	   of	   individuals	   in	   cooperation	  
with	  the	  intelligence	  services.	  Every	  major	  news	  outlet	  and	  large	  corporation	  had	  one	  retired	  
or	  active	  high-­‐ranking	  officer	  on	  their	  executive	  boards	  and	  the	  mainstream	  media,	  as	  they	  had	  
done	  throughout	  the	  1990s,	  tried	  hard	  to	  discredit	  Kurds,	  Islamists,	  and	  socialists.	  The	  military	  
and	   the	  WWG	  were	   aware	   of	   the	   fractures	   among	   the	   ranks	   of	   the	   VP,	   and	   tried	   to	  widen	  
these	  by	  supporting	  Erdoğan	  and	  the	  reformists	  against	  Erbakan	  and	  the	  traditionalists.	  Their	  
calculation	   was	   that	   Erdoğan	   could	   split	   the	   party	   (Bulaç	   2010).	   As	   the	   elections	   neared,	  
however,	   opinion	   polls	   showed	   increasing	   support	   for	   Erdoğan’s	   JDP,	   and	   with	   a	   few	  
percentage	   points	   increase	   every	   month	   leading	   up	   to	   the	   elections,	   the	   media	   started	   a	  
campaign	  to	  discredit	  him	  and	  others	   in	  the	  JDP.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeals’	  Chief	  Public	  
Prosecutor	  filed	  a	  suit	  against	  the	  JDP	  just	  before	  the	  elections	  demanding	  its	  closure.	  	  
All	  these	  machinations	  against	  Erdoğan	  and	  his	  party	  backfired,	  and	  he	  won	  a	  sweeping	  victory	  
in	   the	   general	   elections.	   This,	   however,	   would	   not	   deter	   the	   military-­‐bureaucratic	  
establishment.	   The	   JDP	   sought	   to	   accommodate	   them	   by	   limiting	   its	   activities	   to	   economic	  
recovery,	  harmonisation	  with	  the	  EU	  acquis	  communautaire	  as	  well	  as	  distancing	  itself	  from	  its	  
past.	  Sympathetic	  analyst	  Bulaç	  (2010,	  p.101)	  noted	  that	  the	  JDP	  cadres	  followed	  a	  carefully-­‐	  
crafted	  strategy	  of	  accommodating	  not	  only	  the	  generals,	  but	  also	  big	  capitalists,	  mainstream	  
media,	  the	  US	  government,	  and	  the	  EU.	  The	  JDP	  also	  conveyed	  the	  message	  to	  the	  US	  that	  it	  
was	  willing	  to	  play	  the	  role	  of	  a	  moderate	  Islamic	  force	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  as	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  US	  
plan	  to	  incorporate	  the	  Middle	  East	  into	  the	  US-­‐led	  capitalist	  order.	  Simply	  put,	  the	  first	  step	  of	  
the	   JDP’s	   strategy	   of	   reproduction	   was	   based	   on	   political	   survival	   as	   part	   of	   a	   longer-­‐term	  
strategy	  of	  gradually	  establishing	  itself	  as	  the	  sole	  source	  of	   institutional	  power	  in	  Turkey,	  by	  
slowly	   confining	   the	   military	   into	   its	   barracks,	   disciplining	   secularist	   capitalist	   forces,	   and	  
presenting	  itself	  as	  a	  democratising	  force	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  its	  neighbourhood	  through	  its	  
role	  as	  a	  conduit	  of	  American	  power.	  
It	   is	   in	   this	   context,	   then,	   that	  we	   return	   again	   to	   the	   time	   of	   the	   2003	   decision,	  when	   the	  
governing	   JDP	   found	   itself	   enmeshed	   in	   a	   crisis	   with	   the	   US.	   The	   Bush	   Administration	   was	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certain	  that	  it	  would	  enlist	  the	  support	  of	  the	  Turkish	  government.	  At	  any	  rate,	  the	  US	  baptised	  
the	   new	   JDP	   government	   as	   a	   forward-­‐looking,	   liberal,	   democratic	   Islamic	   force	   that	   could	  
contribute	  to	  stability	  in	  the	  region	  (Bulaç	  2010,	  pp.102-­‐105).	  Besides,	  the	  Bush	  Administration	  
was	   sure	   that	   the	   military	   would	   support	   and	   even	   push	   the	   government	   to	   accept	   US	  
demands.	  The	  US	  government	  engaged	  in	  a	  full-­‐court	  press	  on	  Turkey	  as	  Abdullah	  Gül	  formed	  
the	  new	  government	  in	  mid-­‐November.	  In	  return,	  the	  US	  guaranteed	  the	  territorial	  integrity	  of	  
Iraq,	  a	  say	  over	  Mosul	  and	  Kirkuk,	  and	  compensation	  for	  Turkey’s	  possible	  economic	  losses,	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  authority	  to	  keep	  a	  60	  thousand-­‐strong	  Turkish	  force	  in	  Northern	  Iraq	  to	  secure	  its	  
borders	  against	  any	  PKK	  or	  Iraqi	  incursion.	  Although	  Erdoğan	  had	  no	  official	  role	  due	  to	  his	  ban	  
from	   political	   activity,	   he	   held	   comprehensive	   talks	   with	   the	   authorities	   in	   the	   US,	   as	   the	  
American	   government	   realised	   that	   they	   had	   to	   convince	   him.	   Both	   Erdoğan	   and	   Gül	   were	  
trying	   to	  buy	   time,	   although	   the	  Bush	  Administration	  was	   losing	  patience.	   The	  General	   Staff	  
refrained	   from	   recommending	   any	   concrete	   steps;	   the	   way	   it	   presented	   options,	   however,	  
implicitly	   recommended	   that	   Turkey	   should	   support	   the	   war	   effort,	   not	   least	   because	   non-­‐
compliance	  would	  risk	  Turkish-­‐American	  relations	  (Yetkin	  2004,	  pp.115-­‐17).16	  
The	  government	  was	  under	  immense	  pressure	  from	  many	  sides:	  across	  the	  political	  spectrum,	  
from	   socialist	   left	   to	   far-­‐right,	   public	   opinion	   was	   very	   strongly	   against	   the	   war,	   albeit	   for	  
different	  reasons.	  Many	  JDP	  MPs	  with	  origins	  in	  the	  Islamist	  tradition	  had	  strong	  reservations	  
about	  taking	  action	  against	  a	  neighbouring	  Muslim-­‐majority	  country.	  The	  NSC	  explained	  to	  the	  
government	   that	  Turkey	  could	  not	   stay	  out	  of	   it,	   the	  President	  warned	   that	  without	   a	  UNSC	  
resolution,	   the	   war	   would	   be	   illegitimate,	   and	   the	   US	   government	   continuously	   urged	   the	  
government	   to	   secure	   parliamentary	   approval.	   The	   party	   leadership	   was	   not	   enthusiastic	  
about	  joining	  the	  coalition	  forces	  either.	  The	  JDP	  government	  had	  tried	  hard	  to	  enlist	  EU	  and	  
US	   support	   in	   demonstrating	   its	   Western-­‐looking	   democratic	   credentials	   and	   continued	  
recognition	  as	  a	  democratic	   force.	  Furthermore,	   they	  knew	  very	  well	   that	   the	  military	  would	  
normally	  be	  supportive	  of	   the	  US.	  At	   the	  time,	   the	  JDP	  depended	  on	   its	  strong	  electoral	  and	  
American	  support	  to	  politically	  survive.	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  reluctantly	  agreed	  to	  take	  the	  motion	  to	  
the	  Parliament.	  As	   the	  military	   knew	   that	   the	  war	  would	  have	  deleterious	   consequences	   for	  
Turkey	  whether	  it	  supported	  the	  coalition	  powers	  or	  not,	   it	  wanted	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  all	  the	  
heat	   was	   taken	   by	   the	   government.	   Prime	   Minister	   Gül	   was	   at	   pains	   to	   secure	   the	   public	  
approval	  of	  the	  President,	  the	  NSC,	  or	  the	  opposition,	  or	  at	  least	  one	  of	  them.	  At	  stake	  was	  the	  
survival	  of	   the	   JDP	  and	   it	   could	  not	  afford	   to	  alienate	  either	   the	  US	  government	  or	   the	  NSC.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Later	  on,	  the	  General	  Staff	  would	  tell	  the	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Committee	  that	  Turkey’s	  interests	  
required	  an	  urgent	  decision	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  coalition	  (Yetkin	  2004,	  pp.118-­‐19).	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None	  of	   the	   important	   actors	   supported	   the	  motion	  publicly.	   The	   JDP	   leadership	  waited	   for	  
two	  more	  NSC	  meetings	   in	   the	  hope	  of	   securing	  positive	   recommendation	   from	  the	  Council,	  
but	  to	  no	  avail.	  The	  self-­‐designated	  ‘guardians’	  of	  the	  state	  chose	  to	  leave	  the	  decision	  to	  the	  
elected	   government,	   maybe	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   the	   Republic’s	   history,	   when	   an	   essential	  
national	  security	  matter	  was	  under	  discussion.	  	  
Four	  historically	  specific	  and	  interrelated	  developments	  made	  this	  possible.	  First,	  the	  military	  
had	   successfully	   deposed	   the	   Erbakan-­‐Çiller	   government	   in	   1997	   in	   a	   bloodless	   coup,	   and	  
having	  created	   the	  conditions	  of	   leading	   from	  behind	   the	   scenes,	   it	   tried	   to	   limit	   its	  political	  
activities	  to	  making	  recommendations	  through	  the	  NSC.	  Secondly,	   in	  entrenching	   its	  position	  
throughout	   the	   1990s,	   the	   military	   established	   itself	   as	   one	   of	   the	   largest	   capitalist	  
corporations	   in	  the	  country	  with	   its	  OYAK	  (Ordu	  Yardımlaşma	  Kurumu,	  Armed	  Forces	  Mutual	  
Assistance	   Society,	   originally	   a	   pension	   fund)	   controlling	   majority	   shares	   in	   a	   series	   of	  
companies	   including	   in	   automotive,	   banking,	   insurance	   and	   other	   important	   sectors	   of	   the	  
economy,	   binding	   its	   fortunes	   to	   the	   general	   political	   stability	   of	   the	   country.17	  Thirdly,	   the	  
international	  isolation	  of	  the	  country	  throughout	  the	  1990s,	  and	  Turkey’s	  attempts	  to	  break	  it	  
by	   gradually	   harmonising	   its	   political	   and	   legal	   regimes	   to	   those	   of	   the	   EU,	   side-­‐lined	   the	  
military	  in	  decision-­‐making	  processes,	  rendering	  any	  direct	  political	  intervention	  of	  the	  military	  
unlikely.	   Fourthly,	   then	  Chief	  of	  General	   Staff	  Hilmi	  Özkök,	   adopted	   in	   general	   a	   conciliatory	  
tone,	  attracting	  fury	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  high-­‐ranking	  officers	  within	  the	  military	  cadres.18	  The	  
cumulative	  effect	  of	   these	  developments,	  combined	  with	   the	  desire	  of	   the	  generals	   to	  make	  
the	   government	   take	   the	  heat	   for	   any	  decision,	   prevented	   the	  military	   from	   taking	   a	   strong	  
position	  on	  the	  motion.	  
Desperately	   evading	   decisive	   action,	   the	   government	   sought	   to	   convince	   Saddam	   to	  
cooperate.	   The	   JDP	   leadership	   was	   not	   even	   able	   to	   convince	   their	   MPs,	   let	   alone	   their	  
constituency.	   The	   party’s	   membership	   consisted	   of	   a	   broad-­‐based	   coalition	   of	   ‘reformists’	  
from	  the	  National	  Outlook	  Movement,	  nationalists,	  conservatives,	   some	   left-­‐wing	  and	   liberal	  
opinion	  leaders,	  and	  politicians.	  Conservative	  and	  National	  Outlook	  elements	  in	  the	  party	  were	  
uncomfortable	  with	   the	   idea	  of	   supporting	  a	  US	   invasion	  of	   a	  neighbouring	  Muslim	  country.	  
Nationalists	  were	  accommodating,	  provided	  that	  Turkey’s	  demands	  in	  return	  for	  support	  were	  
met;	  in	  this	  sense	  their	  position	  matched	  that	  of	  the	  military.	  PM	  Gül	  was	  vocal	  about	  the	  fact	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  For	  further	  information	  on	  OYAK	  see	  Akça	  (2010).	  
18	  Claims	  abound	  as	  to	  whether	  Gen.	  Özkök	  did	  what	  he	  did	  because	  he	  was	  a	  principled	  democrat,	  a	  
latent	  Islamist,	  or	  a	  pragmatist.	  All	  three	  positions	  have	  strong	  evidential	  bases,	  although	  it	  is	  more	  likely	  




that	  he	  would	  not	  easily	  be	  able	  to	  convince	  JDP	  MPs	  to	  support	  the	  motion.	   In	  the	   last	   few	  
days	  before	  voting	  on	  the	  motion,	  text	  messages	  from	  ordinary	  people	  flooded	  the	  cell	  phones	  
of	  JDP	  MPs	  urging	  them	  to	  say	  no.	  The	  RPP	  members	  urged	  JDP	  MPs	  ‘to	  fear	  God,	  not	  the	  US’,	  
in	  explicit	  reference	  to	  JDP’s	   Islamic	  credentials.	  Thousands	  on	  the	  streets	  marched	  against	  a	  
war	   in	   Iraq.	   One	   could	   speculate	   with	   much	   sense	   that	   had	   the	   JDP	   been	   in	   opposition,	   it	  
would	   have	   rejected	   the	  motion	   as	   strongly	   as	   the	   RPP	  MPs	   did.	   The	   reluctance	   of	   the	   JDP	  
leadership	  was	  so	  obvious	  that	  no	  binding	  parliamentary	  group	  decision	  was	  taken	  forcing	  the	  
MPs	   to	  vote	  yes.	   If	   group	  decision	  had	  been	   taken,	   the	  motion	  would	  probably	  have	  passed	  
considering	  that	  no	  other	  important	  motion	  to	  be	  brought	  by	  the	  Cabinet	  to	  the	  parliament	  in	  
the	  13	  years	  of	  JDP	  governments	  would	  fail.	  That	  the	  motion	  did	  not	  pass	  was	  not	  a	  failure,	  but	  
a	   relief	   for	   the	   JDP	   leadership.	   Although	   Turkey	   attracted	   much	   reprimand	   from	   the	   US,	   it	  
could	  refer	  to	  the	  democratic	  nature	  of	  government	  in	  Turkey	  and	  firmly	  place	  Turkey	  in	  ‘Old	  
Europe’.	   In	   any	   case,	   the	   newly-­‐established	   coalition	   government	   in	   Germany	   had	   recently	  
brought	  the	  Social	  Democrats	  and	  Greens	  to	  power.	  The	  SDP	  leader,	  Gerhard	  Schroeder,	  and	  
the	   Foreign	   Minister,	   Joschka	   Fischer,	   of	   the	   Greens	   were	   willing	   to	   see	   Turkey	   in	   the	   EU.	  
Similarly,	   Jacques	   Chirac	   of	   the	   Socialist	   Party	   in	   France	   was	   cautiously	   supportive	   of	   the	  
Turkish	  bid.	  That	  both	  countries	  were	  also	  ardent	  critics	  of	  the	  US	  policy	  toward	  Iraq,	  helped	  
Turkey	  break	  its	  isolation,	  while	  simultaneously	  contributing	  to	  the	  indecisiveness	  of	  the	  JDP.	  
6.	  Conclusion	  
As	   the	   second	   leg	   of	   a	   three-­‐chapter	   illustration	   of	   the	   theoretical	   framework	   presented	   in	  
Chapter	  2,	  this	  chapter	  problematized	  Turkey’s	  decision	  to	  deny	  passage	  and	  basing	  rights	  to	  
the	  United	  States	  in	  its	  planned	  war	  on	  Iraq	  in	  2003.	  The	  chapter	  started	  with	  a	  review	  of	  the	  
limited	   literature	  on	  the	  so-­‐called	   ‘1	  March	  permit’	   in	  Turkish	  parlance,	  and	  showed	  that	  the	  
existing	   literature	   depended	   on	   faulty	   abstractions	   and	   frozen	   taxonomies	   to	   account	   for	  
failure	   of	   the	   motion.	   Real	   agents	   were	   put	   into	   containers	   of	   roles,	   real	   institutions	   into	  
abstract	   concepts,	   and	   temporal	   configurations	   into	   frozen	  abstractions.	  To	  make	  up	   for	   the	  
deficiencies	  of	  the	  existing	  literature,	  in	  Section	  3	  I	  located	  the	  real	  abstractions	  from	  the	  point	  
of	  view	  of	  the	  main	  agents	   involved:	  the	  JDP	  and	  the	  military.	  The	   institutional	  configuration	  
(that	   is,	   the	   real	   abstractions)	   that	   these	   agents	   found	   themselves	   in	  were	   historicised,	   and	  
their	  formation	  and	  emergence	  were	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  Ottoman	  times	  in	  subsections	  4.1	  and	  
4.2.	  Section	  4	  as	  a	  whole	  showed	  the	  formation,	  rise,	  consolidation,	  and	  further	  entrenchment	  
of	   the	   military-­‐bureaucratic	   rule	   in	   Turkey	   through	   various	   institutionalised	   patterns	   of	  
relations.	   Furthermore,	   it	   showed	   that	   the	   social	   reproductive	   strategy	   of	   the	   military-­‐
bureaucratic	   establishment	   consisted	   of	   integrating	   Turkey	   into	   the	   American-­‐led	   capitalist	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order	   throughout	   the	   Cold	  War	   years	   and	   of	   repressing	   any	   challengers	   to	   its	   rule	   using	   a	  
variety	   of	   means	   including	   instigating	   chaos,	   assassinations,	   cooperating	   with	   criminal	  
networks,	  placing	   its	  operatives	   into	   key	  media,	   finance,	   and	   industrial	   corporations,	   staging	  
coups	  as	  against	  elected	  governments	  and	  so	  on.	  Finally,	  the	  preceding	  section	  discussed	  the	  
conundrum	  the	  JDP	  leadership	  tried	  to	  evade.	  The	  central	  argument	  of	  the	  chapter	  was	  that,	  
reluctant	   to	   go	   through	   with	   the	   motion,	   the	   JDP	   found	   a	   direct	   rejection	   of	   US	   demands	  
unfeasible,	   for	   hanging	   in	   the	   balance	  was	   its	   political	   survival.	   As	   the	  military-­‐bureaucratic	  
establishment	  had	  entrenched	   itself	   throughout	   the	  1980s	   and	   the	  1990s,	   the	   JDP’s	   survival	  
depended	  on	  its	  ability	  to	  accommodate	  the	  military	  and	  secure	  the	  support	  of	  the	  US.	  On	  the	  
other	  hand,	   the	   JDP’s	   electoral	   success	  owed	  much	   to	   the	  disillusionment	  of	   the	  population	  
with	  the	  preceding	  coalition	  government’s	  economic	  performance,	  and	  a	  rejection	  could	  mean	  
losing	  billions	  of	  dollars	  promised	  by	  the	  US	  government.	  Squeezed	  by	  the	  US	  government	  and	  
the	  Turkish	  populace,	  the	  JDP	  government	  failed	  to	  secure	  public	  approval	  from	  the	  generals,	  
parliamentary	  opposition	  or	  the	  President,	  and	  proceeded	  to	  take	  the	  motion	  to	  vote	  without	  
strong	  parliamentary	  support.	  In	  a	  word,	  it	  brought	  the	  motion	  to	  the	  parliament	  reluctantly.	  
The	  result	  was	  a	  relief	  for	  the	  JDP	  government,	  rather	  than	  defeat.	  
Building	   on	   the	   theoretical	   framework	   presented	   in	   Chapter	   2,	   this	   chapter	   followed	   the	  
footsteps	  of	   the	  primary	   agents	   involved	   in	   this	   episode	  of	   Turkish	   foreign	  policy-­‐making.	   In	  
order	   not	   to	   reproduce	   the	   fallacious	   abstraction	   that	   takes	   the	   military-­‐bureaucratic	  
establishment	   as	   a	   given,	   unchanging	   and	   natural	   reality	   of	   the	   Turkish	   state,	   it	   historically	  
analysed	  the	  contradictory	  social	  reproductive	  strategies	  of	  agents	  in	  late	  Ottoman	  times	  that	  
bestowed	   a	   prominent	   role	   on	   the	   establishment	   in	   Turkey	   now	   in	   alliance	   with	   a	  
strengthening	   industrial	   capitalist	   class.	   Although	   the	   alliance	   between	   the	   military-­‐
bureaucratic	   establishment	   and	   the	   big	   industrial	   capitalists	   was	   contested	   many	   times	  
throughout	  the	  Republican	  Era	  by	  different	  forces,	  the	  strongest	  challenge	  came	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
socialist	   labour	  movements	   in	   the	   1970s,	   before	   the	   1980	  military	   coup.	   The	   coup	   not	   only	  
restored	   the	   role	   of	   the	   establishment,	   but	   also	   helped	   the	   industrial	   capitalists	   to	   restore	  
profits.	  The	  next	  significant	  challenge	  came	  from	  the	  Islamists,	  whose	  ascendance	  was	  in	  part	  
an	   inadvertent	   consequence	   of	   the	   generals’	   wish	   to	   counterbalance	   socialist	   tendencies	   in	  
society.	  Rising	   throughout	   the	  1980s,	   the	   small	   capitalists	  of	  Anatolia	   supported	   the	   Islamist	  
Welfare	  Party	  en	  masse	  and	  the	  WP	  became	  the	  larger	  partner	  of	  a	  coalition	  government.	  This	  
challenge	  was	   thwarted	  by	   the	  military	   in	  a	   ‘postmodern	  coup’.	   In	  a	  word,	  by	   late	  2002,	   the	  
Turkish	  state	  did	  not	  exist	  as	  a	  consolidated	  and	  relatively	  well-­‐established	  social	  institution,	  or	  
to	   put	   it	   in	   the	   conceptual	   language	   of	   this	   thesis,	   although	   the	   Turkish	   state	   was	   a	   real	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abstraction,	   its	  status	  as	  a	   real	  abstraction	  was	  time	  and	  again	  challenged	  by	  different	  social	  
forces	   in	  a	  way	   that	  does	  not	  apply	   to	   the	  American	  state;	  only	   through	   the	  use	  of	  coercion	  
had	  the	  military	  imposed	  itself	  as	  a	  real	  abstraction	  upon	  society.	  The	  latest	  challenge	  by	  the	  
reformed	  Islamists	  had	  not	  yet	  been	  met	  by	  the	  military	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  decision,	  creating	  a	  
fine	  balance.	  This	  fragile	  balance	  between	  the	  JDP	  and	  the	  military-­‐bureaucratic	  establishment	  
marked	   the	   institutional	   configuration	   that	  was	   in	  place.	  This	   is	  why,	  unlike	   in	   the	  preceding	  
chapter	  where	  the	  American	  state	  was	  taken	  to	  be	  the	  main	  agent	  of	  foreign	  policy,	   I	  picked	  
the	   military	   and	   the	   JDP	   as	   the	   primary	   agents,	   and	   not	   the	   Turkish	   state	   as	   a	   social-­‐
institutional	  complex.	  This	  also	  called	  for	  what	  mainstream	  IR	  and	  FPA	  studies	  call	  a	  sub-­‐unit	  
level	  analysis,	  as	  the	  foreign	  policy	  decision	  in	  question	  was	  the	  unintended	  consequence	  of	  a	  
specific	  balance	  of	  forces	  among	  actors	  vying	  for	  control	  of	  the	  state.	  That	  the	  JDP	  leadership	  
sought	  to	  prove	  its	  democratic	  and	  Western	  credentials	  to	  the	  US	  in	  order	  to	  politically	  survive	  
in	  Turkey	  and	   that	   the	   foreign	  policy	  decision	   in	  question	   took	  shape	  as	  a	   result	  of	  different	  
social	   actors’	   contradictory	   strategies	   of	   reproduction	   showed	   explicitly	   that	   in	   reproducing	  
themselves,	  actors	  bridged	  what	  we	  analytically	  divide	  as	  domestic	  and	  international.	  Both	  the	  
configuration	   of	   the	   Turkish	   state	   as	   a	   real	   abstraction	   and	   other	   conjunctural	   abstractions	  
surrounding	   the	   decision,	   as	   the	   long-­‐term	   results	   of	   the	   contradictory	   and	   diachronically	  
related	  praxes	  of	  differently	  situated	  and	  motivated	  agents,	  provided	  the	  context	  of	  action	  for	  
the	  JDP	  leadership.	  However,	  just	  as	  every	  other	  agent	  who	  contributed	  to	  the	  inter-­‐subjective	  
making	  of	   this	  conjuncture,	   its	  actions	  did	  not	  directly	  emanate	   from	  the	  context;	   rather	  the	  
indecision	   was	   an	   active	   subjective	   intervention	   to	   what	   appeared	   as	   an	   overwhelming	  
externality.	  
This	   is	  not	  yet	   the	  end	  of	   the	  story,	  however.	  This	   represents	  only	   the	  vantage	  points	  of	   the	  
relevant	  actors	   in	  Turkey.	  Along	  with	  the	  preceding	  chapter,	   it	   still	  does	  not	  show	  how	  what	  
we	  call	   foreign	  policy	  and	   international	   relations	  are	  bridged	   in	  praxis.	   It	   is	   yet	  another	  one-­‐
sided	  representation	  of	  reality.	  The	  picture	  will	  reveal	  itself	  more	  fully,	  when	  the	  next	  chapter	  




5.	  SADDAM’S	  IRAQ:	  FOREIGN	  POLICY	  OF	  AN	  INSECURE	  
DICTATORSHIP	  
5.1.	  Introduction	  
In	  this	  third	  part	  of	  the	  three-­‐chapter	  illustration,	  I	  problematize	  Iraq’s	  failure	  to	  fully	  comply	  
with	   the	   demands	   of	   the	   international	   community	   led	   by	   the	   US	   to	   disarm	   and	   allow	  
international	   inspectors	   to	   monitor	   and	   help	   carry	   out	   the	   disarmament	   process.	   In	   other	  
words,	   this	   chapter	   seeks	   to	  understand	  why	   the	   International	  Atomic	  Energy	  Agency	   (IAEA)	  
and	   the	   United	   Nations	   Monitoring,	   Verification	   and	   Inspection	   Commission	   (UNMOVIC)	  
inspections	  turned	  into	  a	  ‘cat	  and	  mouse	  game’,	  as	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  press	  called	  it,	  and	  last	  
ditch	  efforts	  by	  regional	  leaders	  proved	  futile.	  The	  unwillingness	  to	  give	  heed	  to	  warnings	  from	  
the	   international	   community	   on	   Saddam	   Hussein’s	   part	   defied	   the	   logic	   of	   prudence	   and	  
caution.	   The	   heated	   rhetoric	   of	   Saddam	   and	   other	   regime	   figures	   against	   the	   ‘imperialist	  
designs’	   of	   the	   USA,	   and	   Iraq’s	   continued	   retaliations	   against	   the	   allied	   aircraft	   which	  
monitored	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘no-­‐fly	   zones’	   to	   the	   north	   and	   the	   south	   of	   the	   country,	   further	  
contributed	   to	   increasing	  hostilities	  between	   the	  US	  and	   Iraq.	  Moreover,	   there	  were	  gaps	   in	  
the	  12,000	  page	  declaration	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  submitted	  to	  UNMOVIC	  regarding	  the	  status	  
of	   its	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction	  (WMD)	  arsenal	  and	  programmes.	  For	  instance,	  UNMOVIC	  
and	   the	   IAEA	   found	   eleven	   chemical	   warheads	   which	   were	   not	   declared	   in	   the	   report	  
submitted	  by	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  (UNMOVIC	  2003).	  Finally,	  the	  Iraqi	  state	  rejected	  offers	  by	  
regional	  powers	  such	  as	  Egypt	  and	  Turkey	  to	  mediate,	  ignoring	  their	  warnings	  to	  back	  down.	  	  
Briefly,	   then,	   this	   chapter	   interrogates	   the	   reason	   why	   the	   Iraqi	   government	   did	   not	   fully	  
comply	  with	  the	  requirements	  of	  several	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  Resolutions	  (UNSCR)	  
including	  the	  last,	  UNSCR	  1441,	  which	  demanded	  that	  Iraq	  fully	  cooperate	  with	  the	  UNMOVIC	  
and	   IAEA	   inspectors	   in	   documenting	   the	   status	   of	   Iraq’s	   nuclear,	   chemical,	   and	   biological	  
warfare	   capability,	   at	   the	   expense	  of	   risking	   imminent	   invasion	  by	   the	  US	   and	   its	   allies.	   The	  
answer	   is	  that	  Saddam	  did	  not	  appreciate	  the	  US	  resolve	  to	  change	  the	  regime	  in	   Iraq,	  as	  he	  
was	  preoccupied	  with	  the	  perceived	  threat	  from	  within	  Iraq,	  which	  he	  thought	  would	  take	  the	  
form	   of	   a	   US-­‐backed	   coup.	   What	   requires	   explanation,	   however,	   is	   exactly	   this	   failure	   on	  
Saddam’s	   part	   to	   see	   what	   was	   coming.	   This,	   in	   turn,	   cannot	   be	   explained	   simply	   with	  
reference	   to	   the	   immediate	   context	   in	   which	   Saddam	   found	   himself	   in	   late	   2002	   and	   early	  
2003.	   Without	   accounting	   for	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   Iraqi	   state	   and	   the	   role	   of	   coups	   and	  
conspiratorial	   politics	   in	   its	   evolution	   it	   is	   only	   normal	   that	   Saddam’s	   behaviour	   is	   seen	   as	  
reflecting	  psychopathological	  tendencies.	  I	  argue	  that	  Saddam’s	  fear	  of	  internal	  machinations	  
	  	  
121	  
was	  not	  unfounded,	  particularly	  after	  his	  strategies	  of	  reproduction	  were	  undermined	  first	  by	  
the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  War,	  then	  by	  the	  Gulf	  War	  and	  sanctions,	  and	  finally	  by	  the	  several	  US	  attempts	  
to	  overthrow	  him,	   and	   its	   adoption	  of	   regime	   change	  as	   the	  official	  American	  policy	   toward	  
Iraq.	  Neither	  can	  the	  context	  generated	  by	  the	  real	  abstractions	  formed	  around	  the	  Iraqi	  state	  
complex	  and	  the	  way	  they	  work	  automatically	  produce	  an	  account	  of	  Saddam’s	  and	  his	  inner	  
circle’s	  miscalculation	  of	  the	  developments	  that	  led	  to	  the	  invasion.	  The	  historical	  narration	  of	  
the	   formation	   of	   the	   real	   abstractions	   that	   he	   and	   his	   aides	   found	   themselves	   in	   must	  
therefore	  be	  complemented	  with	  an	  account	  of	  how	  they	  experienced	   these	  externalities	  as	  
well	  as	  how	  they	  responded	  to	  them.	  	  
The	   argument	   is	   developed	   in	   four	   steps.	   The	   next	   section	   reviews	   the	   literature	   on	   Iraqi	  
foreign	  policy	  in	  general,	  and	  its	  response	  to	  pressure	  by	  the	  US	  in	  late	  2002	  and	  early	  2003	  in	  
particular.	  Section	  3	  presents	  a	  snapshot	  of	   the	  circumstances	   in	  which	  Saddam	  Hussein	  and	  
the	  Iraqi	  state	  found	  themselves	  in	  this	  period.	  Building	  on	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  literature,	  
Section	  4	  takes	  a	  longer	  historical	  route	  to	  locating	  the	  historical	  sources	  of	  Saddam’s	  fear	  of	  a	  
coup	   in	   the	   formation	   and	   evolution	   of	   the	   Iraqi	   state.	   Furthermore,	   it	   provides	   a	   historical	  
narration	  of	  the	  emergence	  and	  consolidation	  of	  Saddam’s	  rule	  as	  well	  as	  its	  gradual	  demise	  in	  
the	  1990s	  to	  prepare	  the	  ground	  for	  putting	  Saddam’s	  seemingly	  pathological	  behaviour	  in	  the	  
run-­‐up	  to	  the	  US	  invasion	  into	  its	  proper	  context,	  which	  is	  done	  in	  Section	  5.	  To	  make	  up	  for	  
any	   objectivising	   that	   a	   historical	   reconstruction	   of	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   context	   causes,	  
Section	   5	   makes	   use	   of	   a	   series	   of	   classified	   intelligence	   reports	   as	   well	   as	   transcripts	   of	  
captured	  recordings	  of	  Saddam’s	  meetings	  with	  his	  inner	  circle.	  
5.2.	  Saddam’s	  Ambiguity:	  Contending	  Explanations	  
If	   the	   academic	   literatures	   on	   the	  US	   decision	   to	   invade	   Iraq	   and	   Turkey’s	   decision	   to	   deny	  
passage	  and	  basing	  rights	  to	  invading	  US	  troops	  are	  limited,	  the	  literature	  on	  Iraq’s	  decision	  to	  
escalate	  the	  standoff	  with	  the	  United	  States	  in	  late	  2002	  and	  early	  2003	  is	  almost	  non-­‐existent.	  
Not	  only	  accounts	  of	  this	  specific	  foreign	  policy	  episode,	  but	  also	  Iraqi	  foreign	  policy	  in	  general	  
failed	   to	   capture	   much	   scholarly	   attention.	   Some	   exceptions	   include	   studies	   in	   intelligence	  
(Seliktar	  and	  Dutter	  2009;	  Katz	  2006),	  but	  they	  reduce	  Iraqi	  foreign	  policy	  under	  Saddam	  to	  the	  
rationality	  of	  an	  ‘autocrat’.	  Iraqi	  foreign	  policy	  is	  generally	  covered	  as	  part	  of	  studies	  either	  on	  
the	  foreign	  policies	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  states	  (Hinnebusch	  and	  Ehteshami	  2002;	   Ismael	  1986;	  
Telhami	  and	  Barnett	  2002;	  Halliday	  2005;	  Brown	  2004)	  or	  on	  the	  foreign	  policies	  of	  Arab	  states	  
(Korany	   and	   Dessouki	   1991;	   Mohamedou	   2003).	   There	   are	   several	   interrelated	   reasons	   for	  
this,	  all	  of	  which	  generated	  general	  tendencies	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  foreign	  policies	  of	  Middle	  
Eastern	  and	  Arab	  states:	  first	  of	  all,	  IR	  took	  shape	  in	  response	  to	  the	  needs	  first	  of	  the	  US	  and	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then	  of	  similarly	  organised	  polities,	  and	  FPA	  more	  so.1	  Secondly,	  states	  in	  the	  Arab	  world	  or	  the	  
Middle	  East	   in	  general	  are	  not	  considered	  actors	  capable	  of	  autonomous	  external	  behaviour	  
because	   of	   their	   subordinate	   position	   in	   the	   international	   system.	   Thirdly,	   even	  when	   these	  
states	  are	  not	  lumped	  together	  as	  Arab	  states	  or	  Middle	  Eastern	  states,	  their	  foreign	  policy	  is	  
analysed	   through	   a	   lumping	   together	   of	   their	   leaders	   as	   dictators	   and	   examination	   of	   their	  
individual	   (mostly	   psychological)	   characteristics.	   The	   three	   research	   tendencies	   mentioned	  
above	   were	   called	   by	   Mohamedou	   (2003)	   ‘the	   great	   powers	   approach’,	   ‘the	   reductionist	  
approach’,	  and	  ‘the	  psychologistic	  approach’,	  based	  on	  Korany	  and	  Dessouki’s	  (1991)	  seminal	  
work	  on	  The	  Foreign	  Policies	  of	  the	  Arab	  States.2	  	  
What	   Mohamedou	   (2003)	   calls	   ‘the	   great	   powers	   approach’	   represented	   an	   extension	   of	  
structural	  realism.	  To	  the	  structural	  realist	  mind,	  the	  foreign	  policies	  of	  Arab	  or	  Middle	  Eastern	  
states	  are	  nothing	  but	  a	   function	  of	   the	  struggles	  among	  great	  powers.	  Similar	   to	   this	   ‘great	  
powers	  approach’	   is	  dependency	  theory,	  which	  again	  downplays	  the	  ability	  of	  so-­‐called	  Third	  
World	  states	  to	  formulate	  their	  external	  relations	  (Marr	  2004,	  p.181).	  Mearsheimer	  (2003),	  for	  
example,	  maintained	  that	  Iraq’s	  foreign	  policy	  would	  reflect	  US	  foreign	  policy	  toward	  Iraq,	  and	  
that	   deterrence	   and	   containment	   would	   ensure	   Iraq’s	   wider	   compliance	   with	   international	  
norms,	   just	   as	   they	  would	   in	   the	   case	   of	   every	   other	   similarly-­‐positioned	   state	   according	   to	  
realism	  because	   it	   is	   the	  prudent	  course	  of	  action.	  Others	   influenced	  by	  realist	  epistemology	  
refer	  to	  Iraq’s	  policy	  of	  strategic	  ambiguity	  that	  would	  enable	  it	  to	  simultaneously	  comply	  with	  
the	   demands	   of	   the	   international	   community	   and	   deter	   others	   from	   taking	   military	   action	  
against	  it	  (e.g.	  Rubin	  2003).	  This	  remains	  problematic,	  however,	  as	  it	  takes	  external	  ‘systemic’	  
determination	   as	   the	   sole	   source	  of	   Iraqi	   foreign	  policy.	   Secondly,	  what	  Mohamedou	   (2003)	  
calls	   ‘the	   reductionist,	   or	  model-­‐building	   approach’	   examines	   the	   foreign	   policies	   of	  Middle	  
Eastern	   or	   Arab	   states	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   models	   originally	   devised	   to	   analyse	   the	  
foreign	   policies	   of	   economically	   and	   institutionally	   complex	   states.	   These	   ‘middle-­‐range	  
theories’	   fail	   to	   take	   into	   account	   the	   specificity	   of	   the	   former,	   each	   of	   which	   embodies	  
different	  sets	  of	  social	  relations,	  and	  reduce	  their	  foreign	  policies	  to	  one	  of	  its	  aspects,	  such	  as	  
public	  opinion	  or	  bureaucratic	  structure.	  Thirdly,	  individualistic	  approaches,	  again	  derived	  from	  
models	   based	   on	   North	   American	   and	   Western	   European	   states,	   focus	   on	   the	   leaders	   of	  
Middle	  Eastern	  or	  Arab	   states,	   and	   lump	   together	  all	   these	   leaders	  as	  dictators	  or	   autocrats	  
who	  generally	  suffer	  from	  delusions	  or	  suicidal	  tendencies.	  These	  approaches	  at	  best	  disregard	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See	  footnote	  3	  in	  Introduction.	  A	  very	  influential	  figure	  in	  the	  field	  of	  FPA,	  Graham	  Allison,	  admitted	  
that	  when	  he	  developed	  his	  FPA	  model,	  he	  did	  not	  have	  in	  mind	  non-­‐Western	  states	  at	  all	  (see	  Korany	  
and	  Dessouki	  2010,	  p.25).	  
2	  The	  following	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  follows	  a	  slightly	  modified	  version	  of	  this	  classification.	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the	   role	   played	   by	   actors	   other	   than	   leaders,	   and	   at	   worst	   attribute	   psychopathological	  
tendencies	  to	  these	  leaders,	  and	  brush	  away	  complexities	  of	  the	  relations	  that	  constitute	  their	  
rule	  as	  well	  as	  relations	  they	  have	  with	  what	  is	  external	  to	  them	  (e.g.	  Glad	  2002).	  
Accounts	   of	   Iraqi	   foreign	  policy,	   then,	   are	   provided	  within	   these	  parameters	   in	   general.	   The	  
complexity	   of	   the	   matter,	   however,	   is	   demonstrated	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   all	   these	   approaches	  
suffer	  from	  self-­‐imposed	  theoretical	  and	  conceptual	  limitations.	  They	  fail	  to	  account	  for	  this	  or	  
that	   aspect	   of	   Iraqi	   foreign	   policy-­‐making	   processes	   and	   to	   reflect	   a	   more	   comprehensive	  
picture	  of	  it	  (Marr	  2004,	  pp.181-­‐182).	  But	  more	  historically	  and	  locally	  sensitive	  accounts	  fare	  
no	  better.	  In	  treating	  ‘the	  state	  of	  Iraq	  as	  a	  unit	  of	  analysis	  and	  as	  an	  international	  actor’,	  Tripp	  
(2002),	   for	   instance,	  does	  not	   fall	   into	   the	   trap	  of	  a	   realist	  unitary	  view	  of	   the	  state;	  but	   the	  
problem	   with	   his	   account	   is	   less	   about	   his	   sensitivity	   toward	   the	   (primarily	   symbolically)	  
‘contested’	   nature	   of	   the	   Iraqi	   state,	   and	   more	   about	   his	   unquestioning	   use	   and	   eclectic	  
combination	  of	   the	  pre-­‐conceived	  conceptual	  apparati	  of	   the	   literature.	   In	   the	  end,	  what	  we	  
learn	  about	  Iraqi	  foreign	  policy	   is	  that	   it	  results	  from	  an	  interaction	  of	  the	  ideational	  and	  the	  
material,	   the	  domestic	  and	  the	   international,	  and	  the	  economic	  and	  the	  political,	  where	  one	  
aspect	   of	   each	   couplet	   may	   play	   a	   larger	   role	   than	   the	   other.	   Constructivist	   accounts	   (e.g.	  
Dawisha	  2002)	  cite	  contesting	  identities	  in	  Iraq	  as	  determining	  factors	  for	  Iraqi	  foreign	  policy-­‐
making.	   Iraq	   stays	   out	   of	   the	   purview	   of	   liberal	   peace	   theory,	   which	   automatically	   assigns	  
Hobbesian	  qualities	  to	  non-­‐liberal	  states.	  	  
Only	  a	  very	  limited	  number	  of	  sources	  strive	  to	  explain	  why	  Saddam	  behaved	  the	  way	  he	  did	  in	  
response	  to	  escalating	  tension	  with	  the	  US.	  One	  such	  example	  is	  Braut-­‐Hegghammer’s	  (2006)	  
article	   on	  WMD	  proliferation	   and	   Iraq’s	   response	   to	   external	   pressure	   for	   non-­‐proliferation.	  
Braut-­‐Hegghammer’s	   (2006)	   explanation	   is	   that	   Saddam	  Hussein	   pursued	   two	   contradictory	  
strategies	  simultaneously:	  while	  willing	  to	  convince	  the	  UN	  that	  the	  country	  did	  not	  have	  any	  
WMDs	   or	   WMD	   development	   programmes,	   the	   Iraqi	   state	   also	   wished	   to	   deter	   Iran	   by	  
manipulating	   it	   into	   believing	   that	   it	   had	   an	   active	   programme.	   Similarly,	  Woods,	   Lacey	   and	  
Murray	   (2006)	   advance	   the	   argument	   that	   Saddam	   did	   not	   believe	   that	   the	   US	  would	   dare	  
invade	   Iraq	   for	   fear	  of	   reaction	   from	  France	  and	  Russia.	   Even	   if	   it	  were	  certain	   that	  Saddam	  
believed	   so,	   this	   raises	   further	   questions	   as	   to	   the	   relations	   between	  him	   and	  others	   in	   the	  
government,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Baath	  Party,	  the	  configuration	  of	  relations	  that	  constitute	  the	  real	  
abstraction	   that	   we	   call	   the	   Iraqi	   state	   within	   a	   context	   of	   wider	   social	   relations,	   the	  
combination	  of	  which	  made	  this	  belief	  plausible.	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5.3.	  The	  World	  as	  it	  Appeared	  to	  Saddam	  Hussein	  and	  the	  Baath	  Party	  	  
After	  a	  decade	  of	  a	  devastating	  regime	  of	  sanctions,	  Iraq	  started	  to	  recover	  in	  the	  early	  2000s.	  
The	  oil-­‐for-­‐food	  programme	  administered	  by	  the	  UN	  was	  expanded	  over	  time	  to	  include	  other	  
sectors	   such	   as	   health,	   and	   Iraq’s	   economy	   saw	   signs	   of	   improvement	   in	   the	   late	   1990s.	   By	  
2000,	  Iraq’s	  oil	  exports	  reached	  USD	  30	  billion	  after	  the	  upper	  limit	  to	  exports	  were	  removed.	  
There	  were	  sufficient	  grounds	  to	  believe	  that	  Saddam’s	  hold	  on	  power	  and	  Baathi	  control	  of	  
the	   Iraqi	   state	   could	   continue.	   Notwithstanding	   these	   positive	   signs,	   Saddam’s	   rule	   faced	  
enormous	  challenges.	  	  
The	  US-­‐led	  sanctions	  regime	  not	  only	  broke	  the	  back	  of	   the	  Baathi	   regime	  economically,	  but	  
posed	   a	   significant	   threat	   to	   its	   survival	   following	   the	   Iraq	   Liberation	   Act	   of	   1998,	   which	  
publicly	  declared	  regime	  change	  as	  official	  US	  policy	  toward	  Iraq,	  and	  more	  particularly	  when	  
the	   Bush	   government	   held	   Saddam	   responsible	   for	   the	   9/11	   terrorist	   attacks.	   Increasing	  
pressure	  on	  the	  Iraqi	  state	  peaked	  when	  UNSC	  Resolution	  1441	  gave	  a	  final	  chance	  to	  Iraq	  to	  
disarm	  itself	  of	  WMDs	  in	  November	  2002.	  Iraq	  was	  asked	  to	  fully	  comply	  with	  the	  Resolution,	  
which	   involved	   full	   cooperation	  with	  UNMOVIC	   and	   IAEA	   inspectors.	   Furthermore,	   since	   the	  
1980s	  Iraq	  had	  exhausted	  all	  opportunities	  for	  good	  relations	  with	  its	  neighbours.	  The	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  
war	  of	  the	  1980s	  and	  the	  atrocities	  it	  committed	  during	  the	  war,	  the	  invasion	  of	  Kuwait,	  hostile	  
relations	  with	  Saudi	  Arabia	  as	  well	  as	  its	  failure	  to	  fully	  comply	  with	  the	  UNSC	  Resolution	  that	  
ended	   the	   Persian	   Gulf	   War	   in	   1991	   (UNSCR	   687)	   indicated	   that	   the	   noose	   was	   tightening	  
around	  Iraq.	  Meanwhile,	  Iran	  had	  restored	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  Kuwait	  
and	  all	  important	  regional	  powers	  stood	  against	  Iraq	  in	  the	  period.	  
Saddam	  thought	  he	  could	  still	  manage	  these	  challenges	  as	  he	  had	  done	  throughout	  the	  1990s.	  
The	   source	  of	   his	   primary	   fear	  was	   domestic.	   Kurds	   in	   the	  north	  had	   shown	   time	   and	   again	  
their	  aspiration	  to	  further	  autonomy	  or	  even	  wring	  independence	  from	  the	  central	  Iraqi	  state.	  
Although	  the	  Kurds	  were	  granted	  autonomy	  in	  the	  1970s,	  their	  fortunes	  depended	  mostly	  on	  
the	   calculus	   of	   power	   in	   Iraq’s	   relations	   with	   neighbouring	   countries	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
superpowers.	   The	   Shia	   had	   never	   enjoyed	   the	   influence	   that	   the	   Kurds	   enjoyed	   throughout	  
Saddam’s	  rule.	  They	  were	  always	  underrepresented	  in	  government	  and	  they	  had	  no	  external	  
support	  to	  lean	  on	  but	  for	  irregular	  support	  given	  by	  Iran	  to	  segments	  of	  their	  population.	  Both	  
minorities,	   however,	   were	   extremely	   discontented	  with	   Saddam’s	   rule,	   as	   demonstrated	   by	  
their	   repeated	   uprisings	   against	   him.	   What	   Saddam	   feared	   most,	   however,	   were	   the	  
machinations	   of	   the	   fractions	   of	   the	   ruling	   elite,	   including	   the	   military	   and	   intelligence	  
organisations,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  Baathi	   leadership.	   In	  any	  case,	   the	  Kurds	  did	  not	  raise	  claims	  to	  
central	   authority	   and	   they	   could	   be	   contained	   in	   the	   North,	   and	   the	   Shia	   were	   sufficiently	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neutralised	   to	   pose	   no	   real	   threat	   to	   Saddam’s	   rule.	   The	   rest	   of	   the	   population	   were	   too	  
oppressed	   to	   rise	   up	  without	   endangering	   their	   own	   and	   their	   families’	   lives,	   reflecting	   the	  
conditions	  that	  Kanan	  Makiya	  (1998)	  once	  described	  as	  The	  Republic	  of	  Fear.	  It	  is	  safe	  to	  argue	  
that	  Saddam’s	  fears	  were	  not	  unfounded;	  it	  is	  no	  secret	  that	  the	  United	  States	  tried	  to	  depose	  
Saddam	   Hussein	   through	   CIA	   operations	   recruiting	   or	   enticing	   Iraqi	   military	   or	   intelligence	  
officers	   (Allawi	   2007,	   p.63).	   Furthermore,	   throughout	   the	   short	   history	   of	   the	  modern	   Iraqi	  
state,	   changes	  of	   rule	  have	  always	   taken	   the	   form	  of	  military	  or	  palace	  coups.	   In	  a	  way,	   this	  
had	  become	  an	  institutionalised	  practice	  of	  power	  transition.	  
It	   is	   under	   these	   circumstances	   that	   Saddam	   Hussein	   faced	   growing	   pressure	   from	   the	  
international	  community	  led	  by	  the	  US	  following	  the	  adoption	  of	  UNSCR	  1441,	  and	  imminent	  
threat	  of	   invasion	  by	   the	  US	  and	   the	  UK.	  Resolution	  1441	  decided	   that	   Iraq	  was	   ‘in	  material	  
breach’	  of	  its	  obligations	  under	  Resolution	  687,	  which	  had	  ended	  the	  First	  Gulf	  War.	  Iraq	  was	  
given	   a	   ‘final	   opportunity’	   to	   fully	   account	   for	   its	   existing	   WMDs,	   WMD	   programmes,	  
disarmament	  activities	  and	  ballistic	  missiles	  with	  a	  range	  of	  more	  than	  50	  kilometres,	  and	  to	  
cooperate	   fully	   with	   the	   UNMOVIC	   and	   IAEA	   inspectors.3	  Saddam	   responded	   by	   complying	  
partially,	  as	  he	  felt	  confident	  that	  pressure	  and	  protests	  by	  the	  French,	  Germans	  and	  Russians	  
as	   well	   as	   some	   Arab	   states	   and	   the	   publics	   of	   the	   United	   States	   and	   the	   United	   Kingdom	  
would	  make	  it	  almost	  impossible	  for	  the	  US	  to	  launch	  a	  ground	  attack.	  Sanctions	  and	  US	  covert	  
operations	   against	   his	   regime	   in	   the	   1990s,	   such	   as	   the	   Shahwani-­‐INA-­‐CIA	   coup	   plot	   (Allawi	  
2007,	  p.63),	  had	  prompted	  Saddam	  to	  hold	  on	  to	  and	  consolidate	  his	  totalitarian	  rule.	  He	  had	  
reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  gravest	  threat	  to	  his	  rule	  would	  arise	  from	  within	  the	  officer	  corps.	  
This	  has	  roots	   in	   the	   formation	  and	  the	  historical	  evolution	  of	   the	   Iraqi	  state	  and	  the	  role	  of	  
different	   officer	   factions	   in	   it.	   Although	   the	   Baathi	   regime	   was	   established	   in	   1968,	   its	  
configuration	   had	  much	   to	   do	  with	   the	   preceding	   period	   of	   dictatorships	   that	   followed	   the	  
overthrow	   of	   the	  monarchy.4	  The	   role	   officers	   came	   to	   play	   in	   Iraqi	   politics,	   in	   turn,	   had	   its	  
social	  origins	  in	  the	  monarchical	  period,	  to	  which	  we	  will	  now	  turn.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Although	  this	  resolution	  sounded	  like	  a	  final	  warning,	  it	  did	  not	  automatically	  authorise	  the	  use	  of	  
force	  in	  case	  of	  noncompliance.	  The	  Bush	  administration	  argued	  that	  all	  UNSCRs	  concerning	  Iraq’s	  
WMDs	  were	  based	  on	  UNSCR	  678,	  which	  authorised	  the	  use	  of	  force.	  This	  was	  taken	  by	  many	  as	  a	  
stretch	  of	  reasoning.	  	  
4	  Batatu’s	  (1978)	  seminal	  work	  provides	  an	  excellent	  exposition	  of	  the	  social	  sources	  of	  the	  new	  Iraqi	  
state	  in	  its	  formative	  period.	  For	  an	  alternative	  account	  regarding	  the	  sources	  of	  dictatorship	  in	  the	  
militaristic	  nature	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  politiy	  during	  the	  inter-­‐war	  period,	  see	  Simon	  (2004).	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5.4.	  The	  Social-­‐Historical	  Sources	  of	  the	  Baathi	  Dictatorship	  	  
5.4.1.	  The	  Formation	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  State	  and	  the	  Emergence	  of	  the	  Baathi	  
Dictatorship	  
It	  is	  commonplace	  in	  historical	  studies	  on	  the	  Iraq	  to	  note	  that	  Iraq	  ‘did	  not	  exist’	  until	  it	  was	  
created	  by	  the	  British	  following	  the	  WW	  I	  (N.	  Smith	  2005,	  p.3;	  Marr	  2011,	  p.8).5	  This	  does	  not	  
mean	  that	  the	  complex	  of	  social	  relations	  that	  would	  later	  give	  form	  to	  the	  Iraqi	  state	  did	  not	  
exist	  as	  well,	  however.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  central	  state,	  different	  regions	  of	  Iraq	  were	  ruled	  by	  
different	   confederations	  of	   tribes,	   each	  with	  diverse	   sets	  of	   social	   relations	  of	   reproduction.	  
The	  shaikhs	  (chieftains)	  of	  these	  tribes	  had	  historically	  established	  a	  patrimonial	  rule	  over	  their	  
tribesmen,	   whereby	   they	   appropriated	   a	   portion	   of	   whatever	   their	   tribesmen	   produced	   in	  
return	  for	  security	  and	  stability.	  These	  tribal	  confederations	  were,	  first	  and	  foremost,	  military	  
confederations	  (Batatu	  1978,	  p.67).	  This	  centuries-­‐long	  social	  reproductive	  pattern	  started	  to	  
change	  in	  the	  19th	  century	  as	  a	  result	  of	  attempts	  by	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  to	  catch	  up	  with	  its	  
European	   rivals.	   As	   the	   Ottoman	   Empire	   grappled	   with	   military	   and	   economic	   competition	  
from	  the	  European	  great	  powers	   in	  the	  19th	  century,	   it	   found	  exercising	  central	  control	  over	  
its	  Middle	  Eastern	   territories	   increasingly	  difficult.	   The	   risk	  was	  not	  only	  of	   territorial	   losses,	  
but	  also	  of	  possible	  loss	  of	  revenues,	  since	  the	  Palace	  relied	  on	  tax-­‐farming	  through	  shaikhs	  in	  
its	  Mosul,	  Baghdad	  and	  Basra	  provinces.	  As	  part	  of	  centralisation	  efforts,	  walis	  (governors)	  and	  
qaimaqams	   (governors	   of	   smaller	   administrative	   units)	   of	   these	   provinces	   were	   directly	  
appointed	   by	   the	   central	   administration,	   but	   held	   in	   check	   through	   the	   shaikhs.	   When	   the	  
Palace	   realised	   that	   it	   was	   no	   longer	   capable	   of	   exercising	   direct	   military	   control	   over	   its	  
Mesopotamian	  provinces,	   it	   relied	  on	  a	  strategy	  of	  divide	  and	  rule,	  pitting	  shaikhs	  and	   tribal	  
confederations,	   and	   smaller	   groups	  of	   tribesmen	  and	   its	   own	  administrative	  officials	   against	  
one	   another.	   Through	   tapus	   (usufructuary	   rights	   over	   land),	   it	   turned	   segments	   of	   the	  
peasantry	  into	  small	  landholders.	  The	  gradual	  integration	  of	  the	  Empire	  into	  the	  world	  market	  
also	   made	   its	   presence	   felt	   in	   Iraq.	   Shaikhs	   competing	   against	   one	   another	   for	   land	   and	  
peasants	  lost	  their	  former	  status	  as	  overlord-­‐like	  rulers	  of	  self-­‐sufficient	  tribal	  communities..	  	  
The	  shaikhs’	  rule	  over	  social	  life,	  therefore,	  seemed	  to	  be	  coming	  to	  an	  end	  by	  the	  first	  years	  of	  
the	  twentieth	  century.	  However,	  they	  found	  new	  life	  when	  the	  British,	  lacking	  the	  resources	  to	  
directly	   appoint	   British	   administrative	   officials,	   reversed	   the	  Ottoman	   policy	   of	   undermining	  
them,	  and	  instead	  began	  to	  rely	  on	  them	  to	  rule	  Iraq	  as	  commercial	   landowners	  (Marr	  2011,	  
p.23).	  Following	  the	  suppression	  of	  the	  1920	  tribal	  revolts,	  the	  British	  established	  a	  checks	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




balances	  regime	  in	  Iraq,	  installing	  Faisal	  as	  king,	  while	  putting	  much	  weight	  behind	  the	  shaikhs	  
as	   a	   counterbalance.	   Urban	   nationalist	   elements	   (mostly	   Ottoman-­‐trained	   officers	   and	  
bureaucrats)	   on	   which	   the	   king	   depended,	   as	   they	   were	   the	   only	   educated	   military	   and	  
administrative	   human	   resource,	   constituted	   a	   third	   pole	   in	   the	   configuration	   of	   power	  
relations.	   Although	   installed	   by	   the	   British	   Faisal	   had	   his	   own	   agenda	   for	   unifying	   his	   rule	  
(Batatu	   1978,	   pp.89-­‐90). 6 	  Both	   the	   officers	   he	   depended	   on	   and	   Faisal	   himself	   tried	   to	  
introduce	   a	   system	   of	   conscription	   and	   land	   redistribution	   to	   weaken	   the	   shaikhs,	   but	   the	  
British	  were	  unrelenting.	   The	  British	  also	   limited	   the	  expansion	  of	   the	   Iraqi	   army,	   and	  Faisal	  
would	   lament	   that	   while	   there	  were	   a	   hundred	   thousand	   rifles	   at	   large	   in	   the	   country,	   the	  
state	   had	   only	   fifteen	   thousand	   (Batatu	   1978,	   p.90).	   Finally,	   the	   British	   severed	   the	   ties	  
between	  urban	  centres	  and	  rural	  areas	  controlled	  by	  the	  shaikhs.	  
Throughout	   the	  years	  of	  British	  mandate,	  King	  Faisal	  actively	   supported	   the	   rise	  of	   the	  army	  
against	  the	  British-­‐supported	  shaikhs.	  By	  the	  time	  Iraq	  was	  admitted	  to	  the	  League	  of	  Nations,	  
the	  army	  had	  risen	  to	  prominence	  and	  gained	  an	  autonomous	  political	   role	   in	   Iraq.	  Now	  the	  
king,	  shaikhs	  and	  other	  ‘old	  social	  classes’	  joined	  forces	  to	  curb	  the	  power	  of	  the	  officers,	  who	  
were	  allied	  with	   the	   leftist	   and	  nationalist	   intelligentsia	  and	   the	  urban	  masses	   (Batatu	  1978,	  
p.102).	  In	  1936,	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  army	  would	  result	  in	  the	  Arab	  World’s	  first	  military	  coup,	  led	  by	  
the	  authoritarian	  general	  Bakr	  Sidqi	  and	  supported	  by	  the	  leftist	  Ahali	  group,	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  
the	   traditional	   landowner-­‐shaikh	   dominated	   social	   configuration	   of	   the	   country	   would	   be	  
replaced	   by	   a	   more	   equitable	   social	   order.	   Instead	   of	   delivering	   on	   its	   promises,	   the	   coup	  
paved	  the	  way	  for	  a	  series	  of	  other	  coups	  in	  the	  next	  five	  years.	  As	  aptly	  observed	  by	  Batatu	  
(1978,	  p.118),	  starting	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1930s,	  the	  political	  power	  of	  the	  shaikhs	  decisively	  ended	  
and	  Baghdad	  became	  the	  centre	  of	  political	  life.	  	  
Decomposition	   of	   the	   Iraqi	  monarchy	   continued	   until	   British	   reoccupation	   in	   1941	   following	  
another	   coup.	  During	  WW	   II,	   nationalist	   officers	   seized	  power	  hoping	   that	   they	   could	   finally	  
get	   rid	   of	   the	   British.	   Without	   German	   support,	   the	   British	   reoccupied	   the	   country	   easily,	  
breathing	  new	  life	  into	  the	  monarchy.	  Five	  years	  of	  British	  occupation	  re-­‐established	  the	  ruling	  
coalition	  of	  the	  monarchy,	  large	  landowners,	  and	  pragmatist	  career	  politicians.	  Wide	  segments	  
of	  the	  Iraqi	  population,	  including	  many	  nationalist	  officers,	  held	  the	  British	  responsible	  for	  the	  
plight	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  nation.	  The	  urban	  poor	  were	  getting	  poorer	  every	  day,	  the	  peasantry	  were	  
reduced	   to	   serf-­‐like	   status,	   and	   the	   emergent	   educated	   segments	   of	   the	   population	   found	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Dodge	  (2003b)	  shows	  how	  power	  accumulated	  as	  a	  contradictory	  consequence	  of	  the	  different	  
strategies	  of	  the	  King,	  the	  High	  Commissioner,	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  and	  their	  British	  advisors	  in	  the	  
first	  few	  years	  of	  the	  Mandate,	  and	  how	  the	  arrangement	  evolved	  in	  response	  to	  changes	  in	  British	  
domestic	  politics,	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Wilson’s	  notion	  of	  sovereignty.	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offices	   and	   positions	   filled	   by	   the	   shaikhs.	   Baghdad’s	   population	   had	   doubled	   from	   1922	   to	  
1947	  due	  to	  rural-­‐to-­‐urban	  migration,	  industrialization	  gained	  pace,	  and	  imports	  had	  come	  to	  a	  
halt	  because	  of	  war-­‐time	  supply	  problems	  all	  over	  the	  world,	  all	  of	  which	  contributed	  to	  the	  
emergence	  of	  an	  urban	  working	  class	  movement	  (Farouk-­‐Sluglett	  and	  Sluglett	  2001,	  pp.36-­‐38)	  
staging	  strikes	  with	  students	  protesting	  occasionally.	  In	  response,	  the	  regent-­‐prince	  Abd-­‐al-­‐Ilah	  
introduced	  liberalization	  measures,	  granting	   licences	  to	  several	  political	  parties,	   including	  the	  
Iraqi	  Communist	  Party	  (ICP),	  and	  to	  labour	  unions.	  Insufficient	  reform,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  
the	   signing	   of	   the	   Portsmouth	   Agreement,	   which	  meant	   the	   colonial	   involvement	   of	   Britain	  
would	  continue,	  led	  to	  Al-­‐Wathba,	  or	  the	  leap,	  where	  students,	  workers	  and	  the	  poor,	  led	  by	  
the	   Communists,	   rose	   to	   protest	   the	   signing	   of	   the	   treaty.	   Although	   Wathba	   forced	   the	  
government	  to	  resign,	  several	  hundred	  protesters	  were	  killed	  due	  to	  police	  brutality,	  and	  the	  
new	   government	   of	   Nuri	   Said,	   a	   pragmatist	   politician	  who	   had	   served	   as	   Prime	  Minister	   12	  
times	   since	   the	   1920s,	   was	   quick	   to	   suppress	   opposition.	   More	   significantly	   the	   Wathba	  
marked	  the	  emergent	  role	  of	  the	  ‘street’	  in	  Iraqi	  politics	  (Marr	  2011,	  pp.65-­‐66).	  	  
The	   1950s	   saw	   Iraq	   oil	   revenues	   playing	   a	  much	  more	   important	   role.	  Under	   pressure	   from	  
domestic	  opposition,	  the	  Iraqi	  state	  took	  the	  nationalisation	  of	  Iranian	  oil,	  and	  Nasser’s	  rise	  to	  
power	  in	  Egypt	  both	  as	  pressure	  and	  opportunity	  to	  increase	  oil	  revenues.	  Iraq’s	  share	  in	  the	  
IPC	   (Iraqi	   Petroleum	   Company)	   had	   already	   started	   increasing	   upon	   negotiations	   with	   the	  
British	   in	   1950,	   but	   the	   real	   push	   came	   after	   the	   tapping	   of	   new	   reserves	   and	   further	  
negotiations	   over	   the	   share	   of	   Iraq.	   Between	   1948	   and	   1958,	   oil	   production	   increased	   over	  
ten-­‐fold,	   while	   revenues	   went	   up	   forty-­‐fold	   to	   80	   million	   Iraqi	   Dinars	   (Farouk-­‐Sluglett	   and	  
Sluglett,	  2011,	  p.42)	   ‘contribut[ing]	  some	  60%	  of	   the	  government	  budget’	   (Marr	  2011,	  p.68).	  
Growing	   dissent	   pushed	   the	   government	   to	   introduce	   social	   programmes,	   which,	   however,	  
mostly	  consisted	  of	  funds	  for	  agricultural	  projects	  as	  opposed	  to	  industrial	  ones,	  while	  at	  the	  
same	  time	  increasing	  the	  repression	  of	  organised	  movements.	  This	  further	  alienated	  the	  urban	  
working	   classes	   whose	   real	   wages	   continuously	   fell,	   and	   no	   real	   benefits	   accrued	   to	   the	  
peasantry.	  The	  programmes	  merely	  consolidated	  the	  class	  rule	  of	  the	  large	  landowners	  in	  the	  
country.	  Developments	  in	  Palestine	  as	  well	  as	  in	  Egypt,	  and	  Iraqi	  participation	  in	  the	  Baghdad	  
Pact,	   infuriated	  the	  Communists	  and	  Arab	  nationalists.	  Communist-­‐led	  uprisings	  in	  the	  Shiite-­‐
majority	   towns	   Najaf	   and	   Hayy	   in	   1956	   mounted	   a	   formidable	   challenge	   to	   the	   Nuri	   Said	  
government,	  but	  were	  unable	  to	  bring	  him	  down	  (Batatu	  1978,	  p.757).	  It	  would	  be	  left	  to	  the	  
military	  officers	  to	  depose	  the	  government	  and	  the	  monarchy.	  
The	  immediate	  forces	  that	  mobilised	  the	  Free	  Officers	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  appear	  to	  lie	  outside	  
the	   borders	   of	   Iraq.	   The	   Tripartite	   Aggression	   in	   1956	   over	   the	   nationalisation	   of	   the	   Suez	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Canal	  by	  the	  Nasser	  government	  in	  Egypt,	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Baghdad	  Pact,	  pledges	  of	  support	  
by	   the	  Soviet	  Union	   to	   those	   fighting	  colonial	  powers,	  and	   the	  general	   tendency	   in	   the	  Arab	  
world	  toward	  Pan-­‐Arabism	  all	  had	  immediate	  influence	  on	  the	  course	  of	  developments	  in	  Iraq.	  
These	  do	  not	  suffice	  to	  account	  for	  the	  1958	  revolution,	  however.	  Social	  tension	  had	  long	  been	  
in	   the	   making,	   and	   had	   manifested	   itself	   on	   different	   occasions,	   starting	   from	   the	   various	  
coups	  between	  1936	  and	  1941,	  through	  the	  Wathba	  of	  1948	  and	  the	  unrest	  of	  the	  1950s,	  and	  
culminating	  in	  the	  Communist-­‐led	  uprisings	  of	  the	  1956.	  All	  these	  reactions	  had	  different	  social	  
sources	  and	  objectives;	  what	  united	   them	  historically	  was	  a	  hatred	  of	  class	   rule	  by	   the	   large	  
landowners	   (shaikhs	   in	   the	   country,	  mallaks	   in	   the	   city).	   By	   the	   1950s,	   urban	   populations	  
including	  the	  working	  class,	  the	  unemployed,	  salaried	  professionals,	  university	  and	  secondary	  
school	  students	  as	  well	  as	  army	  officers,	  found	  their	  fortunes	  dependent	  on	  the	  elimination	  of	  
this	  class	  rule.	  This	  anger	  found	  expression,	  however,	  in	  a	  hatred	  directed	  at	  everything	  British	  
or	  Western,	   because	   it	  was	   them	  who	  had	  established	  and	  now	  perpetuated	   this	   class	   rule.	  
‘Arabisation’	  of	   the	  Communists	   (Batatu	  1978,	  pp.749-­‐750)	  and	  their	   failure	   to	   initiate	   large-­‐
scale	  social	  change	  despite	  their	  extremely	  efficient	  use	  of	  mass	  movements,	  the	  formation	  of	  
an	   alliance	   among	   the	   political	   leadership	   of	   the	   opposition,	   and	   penetration	   of	   the	   officer	  
corps	  by	  Arab	  nationalism	  and	  radical	  social	  ideas	  all	  prepared	  the	  ground	  for	  military	  takeover	  
by	   the	   ‘Free	   Officers’.	   When	   it	   became	   clear	   after	   the	   Najaf	   and	   Hayy	   uprisings	   that	   ‘the	  
street’,	  while	  able	   to	  shake	   the	  government,	  was	  not	  capable	  of	  dealing	   it	  a	   final	  blow,	  Free	  
Officers	   took	   the	  matter	   into	   their	   own	   hands,	   led	   by	   Abdul-­‐Karim	  Qasim	   and	   Abdul-­‐Salam	  
Aref,	  who,	  after	  almost	  two	  years	  of	  planning,	  came	  to	  power	  in	  an	  almost	  bloodless	  coup.7	  
Once	  the	  monarchy	  and	  its	  allies	  were	  eliminated,	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  revolution,	  lacking	  any	  
common	   enemy,	   turned	   against	   one	   another.	  With	   the	   support	   of	   the	   Communists,	   Qasim	  
established	   himself	   as	   the	   “Sole	   Leader”	   of	   the	   revolution.	   As	   Arab	   nationalists	   pushed	   for	  
union	  with	  the	  United	  Arab	  Republic	  (UAR)–a	  state	  formed	  by	  the	  merging	  of	  Egypt	  and	  Syria	  
in	  1958–	  the	  forces	  of	  Qasim	  and	  the	  Communist	  Party	  coalesced	  around	  a	  more	  particularist	  
position,	  albeit	  with	  different	  motives:	  Qasim	  did	  not	  want	  to	  lose	  his	  position	  to	  Nasser;	  and	  
union	   would	   require	   the	   Communist	   Party	   to	   be	   dissolved,	   naturally	   unacceptable	   to	   the	  
Communists.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Kurds	  had	  concerns	  regarding	  their	  status	  in	  the	  UAR.	  
After	   the	   purge	   of	  Aref	   and	  other	  Arab	  nationalists,	   however,	   and	   contrary	   to	   expectations,	  
governmental	   and	   military	   positions	   were	   not	   filled	   by	   the	   Communists,	   due	   to	   Qasim’s	  
distrust	   of	   them.	   They	  had	   to	   rely	  on	   their	   organizational	   prowess	   to	  make	   inroads	   into	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Whether	  this	  episode	  of	  regime	  change	  constituted	  a	  revolution	  or	  a	  military	  coup	  is	  discussed	  in	  detail	  
in	  Batatu	  (1978,	  pp.805-­‐807).	  
	  	  
130	  
government	   and	   the	   military,	   especially	   through	   organising	   in	   peasants’	   federations	   and	  
professional	   associations	   as	   well	   as	   unions,	   but	   following	   the	   Mosul	   and	   Kirkuk	   incidents,	  
Communist	  influence	  began	  to	  wane.8	  
Qasim’s	   volatile	   relations	   with	   the	   Communists	   proved	   to	   serve	   and	   undermine	   him	  
simultaneously.	  While	   the	  Communists	  provided	  whatever	  popular	   legitimacy	  Qasim	  had,	  he	  
was	   worried	   that	   they	   would,	   if	   left	   unchallenged,	   become	   the	   main	   force	   in	   the	   country.	  
Moreover,	  Qasim	  had	  a	  more	  reformist	  agenda,	  and	  he	  was	  concerned	  that	  the	  Communists	  
might	  push	  forward	  more	  radical	  policies	  (Farouk-­‐Sluglett	  and	  Sluglett,	  2001,	  pp.62-­‐65).	  What	  
Qasim	   did	   in	   the	   few	   years	   of	   his	   rule,	   however,	   was	   still	   more	   radical	   than	   what	   many	  
expected	  at	  the	  time.	  Land	  reform	  broke	  the	  back	  of	  the	  shaikhs	  and	  redistributed	  land	  to	  the	  
peasants,	  constituting	  them	  as	  small	  landowners.	  Social	  policies	  in	  urban	  areas	  included	  huge	  
residential	  projects	  as	  well	  as	  access	  to	  modern	  amenities.	  The	  reach	  of	  education	  expanded	  
enormously	  and	  new	  laws	  were	  promulgated	  to	  subject	  rural	  areas	  to	  the	  same	  laws	  as	  those	  
in	  place	   in	  urban	  areas.	  Women’s	  rights	  were	  also	   improved,	  with	  polygamy	  banned	  and	  the	  
minimum	  marriage	   age	   brought	   up	   to	   eighteen.	   All	   these	   social	   policies	   did	   not	   indicate	   a	  
move	   towards	   socialism,	   however.	   The	   Qasim	   government	   pursued	   a	   strategy	   of	  
industrialisation	  and	   favoured	   investors	  by	  exempting	   them	  from	  taxes	   that	  applied	  to	  other	  
segments	  of	  the	  population.	  
By	  undermining	  the	  Communists,	  Qasim	  also	  undermined	  himself,	  in	  the	  process	  empowering	  
the	  Arab	  nationalists,	   led	  by	  the	  Baath	  Party.	  Disaffected	  during	  the	  early	  months	  of	  Qasim’s	  
rule	  and	  failing	  to	  assassinate	  him	  in	  1959,	  Baathist	  officers	  harvested	  the	  fruits	  of	  their	  three	  
years	   of	   careful	   planning	   in	   1963,	   overthrowing	   Qasim’s	   government.	   During	   the	   first	   few	  
months	  following	  the	  coup,	  Baathists	  terrorised	  the	  Communists,	  killing	  and	  arresting	  them	  in	  
their	   thousands	   after	   Qasim	   himself	   had	   been	   executed.	   Although	   development	   plans	  
continued	   under	   Aref	   (and	   later	   under	   his	   brother),	   they	   did	   not	   constitute	   a	   coherent	  
strategy;	   rather	   they	   seemed	   to	   be	   approximations	   of	   Nasser’s	   policies	   in	   Egypt,	   devised	   to	  
ensure	  allegiance	  of	  Nasserite	  elements	  in	  Iraq.	  Nationalisation	  of	  banks	  and	  large	  commercial	  
enterprises	   resulted	   in	   a	   massive	   flight	   of	   capital,	   and	   unskilled	   state	   administrators	  
contributed	   to	   the	  downfall	   of	   the	  economy.	  Nor	  was	   the	  political	   scene	   stable.	   There	  were	  
divisions	   among	   the	  Baathists	   and	  Aref	   played	  on	   these.	   It	   became	  quickly	   obvious	   that	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  In	  response	  to	  a	  coup	  plot	  by	  the	  Arab	  nationalists	  backed	  by	  the	  UAR,	  Qasim	  mobilised	  the	  
communists	  in	  Mosul	  to	  organise	  a	  parade	  which	  turned	  into	  an	  intercommunal	  fight	  between	  Kurdish	  
and	  Arab	  tribes	  in	  Mosul	  and	  then	  between	  Kurdish	  and	  Turkmen	  tribes	  in	  Kirkuk.	  The	  atrocities	  
committed	  against	  both	  Arabs	  and	  Turkmens	  by	  the	  Kurds	  were	  largely	  blamed	  on	  the	  communists	  
(Batatu,	  1978,	  pp.912ff).	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new	  political	  forces	  lacked	  any	  concrete	  programmes.	  When	  Aref	  died	  in	  a	  helicopter	  accident	  
in	  1966,	  a	  power	  vacuum	  emerged,	  to	  be	  filled	  once	  again	  by	  Baathi	  officers,	  who,	  along	  with	  
the	   rest	   of	   the	   officer	   corps,	   were	   disgruntled	   by	   the	   humiliation	   in	   the	   Arab-­‐Israeli	   war	   of	  
1967	  (Batatu,	  1978,	  pp.1063-­‐66).	  
The	  manner	   in	  which	  the	  Baathists,	   led	  by	  Ahmad	  Hassan	  Al	  Bakr,	  pulled	  off	  the	  act	  of	  filling	  
this	   vacuum	   is	   significant,	   not	   only	   because	   of	   its	   historical	   significance	   in	   marking	   the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  Baathist	  era	  proper,	  but	  also	  because	  of	  its	  being	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  way	  the	  
Iraqi	  state	  was	  constituted	  as	  a	  real	  abstraction.	  Bakr	  and	  other	  Baathists	  were	  acutely	  aware	  
that	  the	  crucial	  government	  and	  military	  positions	  were	  held	  by	  Aref	  loyalists,	  so	  what	  they	  did	  
was	   to	   bring	   round	   to	   their	   own	  way	   of	   thinking	   three	   of	   Aref’s	   four	  most	   important	   allies,	  
without	  whom	  he	  could	  not	  ensure	  continuance	  of	  his	   regime,	  all	  of	  whom	  were	  concerned	  
about	   their	   position	   under	   Aref	   (Farouk-­‐Sluglett	   and	   Sluglett,	   2001,	   p.112).	   While	   the	   new	  
cabinet	   reflected	   the	   power-­‐sharing	   agreement	   of	   these	   three	   individuals	   (Abdul	   Razzaq	   al-­‐
Nayyif,	  Abdul	  Rahman	  al-­‐Da’ud	  and	  Sa‘dun	  Ghaydan)	  and	  the	  Baathists,	  real	  capability	  lay	  with	  
the	   Revolutionary	   Command	   Council,	   where	   the	   Baathists,	   mostly	   from	   Tikrit	   (Bakr’s	  
hometown)	  held	  sway	  (Farouk-­‐Sluglett	  and	  Sluglett,	  2001,	  pp.113-­‐4).	   In	   less	  than	  two	  weeks,	  
however,	   Bakr’s	   faction	   took	   full	   control	   of	   the	   new	   regime,	   excluding	   two	   of	   these	   three	  
individuals	  from	  the	  new	  arrangement.	  	  
All	  this	  reflected	  the	  conspiratorial	  nature	  of	  Iraqi	  politics	  in	  the	  post-­‐monarchy	  period	  up	  until	  
the	   1968	   coup.	   It	   seemed	   as	   if	   the	   whole	   game	   of	   power	   was	   played	   out	   in	   complete	  
detachment	  from	  wider	  social	  relations.	   Individual	  officers	  knew	  very	  well	  that	  their	  fortunes	  
were	  strictly	  dependent	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  create	  power	  bases	  for	  themselves	  in	  the	  army.	  This	  
has	  to	  do	  in	  part	  with	  the	  historical	  legacy	  of	  the	  pre-­‐monarchy	  period,	  when	  the	  fragmented	  
nature	  of	  tribal	  rule	  within	  what	  came	  to	  be	  called	  Iraq	  was	  reinforced	  by	  the	  Ottoman	  Court.	  
Tribal	  relations	  continued	  to	  play	  an	  important	  role	  throughout	  the	  period	  of	  monarchy,	  as	  the	  
British	   administrators	   found	   this	   socio-­‐political	   configuration	   suited	   their	   needs.	   Although	  
officers	   during	   the	   monarchical	   period	   came	   from	   diverse	   backgrounds,	   every	   high-­‐ranking	  
officer	  and	  political	  office-­‐holder	  sought	  to	  bring	  their	  loyal	  followers	  to	  key	  positions.	  	  
Secondly,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  the	  immense	  increase	  in	  oil	  output	  and	  oil	  revenues	  starting	  
from	  the	  1950s	  bestowed	  on	  the	  state	  an	  enormous	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  (Dodge	  2003a;	  2005,	  
p.708;	  cf.	  Makiya	  1998).	  This	  autonomy,	  enabled	  the	  Iraqi	  state,	  especially	  under	  Saddam,	  to	  
‘tie’	   the	   Iraqi	   population	   individually	   to	   the	   state	   (Dodge	   2003a,	   p.106)	   for	   their	   day-­‐to-­‐day	  
reproduction,	   with	   40%	   of	   households	   living	   on	   ‘government	   payment’.	   This	   resulted	   in	   an	  
atomisation	  of	  social	  relations	  (Dodge	  2003a,	  p.107),	  for	  individual	  households	  did	  not	  need	  to	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enter	   into	  reproductive	  relations	  with	  one	  another.	  Although	  social	  reforms	  were	   introduced	  
in	  different	  periods,	  this	  was	  more	  due	  to	  the	  new	  rulers’	  desire	  to	  eliminate	  competition	  from	  
tribal	  shaikhs	   than	  to	  any	  attempt	   to	  bridge	  the	  gap	  between	  wider	  society	  and	  the	  political	  
arena.	   This	   phenomenon,	   observed	   in	   other	   oil-­‐producing	   Middle	   Eastern	   countries,	   is	  
generally	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  ‘rentier	  state’	  argument	  in	  the	  literature.	  First	   introduced	  
by	  Mahdavy	  (1970)	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Iran,	  and	  refined	  by	  Beblawi	  (1990),	  the	  concept	  came	  to	  be	  
utilised	  as	  the	  central	  explanans	   for	  the	  authoritarian	  and	  non-­‐democratic	  character	  of	  these	  
states	   (Ross	   2001)	   uninterested	   in	   collecting	   taxes,	   legitimising	   their	   rule	   and	   establishing	  
social	   bases	   to	   reproduce	   their	   rule,	   or	   investing	   in	   productive	   sectors.	  Notwithstanding	   the	  
purchase	   of	   the	   concept,	   it	   reduces	   a	   diversity	   of	   practices	   into	   one	   overarching	   and	  
predetermined	   formula.	   It	   does	  not	   explain,	   for	   example,	   Iraq’s	   industrialisation	  drive	  under	  
Saddam.	  Neither	  can	   it	  explain	   the	  differences	  between	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  Kuwait	  on	  the	  one	  
hand,	   and	   Iraq	   on	   the	   other,	   in	   the	   area	   of	   redistribution	   of	   rent.	   Even	   if	   one	   accepts	   the	  
usefulness	  of	   the	  concept,	   then,	   it	   suffers	   from	  a	  conceptual	  overstretch	   (Okruhlik	  1999).	  As	  
the	   Iraqi	   case	   demonstrates,	   rents	   accruing	   to	   a	   state	   do	   not	   automatically	   translate	   into	   a	  
specific	   regime	   type	   or	   a	   specific	   foreign	   policy	   strategy.	   This	   is	   not	   to	   deny	   that	   it	   was	  
rentierism	   that	   enabled	   the	   Iraqi	   state	   to	   gain	   autonomy	   from	   wider	   social	   reproductive	  
strategies	   of	   the	   population,	   and	   thereby	   be	   relatively	   insulated	   from	   the	   pressures	   of	   the	  
American	   strategy	   of	   ‘economic	   statecraft’	   that	   the	   Clinton	   administrations	   implemented	   in	  
the	  1990s.	  Indeed,	  as	  Dodge	  (2006)	  shows,	  the	  American	  state	  resorted	  invasion	  when	  it	  was	  
unable	   to	   compel	   the	   Iraqi	   state	   into	   the	   orbit	   of	   the	   American-­‐led	   capitalist	   order.	  Making	  
possible	   a	   strategic	   choice,	   however,	   is	   not	   the	   same	   as	   making	   it	   necessary.	   Other	  
dictatorships,	  emblematically	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  chose	  to	  be	  submissive	  despite	  the	  rentier	  nature	  
of	  their	  polities.	  The	  real	  challenge	  is	  to	  show	  how	  this	  autonomy,	  was	  dealt	  with	  by	  the	  Iraqi	  
state	   in	   building	   an	   oppressive	   state	   complex,	   which,	   for	   conjuncturally	   specific	   reasons	  
adopted	  a	  recalcitrant	  foreign	  policy	  strategy.	  
The	   cumulative	   unintended	   consequences	   of	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   monarchy	   and	   the	   military	  
rulers	  were	  massive	   rural-­‐to-­‐urban	  migration,	   expanded	  education,	   and	   the	   rise	  of	   a	  worker	  
population	   who,	   along	   with	   the	   urban	   unemployed	   and	   other	   salaried	   groups,	   expressed	  
themselves	   practically	   as	   the	   working	   class,	   and	   who	   joined	   the	   ranks	   of	   the	   ICP	   –the	   sole	  
conduit	  between	  an	   isolated	  group	  of	  officer-­‐politicians	  and	   larger	  society.	  This	   is	  not	   to	   say	  
that	  other	  organised	  groups	  did	  not	  have	  any	  relations	  with	  larger	  society,	  but	  that	  they	  were	  
also	  enmeshed	   in	   these	  conspiratorial	   relations.	  So	   thirdly,	   liquidation	  of	   the	  Communists	  by	  
successive	  governments	   severed	   the	  state	  machinery	  even	  more	   from	  wider	   social	   relations.	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Left	  to	  their	  own	  devices,	  officers-­‐cum-­‐politicians	  competed	  for	  power,	  forming	  and	  breaking	  
alliances	   and	   recruiting	   trusted	   supporters.	   One	   could	   find	   different	   regiments	   reporting	   to	  
different	   individuals	  who,	   in	  turn,	  had	  diverse	   loyalties;	   that	   they	  could	  trust	  only	   individuals	  
from	  their	  own	  tribes	  or	  extended	  families	  was	  both	  a	  result	  and	  a	  constitutive	  aspect	  of	  the	  
conspiratorial	   nature	   of	   political	   change	   (Marr	   2011,	   p.126).	   It	   was	   the	   Baath	   Party	   under	  
Saddam	  Hussein	  that	  would	  bring	  a	  halt	  to	  the	  fragmented	  nature	  of	  rule	  in	  Iraq,	  albeit	  to	  the	  
detriment	  of	  others	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  Iraqi	  society.	  
5.4.2	  Saddam	  is	  Iraq,	  Iraq	  is	  Saddam:	  Tribalisation	  and	  Personalisation	  of	  
Rule	  against	  the	  ‘Enemies	  within’	  
The	   full	   consolidation	   of	   the	   state	   security	   institutions	   as	   Baathi	   security	   institutions	   was	  
achieved	  under	  the	  Bakr	  administration.	  Initiating	  a	  new	  reign	  of	  terror	  against	  every	  potential	  
competitor	   and	   dissenter,	   he	   established	   a	   totalitarian	   state	   in	   Iraq.	   Yet	   again,	   he	  was	  well	  
aware	   that	   the	   challenge	  would,	   as	   it	   almost	   always	  did,	   come	   from	  within	  his	   government.	  
Both	  Interior	  and	  Defence	  Ministers	  were	  aiming	  to	  form	  their	  own	  organs	  of	  security,	  but	  at	  
the	  same	  time	  competing	  with	  each	  other	  regarding	  their	  respective	  jurisdiction.	  Bakr	  was	  also	  
establishing	  his	  own	  security	  apparatus,	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  his	  relative	  Saddam	  (Farouk-­‐
Sluglett	  and	  Sluglett,	  2001,	  pp.119-­‐20).	  By	  1970,	  the	  Bakr-­‐Hussein	  faction	  was	  able	  to	  remove	  
both	  ministers	  and	  secure	  its	  unchallenged	  rule,	  and	  Saddam	  became	  the	  vice-­‐president	  of	  the	  
all-­‐powerful	  Revolutionary	  Command	  Council.	   In	  order	  to	  break	  the	  cycle	  of	  coups,	  the	  Bakr-­‐
Hussein	   regime	   replaced	   military	   officers	   with	   Baath	   members,	   established	   control	   over	  
recruitment	   and	   indoctrination	   within	   the	   army,	   and	   most	   importantly,	   tried	   to	   socialise	  
support	  for	  their	  rule.	  This	  latter	  strategy	  would	  serve	  to	  consolidate	  their	  rule	  in	  several	  ways:	  
while	   socialist-­‐cum-­‐state	   capitalist	   control	   over	   the	   economy	   would	   earn	   the	   respect	   of	  
workers	  and	  peasants,	   it	  would	  also	  expand	  the	  political	  control	  of	   the	  Baathi	  state	  over	  the	  
whole	   social	   life	   of	   the	   country.	   Moreover,	   at	   a	   time	   when	   the	   Baathi	   regime	   did	   not	   lack	  
perceived	  and	  real	  enemies	  abroad,	  it	  would	  secure	  the	  backing	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  providing	  
external	  security	  for	  the	  regime.	  Finally,	  in	  view	  of	  the	  IPC’s	  sway	  over	  the	  country’s	  economy	  
they	  pursued	  a	  strategy	  of	  diversification,	  modernisation,	  and	   industrialisation	   in	  an	  attempt	  
to	   achieve	   economic	   independence	   (Marr	   2011,	   pp.161-­‐162).	   Accordingly,	   the	   new	   regime	  
undertook	   a	   programme	   of	   land	   redistribution,	   followed	   by	   the	   expansion	   of	   literacy	   and	  
health	   services,	   all	   of	   which	   benefited	   the	   urban	   poor,	   as	   well	   as	   a	   nascent	   group	   of	   semi-­‐
private	  entrepreneurs	  who	  exploited	  the	  opportunities	  offered	  by	  government	  investments.	  It	  
was	  also	  the	  Bakr-­‐Hussein	  regime	  that	  finally	  achieved	  nationalisation	  of	  the	  oil	   industry,	  the	  
revenues	  from	  which	  were	  used	  to	  fund	  these	  social	  projects	  as	  well	  as	  military	  modernisation	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projects,	   increasing	   Iraqi	   military	   capability	   considerably.	   The	   new	   regime	   also	   sought	   to	  
incorporate	   the	   Kurds,	   Shia	   and	   Communists,	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   oppressing	   their	  
organised	  movements,	  especially	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  latter	  two	  groups.	  Kurds	  enjoyed	  a	  certain	  
level	  of	  security	  after	  Saddam	  and	  Barzani	  agreed	  on	  Kurdish	  allegiance	  to	  the	  government	  in	  
return	   for	  national	   rights,	   to	   include	  recognition	  of	  Kurdish	  as	  an	  official	   language	   in	  Kurdish	  
regions.	   Pacifying	   these	   groups	  was	   one	  more	  way	   to	   buttress	   the	   Baathi	   rule.	   Later	   in	   the	  
decade,	  however,	  the	  government	  toned	  down	  its	  conciliatory	  remarks	  significantly,	  returning	  
to	  its	  primary	  strategy	  of	  oppression.	  	  
Throughout	   the	   period	   from	   1968	   to	   1979,	   Saddam	   prepared	   the	   ground	   for	   ultimate	  
transition	   to	   his	   presidency,	   significantly	   by	   entrenching	   his	   control	   over	   the	   security	   and	  
intelligence	  services	  of	  the	  country.	  The	  first	  such	  apparatus	  was	  formed	  by	  Saddam	  in	  Syria,	  
when	   he	   had	   had	   to	   flee	   Iraq	   after	   his	   attempt	   on	  Qasim’s	   life	   in	   1959	   failed.	   Jihaz	   al-­‐Khas	  
(Special	   Apparatus)	   as	   it	   was	   called	   then,	   became	   an	   official	   institution	   after	   1968	   (Makiya	  
1998,	  Marashi	   2002)	   and	   was	   dissolved	   in	   1973	   when	   Saddam	   overhauled	   the	   whole	   state	  
security	  and	  intelligence	  service	  following	  a	  coup	  attempt	  against	  himself	  and	  Bakr	  by	  the	  chief	  
of	  al-­‐Amn	  al-­‐‘Amm	  (General	  Security	  Service	  or	  State	  Internal	  Security	  Service),	  Nazim	  Khazzar,	  
notorious	  mastermind	  of	  all	  Saddam’s	  dirty	  work	  in	  oppressing	  dissent	  in	  the	  country.	  Al-­‐Amn,	  
established	   in	   1921	   during	   the	   British	   mandate,	   normally	   reported	   to	   the	   Minister	   of	   the	  
Interior,	   and	   was	   composed	   of	   civilian	   policemen.9	  With	   the	   1973	   restructuring,	   it	   reported	  
directly	   to	   the	   Presidential	   Palace,	   and	   had	   most	   of	   its	   powers	   transferred	   to	   the	   General	  
Intelligence,	  or	  the	  Mukhabarat.	  The	  Mukhabarat	  was	  filled	  with	  former	  members	  of	  Jihaz	  al-­‐
Khas	  and	  those	  most	  loyal	  to	  the	  party.	  Finally	  the	  Military	  Intelligence,	  or	  the	  Istikhbarat	  was	  
tasked	  with	  monitoring	  military	  officers	  to	  pre-­‐empt	  coup	  attempts,	  as	  well	  as	  carrying	  out	  the	  
routine	   task	   of	   collecting	   strategic	   information	   on	   perceived	   enemies	   abroad.	   Through	   his	  
control	  over	  these	  institutions,	  it	  was	  only	  normal	  that	  in	  1979,	  when	  the	  ailing	  President	  Bakr	  
resigned	  from	  his	  post,	  Saddam	  replaced	  him	  as	  the	  president.	  
Saddam’s	  first	  decade	  in	  power	  was	  largely	  marked	  by	  the	  8-­‐year	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  War,	  which	  had	  a	  
crippling	   effect	   on	   Iraq.	   Although	   Iran	   and	   Iraq	   had,	   to	   the	   surprise	   of	   many,	   reached	  
agreement	   on	   various	   issues	   including	   border	   disputes	   in	   1975,	   the	   intention	   of	   the	   Baath	  
government	   was	   to	   uncouple	   the	   Kurdish	   insurgency	   from	   Iran	   –as	   a	   result	   of	   which	   they	  
managed	  to	  put	  an	  end	  to	  the	  Kurdish	  uprising–	  and	  Iraq	  took	  this	  agreement	  as	  a	  truce	  rather	  
than	   a	   comprehensive	   settlement	   (Ghareeb	   1981).	   After	   the	   elimination	   of	   the	   Kurdish	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




insurgency,	   the	   Shia	   remained	   the	  major	   obstacle	   in	   Saddam’s	   mind	   on	   the	   course	   toward	  
national	  unity,	  and	  Khomeini’s	  calls	  for	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  Baathi	  regime	  in	  1979	  found	  an	  
audience	  in	  Iraq,	  giving	  rise	  to	  widespread	  demonstrations	  which	  were	  harshly	  suppressed.	  As	  
cross-­‐border	   skirmishes	   intensified	   on	   the	   Iran-­‐Iraq	   border	   throughout	   1980,	   the	   war	   that	  
would	  devastate	  both	  countries	  started	  in	  September	  that	  year	  with	  an	  Iraqi	  offensive.	  
Even	  before	  the	  Islamic	  Revolution,	  Saddam	  considered	  Iran	  an	  enemy	  who,	  with	  the	  help	  of	  
Israel	   and	   the	   US,	   had	   ambitions	   to	   dominate	   the	   Persian	   Gulf.10	  This	   was	   also	   among	   the	  
reasons	  why	   the	   Iraqi	   state	  was	  willing	   to	   cooperate	  with	   the	  Soviet	  Union	   in	   the	  1970s.	  As	  
Iraq	   developed	   its	   military	   capability	   through	   oil	   revenues,	   it	   could	   now	   credibly	   claim	  
leadership	   in	   the	  Arab	  world,	  especially	  at	  a	   time	  when	  Anwar	  Sadat,	   the	  President	  of	  Egypt	  
after	   Nasser,	   was	   engaging	   in	   diplomatic	   relations	   with	   Israel,	   resulting	   in	   the	   Camp	   David	  
agreement	  (Tripp	  2007).	  Saddam	  saw	  the	  increasing	  tension	  with	  Iran	  both	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  
reproduction	  of	  the	  Baathi	  regime,	  and	  an	  opportunity	  to	  assert	  leadership	  in	  the	  Arab	  world,	  
by	  offering	  itself	  as	  a	  buffer	  between	  an	  expansionary	  regime	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Arab	  world.11	  
As	  the	  tide	  turned	  against	  the	  revolutionary	  regime	  in	   Iran,	  with	  US	  solidly	  against	   it	  and	  the	  
USSR	  remaining	  neutral,	  Saddam	  responded	  to	  threats	  from	  Khomeini	   in	  kind,	  and	   instigated	  
an	  abortive	  coup	  attempt	  in	  Iran	  (Hiro,	  1991,	  p.36).	  Finally,	  he	  went	  on	  the	  offensive.	  	  
As	  the	  war	  raged,	  Saddam	  made	  sure	  that	  his	  regime,	  now	  more	  personal	  than	  partisan,	  ruled	  
unchallenged.	  If	  the	  Bakr	  presidency	  was	  marked	  by	  the	  Baathification	  of	  the	  state,	  Saddam’s	  
term	  was	  characterised	  by	  the	  embodiment	  in	  Saddam	  of	  all	  state	  power.	  Even	  before	  the	  war,	  
shortly	   after	  his	   inauguration,	   Saddam	  purged	  opposition	   from	   the	  Baathi	   ranks	   in	   a	   farcical	  
rendition	  of	  Stalin’s	  show	  trials.	  In	  1982,	  following	  an	  attempt	  on	  his	  life,	  Saddam	  established	  
the	   notorious	   Jihaz	   al-­‐Amn	   al-­‐Khas,	   or	   Special	   Security	   Apparatus,	   which	   served	   as	   a	  
presidential	   intelligence	  service	   (Marashi	  2002).	  Staffed	  by	   those	  most	   loyal	   to	  Saddam	  from	  
all	   three	   agencies	   that	   operated	   in	   the	   country	   in	   the	   1970s	   (Al-­‐Amn,	   Istikhbarat,	   and	  
Mukhabarat)	  and	  led	  by	  Saddam’s	  cousin	  and	  son-­‐in-­‐law	  Hussein	  Kamil,	  the	  main	  task	  of	  this	  
apparatus	   was	   to	   coordinate	   intelligence	   and	   security	   and	   provide	   oversight	   as	   part	   of	   its	  
function	  to	  protect	  the	  president	  and	  presidential	  facilities.	  As	  Marashi	  (2003,	  p.203)	  puts	  it,	  it	  
served	   ‘as	   the	   nerve	   center	   of	   Saddam’s	   security	   apparatus’.	   As	   well	   as	   monitoring	   other	  
agencies	   and	   high-­‐ranking	   officials	   including	   their	   families,	   the	   Special	   Security	   Apparatus	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Saddam	  never	  gave	  up	  on	  his	  suspicions	  as	  to	  a	  possible	  collusion	  of	  Iran	  with	  the	  United	  States	  and	  
Israel,	  even	  after	  the	  Islamic	  revolution	  in	  Iran,	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  recovered	  tapes	  of	  his	  secret	  
meetings	  with	  his	  closest	  aides	  on	  the	  Iran-­‐Contra	  Affair	  (Woods,	  Palkki	  and	  Stout	  2011,	  pp.25-­‐29).	  	  
11	  Saddam	  knew	  very	  well	  that	  the	  major	  states	  in	  the	  Arab	  world	  attributed	  a	  balancing	  role	  to	  Iraq	  in	  
the	  region,	  and	  sought	  to	  manipulate	  this	  (Woods,	  Palkki	  and	  Stout	  2011,	  pp.30-­‐31).	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controlled	   the	   units	   in	   the	   Iraqi	   army	   responsible	   for	   chemical	   weapons	   (Marashi	   2002),	  
turning	   Iraq	   into	  a	   ‘Mukhabarat	  state’.	  Furthermore,	   the	  network	  among	  these	  agencies	  was	  
designed	   in	   such	  a	  way	   that	  every	  operative	  and	  chief	  monitored	   the	  actions	  of	  every	  other	  
within	   the	  agencies	  and	  every	  agency	  monitored	  every	  other	  one.	  That	  all	  of	   them	  reported	  
directly	   to	   the	   Palace	   also	   ensured	   that	   no	   concentration	   of	   power	   and	   influence	  would	   be	  
possible.	  While	   the	  extensiveness	  of	   the	   apparati	  made	   sure	   that	   the	  whole	  population	  was	  
under	  the	  dictator’s	  watchful	  eye,	  the	  competitive	  nature	  of	  inter-­‐agency	  relations	  served	  as	  a	  
bulwark	   against	   coup	   attempts	   that	   had	  made,	   unmade,	   and	   remade	   rulers	   throughout	   the	  
post-­‐monarchy	  period.	  	  
It	  would	  be	  incorrect,	  however,	  to	  attribute	  the	  Saddam’s	  strategy	  of	  reproduction	  of	  his	  role	  
solely	   to	   the	   repressive	   instruments	   of	   the	   state	   (cf.	   Makiya	   1998).	   As	   mentioned	   above,	  
starting	  from	  1968,	  the	  Baath	  Party	  implemented	  a	  series	  of	  social	  policies.	  While	  social	  goods	  
were	   distributed	   unevenly	   among	   different	   sections	   of	   society,	   whereby	   those	   from	   Tikrit,	  
hometown	  to	  both	  Saddam	  and	  Bakr,	  were	  the	  prime	  benefactors,	  poor	  Shia	  also	  benefited.	  
That	   the	  bulk	   of	   non-­‐commissioned	  officers	   and	   conscripts	   composed	  mainly	   of	   Shiite	   Iraqis	  
did	  not	  desert	  en	  masse	  during	  the	  war	  with	  Iran	  is	  a	  case	  in	  point.	  While	  the	  Shiite	  population	  
may	   not	   have	   been	   in	   agreement	   with	   the	   policies	   of	   the	   Baath	   Party	   ideologically,	   they	  
enjoyed	  the	  social	  policies	  designed	  to	  make	  them	  the	  ‘client	  base’	  of	  Saddam’s	  personal	  rule	  
(Tripp	  2007,	  p.119).	  	  
What	   is	   of	   significance	   here	   regarding	   this	   intelligence	   and	   security	   network	   is	   that	   it	   never	  
functioned	  as	  a	   locus	  of	   foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making,	   this	   remaining	  firmly	   in	  the	  hands	  of	  
the	   Revolutionary	   Command	   Council	   and	   Saddam	   Hussein	   himself	   as	   chair	   of	   the	   council.	  
There	   are	   two	   main	   reasons	   for	   this.	   These	   organisations	   were,	   first	   and	   foremost,	  
preoccupied	  with	  spying	  on	  other	  agencies	  to	  ensure	  loyalty	  to	  the	  Presidency.	  Secondly,	  and	  
more	  importantly,	  even	  when	  they	  offered	  analyses	  of	  external	  threats,	  Saddam	  would	  dismiss	  
these	   analyses	   and	   task	   them	  only	  with	   fact-­‐finding.	  During	   a	  meeting	   in	   late	   1990	  with	   his	  
senior	  officials,	  Saddam	  declared	  that	  he	  wanted	  only	  facts	  from	  the	  intelligence	  organisations,	  
because	  analysis	  ‘is	  my	  specialty’	  (Woods,	  Palkki	  and	  Stout	  2011,	  p.36).	  	  
As	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  war	  progressed,	  the	  Iraqi	  state	  and	  Saddam	  had	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  war	  
would	  not	  result	  in	  a	  quick	  and	  decisive	  victory.	  By	  1982,	  Iran	  had	  reversed	  the	  balance	  in	  its	  
favour.	   From	  now	  on,	   it	   seemed	   the	   tide	  would	   turn	   against	   Iraq	   in	   the	  war,	   even	  with	   the	  
support	   of	   the	   US.	   It	   became	   clear,	   however,	   that	   the	   US,	   while	   worried	   about	   a	   possible	  
spread	   of	   the	   Iranian	   revolution,	   was	   also	   unwilling	   to	   bestow	   decisive	   victory	   on	   Iraq,	   as	  
demonstrated	  by	  the	  revelation	  of	  the	  Irangate	  scandal,	  which	  disclosed	  that	  US	  officials	  were	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selling	  armaments	  to	  Iran	  despite	  its	  arms	  embargo	  in	  order	  to	  fund	  anti-­‐communist	  contras	  in	  
Nicaragua,	  although	  US	  congress	  had	  prohibited	  support	   for	  contras	  earlier.	  To	   turn	   the	   tide	  
once	  again,	  Iraq	  resorted	  to	  chemical	  weapons,	  utilising	  satellite	  imagery	  provided	  by	  the	  US.12	  
Having	   lost	   access	   to	   the	  world	  market	   through	   the	  Persian	  Gulf	  or	   through	  Syria,	  who	   shut	  
down	   the	   pipeline,	   with	   its	   oil	   fields	   destroyed,	   its	   manpower	   depleted	   and	   revenues	  
diminished,	   Saddam	   increasingly	   relied	   on	   external	   debt	   and	   repressive	   instruments	   of	   the	  
state	  to	  reproduce	  himself.	  As	  the	  price	  of	  oil	  fell	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1980s,	  and	  Kuwait	  and	  the	  United	  
Arab	  Emirates	  caused	  it	  to	  fall	  even	  more	  by	  not	  observing	  their	  quotas	  set	  by	  OPEC,	  Iraq	  lost	  
its	  ability	  to	  fund	  the	  war.	  Anxious	  to	  contain	  Iran,	  the	  US	  took	  action	  and	  attempted	  to	  isolate	  
Iran,	  which	  in	  the	  end	  forced	  Iran	  to	  accept	  UN	  mediation	  and	  end	  hostilities	  in	  1988.	  
The	  human	  cost	  of	  the	  war	  was	  over	  500,000	  dead	  according	  to	  conservative	  estimates,	  and	  as	  
many	  injured.	  Although	  Iraq’s	  casualty	  numbers	  were	  much	  lower	  than	  those	  of	  Iran,	  Iraq	  lost	  
a	   larger	   proportion	   of	   its	   17	   million	   population.	   Considering	   that	   those	   who	   died	   also	  
constituted	   the	   active	   workforce	   of	   a	   country	   already	   suffering	   from	   labour	   shortages,	   the	  
possible	  long-­‐term	  effects	  of	  the	  war	  on	  the	  livelihoods	  of	  Iraqis	  and	  the	  reproduction	  of	  the	  
regime	  were	  much	  greater.	  More	  significant	  for	  the	  reproduction	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  people	  and	  the	  
regime	  was	  the	  loss	  of	  oil	  revenues.	  Not	  only	  had	  Iran	  destroyed	  Iraqi	  oil	  fields,	  refineries,	  and	  
equipment,	   but	   also	   blocked	   its	   already	   limited	   access	   to	   the	   Persian	   Gulf,	   compelling	   a	  
landlocked	  Iraq	  to	  use	  pipelines	  through	  Turkey	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia	  for	   its	  exports.	  Hoping	  that	  
the	  war	   would	   end	   quickly,	   Saddam	   had	   flooded	   the	   country	   with	   imported	   foodstuffs	   and	  
other	  consumer	  products	  to	  boost	  the	  morale	  of	  the	  population	  as	  well	  as	  to	  make	  up	  for	  the	  
losses	   in	   agricultural	   output	   due	   to	   lack	   of	   the	   workforce	   (Alnasrawi	   1994).	   Plummeting	   oil	  
prices	   did	   not	   help	   either,	   not	   only	   dramatically	   decreasing	   revenues,	   but	   also	   undermining	  
Iraq’s	   ability	   to	   procure	   primary	   consumer	   goods,	   continue	   social	   policies,	   and	   service	   its	  
debts,	  let	  alone	  funding	  its	  war	  with	  Iran.	  In	  brief,	  the	  war	  had	  a	  devastating	  effect	  on	  Iraq	  as	  a	  
whole.	  
Iraq	   was	   backed	   by	   an	   unlikely	   coalition	   during	   its	   war	   against	   Iran.	   France	   and	   the	   Soviet	  
Union	  had	  provided	  arms,	  the	  US	  had	  provided	  intelligence	  and	  naval	  support,	  and	  Kuwait	  and	  
Saudi	  Arabia	  had	  extended	  their	  financial	  support	  and	  access	  to	  the	  world	  market	  (Stork	  and	  
Lesch	  1990).	  Both	  the	  Gulf	  States	  and	  most	  Middle	  Eastern	  states	  now	  sought	  to	  restore	  the	  
balance	   between	   Iraq	   and	   Iran	   in	   the	   face	   of	   an	   Iraqi	   claim	   to	   regional	   leadership.	   Most	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  In	  one	  instance	  of	  Iraqi	  chemical	  weapon	  use,	  and	  as	  part	  of	  Saddam’s	  genocidal	  Al-­‐Anfal	  campaign	  
against	  Kurds,	  Iraqi	  aircraft	  dropped	  chemical	  gas	  over	  Halabja,	  a	  town	  controlled	  at	  the	  time	  by	  the	  
Kurdish	  peshmerga,	  who	  were	  cooperating	  with	  Iranian	  forces.	  See	  Rabil	  (2002)	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  
Saddam’s	  war	  against	  Kurds	  in	  this	  period	  through	  official	  state	  documents	  of	  Iraq.	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importantly,	  Kuwait	   repeatedly	   rejected	  Saddam’s	   calls	   for	  pardoning	  of	   its	  debts	   to	  Kuwait,	  
escalating	  tension	  with	  Iraq.	  	  
In	   1990,	   Iraq	   invaded	  Kuwait,	   citing	   historical	   claims	   to	   Kuwaiti	   territory,	   accusing	   Kuwait	   of	  
tapping	  Iraqi	  oil	  through	  slant	  drilling,	  and	  charging	  Kuwaiti	  authorities	  with	  economic	  warfare	  
through	  overproduction	  of	  oil.	  The	  annexation	  of	  Kuwait	  would	  restore	  revenues	  crucial	  both	  
for	  credibility	  of	  the	  regime	  in	  the	  Arab	  world	  and	  for	  social	  reproduction	  of	  Baathi	  rule	  in	  Iraq.	  
As	  I	  argued	  in	  Chapter	  Three,	  Iraq’s	  larger	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  was	  to	  establish	  itself	  as	  the	  
hegemonic	  power	  of	  the	  Arab	  world	  by	  representing	  itself	  as	  a	  bulwark	  against	  the	  spread	  of	  
Iranian	   Islamic	   revolution	   and	   a	   countervailing	   force	   against	   Israel. 13 	  The	   US	   wanted	   to	  
establish	  ‘normal	  relations’	  with	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  containing	  Iran,	  and	  this	  
may	   help	   explain	   why	   Iraq	   assumed	   that	   the	   US	   would	   remain	   neutral.	   Furthermore,	   as	  
evidenced	   by	   the	   recording	   of	   a	   discussion	   between	   Saddam	  and	  his	   advisors,	   they	  were	   at	  
pains	   to	  win	   the	  hearts	  and	  minds	  of	   the	  Arab	  public	  by	  charging	  Kuwait	  with	  collusion	  with	  
Israel	   (Woods,	  Palkki	  and	  Stout	  2011,	  pp.170-­‐71).	   In	  any	  case,	  neither	  the	  US	  nor	  Kuwait	  nor	  
other	  Arab	  states	  assumed	  that	  Iraq	  would	  go	  so	  far	  as	  to	  invade	  the	  country	  (Tripp	  2007).	  In	  
the	   period	   following	   the	   invasion,	   while	   the	   US	   was	   working	   to	   build	   up	   pressure	   on	   Iraq,	  
regional	   powers	   including	   Arab	   states	   and	   Turkey	  were	   ambivalent.	  While	   Saudi	   Arabia	  was	  
more	   eager	   to	   listen	   to	   Iraqi	   demands	   at	   the	   beginning,	   it	   became	   concerned	   when	   Iraq	  
changed	   the	   Kuwaiti	   regime	   to	   a	   republic,	   delegitimising	   the	   Saudi	   monarchy	   (Marr	   2011,	  
pp.220-­‐21).	   In	   the	   end,	   Saudi	   Arabia,	   along	  with	   Turkey,	   agreed	   to	   block	   Iraqi	   oil	   pipelines,	  
depriving	  Iraq	  effectively	  of	  most	  of	  its	  export	  capability.	  	  
As	  Iraq	  rejected	  cooperation,	  coalition	  forces	   led	  by	  the	  US	  expelled	  Iraqi	  forces	  from	  Kuwait	  
and	  the	  retreating	  armoured	  units	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  were	  destroyed.	  The	  immediate	  result	  of	  
the	  war	  was	  the	  exposure	  of	  the	  weakness	  of	  the	  regime	  when	  confronted	  by	  a	  superior	  force.	  
More	  importantly,	  it	  marked	  a	  turning	  point	  in	  Iraqi	  history,	  in	  that	  both	  the	  sanctions	  regime	  
and	  the	  inspections	  regime	  undertaken	  in	  accordance	  with	  a	  series	  of	  UNSC	  resolutions	  would	  
start	   the	   process	   of	   the	   unravelling	   of	   Saddam’s	   rule	   in	   Iraq.	   Sanctions	   were	   tied	   to	   the	  
confirmation	  of	  the	  absence	  or	  destruction	  of	  any	  WMDs	  or	  WMD	  development	  programmes	  
by	   the	   United	   Nations	   Special	   Commission,	   or	   UNSCOM,	   the	   precursor	   of	   UNMOVIC.	   The	  
mission	   required	   cooperation	   by	   Iraqi	   authorities	   and	   Saddam’s	   regime	   was	   extremely	  
reluctant	  to	  offer	  this	  unless	  compelled	  to	  do	  so	  (Oudraat	  2002,	  pp.141-­‐142).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  In	  a	  recorded	  conversation	  with	  Deputy	  Prime	  Minister	  Tariq	  Aziz	  and	  other	  aides,	  Saddam	  was	  
certain	  of	  a	  stronger	  Iraq’s	  value	  to	  the	  American	  state	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Arab	  states,	  and	  was	  willing	  to	  play	  
on	  their	  concerns,	  despite	  the	  revelation	  of	  the	  Iran-­‐Contra	  affair	  and	  his	  conviction	  that	  the	  US	  policy	  
was	  one	  of	  balancing	  rather	  than	  taking	  sides	  (Woods,	  Palkki	  and	  Stout	  2011,	  pp.30-­‐31).	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Encouraged	   by	   the	   intervention	   of	   coalition	   forces	   and	   US	   calls	   for	   Iraqi	   people	   to	   rise	   up	  
(Jabar	   1992),	   the	   Kurds	   rebelled	   against	   the	   regime	   and	   took	   control	   of	   Kurdish-­‐populated	  
towns.	  The	   response	  by	   the	  central	   state	  was	  brutal	  and,	  without	  any	  support	   from	  outside,	  
the	  Kurds	   lost	   their	  acquisitions	   in	  a	   few	  weeks.	  The	  result	  was	  a	  humanitarian	  disaster	  with	  
thousands	   dead	   and	   2,500,000	   refugees	   fleeing	   to	   Iran	   and	   Turkey	   because	   of	   fresh	   and	  
painful	  memories	  of	   the	  1988	  Anfal	  Campaign.	  Upon	   request	  of	   the	  governments	  of	  Turkey,	  
France	   and	   Iran,	   the	  UNSC	   passed	   resolution	   688.	   Based	   on	   this	   resolution,	   the	  US,	   UK	   and	  
France	  established	  a	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  for	  Iraqi	  aircraft	  over	  Kurdish	  areas	  of	  the	  country,	  although	  
the	   resolution	   did	   not	   specifically	   mention	   such	   a	   zone	   (Graham-­‐Brown	   2001).	   Following	  
operations	  by	  the	  allied	  forces,	  this	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  effectively	  helped	  establish	  a	  de	  facto	  Kurdish	  
administration	   in	   northern	   Iraq,	   which	   would	   later	   gain	   a	   de	   jure	   status	   as	   the	   Kurdistan	  
Regional	  Government	  (KRG)	  (Stansfield	  2003).	  Two	  main	  Kurdish	  parties	  in	  the	  region,	  the	  KDP	  
led	  by	  Barzani	  and	  the	  PUK	  led	  by	  Talabani,	  set	  their	  differences	  aside	  to	  form	  a	  coalition	  and	  
held	  elections	   in	  1992.	  Similarly	  encouraged	  by	  the	  US,	  and	  disillusioned	  with	  both	  the	  social	  
character	   of	   the	   state	   after	   the	   first	   few	   years	   of	   the	   Iran-­‐Iraq	   war	   and	   with	   wartime	  
patriotism,	  the	  Shia	  embraced	  a	  more	  religious	  stance,	   following	  the	  clerics.14	  Left	   to	   its	  own	  
devices,	  the	  opposition,	  notwithstanding	  its	  ferocious	  sweep	  of	  state	  and	  party	  buildings	  in	  the	  
first	  days	  of	  the	  uprising,	  was	  crushed	  by	  the	  Republican	  Guard	  in	  a	  massacre.	  Another	  no-­‐fly	  
zone	  was	  formed	   in	  the	  south	  of	   the	  country,	  and	   later	  expanded	  to	  south	  of	  Baghdad,	  with	  
the	   aim	   of	   protecting	   civilians	   from	   regime	   oppression.	   Both	   no-­‐fly	   zones	   served	   to	   corner	  
Saddam’s	   rule	   to	   central	   areas	   of	   Iraq	   around	   Baghdad,	   consolidating	   in	   the	   process	   the	  
already	  existing	  division	  among	  the	  three	  main	  ethno-­‐religious	  groups	  in	  the	  country.	  
The	   sanctions	   regime	   that	   would	   devastate	   Iraq	   was	   put	   in	   place,	   ostensibly	   targeting	   the	  
regime,	   not	   its	   people.	   Sanctions	   encompassed	   all	   imports	   except	   medical	   goods	   and	  
foodstuffs.	  Export	  of	  oil,	  on	  which	  the	   Iraqi	  economy	   largely	  depended,	  was	  blocked,	   further	  
crippling	   both	   the	   Iraqi	   state	   and	   society.	   The	   quality	   of	   life	   in	   Iraq	   deteriorated,	   with	   high	  
ratios	   of	   infant	   mortality,	   lack	   of	   healthcare,	   very	   poor	   conditions	   of	   living,	   with	   salaried	  
professionals	  reduced	  to	  poor	  recipients	  of	  state	  rations,	  while	  waged	  workers	  reduced	  even	  
further	  by	   a	  diet	   lacking	   sufficient	  protein.	   If	   the	  population	  did	  not	   suffer	   from	  widespread	  
starvation,	   it	  was	   because	   of	   the	   government-­‐managed	   system	   of	   rationing	   (Graham-­‐Brown	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  uprisings	  in	  Shia	  majority	  cities	  were	  primarily	  motivated	  by	  religious	  
sentiments;	  rather	  religious	  groups	  led	  by	  clerics	  such	  as	  the	  Supreme	  Council	  for	  Islamic	  Revolution	  in	  
Iraq	  (SCIRI)	  and	  the	  Dawa	  Party	  forced	  their	  way	  into	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  uprisings	  See	  Jabar	  (1992).	  
Indeed	  it	  was	  the	  retreating	  Baath	  officers	  who	  initiated	  the	  uprising	  in	  the	  Sunni	  majority	  towns	  of	  Abul	  




2000,	   p.9),	   which	   was	   put	   in	   place	   during	   the	   occupation	   of	   Kuwait	   in	   response	   to	   the	  
embargo.	   The	   lack	  of	   access	   to	  basic	   needs	  on	   the	  part	   of	   the	  population	   gave	   rise	   to	  what	  
Jabar	  (2000)	  called	  the	  ‘retribalization’	  of	  Iraqi	  social	  life,	  as	  kinship	  and	  tribal	  networks	  gained	  
importance	  once	  more	  when	   the	  state	  was	  no	   longer	  able	   to	  distribute	  benefits.	  Those	  who	  
were	   privileged	   enough	   through	   networks	   of	   the	   ‘shadow	   state’	   suffered	   less	   from	   the	  
sanctions	   because	   of	   their	   close	   relations	   with	   the	   regime	   (Dodge	   2003a,	   p.107),	   and	   the	  
Baathi	   regime	   adapted	   to	   the	   sanctions	   in	   time	   (Graham-­‐Brown	   2000,	   p.9)	   displacing	   the	  
burden	  onto	  the	  larger	  disaffected	  population.	  
‘Retribalization’	   of	   social	   relations	   in	   Iraq	   was	   also	   due	   to	   Saddam’s	   conscious	   strategy	   of	  
securing	  his	  rule.	  Now	  Saddam’s	  son	  Qusay	  led	  the	  top	  secret	  service	  organisation,	  the	  Special	  
Security	  Apparatus,	  while	   the	  elite	  Special	  Republican	  Guard	  was	  staffed	  with	  his	   tribesmen.	  
Even	  the	  strategy	  of	  entrusting	  family	  members	  with	  key	  offices	  and	  positions	  failed	  to	  secure	  
his	   rule,	   as	   demonstrated	   by	   Hussein	   Kamil’s	   defection	   and	   cooperation	   with	   UNSCOM	  
regarding	   Iraq’s	   programmes	   of	   WMD.	   In	   1983,	   Saddam	   had	   arranged	   the	   marriage	   of	   his	  
eldest	   daughter	   Raghad	   to	   Kamil	   in	   order	   to	   consolidate	   his	   own	   position,	   despite	   protests	  
from	  the	  elders	  of	  his	  own	  tribe,	  and	  particularly	  his	  half-­‐brothers.15	  Having	  been	  appointed	  to	  
the	  helm	  of	  the	  notorious	  Special	  Security	  Apparatus,	  Kamil	  was	  also	  charged	  with	  overseeing	  
a	   non-­‐conventional	   weapons	   procurement	   and	   development	   programme.	   The	   bitter	   power	  
struggle	  between	  Kamil	  and	  his	  brother	  Saddam	  Kamil	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	  and	  Saddam’s	   sons	  
Qusay	  and	  particularly	  Uday	  on	  the	  other,	  alienated	  Kamil	  from	  Saddam’s	  regime.	  As	  Saddam	  
threatened	  to	  deport	  UNSCOM	  and	  IAEA	  inspectors	  in	  two	  months	  (for	  the	  sanctions	  were	  still	  
in	   place	   in	   mid-­‐1995	   despite	   Iraq’s	   alleged	   cooperation),	   Kamil	   defected	   to	   Jordan	   with	   an	  
entourage	   including	   his	   brother	   Saddam	  Kamil	   and	   their	  wives	   (Saddam’s	   daughters	   Raghad	  
and	   Rana).	   In	   a	   move	   to	   ease	   the	   pressure	   and	   pre-­‐empt	   trouble,	   Saddam	   declared	   Kamil	  
personally	  responsible	  for	  concealing	  WMD-­‐related	  documents	  on	  his	  farm	  (Woods,	  Palkki	  and	  
Stout	   2011,	   pp.296-­‐297).	   Kamil’s	   defection	   marked	   another	   turning	   point:	   It	   revealed	   the	  
extent	  of	  Iraq’s	  weapons	  programmes,	  making	  it	  impossible	  for	  Saddam	  to	  continue	  the	  policy	  
of	   concealment.	   Indeed,	   Saddam	   stepped	   back	   and	   sought	   to	   assuage	   the	   concerns	   of	   the	  
international	   community	   by	  withdrawing	   the	   earlier	   report	   and	   submitting	   a	  more	   accurate	  
one.	  Furthermore,	  he	  had	  to	  accept	  the	  Oil	  for	  Food	  Programme	  that	  the	  UN	  had	  been	  calling	  
for	  over	  the	  previous	  five	  years.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Saddam	  did	  not	  refrain	  from	  arranging	  the	  marriages	  of	  his	  other	  children	  for	  the	  same	  purpose	  (see	  
Karsh	  and	  Rautsi,	  1991,	  p.180-­‐181)	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While	  Kamil’s	   defection	   and	   later	   cooperation	  with	   the	  UN	  officials	  was	   significant	   in	   that	   it	  
increased	  the	  isolation	  of	  Iraq	  internationally,	  its	  real	  importance	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  Saddam’s	  
strategy	  of	  entrusting	  key	  positions	  to	   family	  members	  was	  not	  producing	  the	  consequences	  
he	  had	  intended.	  Although	  Saddam	  was	  able	  to	  hold	  on	  to	  the	  intelligence	  and	  security	  service	  
network	   and	   the	   Republican	   Guard	   after	   to	   maintain	   his	   position,	   what	   he	   feared	   most	  
throughout	  his	  dictatorship	  became	  real	  when	  a	  family	  member	  defected	  just	  at	  a	  time	  when	  
he	  thought	  he	  was	  about	  to	  break	  Iraq’s	  international	  encirclement,	  with	  consensus	  as	  to	  the	  
usefulness	  of	  sanctions	  eroding	  in	  the	  UNSC	  and	  the	  Arab	  world	  (Graham-­‐Brown	  1999).	  	  
In	  January	  1996,	  Saddam	  informed	  the	  UN	  that	  he	  was	  ready	  to	  discuss	  Resolution	  986	  (also	  
known	   as	   the	   Oil-­‐for-­‐Food	   Program)	   that	   he	   had	   rejected	   back	   in	   April	   1995	   when	   he	   still	  
hoped	   he	   could	   persuade	   the	  UNSCOM	   inspectors.	   Ensuing	   inflow	   of	   foodstuffs	   and	   limited	  
export	   of	   oil	   resulted	   in	   a	   degree	  of	   economic	   recovery	  which	   improved	   standards	  of	   living,	  
especially	  in	  the	  regime-­‐controlled	  regions.	  Vanishing	  consensus	  on	  the	  benefits	  of	  sanctions,	  
increasing	  pressure	  from	  the	  publics	  of	  the	  Western	  world	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Arab	  world	  regarding	  
the	  toll	  the	  civilian	  Iraqis	  had	  to	  pay,	  and	  the	  lucrative	  trade	  relations	  of	  Iraq	  with	  three	  UNSC	  
permanent	  members	  (that	  is	  France,	  Russia	  and	  China)	  helped	  Saddam	  to	  further	  consolidate	  
his	   position	   in	   Iraq.	  Moreover,	   the	   split	   between	   the	   KDP	   and	   the	   PUK	   in	   the	   Kurdish	   north	  
weakened	  the	  Kurdish	  threat.	  Attempts	  by	  the	  US	  to	  overthrow	  Saddam	  through	  CIA-­‐backed	  
operations	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  National	  Accord	  (INA)	  and	  Iraqi	  National	  Congress	  (INC),	  led	  respectively	  
by	   CIA	   assets	   Iyad	   Allawi	   and	   Ahmed	   Chalabi,	   failed	   because	   of	   discord	   among	   their	  
constituents.	   In	   one	   such	   episode,	   Saddam	   was	   able	   to	   uncover	   a	   coup	   attempt	   in	   1996	  
through	   the	   extensive	   reach	   of	   his	   internal	   intelligence	   and	   security	   network,	   and	   executed	  
tens	   of	   officers.16 	  However,	   this	   was	   an	   instructive	   reminder	   for	   Saddam	   that	   the	   most	  
formidable	  challenge	  to	  his	  rule	  was	  the	  constant	  danger	  emanating	  from	  the	  security	  apparati	  
of	  Iraq.	  	  
By	  1997,	  although	  revelations	  by	  Kamil	  and	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  UNSCOM	  and	  IAEA	  inspectors	  
verified	   that	   Iraq	   did	   not	   have	   any	  WMDs,	   the	   UNSC	   wanted	   the	   report	   to	   include	   all	   the	  
names,	  companies	  and	  countries	  that	  Iraq	  had	  cooperated	  with	  in	  acquiring	  WMD	  capabilities	  
in	   the	   past,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   names	   of	   all	   personnel	   who	   worked	   in	   the	   production	   and	  
destruction	  of	  WMDs.	  Saddam	  rejected	   this,	  believing	   that	  whatever	   they	  did,	   the	  US	  would	  
not	  be	  satisfied	  until	  he	  was	  overthrown.	  He	  also	  sought	  to	  maintain	  a	  degree	  of	  deterrence	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Marine	  Captain	  and	  UNSCOM	  inspector	  Scott	  Ritter	  (2005)	  gives	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  how	  UNSCOM	  
was	  used	  as	  a	  front	  organization	  by	  the	  CIA	  to	  overthrow	  Saddam.	  According	  to	  Ritter,	  it	  was	  the	  
Mukhabarat	  that	  uncovered	  the	  plot.	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capability	   against	   Israel	   and	   Iran	   by	   remaining	   ambiguous	   (Woods,	   Palkki	   and	   Stout	   2011,	  
pp.256,	   293).17	  Furthermore,	   he	   did	   not	   accept	   the	   inspection	   of	   ‘Presidential	   Sites’	  without	  
notification.	  This	  was	  also	  related	  to	  Saddam’s	  suspicions	  regarding	  the	   intentions	  of	  the	  US:	  
he	  thought	  these	  inspections	  were	  organised	  to	  acquire	  intelligence	  for	  other	  purposes,	  such	  
as	  determining	  targets	   in	  a	  possible	  attack	  by	  the	  US	  or	   Israel.	  Capitalising	  on	  discord	  among	  
UNSC	  permanent	  members	  as	  well,	  Saddam	  made	  it	  increasingly	  difficult	  for	  the	  inspections	  to	  
proceed.	  Uncooperativeness,	  in	  this	  context,	  turned	  into	  a	  bargaining	  chip	  in	  Saddam’s	  hands.	  
Meanwhile,	   the	   Iraqi	   Liberation	   Act	   passed	   in	   the	   US	   Congress	   in	   October	   1998	   openly	  
declared	  US	  foreign	  policy	  toward	  Iraq	  as	  regime	  change.18	  Combined	  with	  this,	  limited	  strikes	  
by	  the	  US	  and	  the	  UK	  as	  part	  of	  Operation	  Desert	  Fox	  marked	  the	  end	  of	  UNSCOM’s	  mission.	  
In	   brief,	   Saddam’s	   strategy	   of	   reproduction	   in	   the	   1980s	   consisted	   of	   three	  main	   elements:	  
expanding	   and	   perfecting	   a	   security	   and	   intelligence	   network	   with	   loyalist	   tribesmen	   and	  
kinsmen	   at	   the	   helm	   designed	   to	   thwart	   any	   coup	   plots,	   incorporating	  whomever	   he	   could	  
from	   the	   disenfranchised	   segments	   of	   the	   population	   and	   oppressing	   the	   rest,	   and	  
implementing	   large-­‐scale	  social	  projects	  as	  well	  as	  adopting	  a	  reformist	  and	  populist	  rhetoric	  
to	   increase	   his	   legitimacy.	   These	   were	   added	   to	   his	   aspiration	   to	   lead	   the	   Arab	   world	   and	  
become	  a	  regional	  power	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  As	  the	  war	  came	  to	  an	  end,	  dealing	  a	  strong	  blow	  
to	   his	   aspirations	   as	   well	   as	   his	   strategies	   of	   reproduction	   by	   devastating	   Iraq’s	   revenues,	  
Saddam	  increasingly	  had	  to	  rely	  solely	  on	  coercive	  tactics.	  Sanctions	  imposed	  by	  the	  UNSC	  in	  
the	  1990s	  further	  crippled	  the	  regime,	  reducing	  its	  effective	  control	  to	  the	  central	  provinces	  of	  
Iraq.	  Saddam	  tried	  to	  maintain	  his	  sway	  over	  the	  security	  and	  intelligence	  network	  by	  installing	  
even	   closer	   relatives	   in	   key	   posts.	   Even	   this	   strategy	   proved	   risky	   when	   his	   sons-­‐in-­‐law	  
defected.	  To	  make	  up	  for	  this	  internal	  security	  deficit,	  a	  new	  security	  force,	  Fedayeen	  Saddam,	  
was	  established	  in	  1995	  to	  protect	  the	  President.	  Incorporating	  members	  of	  Shiite	  and	  Kurdish	  
communities	   into	   his	   regime	   by	   appointing	   them	   to	   some	   relatively	   minor	   positions	   in	  
government	  also	  fell	  victim	  to	  his	  strategy	  of	  tribalisation.	  While	  the	  disaffected	  Shia	  turned	  to	  
religious	   organisations,	   Kurdish	   parties	   reached	   a	   power-­‐sharing	   agreement	   in	   the	   North,	  
although	  Saddam	  would	  do	  his	  best	  to	  pit	  one	  against	  the	  other	  throughout	  the	  1990s.	  As	  the	  
social	  programmes	  failed	  due	  to	  sanctions	  and	  wars,	  Saddam	  could	  not	  continue	  to	  fund	  even	  
the	   basic	   needs	   of	   the	   society.	   Although	   the	   regime	   somewhat	   successfully	   implemented	   a	  
rationing	   system,	   it	   far	   from	  satisfied	   the	  needs	  of	   the	  population	  and	  was	   selective	   toward	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Woods,	  Palkki	  and	  Stout	  (2011,	  p.256)	  claim	  that	  this	  may	  also	  be	  related	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  reliable	  records	  
available	  to	  the	  Iraqi	  government.	  
18	  Although	  the	  Act	  allocated	  approximately	  USD	  100	  million	  to	  supporting	  opposition	  groups	  in	  Iraq,	  




regime	  supporters.	  As	  replacement	  for	  social	  policies,	  Saddam	  increasingly	  adopted	  a	  religious	  
rhetoric,	   ostensibly	   without	   discriminating	   against	   the	   Shia. 19 	  Combined	   with	   an	   anti-­‐
imperialist	   and	   anti-­‐Semitic	   rhetoric,	   this	   was	   designed	   to	   maintain	   a	   degree	   of	   patriotism	  
among	   the	   population.	   Finally,	   he	   turned	   to	   strategic	   ambiguity	   as	   a	   way	   of	   deterring	   any	  
aggression	  against	  Iraq,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  partially	  cooperating	  with	  UNSCOM	  and	  IAEA	  
experts.	  Saddam	  felt	   that	   the	  biggest	  challenge	  to	  his	   reproduction	  was	  an	  American-­‐backed	  
military	  coup,	  and	  although	  scathed,	  his	  control	  over	  the	  oppressive	  intelligence	  and	  security	  
apparati	   remained	   in	   place.	   Moreover,	   until	   the	   invasion	   of	   Iraq	   in	   2003,	   he	   successfully	  
manipulated	  the	  discord	  among	  the	  permanent	  members	  of	   the	  UNSC,	   to	   the	  chagrin	  of	   the	  
US	  and	   the	  UK.	  These	   further	   contributed	   to	  Saddam’s	  belief	   that	   the	  US	  would	  not	  dare	   to	  
launch	  a	  ground	  invasion.	  
5.5.	  Caught	  by	  Surprise:	  Saddam’s	  Misjudgement	  of	  American	  
Intentions	  	  
Since	  Operation	  Desert	  Fox	  in	  December	  1998,	  Saddam	  increasingly	  came	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  
US	  would	  continue	  its	  airstrikes,	  but	  refrain	  from	  launching	  a	  land	  attack.	  He	  expected	  that	  the	  
US	   would	   try	   to	   overthrow	   him	   through	   supporting	   Shiite	   and	   Kurdish	   opposition	   or	  
disgruntled	  military	  officers.	  Therefore,	  on	  Saddam’s	  list	  of	  priorities	  of	  strategic	  threats,	  apart	  
from	  those	  emanating	  from	  his	  aides,	  an	  American	  invasion	  came	  only	  in	  third	  place,	  preceded	  
by	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  coup	  attempt	  or	  an	  attack	  by	  Iran,	  Israel	  or	  Turkey,	  the	  most	  likely	  being	  
Iran	   (Classified	   Intelligence	  Report,	  April	   2004,	   cited	   in	  Woods	  et	   al.	   2006,	  p.25).	  US	  military	  
interventions	   in	   Somalia	   and	   Bosnia	   gave	   Saddam	   the	   impression	   that	   the	   US	   would	   not	  
engage	  in	  a	  costly	  war	  against	  Iraq.20	  While	  he	  knew	  that	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  Liberation	  Act	  
was	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Republicans	  to	  corner	  the	  Clinton	  government,	  he	  was	  still	  confident	  that	  
his	  regime	  would	  be	  under	  no	  threat	  in	  Clinton’s	  term.21	  Even	  though	  Saddam	  and	  his	  advisors	  
knew	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  Republicans	  and	  the	  Democrats,	   their	  assessment	  was	  still	  
that	   the	   ‘Republicans	   [knew]	   that	   the	   regime	   cannot	   be	   ousted’	   (Woods,	   Palkki	   and	   Stout	  
2011,	  p.57).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  In	  one	  such	  show	  of	  piety,	  Saddam	  had	  a	  calligrapher	  write	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  Quran	  using	  27	  litres	  of	  his	  
own	  blood	  (Chulov	  2010).	  	  
20	  In	  the	  minutes	  of	  Saddam’s	  meeting	  with	  Vojislav	  Seselj,	  leader	  of	  the	  Serbian	  Radical	  Party,	  Saddam	  
registers	  his	  views	  on	  the	  weakness	  of	  the	  US	  (Captured	  Iraqi	  document	  dated	  12	  December	  2001,	  cited	  
in	  Woods	  et	  al.	  2006,	  p.16).	  In	  a	  captured	  audiotape,	  Saddam	  is	  heard	  of	  talking	  to	  his	  aides	  about	  the	  
US:	  ‘if	  America	  doesn’t	  condition	  [itself]	  to	  the	  new	  international	  situation...	  they	  will	  see	  problems...	  
didn’t	  they	  [the	  Somali]	  shame	  the	  US	  Army?’	  (Woods	  et.	  al	  2006,	  p.21n79).	  Deputy	  Prime	  Minister	  
Tariq	  Aziz	  also	  confirmed	  that	  Saddam	  was	  ‘very	  confident’	  that	  the	  US	  would	  not	  attack	  (Classified	  
Intelligence	  Report,	  May	  2003,	  cited	  in	  Woods	  et	  al.	  2006,	  p.28).	  
21	  In	  a	  discussion	  with	  his	  senior	  advisors	  Saddam	  registers	  his	  belief	  regarding	  the	  declared	  American	  
policy	  to	  change	  the	  Iraqi	  regime	  and	  the	  Clinton	  position	  on	  it	  (Woods,	  Palkki	  and	  Stout	  2011,	  p.56-­‐57).	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This	  strategic	  calculation	  made	  Saddam	  spend	  all	  his	  energy	  on	  securing	  his	  regime	  against	  any	  
internal	  threat.	  To	  this	  aim,	  he	  ordered	  the	  division	  of	  the	  country	  into	  four	  military	  zones	  with	  
loyal	  allies	  at	  the	  helm,	  devoting	  Iraqi	  military	  preparation	  to	  quashing	  internal	  dissidence.	  He	  
believed	  further	  that	  France	  and	  Russia	  would	  do	  his	  bidding	  in	  the	  UNSC.	  The	  replacement	  of	  
UNSCOM	   by	   UNMOVIC	   was	   a	   move	   to	   alleviate	   some	   of	   the	   concerns	   that	   Saddam	   had	  
regarding	  the	  American	  and	  British	  inspectors,	  whom	  he	  claimed	  turned	  UNSCOM	  into	  a	  locus	  
of	  US	  spying	  activities.22	  UNMOVIC	  would	  report	  directly	  to	  the	  UN.	  Russia	  and	  France	  showed	  
that	   they	  would	  not	   allow	  UNMOVIC	   to	  operate	   like	  UNSCOM	  by,	   for	  example,	  blocking	   the	  
appointment	  of	  Rolf	  Ekeus	  (former	  chair	  of	  UNSCOM)	  as	  head	  of	  UNMOVIC.	  	  
Saddam	  was	  very	  confident	  that	  the	  US	  would	  not	  send	  ground	  forces,	  so	  much	  so	  in	  fact	  that	  
he	   openly	   expressed	   his	   view	   of	   the	   9/11	   attacks	   by	   broadcasting	   a	   message	   over	   Iraqi	  
television	   that	   “America	   is	   reaping	   the	   thorns	  planted	  by	   its	   rulers	   in	   the	  world”	   (Rubin	  and	  
Rubin	  2002,	  p.283).	  A	  defiant	  Saddam	  would	  not	  cooperate	  with	  the	  UNMOVIC	  until	  it	  became	  
clear	   that	   the	   US	   was	   giving	   serious	   consideration	   to	   a	   ground	   invasion.	   As	   the	   12	  months	  
between	   the	  9/11	  attacks	  and	  September	  2002	  saw	  a	  US-­‐induced	  escalation	  of	   tension,	   Iraq	  
declared	   in	   a	   letter	   in	   mid-­‐September	   to	   UN	   Secretary-­‐General	   Kofi	   Annan	   that	   it	   would	  
unconditionally	  allow	  inspectors	  to	  continue	  their	  work.	  When	  the	  UNSC	  accepted	  Resolution	  
1441	  on	  8	  November,	   Iraq	  officially	  agreed	  to	  the	  Resolution	  in	  five	  days	  and	  the	  inspections	  
recommenced	   on	   27	   November.	   Even	   then,	   however,	   Iraq’s	   report	   regarding	   its	   WMD	  
activities	   left	   unaccounted-­‐for	   gaps	   according	   to	  UNMOVIC	   (2003).	   Saddam	   still	   thought	   the	  
objections	  of	  Russia,	  France	  and	  Germany	  could	  prevent	  the	  war	  and	  his	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  opined	  
that	  even	  if	  the	  invasion	  started,	  the	  US	  would	  have	  to	  step	  back	  due	  to	  international	  pressure	  
as	  well	  as	  domestic	  political	  reaction	  (Woods	  et	  al.	  2006,	  p.30).	  
As	  war	  was	  becoming	  more	  likely	  in	  early	  2003,	  Iraqi	  authorities	  did	  everything	  they	  could	  to	  
satisfy	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  inspectors.	  However,	  neither	  relatively	  positive	  reports	  by	  the	  UN	  
Chief	  Weapons	   Inspector	   Hans	   Blix	   nor	   the	   protests	   of	   Russia,	   France	   and	   Germany	   among	  
others	   appeared	   to	   prevent	   escalation.	   Saddam	   and	   his	   aides	   now	   realised	   that	   war	   was	  
almost	   inevitable.	   Realising	   this,	   Deputy	   Prime	   Minister	   Tariq	   Aziz	   reportedly	   noted	   that	  
‘America	   has	   long	   since	   decided	   to	   attack	   Iraq	   and	   nothing	   Iraq	   could	   do	  would	   prevent	   it’	  
(Polk	   2005,	   p.169).	   The	   Iraqi	   government	   was	   so	   desperate	   that	   they	   tried	   to	   establish	  
backchannel	  diplomatic	  links	  with	  the	  US	  government,	  promising	  to	  hold	  elections	  (Guardian,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Most	  famously,	  UNSCOM	  inspector	  Scott	  Ritter	  would	  confirm	  this,	  causing	  outcry	  in	  Iraq	  and	  
controversy	  abroad.	  Ritter	  would	  later	  tell	  the	  whole	  story	  in	  a	  book	  shedding	  some	  light	  on	  the	  
American	  intelligence	  operations	  in	  Iraq.	  See	  Ritter	  (2006).	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2003),	  and	  even	  proposing	  to	  open	   Iraq	  to	  FBI	  agents	   to	  search	   for	  WMDs	  or	  any	  proof	   that	  
linked	   Iraq	   to	  Al-­‐Qaeda,	   although	   the	   proposal	  was	   ‘killed’	   by	   the	  White	  House	   (Polk,	   2005,	  
p.168).	   As	   late	   as	   28	   February,	   that	   is	   three	   weeks	   before	   the	   war,	   Saddam	   ordered	   the	  
destruction	   of	   Al-­‐Samoud	   missiles	   in	   a	   demonstration	   of	   cooperation.	   Other	   last-­‐minute	  
attempts	  by	  Turkey	  and	  Egypt	  failed,	  as	  what	  they	  offered	  to	  Saddam	  was	  refuge	  and	  nothing	  
more.	  Knowing	  that	  any	  agreement	  would	  require	  his	  exile	  along	  with	  his	  two	  sons,	  Uday	  and	  
Qusay,	   Saddam	  refused	   these	  proposals.	   Finally,	  when	  George	  W.	  Bush	   issued	  an	  ultimatum	  
requesting	  that	  Saddam	  and	  his	  sons	   leave	  the	  country	  so	  that	  Coalition	   forces	  could	  disarm	  
Iraq,	   Saddam	   publicly	   rejected	   it,	   and	   the	   war	   to	   end	   his	   rule	   began,	   since	   Bush	   had	   also	  
declared	  that	  whether	  Saddam	  stepped	  down	  or	  not	  the	  invasion	  would	  proceed.23	  	  
The	   preceding	   must	   have	   shed	   some	   light	   on	   the	   necessity	   of	   unpacking	   the	   historical	  
becoming	   of	   a	   conjuncture	   that	   resulted	   in	   war.	   Unlike	   what	   many	   saw	   as	   a	   pathological	  
outpouring	  of	  impulsive	  behaviour,	  Saddam’s	  actions	  reflected	  his	  strategy	  of	  reproduction	  as	  
a	  dictator	  which	  had	  been	   in	  the	  making	  since	  the	  1960s.	  As	  aptly	  observed	  by	  Kevin	  Woods	  
and	   his	   collaborators	   in	   the	   Iraqi	   Perspectives	   Project,	   ‘While	  …	   the	   choices	   Iraq	  made	  may	  
appear	   dysfunctional…,	   the	   regime’s	   response	   to	   the	   threat	   …	   were	   logical	   within	   the	   Iraqi	  
political	  framework’	  (Woods	  et	  al.	  2006).	  	  
5.6.	  Conclusion	  
This	   chapter	   is	   the	   third	   and	   final	   part	   of	   a	   three-­‐chapter	   illustration	   of	   the	   theoretical	  
discussion	   presented	   in	   Chapter	   2.	   It	   started	   with	   raising	   the	   question	   of	   why	   Saddam	  
Hussein’s	  regime	  reacted	  to	  the	  threat	  of	  war	  the	  way	   it	  did,	  defying	  the	  established	   logic	  of	  
mainstream	   IR:	   prudence	   and	   caution.	   Then	   in	   Section	   2,	   it	   engaged	   with	   the	   existing	  
literature,	   and	  argued	   that	  while	   the	   literature	  on	   this	  episode	  of	   Iraqi	   foreign	  policy	   is	   very	  
limited,	  existing	  works	  generally	  saw	  Iraq	  through	  a	  reductionist	  lens,	  either	  by	  reducing	  it	  to	  
another	  Arab	  or	  Middle	   Eastern	   state	  or	   to	   yet	   another	  dictatorship.	   The	   specificities	  of	   the	  
combination	   of	   social	   relations	   that	   helped	   shape	   both	   the	   conditions	   and	   strategies	   of	   the	  
Iraqi	   state	  are	   largely	  disregarded,	   resulting	   in	  psychopathologies	  of	  dictators	   in	  which	   these	  
specificities	  are	  seen	  as	  instances	  of	  general	  abstract	  properties	  of	  dictators	  or	  dictatorships.	  In	  
Section	  3,	  I	  claimed	  that	  Saddam	  had	  good	  reason	  to	  most	  fear	  a	  military	  coup.	  To	  overcome	  
the	   problems	   found	   in	   the	   literature	   and	   to	   historically	   locate	   the	   role	   of	   the	   internal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  In	  a	  meeting	  with	  the	  Spanish	  Prime	  Minister	  Jose	  Maria	  Aznar	  on	  22	  February,	  Bush	  reportedly	  said	  
that	  Saddam	  proposed	  to	  go	  into	  exile	  if	  he	  was	  allowed	  to	  take	  USD	  1	  billion	  and	  information	  on	  WMDs	  
with	  him	  and	  implied	  that	  whether	  he	  left	  or	  not	  he	  would	  face	  charges	  for	  his	  crimes	  against	  humanity	  




machinations	  that	  came	  to	  alarm	  Saddam,	  in	  Section	  4,	  I	  proposed	  and	  undertook	  a	  historical	  
reconstruction	   of	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   Iraqi	   state,	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   officers	   as	   a	   social	  
force,	   the	  autonomisation	  of	  the	  political	  struggle	   from	  wider	  social	   relations,	  and	  finally	   the	  
responses	   Saddam	   gave	   to	   what	   appeared	   to	   him	   as	   the	   constant	   threat	   of	   a	   palace	   coup,	  
which	   in	   turn	   gave	   shape	   to	   the	   Iraqi	   state	   from	   1979	   to	   2003	   and	   beyond.	   The	   historical	  
reconstruction	  revealed	  that	  Saddam’s	  fear	  of	  a	  coup	  was	  not	  unfounded	  at	  all.	  As	  I	  argued	  in	  
section	  4.1,	  both	  Ottoman	  and	  later	  British	  reliance	  on	  tribal	  relations	  to	  reproduce	  their	  rule	  
in	  what	  was	   to	   become	   an	   independent	   Iraq	   contradicted	   the	   influence	   of	  market	   relations	  
that	   both	   empires	   gradually	   introduced.	   Moreover,	   the	   reliance	   of	   the	   Iraqi	   Monarchy	   on	  
British	  support	  on	   the	  one	  hand	  and	   its	   strategy	  of	  expanding	  a	  national	  army	  on	   the	  other,	  
further	   deepened	   the	   contradiction	  whereby	   emergent	   officers	   showed	   their	   dissatisfaction	  
through	  a	  series	  of	  coups	  starting	  from	  1936	  until	  reoccupation	  of	  the	  country	  by	  the	  British.	  
Finally,	   an	   officer	   movement	   overthrew	   and	   abolished	   the	   monarchy	   in	   1958,	   marking	   the	  
beginning	  of	  another	  turbulent	  period	  in	  Iraqi	  history.	  	  
Significant	  increases	  in	  oil	  output	  and	  oil	  revenues	  starting	  from	  the	  last	  years	  of	  the	  Monarchy	  
until	   the	   early	   1980s	   contributed	   to	   the	  decoupling	  of	   the	   state	   from	  wider	   social	   relations,	  
while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   enabling	   it	   to	   deliver	   social	   goods.	   The	   liquidation	   of	   the	   ICP	   after	  
Qasim	  was	  overthrown	  severed	  any	  direct	  link	  that	  enabled	  wider	  segments	  of	  the	  population	  
to	  participate	   in	   the	   formation	  of	   the	  new	   Iraqi	   state.	  This	  made	  possible	  a	   relentless	  power	  
game	  among	  higher-­‐ranking	  officers,	  each	  of	  whom	  entered	   into	  conjunctural	  and	  pragmatic	  
alliances	   and	   tried	   to	   expand	   their	   power	   bases	   within	   the	   military.	   Power	   transitions	  
throughout	   the	  post-­‐monarchy	  period	   took	   the	   form	  of	  military	   coups	  by	  unlikely	  allies	  who	  
almost	   always	   immediately	   fell	   out	   after	   seizing	   power.	   This	   mode	   of	   power	   transition	   led	  
Saddam	  to	  strive	  for	  taking	  control	  of	  the	  whole	  of	  means	  of	  violence,	  control,	  and	  information	  
available	   to	   the	   Iraqi	   state	   starting	   from	   the	   1970s.	   This	   is	   why,	   I	   argued	   throughout	   this	  
chapter,	  Saddam	  feared	  most	  a	  palace	  coup	  by	  military	  officers.	  To	  preclude	  possible	  attempts,	  
Saddam	   reconfigured	   the	   whole	   security	   and	   intelligence	   apparatus	   that	   monitored	   almost	  
every	  act	  of	  the	  officers	  with	  all	  agencies	  reporting	  directly	  to	  the	  Presidency,	  while	  spying	  on	  
one	  another.	  This	  complex	  of	  agencies	  also	  served	  to	  oppress	  the	  disenfranchised	  segments	  of	  
the	  population	  whereby	  everyone	  was	   relegated	  to	   the	  status	  of	   informer	  on	  everyone	  else,	  
themselves	  fearful	  of	  the	  watchful	  eye	  of	  the	  regime.	  While	  Saddam	  also	  catered	  to	  the	  needs	  
of	   wider	   society	   in	   terms	   of	   providing	   social	   goods,	   wars,	   first	   with	   Iran	   and	   then	   with	   the	  
coalition	   forces,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   following	   sanctions	   regime	   rendered	   this	   strategy	   obsolete.	  
Oppression	   of	   Kurds	   and	   the	   Shia	   resulted	   in	   their	   total	   alienation	   from	   the	   regime,	   and	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Saddam	   felt	   increasingly	   encircled	   by	   the	   regional	   powers,	   the	   US	   and	   its	   allies,	   and	   their	  
opposition.	  Relying	  on	  family	  members	  did	  not	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  as	  safe	  as	  he	  assumed	  when	  his	  
sons-­‐in-­‐law	  defected	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s.	  At	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century,	  as	  circumstances	  seemed	  to	  
ameliorate,	  with	  discord	   in	   the	  UNSC,	   limited	  economic	   recovery,	  departure	  of	   the	  UNSCOM	  
inspectors,	   and	   relative	   stabilisation	  of	   the	   security	   situation,	   at	   least	   in	   the	   central	   parts	   of	  
Iraq,	  Saddam	  thought	  he	  could	  finally	  see	  the	  light	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  tunnel.	  Having	  uncovered	  
CIA-­‐instigated	  coup	  attempts	  in	  the	  past,	  securing	  the	  support	  of	  Russia	  and	  France	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  opposition	  of	  many	  others	  to	  US	  war	  plans,	  Saddam	  did	  not	  think	  the	  US	  would	  launch	  a	  
land	   attack;	   rather	   he	   was	   preoccupied	   with	   another	   coup	   attempt	   as	   the	  most	   dangerous	  
threat	  to	  his	  rule.	  This	  is	  why	  he	  adopted	  a	  strategy	  of	  gradual	  or	  partial	  compliance	  in	  the	  face	  
of	  pressure	  by	   the	  UNSC.	  This	   is	   also	  why,	  when	  he	   realised	   that	   the	  US	  government	  meant	  
business,	   he	   accepted	   every	   condition	   set	   by	   the	   successive	   UNSC	   resolutions	   that	   he	   had	  
vehemently	  rejected	  in	  the	  past,	  understanding	  that	  now	  war	  had	  become	  unavoidable.	  
Just	   as	   the	   preceding	   two	   chapters	   did,	   this	   chapter	   also	   demonstrated	   that	   foreign	   policy	  
decisions	   are	   inter-­‐subjectively	   made	   not	   only	   by	   the	   actors	   who	   have	   immediate	   official	  
capacity,	  but	  also	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  agents	  who	  occupy	  different	   spatiotemporal	   locations	  with	  
diverse	  distances	  and	  mediations	  in	  their	  relation	  with	  the	  actual	  decision.	  The	  Iraqi	  decision,	  
in	   this	   sense,	   was	   the	   result	   of	   the	   contradictory	   reproductive	   strategies	   of	   seemingly	  
spatiotemporally	   unrelated	   agents.	   As	  will	   be	   argued	   in	   the	   Conclusion	   of	   this	   thesis,	   these	  
foreign	  policy	  decisions,	  in	  turn,	  contribute	  to	  the	  inter-­‐subjective	  and	  dialectical	  making	  of	  the	  
real	  abstraction	  called	  the	  international	  system.	  
6.	  CONCLUSION	  
6.1.	  Introduction	  
This	   thesis	  problematized	   the	  disciplinary	  gap	  between	  FPA	  and	   IR.	  The	  gap,	   I	   argued,	   is	   the	  
result	   of	   the	  disciplinary	   self-­‐definitions	  of	   these	   two	  enterprises,	   notwithstanding	  extensive	  
overlaps	  in	  their	  subject	  matter.	  While	  FPA	  seeks	  to	  explain	  specific	  foreign	  policy	  decisions	  of	  
specific	  states,	   IR	   tends	  to	   focus	  more	  on	  the	  complex	  consequences	  of	   these	  decisions,	  and	  
seeks	  to	  explain	  the	  patterns	  of	  relations	  between	  states.	  In	  doing	  this,	  they	  externalise	  each	  
other:	  FPA	  takes	  the	  ‘international	  system’	  as	  a	  given	  independent	  variable,	  while	  IR	  attributes	  
predetermined	  forms	  of	  behaviour	  to	  states.	  Abstracted	  as	  different	  ways	  of	  seeing	  the	  same	  
set	  of	  phenomena,	  these	  enterprises	  in	  fact	  freeze	  practical	  historical-­‐social	  aspects	  of	  reality	  
as	   unchanging	   conceptual	   architectonics.	   Attempts	   to	   bridge	   this	   disciplinary	   gap	   fail	   as	   a	  
result,	  since	  rather	  than	  concretely	  relating	  these	  phenomena,	  they	  seek	  to	   juxtapose	  frozen	  
conceptual	  abstractions	  without	  integrating	  them.	  	  
This	  failure,	  I	  claimed,	  can	  only	  be	  addressed	  at	  a	  deeper	  onto-­‐epistemological	  level	  where	  we	  
can	  problematise	  what	  an	  abstraction	   is,	  how	  abstractions	  are	  made	  in	  wider	  social	  relations	  
among	  human	  beings,	  how	  real	   these	  abstractions	  are,	  and	  how	  they	  help	  us	   to	  understand	  
and	   theorise,	   and	   bridge	   this	   gap	   in	   our	   scientific	   undertakings.	   To	   do	   this,	   I	   offered	   a	  
fundamentally	   different	   conception	   of	   abstraction,	   one	   that	   finds	   its	   most	   developed	  
expression	  in	  a	  dialectical	  mode	  of	  thinking.	  In	  this	  framework,	  derived	  mostly	  from	  the	  works	  
of	  Karl	  Marx,	   I	  demonstrated	  that	   real	  abstractions	  such	  as	   the	   ‘state’,	   ‘capital	   relation’,	   ‘the	  
international	   system’	   and	   etc.	   are	   the	   products	   of	   protracted	   and	   contradictory	   historical	  
processes	   that	   are	   generated	   by	   the	   contradictory	   strategies	   of	   a	   variety	   of	   agents	   in	  
reproducing	  life.	  Inasmuch	  as	  they	  are	  experienced	  as	  a	  set	  of	  constraints,	  they	  appear	  as	  real	  
structures	   to	   agents.	   In	   order	   to	   highlight	   the	   contested	   and	   transitory	   nature	   of	   these	   real	  
abstractions,	   I	   maintained	   that	   they	   are	   no	   more	   than	   a	   temporary	   equilibrium	   of	   the	  
contradictory	   historical	   strategies	   of	   reproduction	   of	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   agents.	   The	   main	  
argument	  of	  this	  thesis,	  accordingly,	  is	  that	  in	  their	  concrete	  existence	  states	  practically	  bridge	  
foreign	   policy	   and	   international	   relations.	   In	   their	   practical	   acts	   of	   reproduction,	   what	   is	  
external	   to	   them,	   the	   so-­‐called	   international	   system	   and	   its	   structure,	   appear	   to	   them	   as	   a	  
constraining	   framework	   for	   action.	   By	   acting	   upon	   it,	   however,	   even	   within	   the	   perceived	  
limits	  that	  face	  them,	  they	  contribute	  to	  changing	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  international	  system.	  To	  
put	   it	  differently,	   foreign	  policies	  of	   states	  as	  part	  of	   their	   reproductive	   strategies	   constitute	  
the	   concrete	   historical	   content	   of	   international	   relations.	   As	   states	   do	   not	   operate	   in	   a	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vacuum,	   their	   foreign	   policy	   strategies	   do	   not	   translate	   into	   structural	   determinants	   of	  
international	   relations	  unmediated;	  both	   the	   formation	  of	   foreign	  policy	   strategies	  and	   their	  
constitutive	   influence	   in	   the	   shaping	   of	   international	   relations	   are	   subject	   to	   the	   socio-­‐
historical	   dynamics	   mentioned	   above.	   States	   as	   real	   abstractions,	   and	   their	   foreign	   policy	  
strategies	  are	  themselves	  the	  temporarily	  institutionalised	  and	  ossified	  results	  of	  the	  interplay	  
of	   contradictory	   strategies	   of	   reproduction	   of	   a	   variety	   of	   agents,	   constantly	   contested	   and	  
changing	   in	   response	   to	   these	   strategies.	  By	   the	   same	   token,	  what	  appear	   to	  be	  patterns	   in	  
international	   relations	   are	   the	   real	   abstractions	   generated	   by	   the	   interplay	   of	   foreign	   policy	  
strategies	   of	   a	  multiplicity	   of	   states.	   In	   a	  word,	  what	   states	   do	   as	   part	   of	   their	   reproductive	  
strategies	  unwittingly	  contributes	  to	  the	  making	  of	  what	  appear	  as	  international	  relations.	  	  
It	  is	  in	  this	  onto-­‐epistemological	  framework	  that	  I	  claimed	  that	  the	  units	  and	  levels	  of	  analysis	  
change	   according	   to	   the	   specific	   foreign	   policy	   question	   that	   we	   raise.	   To	  match	   this	   onto-­‐
epistemology,	   I	   offered	   a	   research	   question-­‐guided	   methodology	   in	   FPA.	   This	   requires	  
following	   the	   footsteps	  of	   the	   relevant	   agents	   immediately	   active	   in	   a	   foreign	  policy-­‐making	  
conjuncture.	   As	   foreign	   policies	   are	   themselves	   subject	   to	   contradictory	   strategies	   of	  
reproduction	   and	   emerge	   as	   their	   unintended	   results,	   the	   analysis	   of	   every	   foreign	   policy	  
decision	  requires	  a	  historical	  tracing	  back	  of	  its	  making.	  Analysis	  matches	  theory	  only	  when	  our	  
study	  reflects	  the	  concrete	  complexity	  of	  reality.	  	  
To	   illustrate	  what	  all	   this	  means	  empirically,	   I	   analysed	   three	  counter-­‐intuitive	   foreign	  policy	  
decisions	  by	  three	  states	  in	  the	  early	  2000s.	  The	  first	  case	  was	  the	  US	  decision	  to	  invade	  Iraq	  in	  
2003.	   I	   argued	   that	   the	   US	   grand	   strategy	   of	   ensuring	   and	   maintaining	   US	   primacy	   was	  
reformulated	  by	  the	  Bush	  administration	   in	   its	   implementation,	  with	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  more	  
proactive	  policy	  of	  compelling	  ‘failed’	  and	  ‘rogue’	  states,	  i.e.	  states	  that	  escape	  the	  orbit	  of	  the	  
American-­‐led	  capitalist	  order,	  to	  integrate	  themselves	  into	  this	  order.	  The	  second	  case	  was	  the	  
Turkish	  decision	   to	  deny	  passage	   and	  basing	   rights	   to	   invading	  American	   troops.	   I	   explained	  
this	   decision	  with	   reference	   to	   the	   uneasy	   relationship	   between	   the	  military,	   the	   traditional	  
locus	  of	  foreign	  policy-­‐making	  in	  Turkey,	  and	  the	  newly-­‐established	  JDP	  government.	  Paralysed	  
by	   contradictory	  pressures	   from	  public	  opinion,	   its	   own	   constituency,	   the	  military	   as	  well	   as	  
the	  other	  tutelary	  institutions	  of	  the	  Republic	  and	  the	  US	  government,	  the	  JDP	  government,	  I	  
argued,	   did	   not	   push	   through	   the	  motion	   in	   the	   parliament	   forcefully	   enough	   to	   secure	   the	  
vote.	  Finally,	  I	  raised	  the	  question	  regarding	  Iraq’s	  defiance	  in	  the	  face	  of	  imminent	  invasion	  by	  
the	  US.	  I	  argued	  that	  Iraq’s	  recalcitrance	  was	  based	  on	  a	  miscalculation	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Saddam	  
Hussein	  and	  his	  closest	  advisors	  that	  the	  gravest	  danger	  for	  his	  rule	  was	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  military	  
coup,	  a	  miscalculation	  that	  cost	  him	  his	   life	  and	  regime.	  The	  aim	   in	  these	   individual	  analyses	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was	   not	   to	   propose	   novel	   explanations	   for	   these	   three	   cases	   and	   the	   overlaps	   between	   the	  
literature	  and	  the	  analyses	  offered	  here	  are	  indicative	  of	  this.	  The	  aim,	  first	  of	  all,	  was	  rather	  to	  
demonstrate	   that	   these	   foreign	   policy	   decisions	   were	   not	   instantiations	   of	   pre-­‐conceived	  
theoretical	   models,	   but	   long-­‐term	   consequences	   of	   the	   contradictorily	   related	   praxes	   of	  
spatiotemporally	  differently	  situated	  and	  motivated	  agents.	  Secondly,	  the	  cases	  were	  meant	  to	  
show	   that,	   in	   developing	   reproductive	   strategies,	   individual	   states	   and	   leaders	   practically	  
bridge	   not	   only	   foreign	   policies	   and	   international	   relations,	   but	   also	   what	   researchers	  
analytically	  separate	  as	  the	  economic,	  political,	  legal,	  geographical,	  psychological,	  and	  etc.	  
In	  analysing	  these	  decisions,	  therefore,	  I	  took	  the	  longer	  historical	  route	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  
these	  decisions	  were	  not	  made	   in	  a	  vacuum	  originating	   in	   the	  personalities,	  psychologies,	  or	  
leadership	  styles	  of	  the	  leaders.	  Nor	  were	  they	  the	  strategic	  calculations	  of	  states	  in	  response	  
to	   imperatives	   of	   anarchy	   in	   international	   relations.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   United	   States,	   the	  
strategy	  of	  binding	  other	  states’	  conditions	  of	  reproduction	  to	  the	  American	  grand	  strategy	  of	  
continued	   American	   primacy	   in	   non-­‐coercive	   ways	   has	   long	   been	   in	   the	  making.	  When	   the	  
opportunity	  arose	  to	  make	  the	  world	  ‘not	  just	  safer,	  but	  better’	  with	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  
and	  particularly	  after	  the	  9/11	  attacks,	  the	  Bush	  administration	  took	  the	  proactive	  route	  and	  
attempted	   to	   coercively	   compel	  defiant	   states	   into	   joining	   the	  American-­‐led	  global	   capitalist	  
order.	   That	   it	   was	   the	   Bush	   Jr.	   administration,	   rather	   than	   the	   Bush	   Sr.	   or	   Clinton	  
administrations,	   who	   adopted	   this	   more	   aggressive	   stance,	   serves	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   the	  
decision	  was	  not	   simply	  an	   imperative	  of	   the	   long-­‐standing	  American	   strategy;	   rather	   it	  was	  
the	  result	  of	  a	  different	  view	  of	  a	  different	  world	  by	  the	  new	  administration.	  Similarly,	   in	  the	  
Turkish	  case,	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  rupture	  in	  Turkish	  foreign	  policy,	  I	  historically	  reconstructed	  
the	  formation	  of	  the	  Turkish	  state	  in	  a	  bid	  to	  show	  the	  continuity	  that	  characterised	  it.	  I	  argued	  
that	   the	   traditional	   locus	  of	   foreign	  policy-­‐making,	   the	  military,	   had	   come	   to	  occupy	   centre-­‐
stage	  in	  the	  Turkish	  polity.	  In	  this	  particular	  conjuncture,	  however,	  the	  military	  refrained	  from	  
taking	   a	   strong	  position,	   not	   least	   because	   it	  wanted	   the	   governing	   JDP	   to	   take	   the	  heat	   by	  
passing	   the	   motion.	   Under	   contradictory	   influences	   from	   a	   variety	   of	   domestic	   and	  
international	   political	   and	   economic	   sources,	   the	   JDP	   reluctantly	   took	   the	   motion	   to	   the	  
Parliament,	  and	   failed	   to	   secure	   the	  vote.	   Lastly,	   in	   the	  case	  of	   Iraq,	   I	   argued	   that	  Saddam’s	  
fear	   of	   a	   military	   coup	   was	   not	   unfounded.	   The	   story	   of	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   Iraqi	   polity	  
showed	  that	  the	  state	  developed	  an	  autonomy	  due	  to	  rents	  from	  oil	  production,	  and	  that	  this	  
autonomy	   resulted	   in	   the	   consolidation	   of	   a	   conspiratorial	   political	   life,	   the	   emergence	   of	  
which	   was	   a	   result	   of	   the	   specific	   formation	   of	   the	   Iraqi	   state	   under	   contradictory	   and	  
asynchronous	  influence	  from	  Ottoman	  and	  British	  rules.	  As	  changes	  of	  rule	  almost	  always	  took	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the	   form	  of	  military	  or	  palace	  coups,	  not	   least	  because	   the	  society	  was	   repressed	  under	   the	  
omnipresent	  security	  and	  intelligence	  network	  of	  the	  regime,	  Saddam’s	  primary	  concern	  was	  
internal	  threats	  to	  his	  reproduction.	  Furthermore,	  he	  was	  almost	  certain	  that	  the	  US	  would	  not	  
attack	  because	  of	   the	  discord	   in	   the	   international	   community	   in	   general	   and	   in	   the	  UNSC	   in	  
particular,	  and	   the	  domestic	   legitimacy	  and	   financial	   costs	  of	  a	  US	   involvement	   in	  a	  possible	  
ground	   war.	   While	   these	   three	   cases	   were	   accounted	   for	   dialectically	   as	   foreign	   policy	  
outcomes	  of	  protracted	  historical	  developments	   involving	   the	   seemingly	  unrelated	  praxes	  of	  
diverse	  sets	  of	  agents,	  they	  are	  yet	  to	  be	  presented	  as	  interrelated	  and	  constitutive	  aspects	  of	  
international	  relations.	  This	  is	  what	  the	  next	  section	  seeks	  to	  achieve.	  	  
6.2.	  The	  Dialectical	  Making	  of	  the	  Iraq	  War	  
In	   2002,	   a	   senior	   adviser	   to	   George	   W.	   Bush	   (believed	   to	   be	   Karl	   Rove)	   would	   say	   in	   an	  
interview	  with	  the	  journalist	  Ron	  Suskind:	  	  
We’re	  an	  empire	  now,	  and	  when	  we	  act,	  we	  create	  our	  own	  reality.	  And	  while	  you’re	  
studying	   that	   reality	   …	   we’ll	   act	   again,	   creating	   other	   new	   realities,	   which	   you	   can	  
study	   too...	  We’re	  history’s	   actors…	  and	  you	  …	  will	   be	   left	   to	   just	   study	  what	  we	  do	  
(The	  New	  York	  Times	  Magazine,	  2004).	  
In	  a	  way,	  this	  thinking	  has	  a	  point	  that	  I	  raised	  in	  this	  thesis.	  Historical	  process	  is	  not	  static	  and	  
as	  agents	  act	  upon	  reality,	  they	  simultaneously	  change	  that	  reality.	  In	  another	  sense,	  however,	  
that	   the	  objects	  of	   those	  actions	  are	  at	   the	   same	   time	   the	   subjects	  of	  other	  actions	  on	   that	  
same	  reality	  almost	  always	  generates	  unintended	  consequences	  for	  all	  the	  parties	  involved.	  It	  
is	  this	  inter-­‐subjective	  nature	  of	  international	  relations	  that	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  conceptualise	  
it	   as	   the	   contradictory	   and	   cumulative	   result	   of	   a	  diverse	   set	  of	   foreign	   and	  domestic	   policy	  
acts.	  	  
How	  did	  these	  three	  acts	  of	  foreign	  policy	  by	  three	  different	  states	  contribute	  to	  the	  making	  of	  
international	   relations,	   then?	   I	   already	   argued	   in	   Chapter	   3	   that,	   thanks	   to	   the	   immense	  
network	  of	  relations	  that	  was	  institutionalised	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  with	  
the	  US	  as	  the	  central	  actor	  and	  the	  relative	  capabilities	  of	  the	  American	  state,	  even	  seemingly	  
domestic	   American	   policies	   had	   international	   implications.	   This	   is	   even	   more	   so	   with	   US	  
foreign	   policy.	   Foreign	   policy	   acts	   of	   the	   US	  more	   often	   than	   not	   presented	   themselves	   as	  
‘international	   system-­‐constitutive’	   acts	   from	   the	   vantage	  point	   of	   other	   states.	   For	   instance,	  
when	   the	   Cold	  War	   started,	   the	   emerging	   international	   order	   had	   direct	   influence	   on	   how	  
other	  states	  conducted	  their	   foreign	  policies	  and	  even	  domestic	  policies.	  While	  the	   influence	  
of	  the	  US	  in	  world	  politics	  in	  general	  can	  be	  easier	  to	  appreciate	  due	  to	  its	  unique	  capabilities,	  
the	  contribution	  of	  other	  actors	  to	  international	  relations	  is	  far	  from	  ignorable,	  although	  they	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are	  not	   as	  directly	   constitutive	   as	  US	   foreign	  policies.	   Turkey’s	   alignment	  with	   the	  US	   in	   the	  
Cold	  War,	  for	  instance,	  served	  well	  the	  containment	  strategy	  of	  the	  US.	  If	  Turkey	  had	  fallen	  to	  
the	  Soviet	  Union,	  the	  Soviets	  would	  have	  gained	  access	  to	  the	  Middle	  East,	  possibly	  changing	  
the	  balance	  in	  its	  favour.	  Similarly,	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  Iraqi	  state	  achieved	  independence	  from	  the	  
British,	  its	  foreign	  policies	  started	  to	  leave	  their	  mark	  on	  international	  relations.	  Oscillations	  of	  
the	   Iraqi	   state	  between	  Soviet-­‐backed	  Arab	  nationalism	  and	   Iraqi	  nationalism	   influenced	   the	  
Cold	  War	  order,	  not	  least	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  oil	  price	  volatility.	  	  
This	  much	  intertwinement	  between	  the	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  policies	  of	  individual	  states	  and	  
international	  relations	   is	  accepted	  by	  even	  the	  most	  rigid	  approaches	  of	  FPA	  and	  IR,	  albeit	   in	  
the	  form	  of	  correlations	  between	  abstracted	  variables.	  As	  I	  argued	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  foreign	  policy	  
strategies	   of	   states	   are	   part	   of	   their	   wider	   reproductive	   strategies,	   including	   their	   domestic	  
policies.	  These	  subjective	  strategies	  of	  reproduction	  of	  individual	  states	  also	  inter-­‐subjectively,	  
but	   crucially	   asynchronously	   (that	   is,	   through	   the	   interaction	   of	   a	   diverse	   set	   of	   praxes	   of	  
different	   actors	   at	   historically	   different	   moments),	   construct	   what	   we	   call	   international	  
relations.	   The	   asynchronous	   nature	   of	   this	   inter-­‐subjectivity	   of	   the	   making	   of	   international	  
relations	   makes	   it	   invisible	   to	   the	   undialectical	   eye.	   To	   demonstrate	   how	   foreign	   policy	  
strategies	   as	   part	   of	   wider	   reproductive	   strategies	   inter-­‐subjectively	   make	   international	  
relations,	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	   first	  reconstruct	  the	  making	  of	  the	   Iraqi	  war	  and	  
then	   discuss	   how	   the	   Iraqi	   war	   remade	   international	   relations	   so	   that	   it	   had	   enormous	  
influence	  in	  shaping	  the	  new	  international	  conjuncture	  that	  we	  have	  today.	  
The	  2003	  war	  in	  Iraq	  was	  as	  much	  the	  making	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  and	  the	  British	  colonial	  
administration	  as	  it	  was	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  and	  American	  states.	  As	  Dodge	  (2006)	  registers,	  in	  order	  to	  
make	   sense	   of	   the	   invasion	   of	   Iraq,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   analyse	   not	   only	   the	   long-­‐term	  
institutionalisation	   of	   American	   foreign	   policy,	   but	   also	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   institutional	  
complex	   of	   the	   Iraqi	   state	   which	   was	   largely	   autonomous	   from	   wider	   social	   relations.	   As	  
argued	  in	  Chapter	  5	  this	  autonomy	  was,	  to	  a	  certain	  extent,	  the	  result	  of	  the	  ‘rentierism’	  of	  the	  
Iraqi	  state.	  But	  even	  before	  the	  Iraqi	  state	  became	  an	  independent	  rentier	  state,	  the	  seeds	  of	  
this	   autonomy	   were	   sown	   first	   by	   the	   Ottoman	   Empire	   in	   its	   attempt	   to	   respond	   to	   the	  
increasing	  geopolitical	  challenges	  from	  the	  Great	  Powers.	  As	  part	  of	  its	  centralisation	  policies,	  
the	   Empire	   had	   adopted	   a	   strategy	   of	   empowering	   its	   appointed	   officials	   in	   its	   provinces	   in	  
what	  was	  to	  become	  Iraq,	  driving	  a	  wedge	  between	  Ottoman-­‐trained	  officer	  controlled	  urban	  
centres	   and	   shaikh-­‐controlled	   tribal	   rural	   areas.	   The	   British	   colonial	   administration,	   in	   turn,	  
severed	  the	  town	  from	  the	  countryside	  even	  further	  to	  be	  able	  to	  rule	  via	  tribal	  shaikhs	  and	  
the	  King.	  These	  two	  moves	  by	  the	  Ottoman	  and	  British	  administrations,	  devised	  for	  different	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subjective	   reasons,	   created	   the	   conditions	   for	   the	   rise	   of	   an	   autonomous	   officers	   group.	  
Indeed,	  the	  British	  observed	  the	  autonomy	  of	  political	  life	  at	  a	  very	  early	  time	  (Dodge	  2003b,	  
p.70).	   Furthermore,	   King	   Faisal’s	   attempts	   to	   centralise	   his	   rule	   through	   strengthening	   the	  
army	   also	   contributed	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   this	   social	   force	   to	   his	   own	   expense.	   Finally,	  
increasing	  revenues	  from	  oil	  from	  the	  1950s	  onwards	  made	  the	  Iraqi	  state	  almost	  completely	  
insulated	  from	  the	  needs	  and	  demands	  of	  its	  wider	  society,	  leading	  to	  a	  conspiratorial	  form	  of	  
politics.	  Conspiratorial	  politics,	  in	  turn,	  played	  the	  prominent	  role	  in	  forming	  Saddam’s	  threat	  
perception,	  elevating	  US-­‐backed	  coup	  plots	   to	   top	  of	   the	   list.	  Accordingly,	  Saddam	  could	  not	  
see	  that	  the	  US	  intended	  to	  invade	  Iraq.	  Furthermore,	  the	  opposition	  of	  Germany,	  France	  and	  
Russia	   as	   well	   as	   Turkey	   and	   the	   Arab	   states	   to	   the	   invasion	   encouraged	   Saddam	   to	   be	  
recalcitrant.	  How	  did	  all	  this	  contribute	  to	  the	  making	  of	  the	  war	  in	  Iraq?	  Was	  not	  it,	  after	  all,	  
the	  US	  who	  invaded	  the	  country?	  Saddam’s	  recalcitrance	  was	  not	  really	  about	  getting	  hold	  of	  
weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction;	   rather	   it	  was	  about	  his	  bid	   for	   regional	  power	  status	  and	  as	  a	  
corollary,	   more	   independent	   foreign	   policy.	   Therefore,	   it	   challenged	   the	   long-­‐standing	   US	  
strategy	  of	   primacy	   (cf.	  Dodge	  2006),	  which,	   in	   turn,	  was	   as	  much	   the	  making	  of	   the	   Soviet	  
Union	  and	  the	  Western	  European	  states	  as	   it	  was	   the	  making	  of	   the	  American	  state	  and	  the	  
ruling	   classes	   in	   general.	   American	   primacy,	   as	   argued	   in	   Chapter	   3,	   was	   in	   the	   making	  
throughout	   the	   twentieth	   century.	   Beginning	   from	   the	   Open	   Door	   policy	   –a	   product	   of	  
American	  capital	  and	  the	  state–	  the	  US	  gradually	  established	  itself	  as	  a	  superpower.	  American	  
primacy,	   first	   institutionalised	  within	   the	   framework	  of	   the	  American-­‐led	   capitalist	   bloc	  with	  
the	   consent	   of	   the	   other	   states	   in	   the	   bloc,	   had	   become	   fully-­‐fledged	  American	   rule	   by	   the	  
1990s.	   The	   rise	   of	   the	   neoconservatives	   with	   a	   more	   assertive	   agenda	   of	   domination,	  
combined	  with	  Iraqi	  resistance	  to	  integration	  into	  an	  American-­‐led	  capitalist	  order	  resulted	  in	  
the	  Iraq	  war	  of	  2003.	  	  
The	  2003	  Iraq	  war	  was	  the	  long-­‐term	  dialectical	  making	  of	  the	  reproductive	  praxes	  of	  a	  variety	  
of	   agents	   that	   crystallised	   in	   the	   clash	   between	   the	   American	   quest	   for	   maintaining	   and	  
forcefully	   asserting	   primacy	   and	   Iraqi	   resistance	   to	   this.	   King	   Faisal,	   the	   British	   Colonial	  
Administration,	   the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  American	  ruling	  classes,	   the	  American	  state,	   the	  Soviet	  
state,	   Western	   European	   states	   and	   many	   others	   played	   a	   role	   in	   the	   making	   of	   it.	   The	  
asynchronous	   nature	   of	   the	   praxes	   of	   differently-­‐situated	   agents	   usually	   leads	   to	   an	  
insufficient	   appreciation	   of	   their	   dialectical	   interrelations	   in	   making	   specific	   international	  
developments.	   As	   indicated	   by	   the	   case	   of	   the	  war	   in	   Iraq,	   however,	   the	   domestic	   and	   the	  
international,	  the	  political	  and	  the	  economic,	  and	  foreign	  policy	  and	  international	  relations	  are	  
diachronically	   related	   through	   the	   diverse	   praxes	   of	   a	   diverse	   set	   of	   actors.	   To	   put	   it	   in	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dialectical	   language,	   the	   2003	   war	   in	   Iraq	   was	   a	   social-­‐relational	   consequence	   of	   the	  
reproductive	   strategies	   of	   two	   belligerent	   states:	   the	   US	   and	   Iraq.	  While	   the	   US	   pursued	   a	  
strategy	   of	   maintaining	   and	   expanding	   its	   primacy	   in	   an	   American-­‐led	   capitalist	   order,	   the	  
Baathi	  regime	  under	  Saddam	  sought	  to	  remain	  in	  power	  in	  the	  face	  of	  international	  pressure.	  
While	   the	   decision-­‐makers	   of	   these	   states,	   namely	   the	   Bush	   administration	   and	   Saddam	  
Hussein,	  were	  the	  immediate	  actors	   in	  the	  making	  of	  the	  war,	  they	  did	  not	  do	  what	  they	  did	  
‘under	  circumstances	  chosen	  by	  themselves’.	  Just	  as	  the	  neoconservative	  Bush	  administration	  
inherited	   the	   state	   of	   primacy,	   Saddam’s	   regime	   inherited	   conspiratorial	   politics	   and	   its	  
corollary	   state	   autonomy.	   These,	   in	   turn,	   were	   the	   real	   abstractions	   that	   enabled	   the	   two	  
states	   to	   make	   the	   decisions	   they	   made.	   These	   real	   abstractions	   were	   constructed	   inter-­‐
subjectively	   and	   diachronically	   through	   the	   seemingly-­‐unrelated	   reproductive	   actions	   of	   a	  
variety	  of	   actors	   facing	  different	   ‘structures’	   and	  having	  a	   variety	  of	  purposes.	   The	  Ottoman	  
state	  faced	  both	  a	  geopolitical	  and	  a	  domestic	  challenge,	  respectively	  from	  the	  Great	  Powers	  
and	  the	   local	  notables,	  and	  responded	  to	  this	  by	  trying	  to	  centralise	  and	  consolidate	   its	  rule,	  
separating	   urban	   political	   life	   from	   its	   rural	   social	   base.	   The	   British	   administration	   in	   Iraq	  
sought	   to	   rule	   through	   the	   King,	   balancing	   him	   meanwhile	   with	   the	   re-­‐empowered	   tribal	  
shaikhs,	   further	   alienating	   the	   urban	   population	   from	   the	   rural.	   The	   King,	   in	   turn,	   faced	   the	  
British	  mandate	   as	   a	   ‘structural’	   force	   and,	   in	   trying	   to	   centralise	   his	   rule	   by	   expanding	   the	  
armed	   forces,	   inadvertently	   helped	   the	   rise	   of	   an	   autonomous	   urban-­‐based	   officer	   class.	  
Mostly	   proponents	   of	   Arab	   nationalism,	   these	   officers	   vied	   for	   power,	   turning	   this	   largely	  
autonomous	  political	   life	   into	  a	  conspiratorial	  politics,	   staging	  coup	  after	  coup.	   Increasing	  oil	  
revenues	  and	  Saddam’s	  extensive	  intelligence	  network	  further	  contributed	  to	  the	  severance	  of	  
ties	  between	  politics	  and	  wider	  social	  relations,	  generating	  the	  context	  of	  Saddam’s	  decision.	  
The	  conspiratorial	  nature	  of	  Iraqi	  politics,	  the	  recent	  history	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy	  toward	  
Iraq	  and	  the	   international	  opposition	  to	  war	   led	  Saddam	  to	  underestimate	  the	  threat	  of	  war	  
and	  to	  focus	  rather	  on	  a	  possible	  threat	   from	  within	  the	   Iraqi	  state.	  This,	   in	   itself,	  would	  not	  
have	  caused	  a	  war,	  if	  it	  had	  not	  challenged	  the	  specific	  neoconservative	  interpretation	  of	  how	  
to	   pursue	   American	   primacy.	   Primacy,	   in	   turn,	  was	   in	   the	  making	   throughout	   the	   twentieth	  
century.	   US	   ruling	   classes	   sought	   to	   access	  markets	   in	   the	   Old	  World	   to	   resolve	   their	   over-­‐
accumulation	  problem	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  century	  and	  the	  Wilson	  administration	  was	  keen	  
to	  pursue	  the	  path	  of	  international	  engagement.	  To	  their	  dismay,	  they	  would	  have	  to	  wait	  until	  
WW	   II	   to	   break	   American	   antipathy	   toward	   internationalism.	   The	   crucial	   moment	   in	   the	  
making	   of	   American	   primacy	   came	   at	   the	   end	   of	   WW	   II	   when	   the	   US	   found	   itself	   in	   an	  
unprecedented	  position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  other	  great	  powers.	  The	  main	  aim	  of	  the	  American	  state	  
was	   to	   maintain	   this	   position	   by	   institutionalising	   it.	   Other	   great	   powers	   sought	   to	   keep	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whatever	  was	  left	  of	  their	  former	  status	  and,	  fearful	  of	  a	  possible	  Soviet	  expansion,	  consented	  
to	  binding	   themselves	   to	  an	  American-­‐led	  capitalist	  order.	  The	   increasing	  competitiveness	  of	  
German	   and	   Japanese	   manufacturing	   capitals	   and	   the	   embargo	   of	   the	   oil	   producing	   states	  
resulted	  in	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  framework	  and	  the	  oil	  crisis	  of	  the	  1970s.	  The	  US	  
responded	  to	  this	  challenge	  with	  a	  strategy	  of	  financialisation.	  US	  manufacturing	  capital,	  while	  
at	  pains	  to	  maintain	  its	  post-­‐war	  levels	  of	  profitability	  in	  the	  face	  of	  intense	  competition	  from	  
abroad,	  also	  enjoyed	  the	  discipline	  imposed	  by	  finance	  capital.	  When	  the	  Cold	  War	  ended,	  the	  
US	  sought	  to	  expand	  the	  scope	  of	   its	  primacy	  through	   ‘economic	  statecraft’	  notwithstanding	  
challenges	  from	  a	  resurgent	  Germany	  and	  from	  a	  group	  of	  so-­‐called	  ‘failed’	  or	  ‘rogue’	  states.	  
Following	  the	  9/11	  attacks,	   the	  neoconservatives	  who	  for	   long	  had	  wished	  to	  pursue	  a	  more	  
assertive	  and	  unilateral	  foreign	  policy	  found	  the	  opportunity	  to	  do	  so	  and	  against	  a	  recalcitrant	  
Iraq	  they	  took	  action	  to	  implement	  it.	  
In	  short,	  then,	  both	  American	  primacy	  and	  Iraqi	  autonomy	  were	  made	  inter-­‐subjectively	  as	  a	  
result	   of	   the	   interplay	   of	   the	   praxes	   of	   differently	   situated	   and	   motivated	   agents,	   who	   in	  
reproducing	   themselves	  devised	  strategies	   that	  had	  both	  domestic	  and	   international	   sources	  
and	   influences.	   In	   acting	   upon	   perceived	   ‘structures’,	   both	   domestic	   and	   external,	   their	  
strategies	  generated,	  at	  interplay	  with	  the	  strategies	  of	  others,	  the	  Iraq	  war,	  a	  significant	  issue	  
in	  international	  relations.	  In	  entering	  into	  relations	  with	  one	  another,	  and	  irrespective	  of	  their	  
underlying	   motivations,	   these	   agents	   generated	   multiple	   influences.	   Whether	   domestic	   or	  
external,	   economic	   or	   political,	   (sub-­‐)unit	   level	   or	   system	   level,	   the	   praxes	   of	   these	   agents	  
generated	  a	  dialectical	   international	   result,	  bridging	  meanwhile	  not	  only	   foreign	  policies	  and	  
international	   relations,	   but	   also	   the	   economic	   and	   the	   political,	   and	   the	   domestic	   and	   the	  
external.	  	  
6.3.	  The	  Dialectical	  Making	  of	  International	  Relations	  and	  the	  Iraq	  War	  
The	   Iraq	   war	   is	   important	   for	   this	   thesis	   not	   only	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   making,	   but	   also	   for	   its	  
worldwide	   repercussions.	  On	  1	  May	  2003,	  Bush	   triumphantly	   declared	   that	   the	  mission	  was	  
accomplished	   in	   Iraq.	   The	   regime	  of	   Saddam	  Hussein	  was	   deposed	   and	   a	   democracy	   in	   Iraq	  
was	   in	   the	   process	   of	   emerging.	   As	   months	   passed,	   the	   war	   continued	   to	   take	   its	   toll.	  
Resistance	   against	   the	   American	   forces	   spread,	   and	   a	   sectarian	   civil	  war	   continued	   to	   claim	  
many	   lives.	   In	  October	   the	  same	  year,	  Time	  magazine	   featured	  a	  cover	  showing	  Bush	  on	  the	  
day	   of	   his	   victory	   speech	   with	   the	   headline,	   ‘Mission	   not	   Accomplished’.	   It	   was	   becoming	  
increasingly	  clear	  that	  the	  US	  plan	  to	  reform	  state	  structures	  was	  evidently	  misconceived.	  Total	  
collapse	  of	  state	  institutions	  and	  exclusion	  of	  former	  members	  of	  the	  Baath	  Party	  from	  public	  
offices	   compelled	   the	  occupying	  US	   forces	   to	  undertake	   the	  gigantic	   (and	  unwanted)	   task	  of	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state-­‐building	   (Dodge	  2005).	   The	  Bush	  administration	  and	   its	  officials	   including	  Paul	  Bremer,	  
head	   of	   the	   Coalition	   Provisional	   Authority,	   maintained	   their	   optimism	   as	   power	   was	  
transferred	   to	   the	   Iraqi	   Interim	   Government	   in	   mid-­‐2004.	   The	   transfer	   of	   power	   continued	  
with	  the	  election	  of	  a	  constitutive	  assembly	  and	  a	  permanent	  government	   in	  2005	  and	  2006	  
respectively.	  	  
None	   of	   these	   would	   successfully	   address	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   insurgency.	   The	   insurgency	  
started	  right	  after	  the	  invasion,	  although	  the	  first	  insurgents	  were	  Saddam	  and	  Baath	  loyalists	  
in	  the	  Sunni	  areas	  of	   Iraq	  as	  well	  as	  some	  Shia	  militant	  groups.	  Contrary	  to	  expectations,	  the	  
resolve	   of	   the	   insurgents	   was	   not	   broken	   by	   the	   capture	   of	   Saddam	   Hussein	   in	   late	   2003.	  
Joined	  by	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  militants	  and	  other	  radical	  Islamist	  groups,	  the	  insurgents	  expanded	  their	  
scope	   of	   operations	   and	   claimed	   increasingly	   more	   lives.	   Unmindful	   of	   the	   potential	   for	  
sectarian	   tension,	   the	  Americans	   sought	   to	  accommodate	   the	  Sunni	  and	   the	  Shia	  along	  with	  
the	  Kurds	  by	  distributing	  government	  posts.	  Disenfranchised	   throughout	   the	  Baathi	   rule	  and	  
disgruntled	  by	  the	  practices	  of	  the	  occupying	  American	  forces,	  sections	  of	  the	  Shia	  also	  took	  up	  
arms.	   Particularly	   starting	   from	   2006,	   a	   civil	   war	   erupted	   between	   al-­‐Qaeda	   militants,	   the	  
Islamic	  State	  of	  Iraq	  (which	  would	  become	  ISIS	  later)	  and	  Baath	  loyalists	  on	  the	  one	  side,	  and	  
the	  Mahdi	  Army	  led	  by	  Shia	  cleric	  Muqtada	  as-­‐Sadr	  and	  some	  other	  smaller	  Shiite	  factions	  on	  
the	  other.	  The	  response	  was	  a	  surge	  in	  troops	  that	  was	  supposed	  to	  contribute	  to	  security	  and	  
stability	   in	   Iraq.	   The	   surge	   in	   troops,	   the	   recruitment	   of	   some	   Sunni	   tribes	   to	   ward	   off	   the	  
threat	   posed	   by	   the	   more	   radical	   elements	   within	   the	   Sunni	   population,	   and	   finally	   the	  
pacification	   of	   the	   Shia	   groups	   thanks	   to	   the	   new	   power-­‐sharing	   arrangement	   that	   would	  
decisively	   and	   effectively	   give	   control	   of	   the	   government	   to	   the	   majority	   Shiite	   population	  
seemed	  to	  have	  worked	  in	  creating	  a	  condition	  of	  relative	  stability	  by	  2008.	  	  
In	  late	  2011,	  as	  the	  last	  US	  troops	  withdrew	  from	  Iraq,	  President	  Obama	  would	  announce	  that	  
they	  were	  ‘leaving	  behind	  a	  sovereign,	  stable	  and	  self-­‐reliant	  Iraq’	  (The	  White	  House,	  2011).	  By	  
mid-­‐2014	   it	   became	  obvious	   that	   this	   could	  not	   be	   further	   from	   the	   truth.	   Today,	   ISIS	   (now	  
simply	   the	   IS	   or	   the	   Islamic	   State)	   is	   in	   control	   of	   almost	   half	   of	   Iraqi	   territories	   outside	  
Kurdistan.	   Let	   alone	   ‘stable’	   or	   ‘self-­‐reliant’,	   Iraq	   does	   not	   match	   even	   the	   loosest	   criteria	  
associated	  with	  sovereignty.	  After	  years	  of	  oppression	  and	  exclusion	  under	  the	  Nouri	  al-­‐Maliki	  
government	   following	   their	   best	   days	   under	   Saddam,	   the	   disaffected	   Sunni	   population,	  
whether	  radical	  or	  moderate	  or	  even	  secular,	  joined	  forces	  with	  the	  IS	  in	  a	  bid	  to	  reverse	  their	  
fortunes.1	  The	   on-­‐going	   chaos	   in	   Iraq	   has	   led	   the	   country	   to	   the	   brink	   of	   disintegration	   and	  
total	  social	  collapse.	  Although	  I	  argued	  throughout	  this	  thesis	  that	  the	  results	  of	  foreign	  policy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  On	  cooperation	  between	  the	  IS	  and	  the	  secular	  Baathi	  forces	  see	  Harris	  (2014).	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strategies	  are	  almost	  always	  unintended	  to	  this	  or	   that	  degree,	  US	  strategy	   in	   Iraq	  produced	  
almost	   the	  polar	  opposite	  of	   the	   initial	   intention.	   Instead	  of	  a	  stable	  and	  US-­‐friendly	  state	   in	  
Iraq,	  what	  it	  had	  in	  the	  end	  was	  a	  haven	  for	  a	  militant	  group	  that	  is	  found	  extremist	  even	  by	  
the	  standards	  of	  al-­‐Qaeda.	  The	  mission	   is	  far	  from	  accomplished.	   Indeed	  the	  war	   in	   Iraq	  as	  a	  
dialectical	  outcome	  of	  the	  contradictory	  reproductive	  strategies	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  agents	  changed	  
the	  nature	  of	  international	  relations.	  Just	  as	  the	  individual	  decisions	  of	  state	  agents	  were	  the	  
dialectical	   results	   of	   the	   domestic	   and	   international	   influences	   of	   the	   praxes	   of	   a	   variety	   of	  
diachronically-­‐situated	  agents,	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  international	  system	  is	  also	  a	  dialectical	  
result	  of	  these	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  policies-­‐cum-­‐reproductive	  strategies.	  
The	   world	   before	   the	   Iraq	   war	   was	   characterised	   by	   an	   institutionalised	   American	   primacy	  
whether	  one	  calls	  it	  a	  liberal	  constitutional	  order	  or	  a	  unipolar	  system	  with	  liberals	  and	  realists	  
respectively.	  The	  US	  enjoyed	  unparalleled	  status	  as	  the	  sole	  superpower.	  A	  decade	  later,	  as	  US	  
relative	  power	  declines,	  the	  world	  now	  is	  sailing	  toward	  a	  more	  multipolar	  ‘system’.	  Along	  with	  
the	   financial	   crisis	   of	   2008	   and	   the	   Arab	   uprisings	   of	   the	   late	   2000s,	   the	   Iraq	   war	   of	   2003	  
played	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   the	   reshaping	   of	   international	   relations.	   As	   argued	   above,	   the	   war	  
generated	  exactly	  the	  opposite	  results	  that	  the	  American	  leaders	  had	  in	  mind.	  First	  of	  all,	  the	  
aim	   of	   incorporating	   Iraq	   into	   an	   American-­‐led	   world	   capitalist	   order	   failed	   miserably.	  
Similarly,	   the	   two	   ‘demonstration	   effects’	   that	   the	   Iraqi	  war	  was	  meant	   to	   generate	  did	   not	  
serve	  the	  intended	  aim.	  The	  US,	  it	  will	  be	  remembered,	  wanted	  to	  make	  an	  example	  of	  Iraq	  by	  
showing	   that	   a	   tyrannical	   dictatorship	   could	   be	   deposed	   and	   replaced	   with	   a	   stable	   liberal	  
democracy.	   The	   war	   would	   also	   make	   it	   clear	   to	   friend	   and	   foe	   alike	   that	   the	   US	   had	   the	  
resources,	   capacity	   and	   will	   to	   compel	   defiant	   states,	   be	   they	   medium-­‐sized	   powers	   with	  
regional	   aspirations	   or	   great	   powers	  with	   global	   aspirations,	   to	   accept	   that	   their	   aspirations	  
were	  futile.	  Thirdly,	  the	  strategic	  objective	  of	  controlling	  Iraqi	  oil	  supply	  also	  proved	  a	  failure,	  
as	  countries	  such	  as	  China	  and	  Turkey	  among	  others	  seek	  to	  get	  their	  share	  of	   the	  country’s	  
oil.2	  	  
The	   responses	  of	   traditional	  US	  allies,	  and	  significantly	   that	  of	  Turkey,	   its	   last	  Cold	  War-­‐type	  
ally,	  demonstrated	  that	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  Soviet-­‐like	  system-­‐wide	  threat	  to	  the	  American-­‐led	  
capitalist	  order,	   their	  allegiance	  would	  no	   longer	  be	  automatic.	  Throughout	   the	  1990s,	  while	  
Germany	  and	  France	  sought	  to	  devise	  a	  more	  European	  and	  independent	  security	  and	  foreign	  
policy	  framework,	  Turkey,	  facing	  a	  series	  of	  perceived	  domestic	  threats,	  remained	  in	  the	  orbit	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  By	  2013,	  China	  was	  buying	  almost	  half	  of	  all	  Iraqi	  oil	  output	  (Arango	  and	  Krauss	  2013).	  Turkey	  and	  the	  
Kurdistan	  Regional	  Government	  in	  Iraq	  have	  recently	  agreed	  to	  export	  Kurdish	  oil	  from	  Turkish	  ports	  in	  
defiance	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  central	  government	  (Morelli	  and	  Pischedda	  2014).	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of	  the	  US.	  Turkey’s	  self-­‐imposed	  isolation	  made	  this	  more	  of	  a	  necessity	  than	  a	  choice	   in	  the	  
eyes	  of	  the	  military-­‐bureaucratic	  establishment.	  Yet	  American	  assertiveness	  and	  unilateralism,	  
along	  with	  the	  domestic	  challenges	  the	  ruling	  party	  faced,	  led	  Turkey	  to	  break	  its	  long-­‐standing	  
pro-­‐US	   foreign	   policy	   in	   this	   case.	   Experienced	   as	   a	   ‘structural’	   aspect	   of	   the	   international	  
system,	  the	  Turkish	  decision	  demonstrated	  that	  even	  the	  closest	  of	  US	  allies	  could	  sever	  ties.	  	  
The	   Iraqi	   decision,	   in	   turn,	   while	   proving	   fatal	   for	   Saddam	   Hussein,	   demonstrated	   that	   the	  
capabilities	  of	  the	  US	  do	  not	  necessarily	  translate	  into	  an	  ability	  to	  change	  international	  reality	  
at	   its	   pleasure.	  While	   other	   states	   recalcitrant	   to	  US	   attempts	   to	   incorporate	   them	   into	   the	  
American-­‐led	  capitalist	  order	  still	  face	  American	  primacy	  as	  a	  ‘structural’	  constraint,	  they	  now	  
are	  more	  confident	  that	  the	  US	  will	  not	  seek	  to	  invade	  to	  change	  their	  regimes.	  The	  defiance	  of	  
the	  Bashar	  Assad	  regime	  in	  Syria	  is	  a	  case	  in	  point.	  When	  Assad’s	  Syria	  was	  also	  hit	  by	  protests	  
and	   demonstrations	   like	   many	   Arab	   countries	   at	   the	   time,	   his	   harsh	   response	   attracted	  
international	   condemnation	   as	  well	   as	   resulting	   in	   the	   rise	   of	   an	   armed	   struggle	   against	   his	  
dictatorship.	   The	   opposition,	   quickly	   organised	   under	   the	   umbrella	   organisation	   Free	   Syrian	  
Army	   (FSA),	   was	   composed	   of	   various	   disaffected	   segments	   of	   the	   Syrian	   people.	   While	   it	  
seemed	  very	  likely	  that	  Assad’s	  regime	  would	  be	  toppled	  fast	  with	  the	  US	  and	  Europe,	  as	  well	  
as	  Arab	  allies	  of	  the	  US	  and	  Turkey	  supporting	  the	  rebels,	  the	   ‘leading	  from	  behind’	  doctrine	  
that	  worked	  initially	  well	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Libya	  could	  not	  be	  employed	  in	  Syria,	  not	  least	  because	  
the	  Libyan	  case	  proved	  unsuccessful	  as	   time	  passed.	  Furthermore,	   the	  US	  and	   its	  allies	  have	  
yet	  to	  formulate	  a	  viable	  post-­‐Assad	  arrangement.	  	  
Combined	   with	   the	   failure	   in	   Afghanistan	   to	   turn	   the	   country	   into	   a	   stable	   democracy,	   the	  
financial	  crisis	  of	  2008	  and	  the	  resurfacing	  of	  a	  general	  dislike	  of	  wars	  and	  foreign	  adventures	  
among	   the	   American	   public	   would	   lead	   the	   newly	   elected	   Barack	   Obama	   to	   pursue	   a	   less	  
adventurous	  foreign	  policy	  starting	  from	  2008.	  Even	  before	  his	  election	  to	  office,	  US	  failures	  in	  
Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq,	  US	  disregard	  of	  international	  law	  in	  invading	  Iraq,	  and	  NATO’s	  expansive	  
tendencies	  were	  taken	  by	  Russia	  as	  a	  license	  to	  intervene	  in	  Georgia	  in	  response	  to	  exchanges	  
of	  fire	  between	  pro-­‐Russian	  South	  Ossetians	  and	  regular	  Georgian	  forces.	  When	  Obama	  came	  
to	   office	   and	   declared	   his	   priority	   to	   be	  mainly	   domestic	   social	   and	   economic	  matters,	   the	  
expectation	  was	  that	  he	  would	  reverse	  eight	  years	  of	  aggressive,	  unilateral	  American	  foreign	  
policy	   strategy.	   In	   essence,	   the	   foreign	   policy	   strategy	   of	   the	   Obama	   government	   was	   to	  
ensure	   the	   continuation	   of	   American	   leadership	   in	   the	   world,	   but	   he	   had	   a	   different	  
conception	  of	  this	  leadership,	  especially	  when	  it	  came	  to	  wars:	  ‘leading	  from	  behind’	  as	  put	  by	  
one	  of	  his	  advisors.	  While	  the	  strategy	  seemed	  to	  be	  successful	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Libya,	  it	  failed	  to	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produce	   the	   intended	   result	   in	   the	   longer	   term,	   as	   Libya	   slipped	  back	   into	   conflict	   after	   the	  
NATO	  intervention	  led	  by	  the	  UK	  and	  France	  in	  2012.	  
The	   more	   prudent	   approach	   the	   Obama	   administration	   adopted	   translated	   into	   reactive	  
responses	  to	  major	   international	  problems	   in	  the	  world.	   Its	   failure	  to	   lead	  the	  recovery	  from	  
the	  financial	  crisis	  raised	  questions	  as	  to	  the	  ability	  and	  willingness	  of	  the	  US	  to	  govern	  world	  
financial	  markets	  effectively,	  as	   it	  had	  done	  throughout	   the	  1990s.	  The	  uprisings	   in	   the	  Arab	  
world,	  primarily	  directed	  at	  American-­‐supported	  dictatorships	  in	  the	  region	  also	  caught	  the	  US	  
unprepared.	  These	   inabilities	  and	   lack	  of	   resolve	  on	  the	  part	  of	   the	  US	  government,	  coupled	  
with	  its	  failures	  to	  transform	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan	  along	  intended	  lines	  left	  US	  leadership	  open	  
to	  dispute.	  Experienced	  as	  an	  indisputable	  fact	  by	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	   in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  
period	   until	   the	   failures	   of	   the	   US	   in	   Iraq	   and	   Afghanistan	   surfaced,	   the	   overwhelming	   gap	  
between	  the	  US	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  according	  to	  every	  available	  index	  did	  not	  appear	  to	  
directly	  translate	  into	  an	  ability	  to	  subject	  others	  to	  its	  strategies.	  It	  is	  this	  new	  understanding	  
that	   the	  US	  may	   not	   in	   fact	   be	   able	   to	   ‘create’	   its	   own	   reality	   and	   leave	   us	   to	   study	   it	   that	  
informs	   the	   increasing	   recalcitrance	   of	   other	   states	   towards	   the	   US	   strategy	   of	   creating	   a	  
‘better’	  world.	   As	   it	   became	   clear	   that	   the	  US	   lacked	   the	  will	   and	   power	   to	   deal	  with	   other	  
problems	  such	  as	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  and	  the	  financial	  crisis,	  the	  way	  the	  world	  appeared	  to	  other	  
major	  and	  minor	  powers	  changed	  significantly,	  in	  a	  way	  that	  will	  probably	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  near	  
future,	   in	   abstracto,	   by	   realists	   as	   a	   slide	   toward	   multipolarity	   in	   the	   ‘structure	   of	   the	  
international	   system’,	   with	   ‘balance	   of	   power’	   tilting	   towards	   the	   new	   contender	   of	   the	  
hegemon	   (i.e.	   China),	   or,	   depending	   on	   the	   outcome,	   by	   liberals	   as	   an	   ‘increasing	  
interdependence’	  and	  a	  ‘diffusion	  of	  democratic	  values’,	  or	  by	  constructivists	  as	  a	  diffusion	  of	  
competitive,	  cooperative,	  or	  conflictual	  ideas	  in	  the	  world.	  
The	   recent	   resurgence	   of	   Russia,	   for	   example,	   coincides	   with	   this	   transformation	   in	  
international	   relations.	   The	   favourable	   changes	   in	   energy	   prices	   and	   the	   ensuing	   secular	  
growth	   of	   the	   Russian	   economy	   with	   state	   enterprises	   in	   the	   lead	   helped	   to	   reinforce	   its	  
position.	   This	   newfound	   strength	   would	   make	   itself	   felt	   starting	   from	   2008	   when	   Russian	  
troops	  entered	  Georgia	  under	  the	  pretext	  of	  peacekeeping,	  but	  in	  fact	  was	  in	  the	  making	  since	  
the	  early	  2000s.	  When	  he	  assumed	  power	  in	  2000,	  Putin	  was	  probably	  as	  aware	  as	  Bush	  was	  
that	   the	  US	  was	  occupying	  an	  unmatched	  and	  unprecedented	  position	   in	   the	  world,	  with	   its	  
closest	  rival	  languishing	  far	  behind.	  The	  assertive	  posture	  of	  the	  US	  and	  the	  meagre	  position	  of	  
Russia,	  informed	  a	  moderate	  Russian	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  whereby	  Russia	  shied	  away	  from	  
challenging	   the	  US	   in	   issues	   that	  were	  deemed	  central	   to	  US	   interests,	  while	   it	  was	   strongly	  
assertive	   in	  matters	   not	   considered	   of	   central	   importance	   by	   the	  US	   (MacFarlane	   2006).	   By	  
	  	  
160	  
2008,	  however,	  the	   inability	  of	  the	  US	  to	  achieve	  any	  of	   its	  objectives	   in	   Iraq	  or	  Afghanistan,	  
the	  outbreak	  of	   the	   financial	  crisis,	  and	  the	  wavering	  responses	  of	   the	  US	  to	  the	  uprisings	   in	  
the	  world	  contributed	  to	  the	  Russian	  view	  of	  the	  US	  as	  declining,	  a	  view	  that	  was	  reinforced	  by	  
the	  perceived	  US	   inability	   to	  deal	  with	   the	   rising	   influence	  of	  China.	  Fully	  aware	   that	   the	  US	  
neither	   has	   the	  will	   nor	   the	   confidence	   to	   engage	   in	   an	   overseas	  military	   adventure,	   Russia	  
sought	   to	   reverse	   the	   course	   of	   its	   containment	   by	   the	   US	   by	   breaking	   it	   in	   Georgia	   and	  
Ukraine.	   The	   same	   assertiveness	   made	   its	   presence	   also	   felt	   as	   Russia	   acted	   to	   break	   the	  
deadlock	  over	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  in	  Syria	  by	  brokering	  an	  agreement	  with	  the	  Syrian	  
regime,	  when	  the	  US	  was	  largely	  inert.	  Russia,	  in	  short,	  wanted	  to	  capitalise	  on	  what	  appeared	  
to	  it	  as	  a	  decline	  in	  US	  capabilities.	  
It	  was	  China,	  however,	  who	  made	  the	  most	  of	  the	  perceived	  American	  decline.	  Today	  it	  is	  not	  
the	  US,	  but	  China	  who	  taps	  half	  of	  Iraqi	  oil	  production.	  This	  turn	  of	  events	  and	  the	  gains	  made	  
by	   China	   led	   pundits	   to	   declare	   China	   the	   winner	   of	   the	   Iraq	   war	   (e.g.	   Schiavenza	   2013).	  
Following	  Deng	  Xiaoping’s	  caution	  to	   lie	   low	   in	  foreign	  policy,	  China	  generally	  refrained	  from	  
engaging	   in	  unnecessary	   tensions	  with	   the	  US	  or	  with	  other	   relatively	   great	  powers	   for	   that	  
matter.	  While	  the	  globalising	   interests	  of	   the	  Chinese	  state	  also	  globalise	   its	  problems,	  some	  
regional	  tensions	  aside,	  China	  seems	  to	  be	  unwilling	  either	  to	  challenge	  the	  role	  of	  the	  US	  or	  
enmesh	  itself	  in	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  faraway	  lands.	  This	  is	  not	  say	  that	  China	  is	  not	  aware	  of	  
the	   relative	   decline	   in	   the	   abilities	   of	   the	   United	   States	   to	   project	   its	   power	   over;	   rather	   it	  
indicates	   that	   although	   China	   benefits	   from	   this,	   it	   as	   yet	   does	   not	   wish	   to	   risk	   its	  
uninterrupted	  march	   toward	   the	   status	   of	   great	   power.	   Furthermore,	   locked	   on	   the	  Middle	  
East,	  the	  Bush	  administration	  had	  largely	  ignored	  the	  rise	  of	  China,	  allowing	  the	  Chinese	  rise	  to	  
be	  relatively	  peaceful.	  
This	   is	   not	   to	   claim	   that	   the	   realist	   analysis	   of	   polarity	   of	   the	   system	   captured	   the	   essential	  
principle	  of	   international	   relations.	  This	   is	   to	  show	  that	  what	  appears	  as	   the	  structure	  of	   the	  
‘international	   system’	   at	   specific	   conjunctures,	   in	   fact	   are	   the	   historical	   and	   inter-­‐subjective	  
results	  of	  not	  only	  the	  foreign	  policies	  of	  states	  but	  also	  other	  reproductive	  strategies	  of	  states	  
and	  other	  agents.	  The	   transformation	  of	   this	   ‘structure’	  does	  not	   take	  place	  according	   to	  an	  
independent	   logic;	   the	  piecemeal,	   relational	  and	  complex	  nature	  of	   large-­‐scale	  social	  change	  
conceals	   the	   inter-­‐subjective	   and	   praxis-­‐based	   character	   of	   the	   transformation	   of	   real	  
abstractions	  such	  as	  the	  ‘structure’	  of	  international	  relations.	  What	  is	  crucial,	  from	  a	  historical	  
materialist	  dialectical	  point	  of	  view	  are	  exactly	  the	  processes	  through	  which	  these	  changes	  in	  
what	   we	   call	   international	   relations	   take	   place,	   and	   it	   is	   through	   the	   concrete	   praxes	   of	  
concrete	   agents	   that	   we	   can	   analyse	   these	   processes.	   The	   bridge	   between	   FPA	   and	   IR,	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therefore,	   can	   only	   be	   established	   through	   such	   dialectical	   analyses	   of	   seemingly	   discrete	  
concrete	  praxes,	  which,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  foreign	  policy	  strategies	  almost	  always	  
already	   involve,	   wittingly	   or	   unwittingly,	   a	   bridging	   of	   foreign	   policy	   and	   international	  
relations.	   The	  war	   in	   Iraq,	  understood	  as	   the	  dialectical	  making	  of	  differently	  motivated	  and	  
situated	   agents,	   marked	   a	   turning	   point	   in	   international	   relations:	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   US	   to	  
achieve	   its	   goals,	   the	   defiance	   of	   the	   Turkish	   state	   as	   well	   as	   other	   US	   allies,	   and	   the	  
recalcitrance	  of	   the	   Iraqi	   regime	  generated	  the	  perception	   in	   the	  Chinese	  and	  Russian	  states	  
that	  the	  US,	  unable	  to	  exercise	   leadership,	  had	  entered	  a	  phase	  of	  decline.	  While	  by	   itself,	   it	  
did	  not	  ‘cause’	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  multipolar	  or	  bipolar	  world,	  together	  with	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  
US	   to	   resolve	   the	   2008	   financial	   crisis	   and	   to	  manipulate	   the	   uprisings	   in	   the	  Arab	  world,	   it	  
dialectically	   contributed	   to	   the	   making	   of	   the	   new	   set	   of	   interrelations	   in	   international	  
relations.	   It	   was	   the	   active	   intervention	   of	   the	   historically	   and	   spatially	   differently	   situated	  
agents	   to	   what	   appeared	   to	   them	   as	   constraining	   international	   structures	   that	   generated	  
international	  relations	  today	  as	  experienced	  by	  states.	  
6.4.	  Concluding	  Remarks	  
Just	   as	   the	   British	   and	   Ottoman	   Administrations	   in	   Iraq	   had	   no	   idea	   that	   they	   were	  
contributing	  to	  the	  making	  of	  a	  war	  a	  century	  later,	  the	  Turkish	  state,	  the	  American	  state	  and	  
the	   Iraqi	   state,	  and	   the	   institutions	  and	   individuals	  making	  up	   these	   states,	  were	  completely	  
unaware	  that	  they	  were	  contributing	  to	  a	  change	  in	  status	  quo	  among	  the	  major	  powers	  of	  the	  
world.	   This	   is	   not	   to	   say,	   however,	   that	   a	   structural	   international	   logic	   was	   at	   work,	  
independently	   of	   the	   actions	   of	   agents.	  What	   we	   call	   international	   relations,	   therefore,	   are	  
neither	  a	  set	  of	  patterned	  relations	  between	  functionally	  like	  or	  isomorphic	  units,	  nor	  a	  direct	  
product	   of	   the	   decisions	   of	  major	   powers,	   no	  matter	   how	   ‘capable’	   they	   are.	  What	  we	   call	  
international	   relations	   are	   rather	   the	   cumulative	   consequences	   of	   seemingly	   spatially	   and	  
temporally	   unrelated	   praxes	   of	   differently	   situated	   and	   motivated	   agents	   from	   all	   levels	   of	  
analysis,	  acting	  in	  a	  dynamic	  environment.	  It	  is	  the	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making	  and	  strategy-­‐
devising	   processes	   of	   states	   that	   dialectically	   interweaves	   the	   multiple	   influences	   of	   these	  
praxes	  into	  one	  crystallised	  decision	  and	  turns	  them	  into	  constitutive	  aspects	  of	  international	  
relations.	   The	   practice	   of	   foreign	   policy-­‐making,	   then,	   not	   only	   bridges	   foreign	   policy	   and	  
international	   relations,	   but	   also	  makes	   them	   one	   in	   the	   praxes	   of	   states.	   Dialectic	   uncovers	  
both	  the	  practical	  abstractions	  that	  states	  make	  in	  devising	  foreign	  policy	  strategies	  and	  their	  
concrete	  sociohistorical	  content	  as	  well	  as	  how	  these	  strategies	  interact	  with	  other	  strategies	  
so	   as	   to	   constitute	   what	   we	   call	   international	   relations.	   Dialectical	   method,	   just	   like	   reality	  
itself,	  strives	  to	  match	  the	  complexity	  of	  things	  and	  relations	  rather	  than	  caging	  them	  in	  pre-­‐
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conceived	  conceptual	  architectonics;	  thus,	  in	  describing	  the	  inter-­‐subjective	  making	  of	  foreign	  
policies	   and	   international	   relations	   it	   reflects	   the	   unity	   between	   the	   two	   instead	   of	  
conceptually	  inventing	  it.	  
The	   implications	   of	   this	   dialectical	   method	   for	   the	   study	   of	   IR	   are	   numerous.	   First	   and	  
foremost,	  instead	  of	  studying	  international	  relations	  and	  foreign	  policies	  on	  their	  own	  right	  in	  
a	  vacuum,	  it	  places	  them	  into	  their	  wider	  sociological	  context	  and	  seeks	  to	  uncover	  their	  social	  
content.	   This	   way	   it	   is	   able	   to	   establish	   IR	   and	   FPA	   as	   aspects	   of	   a	   larger	   sociological	  
undertaking.	   Secondly,	   rather	   than	   seeing	   international	   developments	   as	   instances	   of	  
predetermined	  formulae,	  dialectic	  is	  after	  the	  concrete	  social-­‐historical	  relations	  that	  generate	  
international	  and	  foreign	  policy	  outcomes.	  By	  doing	  these,	  it	  contributes	  to	  an	  ever-­‐expanding	  
literature	   on	   international	   historical	   sociology	  which	   strives	   to	   see	   international	   relations	   as	  
aspects	   of	   human	   social	   life.	   Thirdly,	   offering	   the	   notion	   of	   real	   abstraction	   as	   a	   central	  
category,	   it	   contributes	   to	   the	   agent-­‐structure	   problem	   by	   arguing	   that	   this	   conceptual	  
dichotomy	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  false	  formulation,	   in	  that	   it	   juxtaposes	  individual	  agents	  with	  the	  
cumulative	  result	  of	  their	  actions,	  i.e.	  real	  abstractions.	  
Notwithstanding	  its	  contributions	  to	  IR,	  the	  method	  utilised	  here	  has	  some	  limitations	  as	  well.	  
Most	   importantly,	   the	   historicism	   of	   the	   dialectic	   employed	   here	   does	   not	   offer	   a	   clear-­‐cut	  
methodological	   procedure.	   This,	   in	   turn,	   generates	   difficulties	   in	   linking	   meta-­‐theoretical	  
principles	   to	   concrete	   historical	   material.	   	   This	   is	   the	   result	   of	   a	   specific	   methodological	  
strategy	  adopted	  in	  this	  thesis.	  One	  of	  the	  central	  arguments	  of	  the	  thesis	  is	  that	  preconceived	  
conceptual	   abstractions,	   and	   therefore	   theories,	   cannot	   be	   superimposed	   upon	   concrete	  
reality.	  Concepts	  based	  on	  either	  a	  systematization	  of	  so-­‐called	  empirical	  regularities	  or	  pure	  
philosophical	   speculation	   is	   of	   such	   nature.	   That	   is	   why	   the	   onto-­‐epistemological	   principles	  
offered	  in	  this	  thesis	  recommend	  a	  research	  question	  guided	  analysis.	  	  	  
The	  consequent	  lack	  of	  middle-­‐range	  theories	  or	  mediating	  categories	  or	  concepts	  generates	  a	  
seeming	   disjuncture	   between	   theory	   and	   empirical	   analysis.	   	   But	   intermediate	   theories	   as	  
complexes	   of	   conceptual	   relations	   and	   concepts	   presuppose	   regularities	   or	   patterns.	   Then	  
those	  who	  set	  out	  to	  utilise	  them	  posit	  the	  presuppositions	  of	  concepts	  and	  theories	   in	  their	  
research	  and	  force	  reality	  to	  comply	  with	  theory,	  or	  at	  best	  add	  another	  concept	  derived	  from	  
another	   research	   to	   cover	   what's	   in	   excess	   of	   the	   theory	   in	   question.	   To	   an	   extent	   this	   is	  
inevitable,	   unless	   the	  procedure	   is	   reversed	   and	   research	   is	   initiated	  with	   a	  well-­‐formulated	  
research	  question.	   The	  difference	  between	  a	  dialectical-­‐historicist	   and	  a	  positivist	  method	   is	  
that	   whereas	   the	   former	   only	   temporarily	   freezes	   the	   explananda	   to	   be	   reproblematised	   if	  
research	   shows	   it	   to	   be	   wrongly	   formulated,	   the	   latter	   freezes	   both	   the	   explananda	   and	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explanantia.	  Such	  open-­‐ended	  process	  may	  be	  adversely	  affected	  by	  the	  potential	  presence	  of	  
infinite	  determinations.	   It	  may	  open	  the	  door	  to	   infinite	  causal	  regression	   in	  time	  and	  space.	  
These	  limitations	  are	  inevitable	  if	  one	  insist	  on	  the	  historicist	  method;	  at	  any	  rate	  historicism	  is	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